| The U.S.-China and China-Russia Summits and the Structural Shift in the International Order

The U.S.-China summit and the China-Russia summit, held back-to-back in Beijing in May 2026, were events that went beyond mere bilateral summit diplomacy to encapsulate a structural shift in the international order in concentrated form. In particular, the rules-based international order led by the United States and the West since the end of World War II is facing serious pressure amid simultaneous geopolitical crises, including the protracted Russia-Ukraine War, the outbreak of the Iran War, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Sino-Japanese friction, and security instability on the Korean Peninsula. Held against this backdrop, the two summits demonstrated both domestically and internationally that the U.S.-centered unipolar order can no longer function stably in its existing form, and that a new multipolar international order centered on the trilateral relationship among the United States, China, and Russia is now taking shape in earnest.

The U.S.-China summit and the China-Russia summit, held back-to-back in Beijing in May 2026, were events that went beyond mere bilateral summit diplomacy to encapsulate a structural shift in the international order. In particular, the rules-based international order led by the United States and the West since World War II is facing serious pressure amid simultaneous geopolitical crises, including the protracted Russia-Ukraine War, the outbreak of the Iran War, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, China-Japan friction, and security instability on the Korean Peninsula. Held against this backdrop, the two summits demonstrated both domestically and internationally that the U.S.-centered unipolar order can no longer function stably in its existing form, and that a new multipolar international order centered on the trilateral relationship among the United States, China, and Russia is now taking shape in earnest.

The U.S.-China summit revealed not so much a resolution of U.S.-China strategic competition as a shared pursuit of stable management aimed at reducing the costs of confrontation. In particular, the United States demonstrated an approach of seeking to utilize China's role in resolving issues related to Russia, Iran, and North Korea, even as it continued to check Chinese power, while China maintained what may be characterized as a posture of "fighting without breaking" (鬪而不破), avoiding full-scale confrontation with the United States while refusing to yield on core interests in areas such as Taiwan, advanced technology, rare earths, critical minerals, and the Iran issue. The United States described the summit as having produced certain achievements in the economic, industrial, and supply chain domains, but on core strategic issues including Taiwan, Iran, advanced technology, and rare earths, fundamental differences in position between the two countries were laid bare.¹⁾ China likewise characterized agreements discussed during President Trump's visit relating to tariffs, agriculture, and aircraft as preliminary in nature, and announced that both sides had agreed to continue discussions on the establishment of an investment commission and a trade commission, item-specific tariff reduction negotiations, and agricultural products and market access issues.

The China-Russia summit held on May 20, by contrast, demonstrated that China and Russia are further institutionalizing the strategic cooperation through which they jointly respond to the rules-based international order led by the United States and the West. Presidents Xi Jinping and Putin assessed that the bilateral relationship had reached its highest level in history and agreed to extend The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation concluded in 2001, concluding more than 40 cooperation documents across multiple domains including trade, technology, and media. The two leaders also issued separate joint statements emphasizing their strategic relationship and energy cooperation and calling for the construction of a multipolar international order and a new type of international relations, making clear their shared determination to respond jointly to the U.S. and Western-centered international order.²⁾

In this way, the U.S.-China summit and the China-Russia summit carry contrasting diplomatic significance. If the U.S.-China summit was summit diplomacy aimed not at resolving but at managing conflict, the China-Russia summit may be understood as summit diplomacy institutionalizing shared strategic perceptions and a vision of an anti-Western order. That is, the United States and China emphasized economic transactions and the necessity of crisis management within a framework of strategic competition, while China and Russia, though not a formal military alliance, are structuring political, economic, energy, technological, and security cooperation in order to respond to the U.S. and Western-centered order. These changes are expected to exert a significant impact on the Northeast Asian, Korean Peninsula, and Eurasian orders.

| Key Contents and Implications of the U.S.-China Summit: From Strategic Competition to Stable Management

Compared with previous U.S.-China summits, the Beijing summit revealed notable differences across four key dimensions. First, the agenda expanded beyond bilateral issues to encompass a complex set of matters spanning global affairs and economic security. Whereas previous U.S.-China summits had proceeded around individual agenda items such as bilateral trade, Taiwan, the South China Sea, human rights, climate change, and military communication, this summit saw the Iran War and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the protracted Russia-Ukraine War, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait issue, rare earths and critical minerals, semiconductors and artificial intelligence (Al), and agricultural products and aircraft purchases all discussed as a single strategic package. This demonstrates that economics and security in the U.S.-China relationship can no longer be separated, and that virtually every agenda item is being transformed into a strategic security and economic security issue.

