The 36th NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) Summit was held in Ankara, the capital of Türkiye, on July 7-8, 2026. Leaders from all 32 NATO member states, including U.S. President Donald Trump, Canada, and 30 European allies, concluded the two-day summit amid growing uncertainty surrounding great-power competition and regional and global security. The summit took place as the war in Europe between Russia and Ukraine approaches its fifth year and the war in the Middle East between the United States and Iran, which began in February this year, continues.

Ahead of the Ankara Summit, President Trump had publicly criticized U.S. allies in Europe and Asia for failing to respond to U.S. requests for cooperation during the war with Iran. He had also suggested imposing separate tariffs on Spain, the only NATO ally that had declined to commit to the 5 percent defense spending pledge at last year's Hague Summit, and once again raised the issue of Greenland, a Danish territory, which in January this year had generated repercussions serious enough to raise concerns about a potential rift within NATO. After the summit, however, Trump expressed satisfaction, saying that the atmosphere had been positive. European allies, which had approached the summit with considerable apprehension, also viewed it as a success, particularly because they were able to adopt a concise Summit Declaration. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte's role as a facilitator also appears to have contributed to this outcome, as he worked across the Atlantic to make the case for and explain increases in European allies' defense spending.

At the summit, the leaders reached agreements on four major issues: (i) recognition of the increases in European allies' defense spending over the past year following the 2025 Hague defense spending commitment, as well as the importance of defense industrial cooperation among allies to strengthen future defense capabilities; (ii) a vision for European allies to reduce their existing dependence on the United States and assume a more leading role in their own defense, referred to as "NATO 3.0"; (iii) reaffirmation of Russia and terrorism as long-term threats to the Alliance and of the Alliance's collective defense commitment; and (iv) strengthened support for Ukraine amid the ongoing war. In addition, regarding Iran, which is currently at war with the United States, the leaders called on Tehran to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons and to respect freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As the second NATO summit of the second Trump administration, the 2026 Ankara Summit once again demonstrated the Alliance's cohesion and resilience both internally and externally. At the same time, uncertainties and challenges remain regarding the implementation of the agreements reached in Ankara and warrant further examination. This article briefly reviews the Ankara Summit Declaration, the challenges and prospects associated with the transition toward "NATO 3.0," for which a clear roadmap has yet to emerge, and the policy implications for South Korea.

| 2026 Ankara NATO Summit Declaration: Content and Analysis

The Ankara Summit issued a declaration similar in length to the Hague Summit Declaration, at two pages.¹⁾ Overall, both NATO summits held under the second Trump administration, last year and this year, produced declarations consisting of five paragraphs. Compared with previous NATO summit declarations, they are notable for their brevity. This stands in clear contrast to the 90 paragraphs of the 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué and the 38 paragraphs of the 2024 Washington Summit Declaration. The following summarizes and analyzes the five paragraphs in order.

Reaffirmation of NATO's Collective Defense Commitment

As in the 2025 Hague Summit Declaration, the leaders reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to Article 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty on "collective defense" and to the transatlantic Alliance. Based on a "360-degree approach to deterrence and defence," they pledged to safeguard "the peace, security, and prosperity of one billion people across the free and democratic territories of the Alliance."

▷ Despite the second Trump administration's "America First" policy and its frequent expressions of skepticism toward alliances, the United States and the other NATO allies succeeded in reaffirming the values of freedom and democracy that they have shared over the past 77 years. At both the Hague and Ankara summits, despite President Trump's dissatisfaction with European allies before the meetings, there was no dispute at the summits over this principle.

Russia as a Long-Term Threat and Alliance-Level Defense Industrial Cooperation

As in the Hague Summit Declaration, the leaders identified "Russia and persistent terrorism" as long-term threats to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. They also assessed that the commitments made under the Hague defense spending pledge last year, under which allies committed to spending 5 percent of GDP by 2035, were being implemented during the first year. They stated that European allies and Canada increased investment in core defense requirements by more than $139 billion in 2025 and that more than $50 billion in new procurement commitments were announced on the occasion of the 2026 Ankara Summit. The leaders pledged to expand the Alliance's collective production capacity and accelerate innovation through cooperation with industry. They also agreed to remove barriers to defense trade among allies and leverage NATO partnerships to maximize the depth of and cooperation within the defense industrial base.

