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Assessment of North Korea's Weapon Development Activities in 2025 and Outlook for 2026 |
| March 10, 2026 |
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Jang Won JOVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jjo@sejong.org
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North Korea's weapons development activities in 2025 unfolded primarily around two dimensions: △ strengthening the operational combat capabilities of weapons systems and △ expanding the production base for conventional forces. In particular, reporting by North Korean state media on Kim Jong Un's field guidance to nuclear, missile, and munitions facilities indicates that Kim Jong Un is focused not merely on the performance of military weapons themselves, but on maximizing operational combat capability, including whether all elements necessary for the operation of military weapons in actual battlefield environments are being properly realized. This appears to reflect North Korea's ability to identify the strengths and weaknesses of its weapons systems in actual combat, based on the results of North Korean military weapons employment in the Russia-Ukraine war.
In terms of the international political environment, North Korea faced a need to demonstrate strategic deterrence centered on nuclear weapons and missiles, amid △ U.S.-China strategic competition, △ the continued extended deterrence commitment of the ROK-U.S. alliance, and △ ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, yet few notable developments related to nuclear development were observed, and no ICBM-class missile launches were conducted, resulting in little demonstrable progress in the area of advancing nuclear and missile capabilities. Furthermore, North Korea appears to be encountering difficulties in developing a submarine-to-surface launch platform, and its claimed program of nuclear submarine development is assessed to remain at the early stages of hull construction and preliminary research on key components such as reactors, propulsion systems, and cooling equipment.
Meanwhile, through the 9th Party Congress held in February 2026, North Korea put forward ambitious plans as the principal elements of a new five-year plan for defense capability enhancement, including △ a comprehensive land- and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile complex, △ an artificial intelligence unmanned attack complex, and △ special assets for satellite attack, advanced electronic warfare weapon systems, and the development of reconnaissance satellites. However, significant technical barriers are anticipated to exist with respect to achieving these objectives within a five-year time frame.
This paper draws on materials released by North Korean state media to assess North Korea's weapons development activities in 2025, with a focus on △ nuclear and missile developments and △ trends in Kim Jong Un's field guidance to munitions facilities. It further provides an outlook on the direction of weapons development activities in 2026, based on the announced outcomes of the 9th Party Congress, among other sources. -
In 2022 and 2023, North Korea attempted to elevate the salience of the nuclear issue through a series of measures, including △ the restoration of tunnels at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, △ the adoption of a nuclear forces policy law, △ the conduct of military training exercises for tactical nuclear operational units within the Korean People's Army, △ the proclaimed goal of an "exponential increase in nuclear warhead stockpiles," and △ the unveiling of what it designated the "tactical nuclear warhead, Hwasan-31." In 2024, however, nuclear-related activities entered a period of relative quiescence compared to 2022 and 2023. During this period, North Korea disclosed a highly enriched uranium production facility in Kangson (September) and publicized a statement by Kim Jong Un to the effect that "the number of centrifuges must be further increased in order to exponentially expand the nuclear weapons stockpile," reflecting a pattern of highlighting nuclear capabilities through rhetorical means rather than through direct exposure of substantive nuclear development activities.
Entering 2025, Kim Jong Un conducted an field inspection in January of a nuclear material production facility and a nuclear weapons research institute (assessed to be located at Yongbyon), where he remarked that "2025 is an important year for strengthening nuclear capabilities." In September, he visited the nuclear weapons research institute, met with scientists and engineers engaged in nuclear-related fields, and presided over an important consultative conference concerning nuclear material and nuclear weapons production, thereby encouraging the advancement of nuclear material production and related research activities. Beyond these instances, however, North Korea failed to demonstrate direct developmental activities related to nuclear development in a manner broadly similar to 2024.