Second, the level of agreement between the two countries remained confined to sector-specific transactions and limited management rather than constituting a comprehensive strategic accommodation. The United States presented as its principal achievements China's purchases of U.S. agricultural products and Boeing aircraft, access to the Chinese market for beef and poultry, and the stabilization of rare earth and critical mineral supply chains. On the Taiwan issue, the Iran War, advanced technology controls toward China, and Korean Peninsula and South China Sea issues, however, fundamental differences in position between the two countries persisted.³⁾ This summit, in other words, was less the starting point of strategic rapprochement or the resolution of the new Cold War than an exercise in limited transactions and crisis management aimed at reducing the risk of mutual conflict and confrontation. Third, the manner of linking economics and security became more concrete. The United States, through economic negotiations with China, pursued the tangible benefits of trade balance improvement, agricultural export expansion, aircraft sales, and critical mineral supply chain stabilization, while simultaneously expecting China to cooperate to a certain degree with U.S. global strategic objectives on the Iran, Russia, and North Korea issues. China, by contrast, offered some economic concessions while refusing to accept U.S. pressure on the Taiwan issue, core technology controls, Iranian crude oil imports, and cooperation with Russia and North Korea. This signifies that the U.S.-China relationship has moved beyond the simple trade and commercial disputes of the past and is transforming into a complex strategic competition in which geopolitics and geoeconomics are mutually intertwined. Fourth, the messages conveyed by the top leaders of the United States and China also shifted. Whereas previous U.S.-China summits had largely emphasized "preventing conflict," "managing competition responsibly." and "restoring communication channels," this summit foregrounded expressions such as "tangible benefits," "transactions," "strategic stability," and "respect for core interests." The United States, in other words, framed the summit primarily in terms of economic achievements, while China emphasized the strategic stability of the U.S.-China relationship and a relationship of equality between great powers.

At the same time, China formally raised the Taiwan issue as its most important core interest at the U.S.-China summit. President Xi Jinping warned that the Taiwan issue is the most sensitive and important matter in the U.S.-China relationship, and that if the United States were to send the wrong signals to pro-independence forces in Taiwan or continue arms sales, the situation could enter an extremely dangerous phase. The two leaders appeared to share a recognition of the need to manage the possibility of accidental conflict through political, diplomatic, and military communication channels, and to discuss major regional issues including the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. The fundamental differences in the two countries' positions on the Taiwan issue, however, remain unresolved. Clear divergences between the United States and China were also evident on the Iran War and the Strait of Hormuz issue.⁴⁾ While the United States stated that China had agreed on the need to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and on the necessity of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open, China maintained a cautious posture, stating only that views had been exchanged on the Middle East situation and the Strait of Hormuz issue. This reflects a sophisticated strategic calculation on China's part to seek a degree of cooperation with the United States in preventing armed conflict and managing crises, while avoiding direct alignment with the U.S.-led pressure framework on the Iran issue.

Looking back at previous U.S.-China summits, the emphasis was consistently on preventing conflict and restoring communication channels. The 2022 Bali summit, for instance, focused on establishing strategic guardrails to prevent bilateral competition from escalating into military conflict, while the 2023 San Francisco summit was primarily oriented toward restoring limited cooperation agenda items including military communication channels, the fentanyl issue, Al risk management, and climate change. U.S.-China summits since 2024 similarly remained at the level of managing conflicts over trade, technology, and the Taiwan issue. In essence, the core of U.S.-China summit diplomacy throughout this period rested on the shared recognition that "strategic competition is unavoidable, but physical confrontation and conflict must be prevented."

