Chinese President Xi Jinping has concluded his first state visit to North Korea in seven years, a trip that has generated intense debate over its strategic significance. Officially, the visit commemorated the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance signed between China and North Korea in 1961. It was Xi's second trip to Pyongyang following his 2019 visit marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Although the anniversary served as a convenient diplomatic pretext, Xi's decision to make North Korea his first overseas destination of the year carried significance far beyond a reaffirmation of traditional friendship and a pledge to deepen strategic cooperation. The visit was especially noteworthy because it came immediately after Xi hosted U.S.-China and China-Russia summits in Beijing in May with Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Earlier, at China's Victory Day celebrations in September 2025, Xi had prominently positioned Putin and Kim Jong Un at his side while openly intensifying efforts to challenge the U.S.-led international order.

China and North Korea have traditionally described their relationship as one of "lips and teeth" (脣亡齒寒), reflecting a perception of mutual strategic dependence. Yet despite being socialist allies bound by what both sides call a blood-forged friendship, the two countries have experienced repeated strains in their bilateral relationship since North Korea embarked on its nuclear weapons program in earnest. As U.S.-China strategic competition has intensified and North Korea and Russia have evolved into what increasingly resembles a de facto military alliance, China has shown a growing tendency to view North Korea's nuclear capabilities as a strategic asset rather than a liability. Even so, Beijing's position on how far it is willing to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea remains far from clear.

As is customary, the summit produced neither a joint statement nor an official agreement. Instead, China's Xinhua News Agency and North Korea's Korean Central News Agency released separate accounts of the meeting, emphasizing different points and revealing subtle signs of diplomatic maneuvering. More strikingly, neither 'denuclearization' nor the 'Korean Peninsula issue' was mentioned in discussions of regional security. This omission has generated even greater speculation. Whether the summit ultimately represented an implicit Chinese acceptance of North Korea's nuclear status in exchange for Pyongyang's support on Taiwan, or marked the formal beginning of a strategic partnership organized around a new anti-American front, remains a question that will require further time and evidence to answer.

This report seeks to examine the strategic implications of Xi Jinping's visit for the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia from multiple perspectives. It first analyzes what Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping sought to achieve through their discussions in Pyongyang and the extent to which those objectives were realized or frustrated. It then explores the structural implications of the newly reconfigured China-North Korea relationship for denuclearization negotiations and inter-Korean relations, before offering policy recommendations for the strategic choices the South Korean government should consider going forward.

| What North Korea and China Exchanged, and the Price of 'Tacit Acceptance'

The state media of both countries gave extraordinary coverage to the summit. On June 9, the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, devoted its entire front page to Xi Jinping's visit to North Korea, filling it with articles and five photographs. Xinhua News Agency likewise saturated the front page of its website and mobile platform with related articles, photographs, and videos. North Korea did the same. On June 9, Rodong Sinmun expanded its publication from six pages to ten pages, dedicating seven pages to special coverage of Xi's visit and publishing 80 photographs.

While both sides employed lavish rhetoric to emphasize that bilateral relations had entered a new chapter and that they had agreed to expand cooperation across various fields, their silence on denuclearization is arguably more significant. Following the North Korea-China summit held on the occasion of the September 2025 Victory Day celebrations in Beijing and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's visit to Pyongyang in April 2026, this marked the third consecutive high-level official dialogue in which any reference to denuclearization was omitted. The change in tone is striking when compared with Xi's 2019 visit to North Korea, during which he explicitly stated that China supported "the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Even after the U.S.-China summit in May, the White House announced that "Trump and Xi reaffirmed their shared goal of North Korean denuclearization," whereas the Chinese government merely stated that the two leaders had "exchanged views on issues related to the Korean Peninsula."¹⁾

The term 'denuclearization,' long used almost as a boilerplate expression in international discussions of North Korea's nuclear program, appears to have lost its place in North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia summit diplomacy. From Pyongyang's perspective, having secured Russia's explicit support and China's tacit consent, North Korea may now feel increasingly confident that it no longer faces meaningful international pressure regarding denuclearization.

Immediately before Xi's visit, North Korea openly demonstrated its anti-denuclearization posture before both China and the broader international community. Kim Jong Un revealed what was believed to be a new nuclear-material production facility associated with uranium enrichment and declared that "further expanding and strengthening the state's nuclear force and fully exercising the status of a nuclear-armed state constitute an unchanging political and military position and a responsible duty."²⁾ Kim Yo Jong likewise dismissed the U.S. claim that the American and Chinese leaders had reaffirmed a shared commitment to denuclearization as "a game of spreading falsehoods." She stated that "the line of continuously strengthening the self-defensive nuclear war deterrent, proclaimed by the head of state, is an irreversible final conclusion that must be carried out without condition."³⁾

