| Introduction

There has been substantial domestic and international media coverage of China's mediation diplomacy. Looking at the recent Iran crisis alone, there were reports in early April that China had mediated a ceasefire between the United States and Iran, and in early May that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had invited Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi to Beijing for the first time since the outbreak of the war, holding a foreign ministers' meeting between the two countries and emphasizing the urgency of peace negotiations between the United States and Iran and a comprehensive ceasefire. The early April reports were made in the context of the period surrounding the announcement of a U.S.-Iran ceasefire, while the early May reports followed closely on the China-Iran foreign ministers meeting and coincided with optimistic remarks by President Trump regarding U.S.-Iran negotiations, lending both sets of reports a tone of anticipation regarding some form of Chinese role in ending the war.

At the same time, it can also be observed that in China's mediation diplomacy, the term "mediation" tends to be used at the level of everyday political rhetoric rather than in its precise sense, giving rise to practical confusion and conceptual misunderstanding regarding the nature and role of China's mediation diplomacy. In international law and international relations, a clear distinction is drawn among good offices (limited to facilitating contact and dialogue between the parties), conciliation (in which a third party investigates the facts and recommends a non-binding resolution), mediation (in which a third party actively participates in negotiations and proposes and persuades the parties toward a compromise, without binding authority), and arbitration (in which a third party renders a binding decision). In media coverage of China's related activities, however, the term "mediation" is commonly applied in a general sense, in some cases impeding accurate understanding of the actual nature of China's mediation diplomacy.

This paper examines actual cases of China's diplomacy conducted to date, with the aim of dispelling conceptual ambiguity and confusion regarding its substance and contributing to an understanding of the distinctive characteristics and limitations of China's approach to mediation diplomacy.

| China's Mediation Diplomacy: A Carefully Calibrated Design

China has operated its mediation diplomacy in earnest since 2022. The initial public articulation of this approach came with President Xi Jinping's proposal of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) at the opening ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference in April 2022. What is noteworthy is that the GSI was not born as a single independent initiative standing apart from all else, but rather emerged within the context of a larger series of flows and configurations. In this regard, the ideological foundation of the GSI is generally understood to have originated in the Historical Resolution adopted in 2021 ("Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century"). The 2021 Historical Resolution, the third such resolution adopted in the hundred-year history of the Chinese Communist Party following those of Mao Zedong in 1945 and Deng Xiaoping in 1981, positioned Xi Jinping alongside Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping as one of the three supreme leaders, while also providing the theoretical foundation for President Xi's third consecutive term. The Historical Resolution further put forward the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" as the direction for the Party to pursue, and this "role of China in the new era" appeared on the international stage in the form of a package designated the "Three Global Initiatives." The Three Global Initiatives were announced sequentially: the Global Development Initiative (GDI) in 2021, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in 2022, and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) in 2023.

Meanwhile, the direction of global governance that China pursues in the security domain is addressed in greater detail in the GSI Concept Paper additionally published by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2023. The Concept Paper sets out six principles: Δ sovereignty and territorial integrity, Δ non-interference in internal political affairs, Δ commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, Δ rejection of Cold War mentality, Δ rejection of double standards, and Δ opposition to abusement of unilateral sanctions. It also explicitly identifies "promoting the political resolution of international and regional hotspot issues(热点문제)" as one of twenty priority areas of cooperation.

The Concept Paper itself, however, does not explicitly designate China as a "mediator." The relevant expressions the document actually employs include: "supports (支持) the peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiation," "promotes (推动) the political resolution of disputes," "encourages(鼓励) the countries concerned to resolve issues through direct dialogue, and China "is willing to play a constructive role(愿发挥建设性作用).” These formulations suggest that the language was carefully chosen to situate China's role within the domain of good offices or conciliation as defined under international law.

In fact, China's decision not to explicitly designate its own role as that of a "mediator," contrary to the framing common in general media coverage, can also be understood as a result of an awareness of the structural contradiction embedded within the document itself. One of the core principles of the GSI is non-interference in internal affairs, and the moment China were to declare itself a "mediator," it could come into conflict with the principle of non-interference that China itself has put forward. Furthermore, if China's role were explicitly designated as that of a "mediator" in the document, China could face demands to play a role in disputes in which it has no wish to be involved. By preserving the ambiguous expression of "facilitator," China may have anticipated the effect of preserving the freedom to selectively engage in accordance with economic interests or strategic judgment, that is, preserving the freedom of selective intervention.