The 2026 U.S.-China summit, however, reveals a fundamental change in the nature of the U.S.-China relationship in that it maintained the framework of mutual conflict management while shifting the focus toward transactional management. The U.S.-China relationship is no longer one in which economics and security are separated; it is transforming into a complex competitive relationship in which economic security, technology security, energy security, and military security are mutually interlinked. Through this summit, the United States sought to emphasize economic achievements domestically while demonstrating China's responsible role on the Iran, North Korea, and Russia issues externally. China, by contrast, emphasized the stable management of the U.S.-China relationship, a relationship of equality between great powers, respect for core interests, and non-interference in the Taiwan issue. From China's perspective, the summit was an occasion to confirm China's core interests and international standing while avoiding full-scale confrontation with the United States.

Ultimately, while the likelihood that the U.S.-China relationship will lead to full-scale conflict following this summit is not high, the structure of strategic competition itself has not been relaxed. The two countries cannot completely sever their economic interdependence, and cooperation remains necessary on certain global issues including nuclear nonproliferation, Iran, North Korea, climate, and financial market stability. On Taiwan, advanced technology, military security, supply chains, and the competition over values and systems, however, structural confrontation continues. The U.S.-China relationship is therefore likely to evolve into a state of unstable stability characterized by the coexistence of conflict and cooperation, the alternation of strategic competition and transactions, and the simultaneous presence of crisis management and mutual distrust.⁵⁾

| Key Contents and Implications of the China-Russia Summit: From Declaratory Cooperation to Institutionalized Solidarity

Since the Russia-Ukraine War, China-Russia summits have functioned as a critical catalyst for expanding strategic cooperation between the two countries. At the summit held on the occasion of the Beijing Winter Olympics in February 2022, China and Russia shared a common problem consciousness regarding the U.S. and Western-centered unipolar order and NATO enlargement, displaying a degree of strategic closeness symbolized by the expression that cooperation between the two countries has "no limits." As Western sanctions against Russia became protracted and the Russia-Ukraine War continued in the form of an attritional conflict, Russia came to regard economic, energy, and financial cooperation with China as the core foundation of its survival strategy. China, for its part, came to perceive Russia as a strategic rear flank and core partner in Eurasian cooperation within the framework of mounting U.S. pressure on China and the strengthening of the Indo-Pacific strategy.⁶⁾

The 2026 China-Russia summit advanced this trajectory a step further. Whereas previous China-Russia summits had placed emphasis on confirming strategic trust and shared anti-Western perceptions, this summit was distinguished by the documentation, institutionalization, and sector-specific structuring of bilateral cooperation. In particular, the two leaders emphasized the deepening of their comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, and reaffirmed the long-term foundation of cooperation through the extension of the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the adoption of a joint statement, and the signing of more than 40 cooperation documents and memoranda of understanding. This demonstrates that China-Russia cooperation is moving beyond the level of simple political declarations and entering a stage of institutionalization.⁷⁾ The two leaders are advancing cooperation across diverse domains including diplomacy, security, national defense, economics, energy, technology, media, and education through small-group and expanded summit formats. Driven by these structural changes, the China-Russia summit held in Beijing on May 20 exhibited four notable characteristics that distinguished it from its predecessors. First, the discourse of China and Russia on a multipolar international order and a new type of international relations has become markedly sharper. The two countries criticize the U.S. and Western-centered rules-based order as an order of unilateralism, hegemonism, bloc politics, and interference in internal affairs, and are presenting UN-centered international order and cooperation through BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Global South as the foundation of an alternative multipolar international order. This signifies that China and Russia are moving beyond simply opposing the U.S. and Western-led unipolar order and are positioning themselves as architects of a new multipolar international order and as spokespersons for the Global South.

Second, energy cooperation has been elevated to the dimension of strategic security. Russia, following Western sanctions and the contraction of European markets, regards China as its core energy demand base, while China, taking into account Middle East instability, maritime transportation route risks, and energy security uncertainties, places high strategic value on land-based energy supply chains of Russian crude oil, gas, coal, and uranium. President Putin in particular emphasized at the China-Russia summit that energy cooperation is the core driving force of Russia-China economic cooperation, and the two sides agreed to expand not only energy cooperation but also all-around economic cooperation in the context of the Middle East crisis, with Russia as a stable resource supplier and China as a responsible consumer. According to Chinese side announcements, bilateral China-Russia trade has exceeded 200 billion dollars for three consecutive years, reaching approximately 228 billion dollars in 2025.⁸⁾ In the financial domain, the trend toward de-dollarization also warrants attention. China and Russia are advancing the expansion of yuan and ruble-denominated settlements, the construction of independent payment networks, and the expansion of financial cooperation within BRICS in order to respond to U.S. financial sanctions and dollar hegemony. While this trend is unlikely to replace the dollar-centered system in the short term, it has the potential over the medium to long term to promote the pluralization of the international financial order, particularly in the dimensions of energy transactions, sanctions evasion, and the expansion of financial and payment system autonomy with Global South countries.