Separately, North Korea reported (Rodong Sinmun) that "a joint strike training exercise involving long-range artillery and missile systems on the eastern front was conducted on May 8 under the guidance of Kim Jong Un," characterizing the missile launches as part of nuclear warfare training. A spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense asserted that "the purpose of the training was to familiarize the relevant units with the procedures for operating the aforementioned weapons in accordance with the state's comprehensive nuclear weapons management system, designated 'Nuclear Trigger.'" In this manner, North Korea continued its practice of framing short-range ballistic missile and super-large multiple rocket launcher firing exercises as "tactical nuclear operational system training," thereby sustaining its established pattern of demonstrating nuclear capabilities through rhetoric rather than through substantive and direct advancement of nuclear capabilities. -
Ballistic Missiles and Multiple Rocket Launchers
North Korea launched several short-range ballistic missiles and 600mm multiple rocket launchers on January 14, May 8, and November 7, 2025. Following the inauguration of President Trump in January 2025, who had signaled the possibility of dialogue with Kim Jong Un, the frequency of ballistic missile launches showed a declining trend compared to previous years, and no space launch vehicles or ICBM-class missiles were launched. North Korea had announced at the Workers' Party plenary session on December 30, 2023, that it would launch three additional military reconnaissance satellites in 2024; however, following a failed reconnaissance satellite launch on May 24, 2024, which resulted in only a single launch attempt, North Korea did not conduct any reconnaissance satellite launches in 2025. Furthermore, while North Korea had launched the solid-fuel model "Hwasongpho-18" on three occasions in 2023, the first on April 13, the second on July 12, and the third on December 18, and subsequently launched the new intercontinental ballistic missile "Hwasongpho-19" on October 31, 2024, it did not launch any ICBM-class missiles even once in 2025. This appears to be attributable not only to internal technical factors, but also to a deliberate calibration of the level of provocation in consideration of the surrounding security environment on the Korean Peninsula, including close observation of the Trump administration's North Korea policy and the continuation of military support to Russia.
Hypersonic Missiles
North Korea conducted its first test launch of a hypersonic glide vehicle in January 2021 and carried out three test launches through January 2022, during which it tested rudimentary flight performance with the aim of identifying the flight patterns of glide vehicles separated from liquid-fuel launch vehicles and accumulating flight trajectory data. Subsequently, beginning in January 2024, North Korea conducted its fourth test launch utilizing a solid-fuel missile as the launch vehicle, and in April 2024 conducted a fifth test launch using an improved solid-fuel missile as the launch vehicle. The fourth and fifth test launches are also assessed to have been aimed at identifying the glide vehicle's flight patterns over a designated flight duration and accumulating flight trajectory data.
On January 6, 2025, North Korea conducted its sixth test launch, announcing that "the hypersonic glide flight warhead flew along its designated flight trajectory with a first apogee altitude of 99.8 km and a second apogee altitude of 42.5 km, and accurately impacted the designated virtual target waters in the open sea at a range of 1,500 km." North Korea further claimed that "new carbon fiber composite materials were applied in the construction of the engine air frame, and new and effective methods were introduced in the flight and guidance control systems." This suggests that improvements were made to the heat resistance performance of the glide vehicle as well as to its weight reduction, and it is assessed that North Korea has begun applying new precision guidance and control technologies to achieve target impact by leveraging the flight characteristics identified through accumulated launch data. In addition, an examination of the configuration design of the glide vehicle employed in the sixth launch indicates that, in comparison with previous glide vehicles, advancements have been made in terms of configuration design, as evidenced by the streamlined body shape and wing configuration. In light of the foregoing, North Korea is assessed to have achieved some degree of technical progress, including △ improvements to the rocket engine performance of the launch vehicle and △ refinements to the glide vehicle design, based on analysis of flight data accumulated through the five preceding test launches.
Meanwhile, North Korea briefly announced that "on October 22, 2025, a test of an important weapons system was successfully conducted," making only a concise statement regarding the conduct of a test involving a hypersonic vehicle. In contrast to the January 6 announcement of the "hypersonic glide vehicle test launch," in which specific flight parameters were provided, this announcement conveyed only the fact that a test launch had been conducted. Although North Korea carried out its second test launch of 2025, it appears that the program remains at the stage of analyzing flight patterns such as long-range glide maneuvers of the hypersonic glide vehicle and integrating the findings into precision guidance and control technologies. It is assessed that additional test launches will be required in order to develop precision guidance and control algorithms for high-speed flight under hypersonic conditions and to secure sufficient flight data necessary for the development of hypersonic aerodynamic design and thermal shielding technologies.