Nevertheless, despite the carefully calibrated GSI Concept Paper, it is also true that China's image as an "active mediator" has spread considerably. This is partly attributable to the fact that external observers and the media have used the term "mediation" flexibly and in a broad sense rather than precisely. In the case of the Saudi-Iran normalization agreement of March 2023, for instance, which China has actively designated as a practical example of the GSI in action, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially employed the expression "斡旋”(facilitation), stating that "China successfully facilitated (斡旋) the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran." Some Chinese state media outlets, however, citing experts, also used the paired expression "调停·斡旋”(conciliation and facilitation). As is widely understood, China's expression"调停”(conciliation) carries a meaning closer to Conciliation or Mediation under international law, implying that China participated in negotiations and proposed and persuaded the parties toward a compromise, than does "斡旋”(facilitation), which corresponds to Good Offices under international law, and as such carries a nuance of evaluating China's more active role.

That said, it would also not be accurate to view this kind of spread of China's mediator image as entirely unrelated to China's official external statements. For example, in the GSI-related provisions of the "Beijing Declaration on Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era," adopted as an outcome of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing in September 2024, the text employs the expression "actively participating in '斡旋调停” (facilitation and conciliation) on regional hotspot issues," indicating that China has used the paired expression "斡旋调停” in official documents. Of course, by appending the phrase "in response to requests from the African side," China explicitly specifies that it participates not as a self-initiated mediator but in a manner of being called upon, thereby deliberately avoiding conflict with the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. Nevertheless, it can be observed that rather than excluding the expression “调停(conciliation)," China is using it selectively and flexibly as needed in the direction of emphasizing its own role.

| Major Case Analysis

Within the trajectory described above, the Chinese government began actively operating a series of mediation diplomacy initiatives from 2023 onward. In March 2023, China contributed to the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran for the first time in seven years, drawing international attention as a successful case of China's mediation diplomacy. Emboldened by the Iran-Saudi mediation, China also began re-engaging actively in the consultation process between Bangladesh and Myanmar to resolve the Rohingya repatriation issue, a long-standing unresolved matter since 2017. In 2024 as well, certain limited achievements were recorded, albeit of a temporary nature. In January, China helped bring about the "Kunming Agreement" as a result of mediation efforts aimed at ending the Myanmar civil war, and in July it facilitated the announcement of the "Beijing Declaration," in which leaders of fourteen Palestinian factions including Hamas and Fatah agreed to cease their confrontation and cooperate toward the establishment of a unified Palestinian government. In 2025, China also undertook mediation efforts in the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute. Surveying the countries and issues that China has selected as targets for mediation, several characteristics can be identified.

First, the issues in question were so-called "benign and neutral" matters in which the acute strategic interests of major powers such as the United States and Russia were not directly at stake, and even where they were of concern to major countries, those countries lacked the will to actively obstruct China's mediation efforts. The Saudi-Iran mediation is the most representative example. At the time, Saudi Arabia, observing domestic developments in the United States that raised the prospect of an arms export ban and even a withdrawal of U.S. forces following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, had come to regard the stabilization of its surrounding environment through normalization of relations with its long-standing adversary Iran as an indispensable security objective. Iran, for its part, was in a situation where it needed a diplomatic breakthrough amid international sanctions. The political interests and will of both countries to normalize relations were already aligned. Russia was preoccupied with the war in Ukraine. For China, when the U.S.-centered alliance system in the Middle East was being shaken and fractures were appearing, it was able to secure space to pursue its mediation efforts by leveraging such moments and openings.

Second, China's mediation was directed at countries and political forces over which its economic leverage could be effectively exercised. China's economic influence over Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, and Bangladesh goes without saying, and as the largest trading partner of both Iran and Saudi Arabia, China had more inducements to attract the relevant parties than any competing mediating power. Even when economic leverage was used as an inducement, however, it was employed in a limited manner, only when the realization of economic interests coincided with China's own core interests. In the Rohingya case, for instance, China pledged development investment in Myanmar's Rakhine State, which, as is well known, is a strategically important region for China's Belt and Road Initiative. However, China did not employ economic coercion as a mediation instrument, that is, as a stick, in any of the cases examined. In the Thailand-Cambodia case, Chinese foreign direct investment accounted for an overwhelming 70 percent of Cambodia's total foreign direct investment (FDI) as of 2024, yet China did not use this as a means of pressure. In other words, while China has actively employed economic coercion as a means of pressuring parties for political purposes when its core interests were threatened, as seen in the ban on Australian wine and barley imports, the THAAD retaliation against South Korea, and trade sanctions against Lithuania, it has not employed such measures in mediating disputes between third parties.