Third, advanced technology, digital, artificial intelligence, and media cooperation have newly emerged as areas of focus. While China-Russia cooperation had previously centered on energy. military security, trade, and financial settlement, this summit saw advanced technology, media, digital innovation, and artificial intelligence incorporated into cooperation documents, broadening the scope of bilateral cooperation. This demonstrates that U.S. and Western advanced technology controls targeting China and technology sanctions targeting Russia are, paradoxically, heightening the necessity of advanced technology cooperation between China and Russia. China may, however, be likely to adopt a cautious posture toward sensitive military and technology cooperation that could trigger U.S. secondary sanctions, even as it expands advanced technology cooperation with Russia, given that it cannot entirely abandon its economic and technological relationships with the United States and the West. Fourth, while the China-Russia relationship does not constitute a formal military alliance, it is reinforcing its character as a quasi-alliance. Both China and Russia emphasize the principles of "non-alliance, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties," yet they share considerably similar strategic perceptions on NATO enlargement, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS, ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation, and the Taiwan, Iran, and Korean Peninsula issues. In other words, the two countries are developing a sophisticated strategic solidarity that jointly responds to the U.S. and Western-led unipolar order without declaring an alliance entailing legal mutual defense obligations. The China-Russia relationship may therefore be interpreted not as an ideological military alliance but as an institutionalized quasi-alliance strategic solidarity.

It should be noted, of course, that the China-Russia summit did not achieve substantive progress on every issue. In particular, no clear breakthrough was confirmed on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline issue that Russia has consistently hoped to advance. This demonstrates that China, even as it expands strategic cooperation with Russia, is approaching the relationship with caution, taking into account energy prices, transportation conditions, the risk of excessive dependence on Russia, and the risk of Western sanctions. Furthermore, the manner of concluding the Russia-Ukraine War, the level of military support for Russia, the adjustment of influence in Central Asia, and China's discomfort with DPRK-Russia military cooperation remain as potential imbalance factors within the China-Russia relationship.⁹⁾ At the same time, the United States remains the world's preeminent military, financial, and technological power, maintaining its global alliance network and the dollar-centered financial system. The likelihood that the U.S. and Western-led unipolar order will collapse in the short term solely through the expansion of China-Russia cooperation is therefore not high. Nevertheless, the weakening of U.S. influence relative to the past, war fatigue within the West, simultaneously erupting security crises across the Middle East, Europe, and East Asia, and the deepening of China-Russia strategic solidarity all demonstrate that structural change in the international order is underway.

| Comparing the U.S.-China and China-Russia Summits and Changes in the U.S.-China-Russia Trilateral Relationship

The differences between the U.S.-China and China-Russia summits held back-to-back in Beijing were evident not only in agenda and outcomes but also in the level of diplomatic protocol, the format of the meetings, the composition of attendees, whether joint press conferences were held, and whether joint statements were adopted. These formal differences are not merely a matter of diplomatic protocol but constitute important indicators of the level of trust in the bilateral relationship, the degree of strategic solidarity, and the direction of messaging conveyed domestically and internationally.

The U.S.-China summit carried considerable symbolic weight in that President Trump paid a state visit to China for the first time in approximately nine years. The extended duration of the meetings between the two leaders, the projection of a friendly atmosphere, and scenes of informal dialogue were also highlighted. The substantive character of the summit, however, was ultimately closer to a management-oriented meeting aimed at preventing the deterioration of strategic competition. The two countries reached certain agreements and produced achievements in the economic and trade domains, but did not adopt a comprehensive joint statement or an agreement in the security domain.¹⁰⁾ This signifies that communication between the U.S.-China leaders is possible, but that the level of strategic trust is low and the range of achievable agreement is limited.