Long-Range Cruise Missiles
On January 26, 2025, Rodong Sinmun reported that "the Missile General Bureau conducted a test launch of a sea (underwater) to ground strategic cruise guided weapon on January 25." The report stated that "the launched strategic cruise missiles (assessed to be an improved variant of Pulhwassal-3) flew along elliptical and figure-eight trajectories over a flight range of 1,500 km for 7,507 to 7,511 seconds (2 hours, 5 minutes, and 7 seconds to 2 hours, 5 minutes, and 11 seconds), and accurately struck the target." On February 26, North Korea launched two cruise missiles of the Hwassal-1 series, announcing (Rodong Sinmun) that they "flew for 7,961 seconds and 7,973 seconds respectively, traveling 1,587 km along an elliptical trajectory over the West Sea."
On December 28, North Korea also conducted a launch training exercise involving long-range strategic cruise missiles over the West Sea. North Korea announced that "two launched missiles flew along a flight trajectory designated over the West Sea for 10,199 seconds (2 hours, 49 minutes, and 59 seconds) and 10,203 seconds (2 hours, 50 minutes, and 3 seconds) respectively before striking their targets." Given that the flight trajectory pattern was similar to that of the cruise missiles launched in January while the flight duration increased by more than 44 minutes, the flight performance itself appears to have entered a stage of stabilization. Rodong Sinmun described the exercise as having "inspected the counterattack readiness and combat capabilities of long-range missile units, familiarized missile personnel with the procedures for conducting maneuver and fire support missions, and verified the reliability of the relevant strategic weapons systems." On this basis, the ground-based launch system utilizing a mobile launcher platform is also assessed to have entered the stage of actual operational deployment.
Notably, while photographs released in connection with the December launch depicted the missiles being fired from a mobile launcher platform on the ground, the January launch disclosure showed only the initial flight of the missiles in the air without releasing photographs of the moment of vertical launch from the launch platform, leaving it unclear whether a submarine launch platform was employed.
In conclusion, given that North Korea confirmed flight performance through four cruise missile launch training exercises involving the Hwassal and Pulhwassal series in 2024, and considering that flight duration increased during the 2025 launches while reliability verification exercises and repeated proficiency training on mission execution procedures for the long-range cruise missile weapons system have been ongoing, the long-range cruise missile itself appears to have reached the stage of completed development. However, as no sustained pattern of stable submarine launch platform utilization has been observed, the development of a vertically launched submarine to surface launch platform capable of carrying and operating the missile is assessed to remain incomplete. -
Throughout 2025, Kim Jong Un conducted field guidance to nuclear facilities, missile facilities, and weapons development and production facilities. These visits are interpreted as serving the dual purpose of demonstrating Kim Jong Un's intense personal interest in weapons development and his control as the supreme leader, while also conveying to the United States and the broader international community the message that "the construction of nuclear forces is ongoing and constitutes an irreversible national strategy."
Visits to Nuclear Facilities
On January 29, Kim Jong Un conducted field guidance at a nuclear material production base and a nuclear weapons research institute, with the visits assessed to have been to the nuclear weapons research institute and uranium enrichment facility located at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. These visits took place following remarks made on January 28 by a U.S. National Security Council spokesperson regarding "complete denuclearization of North Korea," and are interpreted as reflecting both resistance to U.S. denuclearization pressure and an intent to demonstrate nuclear capabilities.
On March 8, North Korea reported Kim Jong Un's field guidance to a shipyard and stated that he "also assessed the status of nuclear submarine construction," releasing images of the hull of a nuclear submarine under construction. This appears to have been intended to demonstrate that the development of a nuclear submarine, one of the five major national defense objectives set forth at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, is proceeding on schedule. However, given that North Korea did not disclose the interior of the submarine and that the development and testing of core components such as reactors, propulsion systems, and cooling equipment require a considerable period of time, the program is assessed to remain at the stage of hull construction and preliminary research on key components.
On September 26, Kim Jong Un visited the nuclear weapons research institute, where he met with scientists and engineers engaged in nuclear-related fields and presided over an important consultative conference concerning nuclear material and nuclear weapons production. On this occasion, Kim Jong Un appears to have reviewed the status of efforts related to "advancing nuclear capabilities" and provided guidance on future program plans, while also seeking to demonstrate to the outside world that North Korea will continue to strengthen its nuclear forces.