Third, a significant limitation was that no sustainable mediation outcomes were achieved. China's mediation diplomacy is afflicted by the chronic problem of the "absence of coercive capacity," in that it remains confined to "persuasion and promotion of dialogue (劝和促谈)” without the means or will to compel the parties to comply with agreements, that is, an "absence of guarantee capacity for agreement implementation." This limitation becomes apparent the moment substantive security issues of the parties are touched upon—when confronted with security issues, both the momentum of the mediation process and its outcomes evaporate. The Saudi-Iran normalization of diplomatic relations in 2023, which attracted considerable international attention, is the most representative example: following the outbreak of the U.S.-Iran war in 2026, Iran attacked Saudi energy infrastructure and Saudi Arabia expelled Iranian diplomats, reducing the two countries to a state of de facto severance of relations. This limitation is evident in other cases as well. In the Thailand-Cambodia border dispute mediation, the border conflict between the two countries is being managed through a ceasefire agreement led by ASEAN and the United States, independently of China's mediation. In the Myanmar civil war mediation, the first Kunming ceasefire broke down within a matter of months, the second ceasefire was similarly of limited effectiveness, and the pattern of repeated failures has continued, with the Myanmar civil war remaining at an impasse to this day. With respect to China's mediation efforts in the Myanmar civil war in particular, China, while presenting itself as a mediator, effectively moved in a direction that protected its own economic interests by siding with the military junta, arousing suspicion that China's mediation served as an instrument for managing its own interests rather than resolving the conflict. Regarding the Rohingya repatriation issue, not a single substantive repatriation has taken place to date. In the Palestinian case as well, while Hamas was being driven into a situation in which immediate survival took precedence over the contest for dominance within the Palestinian arena in the face of Israel's large-scale airstrikes on Gaza, making reconciliation among Palestinian factions unavoidable, China succeeded in bringing together the agreement of the various Palestinian factions while failing to bring Israel to the negotiating table.

| The Iran Crisis

The distinctive characteristics of China's mediation diplomacy described above are also observable in the Iran crisis. First, the Iranian nuclear issue, which constitutes the fundamental cause of the current crisis, is not a "benign and neutral" issue for any of the parties involved, including the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, but rather the most direct and core security issue related to national survival, suggesting that it falls outside the scope of the mediation role China has in mind. Should the Iranian theocratic regime, which regards the establishment of a universal Islamic state as the raison d'être of its governance, acquire nuclear weapons, it would constitute an "existential threat" to Israel, a "regime threat" to the Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, and a matter that would shake the foundations of the Middle East security order for the United United States. Iran, too, would find it difficult to accept the permanent and complete elimination of its nuclear program. As already examined, no country, whether Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, or Bangladesh, has responded to China's mediation efforts on matters pertaining to its own security.

Second, China's mediation role is also limited when viewed from the perspective of its economic leverage. As noted above, China has virtually no precedent of employing economic coercion as a mediation instrument in relation to disputes between other countries. In this regard, although China is the primary purchasing country absorbing more than 80 percent of the crude oil Iran exports by sea, it is difficult to conclude that China would exercise influence over Iran by leveraging this position.

What is of interest is that China's influence over Iran could in fact become a double-edged sword that proves burdensome to China itself. There are analogous precedents. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the United States has repeatedly pressured China to exercise its influence over North Korea. During the first Trump administration, President Trump repeatedly and publicly pressed President Xi Jinping directly on Twitter, stating that "China must solve the North Korea problem" and that "China could easily solve it if it wanted to." Following North Korea's sixth nuclear test in 2017, the United States activated secondary boycotts against China and explicitly linked trade negotiations to the North Korean nuclear issue, publicly presenting a deal structure along the lines of "if China pressures North Korea, the United States will make concessions on trade." These points suggest an ambiguity as to whether China's economic influence over Iran constitutes a strategic asset or a strategic liability.

