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Assessment and Implications of Economic Management and Public Welfare at North Korea's 9th Party Congress |
| March 6, 2026 |
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Eunju CHOIResearch Fellow, Sejong Institute | ej0717@sejong.org
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The 9th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party (hereinafter "the 9th Party Congress"), convened in February 2026, placed economic affairs and public welfare once again at the center of its agenda. Unlike the 8th Party Congress, which was held under the compounding pressures of COVID-19, international sanctions, and natural disasters and was accordingly focused on recovery and resilience, the 9th Party Congress took place in a markedly different context: border reopening had restored trade flows and resumed cross-border movement, and the North Korean economy is estimated to have grown by approximately 10 percent relative to 2020 levels.1)
North Korea's economic management choices over the next five years will serve as a key indicator of regime stability and public sentiment, as well as the broader trajectory of its external and inter-Korean strategy.
The 9th Party Congress set the economic course not around rapid growth but around "stabilization and consolidation" and "qualitative development." This reflects a strategic judgment that single-minded pursuit of near-term results risks eroding long-term growth potential, and that improving the overall quality of the economy through the modernization of production processes and more sophisticated management systems should take precedence. The central challenge of the new five-year plan is accordingly how to sustain and manage the gains of the past five years while ensuring operational continuity. Flagship initiatives such as the Local Development 20×10 Policy and the New Rural Revolution Program have moved beyond the construction phase to emphasize "safe operation and scientific maintenance capabilities," a shift that captures this change in orientation. The emphasis on expanding foreign trade, developing tourism as an industry, and advancing the information sector reflects a pragmatic effort to ease supply constraints on key inputs such as energy and raw materials and to improve operational efficiency across the economy.
This paper examines the economic and social agenda of the 9th Party Congress along four dimensions: an assessment of plan implementation performance; the direction and characteristics of the new five-year national economic development plan; sectoral priorities and the implications of local development policy; and the emphasis placed on foreign trade, tourism, and the information industry. It concludes with recommendations on the analytical framework and policy preparedness that the South Korean government should adopt. Even in the current environment, in which inter-Korean relations have been formally defined as relations between two hostile states, accurately reading North Korea's approach to economic management and its policy priorities constitutes the minimum preparation necessary to broaden South Korea's policy options when circumstances change. -
The 9th Party Congress declared that the five-year national economic development plan of the 8th Central Committee had been substantially completed. The publicly released reporting, however, offered virtually no concrete figures — no production volumes, no fulfillment rates — to substantiate this claim. The reporting foregrounded instead expressions such as the laying of foundations, the establishment of implementation systems, the consolidation of an ethos of execution, and the vitalization of production and construction, with achievements presented through an enumeration of initiatives rather than measurable outcomes.
This approach suggests that North Korea is benchmarking economic success less against numerical targets and more against the recovery of administrative capacity and implementation discipline. The emphasis on the elevated role of economic planning bodies and the entrenchment of a culture of rigorous plan execution reflects a deliberate effort to frame economic performance in terms of administrative achievement. Given significant variation in performance across sectors, publishing specific figures would also carry political risk. Structurally constrained sectors such as foundational industries, electric power, and logistics do not lend themselves to single-figure summaries, and quantitative disclosure could expose vulnerabilities rather than demonstrate progress. The formulation "fundamental fulfillment" functions as a carefully calibrated formula that neither denies achievement nor opens the regime to scrutiny of the underlying scorecard.
The absence from publicly released congress reporting of any assessment of whether the 2025 targets set out in Kim Jong Un's 2022 policy address were met points to a deliberate calibration of what is disclosed and how performance is characterized. Internal documents are likely to contain contain more granular assessments by indicator; what is accessible from the outside represents a curated selection. The declaration of fundamental fulfillment should therefore be understood simultaneously as a proclamation that the plan has been carried out and as a political choice about the scope and framing of what is made public. -
The 9th Party Congress defined the strategic direction of the new five-year economic development plan as a phase of stabilization and consolidation, to be followed by gradual qualitative development. This is best understood as a design that prioritizes operational continuity over short-term visible growth, sustains tangible gains in construction and public welfare that residents can experience directly, and builds medium- to long-term growth potential through foundational industries, science and technology, the information sector, and energy.
With international sanctions firmly in place and the external environment remaining highly uncertain, North Korea's decision to prioritize operational stability and management capacity over rapid growth represents a realistic policy choice. The success or failure of the ninth-cycle economy will accordingly be measured less by the scale of declared targets than by the stability of supply and production operations, the normalization of maintenance and operational management, and whether investments in future industries and infrastructure translate into sustainable gains.