▷ This appears to have been the area of greatest interest to President Trump in pursuing "NATO 3.0" and arguably the highlight of the Ankara Summit. In this context, the Defense Industry Forum held in Ankara on the first day of the summit, July 7, was NATO's highest-level event on transatlantic defense production, investment, and innovation. It brought together a broad range of allied governments, companies, and experts. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte emphasized that "there can be no strong defense without a strong defense industry." NATO also launched a single point of contact, the "Front Door for Industry," to make it easier for companies to engage with the Alliance.²⁾ In addition, NATO agreed to explore investments to "strengthen NATO's fuel supply chain" for the energy supplies required for combat readiness on the Alliance's eastern flank, including the modernization of existing fuel storage and transportation infrastructure and support for new facilities such as pipelines.

European-Led European Security under the Trump Administration's "NATO 3.0" Vision

The leaders stated that the goal of modernizing the NATO Alliance is "a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO." European allies and Canada would assume greater responsibility for Alliance security "together with the United States." They also stated that this modernized future Alliance would (i) develop deterrence and defense capabilities through an appropriate combination of nuclear forces, conventional weapons, missile defense, and assets in space and cyberspace; and (ii) invest to achieve superiority in defense capabilities across all domains, including the ability to deploy, support, and sustain military forces; precision-strike weapons, integrated missile defense, unmanned systems, cutting-edge technologies, and intelligence capabilities; a transatlantic battlefield cloud; and powerful AI models.

▷ The objective of Alliance modernization appears to be the Trump administration's vision of "NATO 3.0," namely, European-led security for Europe. Although a detailed roadmap has yet to emerge, the concept reflects a vision for NATO restructuring presented in February 2026 by U.S. Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby. It envisions a structural transition in which European allies assume primary responsibility for conventional defense while the United States concentrates on countering China in the Indo-Pacific.³⁾ "NATO 1.0," during the Cold War, consisted of a group of strong and independent allies capable of assuming responsibility for their own defense. "NATO 2.0," during the post-Cold War period, was characterized by excessive dependence by European allies and Canada on the United States. The envisioned "NATO 3.0" represents a partnership in which Europe directly assumes the burden of defense spending and military capabilities. It has been described as implying not merely burden sharing, but burden shifting.

The Need to Strengthen Support for Ukraine

In language that went further than at the 2025 Hague Summit, the leaders stated that "Ukraine contributes to Euro-Atlantic security, and therefore the Allies must remain united and steadfast in supporting Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity." At present, however, "European Allies and Canada" bear most of the financial burden for bilateral and multilateral security assistance to Ukraine. The leaders therefore emphasized that future support should be "fair, predictable, and sustainable over the long term." The Allies pledged to provide €70 billion worth of military equipment, assistance, and training in 2026. They also reaffirmed their sovereign commitments to provide at least a comparable level of support in 2027. The leaders further welcomed the EU's decision to provide Kyiv with multi-year financing through its "Ukraine Support Loan."

▷ In the case of the United States, NATO's most powerful member, the second Trump administration has pursued an indirect approach to supporting Ukraine since taking office in 2025, rather than providing direct assistance, through the so-called "Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL)" initiative. Under this arrangement, Ukraine prepares a list of the military equipment and weapons it needs, and European allies use that list to purchase U.S.-made weapons for Ukraine. The White House cited as an achievement of this approach that European allies, "instead of American taxpayers," have paid for Ukraine's defense.⁴⁾

Iran: Reaffirming That It Must Not Possess Nuclear Weapons and Calling for Full Respect for Freedom of Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz

The Declaration provided only a brief assessment of the regional and global security environment, stating that the Alliance is "responding and adapting to strategic competition, pervasive instability, hybrid threats, and recurrent shocks." Iran, however, was specifically mentioned. The leaders reaffirmed that Iran must "never possess a nuclear weapon" and called for "full respect for freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz."

▷ As at the 2025 Hague Summit, neither the Indo-Pacific nor China was mentioned in the Summit Declaration. This appears to reflect the Trump administration's security outlook, which is reluctant to embrace multilateralism and linkages between regions. This stands in contrast to the Biden administration, under which NATO focused on the security linkages between Europe and the Indo-Pacific as well as dialogue and cooperation among U.S. allies in the two regions.

| At the Crossroads of the Transition to NATO 3.0: Challenges and Prospects

Although a specific roadmap has yet to emerge, NATO 3.0 is an Alliance modernization vision presented by the Trump administration to its allies during the first half of this year. It entails a structural transition in which European allies assume primary responsibility for conventional defense. With NATO approaching this transition, this section examines future challenges and prospects, focusing on the issues discussed at the 2026 Ankara Summit.