The China-Russia summit, by contrast, was a comprehensive summit diplomacy event combining an official welcoming ceremony, a guard of honor inspection, small-group and expanded meetings, a signing ceremony for China-Russia cooperation documents, and a joint announcement. According to announcements by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Kremlin, the two leaders conducted both small-group and expanded meetings, and following the summit officially formalized the direction of cooperation externally through press announcements and the adoption of joint documents. This demonstrates that the China-Russia summit was not merely a bilateral consultative meeting but one that carried the character of demonstrating to both domestic and international audiences the strategic cooperation and solidarity between the two countries.¹¹⁾

The difference in the character of the two summits is also reflected in the composition of attendees. The U.S.-China summit, with core advisers on economic, trade, and security matters in attendance, was strongly characterized by agenda-specific transactions and coordination. The two sides sought to find partial points of convergence in issue-specific negotiations over tariffs, agricultural products, aircraft, supply chains, rare earths, and investment in the United States. The China-Russia summit, by contrast, was closer to a comprehensive strategic coordination conference combining cooperation across multiple ministries encompassing diplomacy, national defense, energy, finance, industry, technology, media, and education. In other words, if the U.S.-China meeting was "selective negotiation to manage conflict," the China-Russia meeting was "all-around negotiation to expand cooperation." The question of whether a joint statement was adopted is the most significant distinguishing factor. The U.S.-China summit was centered primarily on describing achievements in the economic domain, and no joint statement was issued on core issues including Taiwan, Iran, North Korean nuclear issues, and advanced technology controls. The China-Russia summit, by contrast, saw the adoption of joint statements encompassing the deepening of comprehensive strategic cooperation, the strengthening of good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, and the construction of a multipolar international order and new type of international relations, alongside the conclusion of approximately 40 cooperation documents and memoranda of understanding. This demonstrates that China and Russia are achieving a considerable degree of discursive and institutional alignment in their perceptions of the international order and the direction of their external strategies.

In this light, the U.S.-China summit may be characterized as competitive, transactional, and management-oriented summit diplomacy, while the China-Russia summit may be characterized as summit diplomacy aimed at institutionalizing and consolidating strategic solidarity. The United States and China acknowledge their competition while seeking to prevent conflict, while China and Russia recognize their shared pressures while structuring their cooperation. Through this, China is pursuing a dual strategy of managing conflict and confrontation within the framework of medium to long-term strategic competition with the United States, while simultaneously strengthening strategic cooperation, solidarity, and cohesion with Russia. China is thereby positioning itself not merely as an actor within the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship, but as a pivotal great power capable of simultaneously orchestrating relations with both the United States and Russia.

The U.S.-China and China-Russia summits of May 2026 reveal a new U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship that differs from the U.S.-China-Soviet triangular relationship of the Cold War era. In the 1970s, the United States pursued a Nixon strategy of strategically utilizing China to check the Soviet Union. Today, however, the simultaneous U.S. pressure on both China and Russia is paradoxically producing the effect of promoting strategic closeness between China and Russia. It must be noted, however, that characterizing the current international order simply as a new Cold War is insufficient. The Cold War was an order in which two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, divided military, ideological, and economic blocs in a relatively clear-cut manner. The current international order, by contrast, is a complex competitive order in which the U.S. alliance network and dollar financial system, China's manufacturing, supply chain, and technological influence, Russia's military power and energy resources, the strategic autonomy of the Global South, and the diversifying diplomacy of middle powers all operate simultaneously.

The United States remains the world's preeminent military, financial, and technological power, possessing a powerful network of alliances and partnerships including NATO, the ROK-U.S. alliance, the U.S.-Japan alliance, AUKUS, and the Quad. China is the world's largest manufacturing economy and the core axis of China-centered supply chains, expanding its influence in rare earths, batteries, electric vehicles, solar energy, digital infrastructure, and artificial intelligence. Russia, despite Western sanctions, remains an important actor in nuclear forces, energy, food, military technology, the Arctic sea route, and Eurasian security.