Management innovation is expected to proceed along two broad tracks. The first involves integrating science and technology with the information sector to improve efficiency in both production and administration. In an environment where large-scale capital investment to expand productive capacity is not readily available, this approach seeks to improve the operational efficiency of existing facilities by applying information technology to production planning, raw material procurement, inventory management, and quality control. The second track involves changing the working practices of cadres and specialists. Criticism of the work attitudes and formalism of economic cadres was a recurring theme at the 8th Party Congress and is similarly reaffirmed at the 9th. The repeated injunction to reform the guidance and management of economic affairs from the ground up reflects a recognition that implementation practices and organizational culture, more than institutional design or stated targets, ultimately determine outcomes.
These demands for reform at the human and organizational level are taking shape through clearer accountability at the working level and a strengthened performance evaluation system. Rather than a fundamental transformation of the institutional performance evaluation framework, however, this is better characterized as an attempt at "discipline-based efficiency optimization" — an effort to maximize implementation discipline within the existing planned economy. The intent is to suppress bureaucratic inertia and sharpen execution through a combination of rigorous performance assessment and persistent criticism of formalism. In sum, the management innovation North Korea is pursuing is concentrated on deepening implementation intensity while preserving the foundations of the system. In this process, there remains a real risk that responsibility for project failures will be displaced onto individuals or that internal control mechanisms will be tightened in ways that are ultimately counterproductive. -
The manner in which sectoral tasks are presented in congress reporting simultaneously reveals the strategic priorities of the North Korean economy and the areas of genuine strain. Priorities are signaled through repetition and prominent placement; areas of strain are handled through abstract generalities rather than concrete performance indicators, or through unusually heavy emphasis on operational management, maintenance, and the reinforcement of discipline.
Foundational industries were presented once again as the bedrock of the economy. The congress called for meeting targets in metallurgy, chemicals, electric power, coal, and machine-building, and demanded the execution of tasks in resource development, extractive industries, forestry, and rail transport. Performance in these sectors, however, was addressed only at the level of broad generalities in publicly released reporting. This treatment suggests that while foundational industries remain the essential underpinning of the broader economy, they are also the sector most burdened by structural constraints. Disruptions in the supply of electricity, fuel, raw materials, and components would undermine performance in the public welfare sectors as well.
At the same time, the repeated and prominent placement of foundational industries reflects a strategic commitment to securing medium- to long-term growth potential. Without stability in base industries such as metallurgy, chemicals, and electric power, neither near-term expansion of productive capacity nor the accumulation of potential for the future is possible. In this context, the appointment of An Gum-chol, a former Minister of the Metal Industry, as Party Secretary and Department Director for economic affairs following the 9th Party Congress is instructive. This personnel decision can be read as a deliberate alignment of policy continuity and technical expertise, signaling that North Korea's emphasis on foundational industries will remain unchanged in the ninth cycle.
Sectors more directly linked to public welfare — light industry, agriculture, and construction — were addressed in comparatively more concrete terms. In light industry, the congress emphasized quality improvement, new product development, and production expansion, with specific mention of raising the quality of school uniforms, bags, and footwear. In agriculture, grain production targets were placed front and center, with specific reference to seed revolution, scientific farming, tidal flat cultivation, double-cropping, land improvement, completion of irrigation systems, agricultural mechanization, and the expansion of greenhouse farming.
In construction, the congress reaffirmed its commitment to advancing nationwide construction projects, including the development of Pyongyang and provincial capitals. Kim Jong Un had previously indicated publicly during on-site guidance visits that major projects such as tourist zone development would be proposed and confirmed at the 9th Party Congress, suggesting that the construction agenda has expanded further. In this context, the fact that Kim Jong Un's first publicly reported economic activity following the congress was a visit to the Sangwon Cement Complex is symbolic. Sustaining large-scale construction requires a reliable supply of key building materials such as cement, and the visit can be read as an inspection of the supply chain foundation on which construction performance depends. On the personnel side, the apparent establishment of a construction-dedicated secretariat and department within the Party Secretariat, and the appointment of Kim Jong-gwan — previously a Vice Premier responsible for construction — to that position, signals that construction is being managed as both a near-term performance priority and a major policy domain going forward. As the construction program expands, however, the associated burdens of maintenance and operational costs will grow commensurately. Whether construction activity translates into substantive outcomes — backed by supply chains, maintenance capacity, and operational capability — rather than mere completion statistics, will be the critical benchmark for any future assessment.
