1. Why Korea and France in a Multipolar Era? The Intersection of Their Approaches to "Strategic Autonomy"

The most significant change in Korea-France summit diplomacy in 2026 is not the increased number of meetings. What matters is that, just five months after the two countries upgraded their relationship to a "Global Strategic Partnership" in Seoul on April 3, they began putting that partnership into practice in Paris on September 8 through concrete agreements, high-level dialogues, business cooperation, and military exchanges. Immediately after the April summit, I argued that the next task for Korea-France relations was not to coin new rhetoric, but to build repeatable mechanisms for cooperation: foreign affairs and defense consultative mechanisms, a defense cooperation roadmap, the implementation of concrete nuclear projects, and cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines (hereinafter "SSNs").¹⁾ The September summit addressed much of this agenda, while also bringing into sharp relief the institutional gaps that remain to be filled.

Viewed simply as a strengthening of bilateral ties, the summit's strategic significance cannot be fully understood. In the joint press statement, President Macron stressed that, at a time when the world is being reshaped, Korea and France should act together in defense, security, technology, and energy while each preserves its "sovereignty" and "strategic autonomy" (autonomie stratégique). Here, strategic autonomy does not mean rejecting alliances or adopting a mechanical, equidistant neutrality between the United States and China. Rather, it means expanding a country's capacity and range of options to make independent judgments and act on core national interests and on supply-chain, technology, and security issues. Macron went so far as to say that joint action by the two countries would help ensure that neither falls into "vassalization" (vassalisation) by any great power. He described this as a "coalition of independents" (coalition des indépendants) and presented Korea-France relations as a good illustration of that vision.²⁾

Korea's strategy and France's strategic autonomy start from different premises. Korea places the ROK-U.S. alliance at the center of its security, whereas France seeks broader room for independent action based on its nuclear arsenal, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its autonomous defense industry, and its overseas territories. Nevertheless, the two approaches can converge on one point: strengthening national capabilities while expanding networks of cooperation with trusted partners. Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently described the government's diplomatic strategy as a virtuous cycle of "alliance, self-strengthening, and solidarity," identifying as core principles the deepening of the ROK-U.S. alliance, the strengthening of Korea's own capabilities, and the construction of a broad network of cooperation. From this perspective, France is not a substitute for the ROK-U.S. alliance, but a complementary strategic partner that broadens Korea's diplomatic, security, technological, and energy options.³⁾

France's strategic value is particularly significant in three respects. First, France is one of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council, a nuclear-weapon state, and a core member of the European Union (EU). Second, as a "resident power" in the Indo-Pacific, with overseas territories and permanently stationed forces, it can help connect European and Indo-Pacific security. Third, France possesses world-class capabilities in nuclear energy, defense, space, aeronautics, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum technology—precisely the fields in which Korea needs cooperation and supply-chain diversification to enhance its own strategic autonomy. In particular, France is a leading European defense producer that has pursued "ITAR-free" supply chains and designs in certain strategic sectors to reduce its dependence on U.S.-origin components and technology.⁴⁾ Cooperation with France could therefore reduce Korea's dependence on U.S.-origin controlled items and broaden the technological and supply-chain options available to its defense industry. Accordingly, the central question for Korea-France cooperation should shift from the abstract "Should Korea move closer to France?" to the concrete: "In which areas can the two countries reduce each other's vulnerabilities and strengthen their capacity to act?"

For cooperation to be sustainable, it must also be clear what France stands to gain from Korea. Korea's strategic value to France lies mainly in four areas. First, Korea is one of the most promising Asian partners for ammunition and major defense equipment, combining high production capacity with relatively short delivery times. As the war in Ukraine drags on, Europe faces production bottlenecks in munitions and equipment, and Korea is effectively the only Asian partner able to offer both mass-production capacity and competitive delivery schedules. Second, Korea has strong shipbuilding and naval maintenance capabilities. It is globally competitive in the rapid, large-scale construction of major merchant vessels, and its shipbuilding and maintenance capabilities could broaden cooperation with France in naval MRO and related industrial activities. Third, Korea has a strong record in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. For France, which has experienced repeated delays and cost overruns in new reactor construction, Korea with its record of on-schedule delivery and established equipment supply chain is a valuable partner. Fourth, Korea combines advanced industrial capabilities with cultural influence. Its semiconductor manufacturing capacity, AI infrastructure, and globally influential cultural-content industry can give practical substance to France's vision of "technological sovereignty" and "cultural multilateralism." This complementarity is one of the structural reasons for France's interest in deepening relations with Korea.

Within Europe, strategic autonomy is sometimes understood in terms of greater autonomy from, or reduced dependence on, the United States. At this summit, however, President Macron framed it less as distancing from any particular ally than as strengthening sovereignty and the capacity for independent action. If Korea were to adopt the concept uncritically, it could create unnecessary friction in areas currently under negotiation with Washington, including securing fuel for SSNs, the ROK-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, and trade talks. Korea's security environment differs from France's. Korea should therefore frame cooperation with France not as "autonomy from the alliance," but as the "diversification of supply chains and technological bases," and proactively explain this approach to the United States. Indeed, areas in which France has particular strengths such as naval reactors using low-enriched uranium (LEU) and commercial-scale reprocessing are also areas where the United States would find it difficult to assist Korea. Through concrete examples, Korea must demonstrate that such cooperation is complementary rather than competitive.