Kim Jong Un also declared that "regardless of how circumstances may change, our Party and government will fully support and stand by the policies and positions of the Chinese Party and government in safeguarding their core interests under the principle of One China."⁴⁾ This statement can be interpreted as the price of China's tacit acceptance of North Korea's nuclear status. It amounted to an international alignment signal demonstrating Pyongyang's willingness to support Beijing on its most sensitive security concerns. The statement appears to have been a direct response to Xi Jinping's article published on the front page of Rodong Sinmun on June 8. In that article, Xi observed that "the world is undergoing profound changes unseen in a century and the international situation is becoming increasingly complex," before stating that "both sides must firmly support one another in safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests, while jointly defending regional peace and stability, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order." The significance of this exchange becomes clearer when viewed alongside the May summit in Beijing, during which Xi reportedly signaled, in Trump's presence, the possibility of military action against Taiwan.⁵⁾

Xi also publicly stated during the summit that "exchanges should be strengthened in such areas as diplomacy, law enforcement, and the military." According to officials from South Korea's Ministry of Unification, this was the first time that military exchanges had been publicly mentioned during any of the seven North Korea-China summits held since Xi consolidated power in 2018.⁶⁾ Various interpretations have emerged regarding Xi's intentions. One view is that China seeks to strengthen military cooperation with North Korea and potentially utilize that relationship in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Another interpretation sees it as a hedging strategy against North Korea's rapidly deepening military cooperation with Russia.⁷⁾ Both interpretations likely contain elements of truth. China appears to have a dual objective: preparing for a potential Taiwan crisis while simultaneously ensuring that North Korea's growing military capabilities, enhanced through cooperation with Russia, remain within a range that Beijing can influence and manage. At the same time, it is noteworthy that Rodong Sinmun, in its coverage of the summit, omitted any reference to the discussion of military exchanges. This omission suggests North Korea's desire to avoid appearing dependent on China and to preserve its image of strategic autonomy.

Economic cooperation was another major theme, one that pushes into the gray areas surrounding sanctions on North Korea. Xi Jinping explicitly referred to the full reopening of border crossings, the resumption of civilian air routes and international passenger train services, and practical cooperation in trade, agriculture, construction, science and technology, and healthcare. North Korea had already partially resumed air and rail links with China in March. It has also been developing seaside resorts and hot-spring tourism facilities in preparation for attracting larger numbers of Chinese tourists.

| Different Calculations: What Xi Jinping Wanted and What Kim Jong Un Sought

In the absence of an official joint statement, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping's visit appears to have been driven by three clear strategic objectives.

First, the visit was aimed at reshaping an anti-hegemonic coalition opposed to a U.S.-centered international order. Through this trip, Xi seems to have sought to demonstrate that his relationships with authoritarian states such as North Korea and Russia are stronger than the ties Donald Trump maintains with democratic partners such as South Korea and Japan. In his article published in Rodong Sinmun, Xi emphasized opposition to "hegemonism and power politics" and advocated "a fair and orderly multipolar world." In this sense, China appears to have sought to position Kim Jong Un's North Korea as a key pillar of a cooperative alignment resisting the U.S.-led international order.

Second, the visit reflected Beijing's determination to pull North Korea back into a China-centered orbit after its growing tilt toward Russia. In this regard, Xi's trip was a continuation of the extraordinary diplomatic treatment afforded to Kim Jong Un in Beijing in September of last year. It also helps explain Xi's decision to make a dramatic return visit to Pyongyang, seven years after his previous trip, on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, immediately following both the U.S.-China and China-Russia summits.

Third, Xi made clear that China has no intention of relinquishing its influence over Korean Peninsula affairs. At a time when Trump is exploring the possibility of renewed dialogue with Kim Jong Un, Xi's decision to travel to Pyongyang first can be interpreted as a message that the peninsula's security architecture should not be reshaped without China's consent. Although Beijing has promoted the concept of a 'new type of great-power relations,' accompanied by rhetoric that "the Pacific Ocean is vast enough to accommodate both the interests of China and the United States," the underlying message appears closer to a demand that Washington recognize China's sphere of influence. Xi was signaling that China firmly opposes any independent agreement between Trump and Kim that could undermine Chinese interests.