Third, a pattern has emerged suggesting that the United States harbors suspicions of a form of dual play on China's part with respect to its role. Reviewing the relevant sequence of developments, it is reported that prior to the U.S.-Iran ceasefire agreement of April 8, China invested considerable mediation efforts through meetings, the dispatch of special envoys, and telephone calls with relevant parties including Iran, Russia, and Saudi Arabia. However, immediately following the ceasefire, China received from President Trump no more than an acknowledgment-level assessment to the effect that he had "heard that" China had mediated. Moreover, U.S. media outlets, citing intelligence sources, promptly raised allegations related to China's alleged attempts to supply Iran with MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems) and new air defense systems, prompting China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson to issue a formal denial stating that "these are groundless claims, and arms exports are strictly managed and controlled in accordance with laws, regulations, and international obligations." Subsequently, around April 15, the U.S. Department of the Treasury launched "Operation Economic Fury," named in reference to the military operation against Iran designated "Operation Epic Fury," placing dozens of Chinese companies involved in the purchase and transportation of Iranian oil on its sanctions list. This reflects the U.S. suspicion that China is engaging in "dual play," simultaneously urging Iran to negotiate with the United States and presenting itself as a peace mediator on one hand, while on the other allowing Chinese companies to export dual-use goods that could be diverted for military purposes to Iran, and even facing allegations of attempted arms provision. At this juncture, approximately one month before the U.S.-China summit, the United States had already made clear that what it expected from China was not mediation but pressure on Iran, and that direct or indirect support for Iran would carry consequences.

| Outlook and Implications

Viewed from the foregoing perspective, China is likely to continue focusing on balancing across two fronts while making maximum strategic use of the Iran crisis in a direction that highlights the burdens and limitations of the U.S.-led order.

First, in the context of U.S.-China strategic competition and stable relationship management, China is expected to continue balancing between the United States and Iran. For China, relations with the United States involve far greater strategic interests than relations with Iran and constitute a matter of higher priority. In this regard, it is difficult to imagine China using Iran as a direct lever against the United States. While it may not be disadvantageous for the United States to "bleed and spend money" in the Middle East, military support approaching the level of direct involvement, such as supplying weapons to Iran, would not only be excessively risky but also inconsistent with the GSI principles China itself has proclaimed, and a considerable number of critical economic issues including tariffs, as well as the Taiwan issue, remain on the table with the United States.

For President Xi Jinping, 2027 is the year of the decision on a fourth consecutive term as chairman, the centennial anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army, and a period in which some form of demonstrable achievement on economic matters and the Taiwan issue is necessary. In particular, China's recent economic circumstances, including sluggish domestic consumption, youth unemployment, the collapse of the real estate bubble, and record levels of central and local government debt, are matters that could affect not only China's growth strategy but also regime stability. President Xi faces the necessity of managing the Iran issue while keeping in mind a series of U.S.-China summit schedules through the China-hosted APEC in November and the U.S.-hosted G20 in December, and under these circumstances, placing China in direct confrontation with the United States over the Iran crisis constitutes a minimum political imperative that must be avoided at all costs.

Second, there is the matter of balancing between Iran and the Gulf states. China has consistently pursued a balanced diplomacy of engaging simultaneously with both hostile parties. For example, in the course of actively engaging with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran, China stated that energy, economic, and civilian facilities should not become targets of attack without directly naming or criticizing Iran, and while indirectly checking Iran's blockade behavior by opposing Hormuz passage fees, it has simultaneously secured practical gains through negotiations with Iran on vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz. China has pursued a course of extracting benefits from both sides without tilting toward either Iran or the Gulf states, and as an extension of this approach, China is expected to continue pursuing a light-footprint strategy of minimizing direct military and security involvement while expanding its influence through economic, diplomatic, and technological means. In other words, China is currently pursuing a hedging strategy of maintaining a neutral outward appearance and sustaining relations with all parties while dispersing risk, but once the conflict ends, it is anticipated that China will seek to actively participate in reconstruction projects and discussions on the restructuring of the Middle East order in order to simultaneously secure economic benefits and political voice, ultimately positioning itself as an alternative force capable of wedging between the United States and its regional allies.

In this regard, when China has in the past presented itself as a "mediator" or claimed to be playing a "constructive role" on the Korean Peninsula issue, it is necessary, as in the Iran crisis, to soberly reassess whether China's past mediation constituted management of its own strategic interests or genuine pursuit of North Korean denuclearization. As is generally understood, following the publication of China's white paper on "Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation in the New Era" on November 27, 2025, in which the phrase "support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean Peninsula" was deleted and replaced only with the principled expression that "China maintains a fair position and correct direction on the Korean Peninsula issue, has always worked for peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, and is committed to the process of a political resolution of the peninsula issue," China has no longer included denuclearization language in its official documents. Furthermore, the current situation is one in which China, together with Russia, is even opposing sanctions against North Korea. This suggests the possibility that the Korean Peninsula and North Korean nuclear issue have long since been removed from the scope of China's mediation diplomacy and are being treated from the perspective of China's own strategic security interests.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.