Global South countries, meanwhile, no longer align unilaterally with any single side among the United States, China, and Russia. Leveraging diverse multilateral platforms such as BRICS, SCO, the Global Development Initiative, and the Global Security Initiative, these countries express discontent with the double standards of the U.S. and Western-centered order while maximizing diplomatic autonomy and economic benefit. China and Russia are actively leveraging these trends to position themselves as architects of a multipolar international order and as spokespersons for the Global South. The current international order may therefore be interpreted not as a simple bloc-based or camp-based confrontation of "the United States versus China and Russia, but rather as a managed multipolar order or complex competitive order. The U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship is unfolding as a fluid multipolar order in which confrontation, cooperation, balancing, and transactions all operate simultaneously.

| South Korea's New Strategic Response: Complex Management Diplomacy

The region most directly affected by the U.S.-China and China-Russia summits is the Korean Peninsula. China and Russia have already been emphasizing political and diplomatic resolution over sanctions and pressure-centered approaches on the North Korea issue. This could lead to a weakening of coordinated UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, and heightens the possibility that North Korea will leverage its strategic cooperation with China and Russia to substantially expand its political, diplomatic, security, and economic space. In particular, as DPRK-Russia military cooperation expands with the protraction of the Russia-Ukraine War and the likelihood grows that China will strengthen its engagement with North Korea to maintain influence on the Korean Peninsula, the Korean Peninsula issue is becoming ever more tightly interlinked with the U.S.-China-Russia trilateral relationship. North Korea can already interpret the deepening of China-Russia strategic cooperation, the simultaneous U.S. and Western involvement in the Ukraine and Iran wars, and U.S. and Western checks and pressure on China and Russia as a strategic environment favorable to itself. There is also the possibility that North Korea will further emphasize the legitimacy of its nuclear weapons possession as it observes cases of U.S. military intervention. Within the framework of DPRK-China-Russia trilateral cooperation, the possibilities of sanctions evasion, energy, food, and logistics support, and military technology exchange cannot be ruled out.

As the protraction of the Russia-Ukraine War and the outbreak of the Iran War have strengthened ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation surrounding the Korean Peninsula alongside DPRK-China-Russia solidarity, the trend toward the bloc-ization or camp-ization of regional security is also accelerating. Japan's defense buildup, tensions in the Taiwan Strait, conflicts in the East China Sea and South China Sea and the West Sea structures issue, the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and the interconnectedness of the Russia-Ukraine War and the Iran War are making Korean Peninsula security a matter that can no longer remain a regional issue. The Korean Peninsula is now transforming into a region where U.S.-China-Russia strategic competition, the restructuring of the U.S. alliance network, China's peripheral security strategy, Russia's Eurasian strategy, and North Korea's nuclear strategy all overlap. Should South Korea become trapped within the binary framework of ROK-U.S.-Japan versus DPRK-China-Russia, its diplomatic space will inevitably contract sharply. The ROK-U.S. alliance remains the core pillar of South Korea's security, but if China and Russia are entirely excluded from the Korean Peninsula issue, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue will inevitably become even more difficult. The likelihood also increases that South Korea's options will be substantially constrained in Eurasian logistics, Arctic sea routes, energy security, supply chains, and Global South cooperation. South Korea must therefore pursue a multilayered approach of maintaining the stability of the ROK-U.S. alliance while simultaneously restoring sustained communication channels with neighboring great powers and enhancing crisis management capacity on the Korean Peninsula.

Taking into account the rapidly changing international landscape following the U.S.-China and China-Russia summits, South Korean diplomacy must develop into a more sophisticated strategic complex management diplomacy. This is not passive balancing diplomacy that chooses one side, but an approach that manages the alliance, economic security, relations with China, management of Russia, North Korea policy, Eurasia, and the Global South within a single integrated strategic framework. First, the ROK-U.S. alliance must be restructured as a new comprehensive economic relationship. As the center of gravity of U.S.-China strategic competition has expanded from military security into the domains of technology, supply chains, energy, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence, South Korea must strengthen cooperation with the United States in semiconductors, batteries, shipbuilding, nuclear power, space, cyber, artificial intelligence, and critical minerals.