Kim Jong Un's own calculations also appear to have paid off to a considerable extent. Within the emerging multipolar order promoted by Beijing, Kim seems to have succeeded in elevating North Korea's status toward that of a partner treated on more equal terms with China. By attending China's 80th Victory Day celebrations in September of last year, he made his debut on a major multilateral stage and projected the image of a 'global actor' leading one of the principal states in the anti-U.S. camp. The fact that neither North Korea's nuclear program nor sanctions against Pyongyang were reportedly raised during the summit is also significant. From North Korea's perspective, this may contribute to its broader effort to be accepted by the international community as a normal state.

| Strategic Partnership: Breaking Out of the Blood Alliance

Although Xi Jinping's 2019 and 2026 visits to North Korea shared many outward similarities, they also revealed fundamental differences. Xi's visit seven years ago, which came after two summits between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, was framed around China's self-appointed role as a mediator on denuclearization. In an article published in Rodong Sinmun in 2019, Xi emphasized China's role as a guardian and facilitator, stating that the two sides would "jointly promote progress in dialogue and negotiations related to the Korean Peninsula issue and actively contribute to regional peace, stability, development, and prosperity." By contrast, Xi's 2026 article in Rodong Sinmun employed the language of a relationship among equals. He wrote that "both sides should firmly support each other in safeguarding their sovereignty, security, and development interests, and work together to uphold regional peace and stability, international fairness and justice, and the postwar international order." It is therefore no coincidence that the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) described the summit as "a new milestone in the development of strategic coordination."⁸⁾

At the same time, it would be a mistake to reduce this development to a narrative of complete China-North Korea alignment. The summit also revealed underlying tensions between the two countries. Shortly before Xi's arrival, North Korea publicly showcased what was believed to be a nuclear material production facility and issued a statement through Kim Yo Jong reaffirming its rejection of denuclearization. Such actions were close to a breach of normal diplomatic protocol. Some observers argue that significant differences remained between Beijing and Pyongyang over denuclearization during pre-summit consultations, and that North Korea deliberately moved first in an effort to shape the agenda on its own terms. From this perspective, the absence of any reference to denuclearization may not necessarily reflect Chinese acquiescence to North Korea's nuclear arsenal. Rather, it may have been the outcome of an intense but largely unseen tug-of-war between the two sides over the issue.⁹⁾

There is also little evidence that China has completely abandoned its long-standing commitment to denuclearization in principle. From Beijing's perspective, the most undesirable outcome would be a nuclear domino effect triggered by formal recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, potentially leading Japan to pursue its own nuclear weapons capability. Viewed in this light, China's silence on denuclearization may represent not a rejection of the principle itself, but a tactical decision to place the issue into a management mode in order to keep a Russia-leaning North Korea within Beijing's orbit. In other words, China may be pursuing a dual-track strategy: maintaining a stable relationship with North Korea amid intensifying great-power competition while preserving denuclearization as a diplomatic card that can still be played in its dealings with the United States and South Korea.

| South Korea's Choice: Designing a New Strategy Based on a Clear-Eyed Assessment of Reality

In the wake of the June China-North Korea summit, the international leverage available to pressure North Korea on denuclearization appears to be weakening further. Immediately after Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the "complete denuclearization of North Korea" through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) with Japan and discussions at the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China and Russia, however, appear increasingly reluctant to actively support efforts aimed at North Korea's denuclearization.¹⁰⁾ Since the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2397 following North Korea's launch of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2017, both China and Russia have responded to calls for additional sanctions with veto threats or outright opposition. Having witnessed the consequences of nuclear disarmament through the Iran war, Kim Jong Un now appears to regard nuclear deterrence as an absolute prerequisite for regime survival. President Lee Jae Myung reached a similar conclusion in an interview with The Economist, stating that "after the Iran war, North Korea will be even less willing to give up its nuclear arsenal."¹¹⁾

Against this backdrop, the South Korean government should begin by recalibrating its denuclearization objectives on the basis of a realistic assessment of current conditions. At a press conference marking the first anniversary of his inauguration, President Lee argued that the goal of denuclearization should not be abandoned. At the same time, he emphasized that negotiations should focus in the short term on three objectives: halting additional production of nuclear materials, preventing the transfer of nuclear materials abroad through a moratorium, and stopping the development of intercontinental ballistic missile technologies. This suggests that while maintaining complete denuclearization as the ultimate end-state, Seoul may need to adopt a two-track strategy that prioritizes nuclear freeze measures and nonproliferation goals in the near term.

A second strategic option is to strengthen national capabilities while maintaining channels of communication with China. The Lee administration has moved to increase South Korea's defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, reflecting an effort to expand the country's role within the alliance framework. South Korea has also already secured U.S. consent for the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines and the development of capabilities related to nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing. In particular, enrichment capability represents a potentially significant asset that could expand Seoul's strategic options. At the same time, South Korea cannot afford to abandon diplomacy with China simply because Beijing appears increasingly distant from the denuclearization agenda. China remains North Korea's largest economic partner and has not completely relinquished its influence over Pyongyang. A nuclear-armed North Korea continues to present challenges for Beijing, and concerns persist that North Korean nuclear weapons could ultimately be used in ways contrary to China's core interests. For this reason, Seoul should continue to pursue persistent and carefully calibrated denuclearization diplomacy with China.