In the areas of land management and urban administration, the congress announced plans to strengthen disaster response capabilities and tighten legal controls over environmental protection. This reflects a determination to treat natural disasters and environmental degradation as permanent features of the economic operating environment, and to strengthen management systems to encompass not only post-disaster recovery but also preventive measures and accountability for failures in response. This concern is directly connected to the conduct of cadres revealed during the large-scale flood disasters of 2024, when Kim Jong Un sharply criticized deficiencies in disaster response and the negligence of responsible agencies and officials, signaling that strict accountability would follow. The 9th Party Congress reinforces the intent to bring natural disasters within the domain of governance and administration rather than treating them as acts of force majeure beyond the state's responsibility. - The most distinctive feature of the economic and social agenda at the 9th Party Congress was the reaffirmation of local development policy as a core initiative for the next five years. The Local Development 20×10 Policy — under which light industrial factories, hospitals, and general service facilities are constructed in twenty cities and counties each year — has been institutionalized as an annual program. Combined with the New Rural Revolution Program, it has expanded into a long-term project aimed at simultaneously transforming the living conditions and production systems of regional communities, particularly in underdeveloped areas. This policy is well suited to spreading tangible, visible improvements in daily life across the country. It also serves to moderate the concentration of visible gains in the capital while reinforcing the perception that the state takes responsibility for the basic living standards of all citizens. The critical measure of the policy's success, however, will not be construction output but the operational sustainability of what is built. Factories require raw materials, auxiliary inputs, electricity, fuel, and spare parts to function; hospitals require medicines, consumables, medical personnel, and sanitation systems to serve their purpose. Construction is a one-time undertaking, whereas operations entail continuous expenditure on energy, fuel, consumables, labor, and equipment maintenance. The cumulative burden of operating costs and upkeep will grow over time, and without adequate support from foundational industries and logistics, sustained operation will prove difficult.The New Rural Revolution Program reflects North Korea's effort to combine agricultural productivity improvement with an upgrading of rural living conditions. The underlying logic appears to be that stabilizing and expanding agricultural production requires more than rehabilitating the production base — it also requires improving the living environment of rural residents in order to sustain productive motivation. This signals that North Korea's concept of qualitative development extends beyond simple increases in output to encompass improvements in living standards and access to services.The structure of the Local Development 20×10 Policy — which requires factories, hospitals, and service facilities to be constructed in designated cities and counties within fixed timeframes and brought into actual operation — is likely to intensify centralized mobilization and implementation control. Where projects are not completed on schedule or where operational difficulties arise after commissioning, responsibility is likely to fall on the cadres in charge at the local and sectoral levels. This creates real risks: nominal completions and performative outputs may proliferate, facilities may be left idle because operating costs cannot be sustained, and disparities across localities may widen. Ultimately, this policy is likely to serve as a principal test case for whether the stabilization and consolidation and qualitative development emphasized at the 9th Party Congress translate into substantive outcomes.The recovery of aggregate economic output to approximately 10 percent above 2020 levels, noted earlier, has likely provided a degree of confidence in pursuing these long-term projects. This recovery, however, should be understood not as the product of any single factor but as the result of a confluence of forces: the rebound in aggregate output, shifts in the external environment, the internal mobilization system, and deliberate political decisions. The challenge going forward is whether North Korea can move beyond construction completions to secure the energy and raw material supply chains and the scientific maintenance capabilities needed to operate completed facilities on a stable basis.
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The 9th Party Congress reaffirmed its commitment to expanding foreign trade and to developing tourism as a strategic industry capable of driving economic growth and advancing standards of civilization. This reflects a deliberate effort to reposition external economic activity from a mechanism for generating hard currency into a principal instrument for ensuring the effective implementation of the economic plan.
The rationale behind this policy is grounded in practical economic calculation. Modernizing foundational industries and pursuing large-scale construction projects will generate sharply increased demand for external procurement of essential inputs — key equipment, precision components, and energy sources. Expanding trade is an important means of easing these supply constraints. Tourism, as a service industry comparatively insulated from the effects of sanctions, also offers a viable avenue for hard currency earnings.
The emphasis on the "industrialization" of tourism signals that North Korea now regards tourism not as a vehicle for friendly exchanges or symbolic projects but as an economic sector with genuine revenue-generating and hard currency functions. Whereas North Korea's international tourism in 2025 was limited to a small and largely symbolic number of Russian visitors, the next five years are expected to see a concerted drive to diversify the nationalities of foreign visitors in order to build economic self-sufficiency. Generating a viable revenue structure and achieving economies of scale will require attracting tourists from a range of countries, including China. North Korea is therefore likely to pursue tourism as a commercial business model centered on large-scale resort zones such as the Wonsan-Kalma Coastal Tourist Zone, with infrastructure development oriented toward maximizing returns.