First, defense spending among European allies has increased rapidly over the past four to five years, driven by the repercussions of the war in Ukraine and President Trump's renewed calls for greater defense burden sharing since his return to office. The annual growth rate in defense spending rose from 3.6 percent in 2022 to 5.7 percent in 2023, 12.9 percent in 2024, and 12.4 percent in 2025, with 10 percent growth projected for 2026. As a result, nominal defense spending in 2026 increased by 90 percent compared with 2022. Total defense spending by European allies and Canada in 2026 amounts to $657 billion, while allies allocate an average of 36.8 percent of their defense budgets to equipment, exceeding NATO's 20 percent benchmark.⁵⁾ Meanwhile, member states' defense spending exceeded 2 percent of GDP in 2025 and is expected to reach 2.5 percent in 2026. The leading countries are Poland at 4.3 percent, Lithuania at 4 percent, Estonia at 3.42 percent, Denmark at 3.34 percent, and the United States at 3.19 percent.⁶⁾ In per capita defense spending, Norway, at $3,026, surpassed the United States, at $2,460, for the first time. NATO announced in July 2026 that 17 allies had already met the 2030 target of spending 1.5 percent of GDP on "security-related" expenditures.

Nevertheless, a closer examination of defense spending increases across NATO's multilateral alliance suggests that significant challenges remain in realizing the Trump administration's "NATO 3.0" vision. (i) As of 2025, the combined defense spending of NATO's European allies and Canada, comprising 31 countries, at $657 billion, remains far below the $980 billion defense budget of the United States alone. After the United States, and by a considerable margin, come Germany at $121 billion, the United Kingdom at $92.9 billion, France at $69 billion, Italy at $51.1 billion, Canada at $45.6 billion, and Poland at $44.4 billion.⁷⁾ (ii) On the technical and administrative aspects of the budget increases, there are growing calls for greater clarity regarding how European allies and Canada have financed the additional spending and where the funds will be spent. Greater transparency is needed regarding whether the increases have been financed through borrowing, budget revisions, or reallocations, as well as how much will be allocated to each spending category, in order to strengthen public support and trust among allies. There are also growing calls for clearer and more consistent distinctions between NATO's "core defense requirements," for which the 2030 target is 3.5 percent of GDP, and "security-related" spending, for which the 2030 target is 1.5 percent, as well as between security-related spending and general social spending. (iii) Overall, while achieving the 2030 target of 1.5 percent of GDP in "security-related" spending is expected to be relatively manageable for most allies, reaching the 3.5 percent target for "core defense spending" is likely to prove considerably more difficult, except for a limited number of countries with stronger fiscal positions.

Second, in the process of implementing the Hague defense spending commitment, greater emphasis is being placed on defense industrial cooperation among NATO allies and the removal of trade barriers. Joint production and joint acquisition programs among European allies are also expanding significantly in the process, but U.S. weapons systems and advanced industrial capabilities, as well as U.S. companies, are likely to continue playing an important role for at least a considerable period of time. In other words, in the NATO 3.0 era, which aims to transition toward a European-led European security structure, Europe's dependence on U.S. weapons systems is likely to increase. At the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting in Brussels last June, Secretary Hegseth stated that the United States would invest $1.5 trillion in its own defense in 2027 and conveyed a message about building a so-called "Arsenal of Freedom." He stated, "These weapons will first and foremost protect America and American interests, but they will also serve as a safeguard to strengthen the capabilities of NATO and our other allies." He also advised that "allies must do something fair and strong to defend their own continent."⁸⁾ More extensive defense industrial cooperation between the United States and its European allies could, in the future, build mutual trust and contribute to a more cohesive NATO Alliance. In other words, such cooperation could produce mutually beneficial outcomes by enhancing the Alliance's collective deterrence while strengthening the defense capabilities and defense industries of both the United States and Europe. However, some have raised concerns that further expansion and acceleration of NATO defense industrial cooperation will first require overcoming potential political and geostrategic distrust between the United States and its European allies, as well as removing barriers at the technological level.