Third, South Korea must ensure that it is not marginalized in diplomacy surrounding North Korea's nuclear program at a time when China-North Korea, Russia-North Korea, and trilateral China-North Korea-Russia relations are evolving rapidly, while the possibility of a future U.S.-North Korea summit remains alive. The historic China-North Korea summit produced neither a joint statement nor an official agreement. Nevertheless, the messages conveyed through state media reports offer important clues about the Korean Peninsula's future trajectory. China appears intent on binding North Korea more tightly into an anti-hegemonic coalition, buoyed by growing confidence that it can compete effectively with the United States in the emerging era of great-power rivalry. North Korea, for its part, seems convinced that it has secured a de facto acknowledgment of its nuclear status. Within this new strategic equation, South Korea could either become a passive object shaped by great-power competition or carve out greater room for strategic autonomy. If Xi Jinping's visit to Pyongyang truly marks 'the beginning of a new historical journey,' it may also represent a watershed moment for South Korea, requiring a reassessment of long-held assumptions and the formulation of a new strategy grounded in contemporary realities. Should U.S.-North Korea dialogue resume, the difference between being at the negotiating table and merely accepting the outcome from the outside would be enormous. President Lee's emphasis on sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula during the Group of Seven (G7) Summit in Évian, France, and President Trump's response that he would "play any role necessary to advance progress on Korean Peninsula issues," appears to reflect Seoul's concern about avoiding exclusion from future diplomatic processes.

The possibility that China-North Korea military cooperation could become increasingly institutionalized also casts a new shadow over the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. Such developments could directly affect the U.S.-South Korea alliance as it pursues wartime operational control (Op-Con) transition and broader alliance modernization. If military cooperation between China and North Korea continues to deepen while tensions on the peninsula rise, the alliance could face significant security challenges. China's potential role in facilitating renewed inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea dialogue may also require reassessment. Prior to Xi's visit, the South Korean government openly expressed expectations that China would play a 'constructive role,' while the Ministry of Unification appeared confident that renewed U.S.-North Korea dialogue would eventually become possible. The actual outcome of the summit, however, suggested a very different reality. As a result, Seoul may need to prepare for the possibility that efforts to improve inter-Korean relations will not produce meaningful results in the near term.

1. David Pierson and Choe Sang-Hun, "Why Xi Jinping Is Going to North Korea to Court Kim Jong-un," The New York Times, June 8, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/04/world/asia/china-north-korea-xi-jinping-visit.html?searchResultPosition=1 (accessed June 13, 2026).
2. Cheol-Seon Kim, "Kim Jong-un Visits New Uranium Enrichment Facility, Believed to Be a Newly Built Plant in Yongbyon," Yonhap News Agency, June 4, 2026, https://www.koreancenter.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1362529 (accessed June 13, 2026).
3. Myung-Hoon Jeon, "Kim Yo-jong: North Korea's Status as a Nuclear Weapons State Is Absolutely Irreversible and No Threat Will Be Tolerated," Yonhap News Agency, June 7, 2026, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260607005151504?input=1195m (accessed June 13, 2026).
4. Young-Gyo Jeong, Yoo-Jung Lee, and Seung-Ho Lee, "North Korea and China Enter a New Era of Blood Alliance to Address Global Issues Including Taiwan," JoongAng Ilbo, p. 10, June 10, 2026.
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6. Ye-Ji Jang, "First Public Mention of North Korea-China Military Cooperation: Xi Signals Concern over Growing North Korea-Russia Ties," The Hankyoreh, p. 8, June 10, 2026.
7. Michael Cunningham, "For China, Xi's North Korea Trip Was About Managing Relationships," Stimson Center, June 12, 2026, https://www.stimson.org/2026/xi-jinpings-visit-to-pyongyang-regional-roundup/ (accessed June 14, 2026).
8. Oh-Hyeok Kwon and Cheol-Joong Kim, "China Hails North Korea as a Core Pillar of the Anti-U.S. Front and a New Milestone in Strategic Coordination," Dong-A Ilbo, p. 1, June 10, 2026.
9. Xi Jinping, "Signed Article Published in Rodong Sinmun," June 8, 2026. Notably, the article made no mention of denuclearization, the Korean Peninsula issue, or Russia. Yonhap News Agency, June 10, 2026.
10. Na-Ri Baek, "U.S. Emphasizes North Korean Denuclearization in Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy Following Xi Jinping's Visit to North Korea," Yonhap News Agency, June 11, 2026, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260611000651071?input=1195m (accessed June 14, 2026).
11. "An Interview with South Korea's President Lee Jae Myung Has Put His Country on Track Again, but Challenges Loom," The Economist, June 10, 2026, https://www.economist.com/asia/2026/06/10/an-interview-with-south-koreas-president (accessed June 14, 2026).

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