Visits to Missile Facilities
On September 1, Kim Jong Un visited a short-range ballistic missile factory, followed by a visit to the Chemical Materials General Research Institute under the Missile General Bureau, which conducts research on carbon fiber composite materials used in intercontinental ballistic missiles. North Korea announced that the institute had "manufactured high-powered solid-fuel engines using carbon fiber composite materials and verified the operational reliability and accuracy of the propulsion system through eight ground ejection tests conducted over the past two years."
On September 8, North Korea announced that "the Missile General Bureau conducted a ground ejection test of a new high-powered solid-fuel rocket engine," asserting that "the new solid-fuel rocket engine disclosed on September 1 was used in the test and that thrust had been improved by 40 percent compared to the 1,372 kN engine tested on December 15, 2022." The weight reduction of the propulsion system and the increase in thrust of the new rocket engine are expected to result in an increase in warhead payload capacity. This rocket engine is assessed to be intended for installation on the Hwasong-20, which was publicly unveiled for the first time at the military parade held on October 10, 2025, commemorating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers' Party of Korea.
Visits to Research Institutes and Production Facilities
The Korean Central News Agency reported on September 11 and 12 that Kim Jong Un conducted field guidance of the operations of the Armor Defense Weapons Research Institute and the Electronic Weapons Research Institute under the Academy of National Defense Science. He appears to have reviewed the current status of research on defense systems for tanks and armored vehicles. Notably, during his visit to the Electronic Weapons Research Institute, Kim Jong Un remarked that "at the forthcoming 9th Party Congress, a policy of parallel development of nuclear forces and conventional forces in the field of national defense construction will be put forward," suggesting that North Korea is expected to actively pursue the strengthening of conventional weapons development and munitions production capabilities while maintaining its current level of nuclear and missile technology.
On October 4, Kim Jong Un attended and delivered remarks at the opening ceremony of the weapons and equipment exhibition "Defense Development-2025" held in Pyongyang. On this occasion, he employed rhetoric to the effect that "our strategic interest in this region has grown in direct proportion to the buildup of U.S. military forces in South Korea, and accordingly we have assigned special assets to important targets of interest in a corresponding manner," thereby continuing to sustain military threats directed at South Korea. -
At the expanded plenary session of the 11th meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party held from December 23 to 27, 2024, North Korea proclaimed a "most hardline counter-strategy against the United States to be vigorously implemented in defense of national interests and security." Nevertheless, entering 2025, North Korea intermittently continued launches involving hypersonic glide vehicles, long-range cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and 600mm multiple rocket launchers. North Korea's weapons-related activities in 2025, when compared to the vigorous pace of nuclear and missile-related conduct observed during the 2022 to 2024 period, may be characterized as a reduced level of nuclear and missile activity. This is assessed to be attributable to △ the inauguration of U.S. President Trump, who signaled the possibility of dialogue with Kim Jong Un, and △ the prioritization of resources toward the provision of military weapons support to Russia in connection with the continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war. Furthermore, it appears that considerably greater emphasis was placed on activities aimed at improving launch platforms, such as enhancing the reliability of weapons systems and increasing the mobility of mobile launchers with actual operational employment in mind, rather than on improving the intrinsic performance of missiles themselves.
In addition, through Kim Jong Un's field guidance activities at not only nuclear and missile related facilities but also research institutes associated with conventional weapons, he appears to have sought to encourage researchers and production workers in the relevant fields, thereby demonstrating the supreme leader's personal interest in and commitment to weapons development. By emphasizing the importance and utility of conventional forces as revealed in the Russia-Ukraine war, these activities also appear intended to pursue improvements in production process reliability, quality enhancement, and modernization of actual weapons systems essential to the normal operational functioning of those systems.
Outlook for 2026
On January 3, 2026, Kim Jong Un visited a tactical guided weapons production factory and directed △ the optimization of process layout for the modernization of assembly processes, △ the derivation of optimization measures taking into account the modernization projects of munitions industrial enterprises, and △ the expansion of tactical guided weapons production capacity by a factor of 2.5. On January 4, a hypersonic missile launch training exercise was conducted under Kim Jong Un's observation, during which Kim Jong Un asserted that it "demonstrated the state of readiness of nuclear forces." Rather than demonstrating a direct advancement of nuclear capabilities, he employed rhetoric to the effect that "the practicalization and operationalization of nuclear forces is being pursued" by assuming the mounting of tactical nuclear warheads on the launched missiles, thereby claiming an "advancement of nuclear war deterrence."