Third, the collective defense commitment was reaffirmed in Ankara following the Hague Summit, allowing European allied leaders to breathe a sigh of relief. On the other hand, however, concerns remain because the United States is currently reviewing adjustments to the posture of U.S. forces stationed in Europe under the NATO 3.0 vision, particularly after disagreements over the Iran war emerged in 2026. One month before the summit, on June 3, 2026, U.S. European Command stated that it would reduce the forces and capabilities available to NATO in a crisis.⁹⁾ Specifically, it stated that if one of the European allies were attacked, the United States would no longer provide certain warships and military aircraft. Fifteen days later, at the NATO Defense Ministers' Meeting on June 18, Secretary of War Hegseth expressed frustration that European allies had denied U.S. forces conducting operations against Iran access to military bases in Europe. He stated that the allies had "put American sons and daughters at risk by denying predictable access, basing, and overflight, even though allies should never do so." Secretary Hegseth announced that, under the NATO 3.0 framework, the United States would conduct a six-month review of U.S. forces stationed in Europe so that Europe could assume the fundamental responsibility for its own security.¹⁰⁾

Fourth, there are challenges related to support for Ukraine, which is not a NATO member. (i) During a friendly sideline meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ankara, President Trump praised the performance of Kyiv's drones, which had been proven in combat in 2026, and expressed his willingness to allow Ukraine to produce Patriot missiles domestically. However, the possibility appears to have diminished after the summit for various reasons, including procedural issues. Ukraine is expected to face considerable difficulties without the operation of air defense systems such as the Patriot to protect "civilians." (ii) According to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, by the end of June this year, 26 allies, comprising European allies and Canada, had been able to purchase approximately $4 billion worth of U.S. military equipment through the PURL initiative and provide it to Ukraine since the beginning of the second Trump administration.¹¹⁾ However, the fact that most of this funding has effectively come from only a small number of countries, including Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as the fact that six member states have declined to participate for various reasons, namely France, Italy, Türkiye, Czechia, Hungary, and Slovakia, poses difficulties in making support more equitable, predictable, and sustainable over the long term. France, despite being a relatively large provider of support to Ukraine, appears to have chosen not to participate through the PURL framework in consideration of "European strategic autonomy." In short, while the second Trump administration's PURL initiative has had the positive effect of providing assistance to Ukraine, there is also concern that it could be seen as a source of division rather than a symbol of NATO unity.

Finally, it remains uncertain whether a NATO summit will be held next year, in 2027. Over the past decade, there has been only one year without a summit, in 2020 due to COVID-19. The Hague Summit Declaration in 2025 clearly announced Albania as the host of the 2027 Summit, but the 2026 Ankara Summit Declaration merely concluded by looking forward to the "next Summit." This could indicate either a change of venue or cancellation. Some have already argued that, given the adoption of the Hague defense spending commitment in 2025 and the conclusion of numerous defense contracts this year, it is now more important for NATO to focus on implementing these commitments. From this perspective, issuing yet another declaration in the third year of President Trump's term that reaffirms the collective defense commitment amid renewed tensions and identifies Russia as a long-term threat would amount to little more than formality. Moreover, the NATO Treaty does not require that summits be held annually. The report on the posture of U.S. forces in Europe, scheduled for the end of 2026, will serve as the first important milestone in the readjustment of the Alliance's force structure and military strategy as NATO moves toward the transition to NATO 3.0.

| Policy Implications

The discussion above examined the internal dynamics of the NATO Alliance as it seeks to readjust under the "NATO 3.0" vision, focusing on the major issues addressed at the 2026 Ankara Summit. Based on this analysis, several policy implications can be drawn.

First, there are implications for ROK-NATO relations. At this year's NATO Summit in Ankara, President Lee Jae Myung was the only leader among the IP4, NATO's four Indo-Pacific partners comprising South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, to attend at the head-of-state level. He held his first face-to-face meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, where they discussed issues of mutual interest and ways to advance cooperation. △ At the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum, President Lee proposed a "ROK-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0" centered on the joint research, production, and operation of weapons systems. He stated, "If Korea's stable production capacity and proven technological capabilities are combined with NATO's longstanding expertise, the security capabilities of both sides will be strengthened far beyond their current level."¹²⁾ △ During a sideline meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President Lee also pledged $100 million in comprehensive assistance and stated that South Korea would continue to participate in humanitarian assistance and the international community's recovery and reconstruction efforts.¹³⁾ Since joining NATO as a global partner in 2006, South Korea has steadily maintained and developed its cooperative relationship with the Alliance. President Lee's participation in this NATO Summit can be viewed as appropriate in that it marked another important turning point in ROK-NATO relations built on this foundation.