Strategic communication with China needs to be restored at the level of crisis management. If misunderstandings and distrust between South Korea and China accumulate on issues including the Taiwan Strait, the West Sea, ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation, semiconductor export controls, rare earths and critical minerals, and the possibility of economic retaliation, South Korea's economy and security could be shaken simultaneously. Regular institutionalization of ROK-China strategic dialogue channels encompassing diplomacy, national defense, economic security, supply chains, and maritime security, as well as the establishment of a vice ministerial-level crisis management consultative body under the National Security Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are urgently needed. Third, relations with Russia require limited management rather than full restoration or full severance. Russia remains an important actor in the Korean Peninsula issue, DPRK-Russia relations, Arctic sea routes, energy security, and Eurasian transportation networks. South Korea must maintain the principle of coordinating with the United States and the West on international sanctions, while ensuring that at minimum diplomatic channels, academic exchange, humanitarian cooperation, and non-political dialogue channels related to the Arctic, logistics, and energy are preserved. Sustained efforts are necessary to avoid losing Russia entirely from South Korean diplomacy.

Fourth, North Korea policy must be redesigned as a parallel pursuit of deterrence and engagement. North nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence, missile defense, and the strengthening of autonomous defense capabilities are indispensable. However, in a situation where it is difficult to change North Korea's strategic perceptions and calculations through sanctions and pressure alone, crisis management, prevention of military conflict, humanitarian cooperation, climate, health, and disaster response, and the concept of resuming limited dialogue must be pursued in parallel. In a situation where China and Russia are already emphasizing the easing of sanctions against North Korea and political resolution, the possibility cannot be excluded that South Korea will lose the initiative on the Korean Peninsula issue if it simply repeats existing positions without a new shift in its North Korea policy orientation. Fifth, a new Eurasian strategy must be formulated. Rather than viewing BRICS and SCO solely as anti-Western multilateral platforms, South Korea must analyze the trend toward a China and Russia-led Eurasian-centered multipolar international order and the expansion of strategic autonomy. On this basis, a new Eurasian strategy capable of cooperation among China, Russia, and South Korea, differentiated from the approaches of the past, must be established.

The U.S.-China and China-Russia summits of May 2026 were symbolic events demonstrating that the international order is moving from a unipolar order toward a complex multipolar order. The U.S.-China summit revealed the new character of the U.S.-China relationship, in which economic transactions and stable strategic management coexist in a state where competition and conflict remain unresolved. The China-Russia summit, by contrast, confirmed that while not a formal alliance, the two countries are developing in the direction of institutionalizing anti-Western strategic perceptions, energy, financial, and technology cooperation, and the construction of a multipolar order through joint statements and cooperation documents. Whereas previous U.S.-China summit diplomacy focused on preventing conflict and restoring communication channels, this summit was a transactional stability management meeting combining rare earths, agricultural products, aircraft, Iran, Taiwan, nuclear weapons, artificial intelligence, and supply chains. Whereas previous China-Russia summit diplomacy focused on confirming strategic trust and shared anti-Western perceptions, this summit presented a blueprint for more institutionalized strategic solidarity through treaty extension, the conclusion of more than 40 cooperation documents and memoranda of understanding, energy, technology, media, and trade cooperation, and multipolar order discourse. The China-Russia relationship is not without its problems, however, and unresolved differences remain on the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline issue, the possibility of improvement in U.S.-Russia relations, the level of China's military support for Russia, the manner of concluding the Russia-Ukraine War, and the direction of Eurasian cooperation.

What matters most for South Korea is accurately reading the rapidly changing international order. South Korea must strengthen all-around cooperation on the basis of its alliance with the United States, while simultaneously restoring strategic communication with China, maintaining minimum communication channels with Russia, pursuing both North Korea deterrence and engagement in parallel, and expanding new Eurasian cooperation. In particular, as U.S.-China-Russia trilateral competition intensifies, the task of South Korean diplomacy lies not in simply choosing one side but in managing complex risks and expanding strategic space for the nation's survival and prosperity. The core of South Korean diplomacy going forward may be distilled into three imperatives. First, the ROK-U.S. alliance must serve as the foundation, while ensuring that it does not automatically translate into full-scale confrontation with China and Russia. Second, even amid U.S.-China competition and China-Russia closeness, South Korea must secure independent national interest space in supply chains, energy, the North Korean nuclear issue, Eurasia, and the Global South. Third, in order not to lose the initiative on the Korean Peninsula issue, South Korea must move beyond the existing fixed perspective of North Korea sanctions, pressure, and deterrence and pursue crisis management, dialogue, and diplomacy with neighboring countries including China and Russia in parallel.