The success of this strategy, however, will depend not on declarations but on the practical operating conditions that determine whether tourist volumes can be sustained and grown. The intensity of sanctions enforcement, the flexibility of international payment arrangements, and the development of logistics and tourism infrastructure and safety protocols will be decisive variables. The questions that warrant close attention going forward are how and to what extent trade actually expands, and whether tourism moves beyond limited exchanges centered on a single country to develop into a commercially viable multilateral business model. Whether the expansion of external economic activity can meaningfully ease supply constraints in the domestic production sector and generate new sources of growth will be a central criterion for assessing North Korea's economic performance in the ninth cycle. -
Formulating South Korea's policy agenda requires a strategic approach that draws on analysis of the positions and policy directions revealed at the 9th Party Congress while accounting for the structural confrontation that currently defines inter-Korean relations. North Korea has hardened its stance against inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, which places significant practical constraints on any policy framework premised on near-term cooperative projects. Notwithstanding these constraints, the work of accurately understanding the state of the North Korean economy and the direction of its policy priorities retains considerable importance. The timing and character of any turning point toward relationship recovery are difficult to predict, and without pre-prepared response options, South Korea's policy choices could narrow sharply when that moment arrives. South Korea must also develop clear principles and policy options for how it will position itself in relation to North Korea's economic activities within the broader regional context, particularly as North Korea moves to expand its external economic relationships. This reflects a broader reality: in an East Asian environment where politics, economics, diplomacy, and security are deeply intertwined, North Korea must no longer be confined to exclusively through the bilateral inter-Korean framework.
First, South Korean policy institutions and research bodies should strengthen their capacity to assess the operational effectiveness of the North Korean economy and the actual conditions of public welfare, beyond macroeconomic estimates such as GDP growth rates. For long-term initiatives such as the Local Development 20×10 Policy, whether cities and counties can sustain independent operations is a practical measure of the North Korean authorities' policy implementation capacity and regime resilience. South Korea should accordingly develop more sophisticated indicator systems capable of tracking and assessing sectoral operational conditions, rather than relying solely on aggregate economic measures.
Second, the inter-Korean cooperation agenda should be redesigned around the principle of mutual benefit. The logic of humanitarian assistance or benevolence alone is increasingly unlikely to elicit a positive response from North Korea. Even if the relationship improves, cooperation is likely to begin in areas where mutual interests are clearly defined. In that context, understanding North Korea's dual objective of achieving near-term tangible gains while building medium- to long-term potential will be essential. If North Korea places priority on operational stability and supply improvement, cooperation should be designed around practical effectiveness — focused on operations and maintenance, supply chains and standards, and human capacity and management capability — rather than construction projects as such.
Third, health and disaster response should be actively considered as regional public goods agenda items at the East Asian level. A stable North Korean public health system and enhanced emergency response capacity are of direct benefit to neighboring countries. Infectious diseases and disasters cross borders, and natural disasters have direct implications for logistics, mobility, and economic stability. The 9th Party Congress's inclusion of city and county hospital construction alongside flood control, afforestation, urban management, and building maintenance as maintenance priorities demonstrates that these remain pressing concerns within North Korea itself. Multilateral cooperation frameworks covering epidemic prevention and infection control, the supply management of medicines and consumables, and disaster preparedness and response systems warrant serious consideration going forward.
Fourth, South Korea must develop long-term policy options on broader cooperative agendas such as cross-border infrastructure and logistics network connectivity. The integration and linkage of transportation, logistics, and energy networks is an issue that extends well beyond the bilateral inter-Korean relationship, intersecting with the complex strategic interests of neighboring states and the broader regional economic architecture. If North Korea is serious about developing foreign trade and tourism as strategic industries, it will need to address infrastructure constraints in transportation, logistics, electric power, and telecommunications — and it is likely to do so in conjunction with neighboring countries. South Korea must therefore develop proactive policy frameworks for how to engage with infrastructure connectivity agendas within multilateral East Asian cooperation structures, and on what conditions and principles such participation should be based.
The 9th Party Congress makes clear that North Korea is focused less on macroeconomic quantitative growth than on strengthening the internal foundations of the system through more sophisticated internal management and effective operations. Although the current inter-Korean impasse persists, closely tracking how North Korea navigates its supply constraints and whether local development policy proves sustainable will constitute a strategic asset in preparing for future shifts on the Korean Peninsula. The South Korean government should analyze North Korea's evolving economic management approach from multiple angles and move beyond the frameworks of simple assistance or exchange to continuously develop and refine policy options that account for the complex interplay of the regional economic landscape and the security environment.
| Assessment and Implications of Economic and Social Affairs at North Korea's 9th Party Congress
| Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development
| The New Five-Year Economic Development Plan: Strategic Direction and Management
| Sectoral Priorities and Key Tasks
| Institutionalization of Local and Rural Development Policy
| Pragmatic Reorientation of International Economic Policy
| Policy Directions for South Korea
1) Based on the Bank of Korea's annual estimates of North Korea's real GDP growth rate (−0.1% in 2021, −0.2% in 2022, 3.1% in 2023, and 3.7% in 2024), combined with a state research institution's projection of approximately 3.0% growth for 2025, cumulative growth indexed to 2020 (base year = 100) yields an estimated real GDP level of approximately 109.8 by end-2025, representing a roughly 10 percent expansion relative to the 2020 baseline.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