Second, there are implications for the expansion of South Korea's defense industry into Europe. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, amid security gaps and a broader rearmament trend in Europe, arms imports by NATO's European allies increased by 143 percent in the most recent five-year period, 2021-2025, compared with the previous five years, 2016-2020. This represents a remarkable pace of growth compared with the 9.2 percent increase globally over the same period. During this period, 2021-2025, South Korea rapidly emerged as a key supplier to NATO's European allies, accounting for approximately 8.6 percent of their newly imported weapons and ranking second after the United States at 58 percent. Israel followed at 7.7 percent and France at 7.4 percent.¹⁴⁾ Performance, speed of delivery, price competitiveness, and mass-production infrastructure are seen as key factors behind this success. However, following the Hague and Ankara summits, greater emphasis is being placed on defense industrial cooperation "within the Alliance," which is expected to create constraints on the future expansion of South Korea's defense industry into Europe. At the EU level, initiatives such as the European Defence Industry Programme, introduced in 2024, are already promoting greater intra-European procurement and defense industrial autonomy, increasing the need for local production networks and joint research and development. Most EU member states, 23 of 27, are also NATO allies. Moreover, because the defense industry is a high-technology sector built on stringent security requirements and Alliance standardization, political trust is likely to become a major variable alongside equipment performance and speed of delivery. This factor should not be overlooked or treated lightly, either in South Korea's role as a trusted NATO partner in the Indo-Pacific or in pursuing the "ROK-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0." In this regard, President Lee Jae Myung's pledge in Ankara to provide $100 million in comprehensive assistance to Ukraine, along with his commitment to humanitarian assistance and participation in international recovery and reconstruction efforts, was appropriate for South Korea as a NATO partner. In addition, European leaders have expressed deep concern over North Korea's support for Russia's war effort, including ammunition, missiles, other weapons, and troops. Attention to and understanding of this issue are therefore important if South Korea seeks to strengthen cooperation and build greater trust with NATO. The accumulation of combat experience by North Korean troops and equipment is also a matter of concern for South Korea's national security.

Third, there are implications for the readjustment of the ROK-U.S. Alliance. Both the NATO Alliance, a multilateral alliance, and the ROK-U.S. Alliance, a bilateral alliance, are undergoing a period of readjustment under the second Trump administration. In considering the readjustment of the ROK-U.S. Alliance during this period of transition, it is important to understand the internal dynamics of NATO before and after the 2026 Ankara Summit discussed earlier in this article. Under the NATO 3.0 vision, the United States is expected to release its review of the defense posture of U.S. forces in Europe around the end of 2026, which is likely to entail a transition toward a structure in which European allies assume greater responsibility. Although this model cannot be applied directly to the ROK-U.S. Alliance, it may offer some useful points of reference for its readjustment. Traditionally, NATO members, like South Korea, have been free and democratic states that achieved security and prosperity together with the United States within the postwar rules-based order. As of 2026, U.S. allies in both Europe and East Asia are witnessing a fundamental transformation of the international order. Externally, authoritarian and revisionist states such as China and Russia are challenging that order. Internally, the United States itself, which has served as a cornerstone of the postwar rules-based order, is rapidly readjusting it. The future remains uncertain. Nevertheless, what the two NATO summits held since the beginning of the second Trump administration, in The Hague and Ankara, demonstrate is that most European allies do not regard an international order without the United States as a realistically sustainable policy option. This may reflect a degree of consensus and self-reflection regarding the restructuring of NATO under the concept of "NATO 3.0," centered on European-led security for Europe; the fact that the United States remains a global maritime power; the inability of the allies to replace the U.S. nuclear umbrella; and, above all, the fact that the United States has a public that supports democratic values.

1. The Ankara Summit Declaration (2026.7.8). https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/07/08/the-ankara-summit-declaration
2. NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum 2026 (2026.7.14). https://www.nato.int/
3. Remarks by Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby at the NATO Defense Ministerial (As Prepared) (2026.2.12), US Department of War.
4. Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Defense Investment from NATO Allies, Powering American Industry (The White House, 2026.7.8). https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-secures-historic-defense-investment-from-nato-allies-powering-american-industry/
5. Fenella McGerty, "NATO defence spending: navigating the noise," IISS (2026.7.31).
6. NATO defense spending tracker (Atlantic Council, 2026.4.9).
7. Ibid.
8. Remarks by Secretary of War at the 2026 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, US Department of War (2026.6.18).
9. U.S. European Command Public Affairs, Stuttgart, Germany (2026.6.3).
10. Remarks by Secretary of War at the 2026 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels, US Department of War (2026.6.18).
11. Matt Trunkey, "More European NATO allies should step up help to Ukraine through PURL" (Atlantic Council, 2026.7.3).
12. Republic of Korea Policy Briefing (July 8, 2026). https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148967768
13. Republic of Korea Policy Briefing (July 9, 2026). https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148967840
14. Trends in International Arms Transfers 2025 (SIPRI, 2026.3.9).

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.