Ultimately, following the U.S.-China and China-Russia summits, South Korean diplomacy must transcend the simple logic of camp selection and equip itself with the capacity for strategic complex management. The new multipolar international order led by China and Russia does not represent only risk and challenge for South Korea: it simultaneously offers the possibility of creating new political, economic, and diplomatic cooperation spaces that differ from those of the past. South Korea can therefore break free from existing fixed conceptions and, if it can establish a multilayered political, economic, and security network with China, Russia, and the Eurasian region while stably maintaining the ROK-U.S. alliance, secure both national survival and prosperity simultaneously even amid the rapidly changing international order.

1. Following the U.S.-China summit, the official White House announcement focused primarily on achievements in the economic and trade domains, including rare earths, critical mineral supply chains, agricultural products, aircraft, and investment in the United States. White House, "Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures Historic Deals with China, Delivering for American Workers, Farmers, and Industry," May 2026. Accessed: May 25, 2026.
2. Following the China-Russia summit held in Beijing on May 20, 2026, the two countries adopted a joint statement on the deepening of comprehensive strategic cooperation and the strengthening of good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, and also issued a joint position on a multipolar international order and a new type of international relations. “習近平同俄羅斯總統普京共同會見記者,” 『新華社』, May 20, 2026.
3. Following the U.S.-China summit, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs official announcement emphasized the building of a "new constructive U.S.-China strategic stability relationship," and reported on China's Boeing aircraft purchases, the expansion of U.S. agricultural product imports, the opening of the beef and poultry market, and consultations on minerals and rare earths. “習近平同美國總統特朗普會談,” 『中國外交부』, May 14, 2026.
4. President Xi Jinping raised the Taiwan issue as a core matter in the bilateral relationship at his summit with President Trump, and stated that tacit U.S. support for pro-independence forces in Taiwan could become a source of conflict in the U.S.-China relationship. “習近平對特朗普明確表示:台灣問題是中美關係重중之중,” 『中國網』, May 15, 2026.
5. Following the U.S.-China summit held in Beijing on May 14, President Trump requested that President Xi visit the White House, and the two countries agreed to communicate closely for the successful hosting of the G20 and APEC summits. The two leaders also staged friendly scenes, including a walk through the Temple of Heaven (天壇) Park.
6. President Xi Jinping assessed that the China-Russia relationship had reached "its highest level in history" and agreed to extend the friendship treaty concluded in 2001, demonstrating a significant strengthening of close strategic cooperation.
7. Following the China-Russia summit, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the two countries would strengthen communication and cooperation within multilateral frameworks including the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and APEC, and would also strengthen solidarity with Global South countries. “習近平同俄羅스總統普京會談,” 『中國外交부』, May 20, 2026.
8. The Chinese government stated that bilateral China-Russia trade has exceeded approximately 200 billion dollars for three consecutive years, reaching approximately 228 billion dollars in 2025, and projected that approximately 500 billion dollars could be achievable within five years following the China-Russia summit. “習近平同俄羅斯總統普京共同會見記者,” 『新華社』, May 20, 2026.
9. Since the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia has become increasingly dependent on the Chinese market and on Chinese financial, technological, and consumer goods amid the prolongation of Western sanctions. China, by contrast, while attaching importance to strategic cooperation with Russia, does not desire excessive closeness that would invite additional U.S. and European pressure and sanctions. In other words, while the China-Russia relationship exhibits strong strategic solidarity, the economic circumstances and negotiating power of the two countries are not symmetrical. Putin and Xi hail their friendship and growing energy trade at their meeting in Beijing. AP News, May 20, 2026.
10. The U.S.-China summit demonstrates the characteristic that while basic communication is being maintained, the level of mutual strategic trust is low and the range of achievable agreement is limited.
11. According to announcements by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Russian Kremlin, President Putin received an official welcoming ceremony and a guard of honor inspection at the Great Hall of the People, and subsequently conveyed the joint position of the two countries on bilateral relations and the international situation through a summit with President Xi Jinping and an official press announcement. "President Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin," TASS, May 20, 2026.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.