In light of the trends observed in 2025 and those of January of the current year, North Korea in 2026 appears likely to prioritize △ improvements in the precision and mobility of tactical guided weapons systems such as short-range ballistic missiles and 600mm multiple rocket launchers, aimed at conducting precision strikes on key South Korean military bases and command posts and disrupting missile defense systems, △ improvements in the reliability and quality of weapons systems and increases in production capacity premised on actual battlefield employment, △ modernization of production processes for conventional weapons systems, and △ completion of the development of a submarine to surface missile launch platform.
Meanwhile, on January 3, Venezuelan President Maduro was arrested by the United States and transferred to and detained in New York, and on February 28, the United States conducted a surprise airstrike on Iran during the course of nuclear negotiations, resulting in the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Looking ahead, it is assessed that Kim Jong Un will conduct joint strike training exercises employing a variety of weapons systems under the assumption of tactical nuclear warhead loading, thereby emphasizing the possibility of tactical nuclear employment as a demonstration of nuclear force readiness, while also resorting once again to "nuclear capability advancement" rhetoric that highlights the possibility of mounting nuclear warheads on short-range ballistic missiles and super-large multiple rocket launcher systems. Of course, taking into consideration the international security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula and external relations, there also exists the possibility that North Korea may expose developments at or above an intermediate threshold as circumstances require, including △ the disclosure of nuclear development related activities at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site or uranium enrichment facilities, and △ the public unveiling of what it designates tactical nuclear warheads.
Through the 9th Party Congress, which concluded on February 25, North Korea announced a new five-year plan for defense capability enhancement encompassing the development of △ a comprehensive land and submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic missile complex, △ a comprehensive artificial intelligence unmanned attack complex, △ special assets for satellite attack and electronic warfare weapons systems capable of paralyzing the enemy's command nerve centers, and △ advanced reconnaissance satellites, along with the incremental annual augmentation and deployment of 600mm and 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and a comprehensive operational and tactical missile complex.
The Hwasong-20, publicly unveiled by North Korea in October 2025, has yet to undergo a test launch; however, given that a combustion test of the new solid-fuel rocket engine intended for use in the Hwasong-20, which is well suited for multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle operations, was conducted in September of last year, the possibility exists that a test launch may be carried out in 2026 should the security environment fail to develop in accordance with North Korea's intentions. Meanwhile, no submarine-launched ballistic missile test launches have been conducted since the "mini SLBM" launch near Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province, on May 7, 2022. Given that the development of a submarine launch platform remains incomplete, the development of a large submarine-launched ICBM is assessed to remain a distant prospect. Furthermore, while North Korea has publicly declared its intent to develop △ unmanned attack weapons, △ satellite attack weapons, and △ more advanced reconnaissance satellites in line with cutting-edge weapons trends, the realization of these objectives is expected to encounter numerous technical challenges that must be overcome. Accordingly, it is anticipated that North Korea will allocate resources with greater emphasis on the expansion of conventional forces and weapons systems that contribute to substantive military capability enhancement, as well as on strengthening the production capacity of the defense industry.
From the perspective of South Korea, given that North Korea is advancing toward a "multi-domain military capability enhancement" that extends beyond its existing nuclear and missile-centered strategy to encompass unmanned attack systems, space, and electronic warfare, it is necessary for South Korea to comprehensively develop a corresponding "multi-domain security response strategy." Furthermore, it will be necessary to continuously strengthen and clearly communicate to the outside world "offensive response capabilities" that go beyond a "defense-centered approach," to include △ precision preemptive strike capabilities against key military facilities, △ capabilities to neutralize North Korea's command and control system at the outset, △ capabilities for decapitation operations against the leadership, and △ capabilities for massive punitive retaliation.
| Historical Background
| Assessment of Trends in Nuclear Program Activities
| Assessment of Trends in Missile Development Activities
| Assessment of Kim Jong Un's Field Guidance Activities
| Comprehensive Assessment and Outlook for 2026
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