Seen in this light, the September summit both moved the April upgrade into the implementation phase and marked a starting point for testing how much genuine strategic depth Korea-France relations can acquire. The achievements were clear in defense intelligence, logistics support and training, advanced industries, culture, and civil nuclear energy. Yet the two countries still lack a regular high-level foreign affairs and defense consultative mechanism and a defense cooperation roadmap. In the SSN field—which Korea has launched as a national strategic project—even relatively non-sensitive areas of cooperation, such as personnel, safety, operations, and maintenance, have yet to be formalized. This paper therefore examines both sides of the summit: its "substantive progress" and its "strategic incompleteness."

2. From the April Upgrade to September Implementation: Substantive Outcomes of the Summit

At the Seoul summit on April 3, Korea and France upgraded the "Comprehensive Partnership for the 21st Century," in place since 2004, to a "Global Strategic Partnership" and agreed to broaden cooperation across politics, defense and security, the economy and industry, advanced technology, nuclear energy, the Indo-Pacific, and global issues. What distinguished the September summit was that it translated a substantial part of this broad agenda into concrete agreements, projects, and high-level channels. In the joint press statement, President Lee Jae Myung explained that the two countries had agreed to deepen cooperation in six areas: defense and security; economy and industry; advanced industries and science and technology; people-to-people exchanges and the safety of nationals; culture; and international issues.⁵⁾

Institutionalization advanced first in defense and security. By signing in September the protocol amending the military classified information protection agreement, whose revision had been agreed at the April summit, the two countries strengthened the security framework for exchanging military intelligence. They also agreed to accelerate negotiations toward the early conclusion of an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). An ACSA is a basic logistics framework that allows the two militaries to provide each other with the supplies and services required for joint exercises, port calls, disaster relief, and overseas missions, with costs settled afterward. If the information protection agreement provides a secure gateway for exchanging sensitive information, the ACSA constitutes the "logistics infrastructure" that underpins recurring military cooperation. It is important to distinguish, however, between the actual conclusion of an ACSA and the September agreement to "accelerate negotiations toward its early conclusion."⁶⁾

Operational interoperability also advanced a step. PÉGASE 26, a strategic air deployment mission of the French Air and Space Force, is designed to validate long-range power-projection capabilities and conduct combined exercises with Indo-Pacific partners. In 2026, the mission follows a route of roughly 40,000 km from France through the Arctic and North America to Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India, and the Middle East. Exercises conducted with Korea in conjunction with PÉGASE 26, together with reciprocal port calls by the two navies, turn abstract "defense cooperation" into actual military activity. If such activities are regularized and expanded to include maritime domain awareness (MDA: the capacity to build a comprehensive picture of the activities of vessels, aircraft, and threats at sea), anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, search and rescue, medical and disaster relief, and cyber and space support, Korea-France security cooperation will acquire far greater substance.⁷⁾

In the economic and advanced-technology sphere as well, the intentions expressed in April were translated into implementation documents in September. In AI, semiconductors, and quantum technology, memoranda of understanding (MOUs) were signed on joint research and development (R&D), mutual market access, and expanded investment for start-ups, while a strategic partnership between Samsung Electronics and France's Mistral AI was announced in the presence of the two leaders. The Korea AeroSpace Administration (KASA) and France's National Centre for Space Studies (CNES) signed an implementing arrangement on space-industry promotion to support companies from each country entering the other's market. The creation of a ministerial-level Industrial Strategy Dialogue is also significant, as it provides a mechanism for managing industrial policy, supply-chain, and investment issues on a continuous basis rather than through one-off business events.

Cultural cooperation should be seen not as a peripheral event of the state visit, but as a core achievement that broadened the social foundation of Korea-France relations. The two leaders co-chaired the "Lumière Summit," the first international summit on film and audiovisual content, in Saint-Paul-de-Vence in southern France. Korea and France also unveiled the "Lumière Partnership," under which each country will invest €500 million in the film and audiovisual industries over five years beginning in 2027. While cooperation in the military, nuclear, and advanced-technology fields strengthens ties centered on state institutions and large corporations, exchanges among cultural figures, young people, and researchers broaden the social constituency supporting Korea-France relations. For the strategic partnership to endure across changes of government, this social foundation must expand in tandem.⁸⁾

The sixth area, international issues, also produced noteworthy outcomes. On the Korean Peninsula in particular, President Macron expressed support that went beyond customary diplomatic rhetoric. He stated that Korea could count on France's unwavering support for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and commended President Lee's consistency and pragmatic vision. He went further, criticizing North Korea for supporting Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and for receiving assistance in return for its own military programs. On the Strait of Hormuz, the two leaders agreed to coordinate on freedom of navigation and supply-chain stability. Cooperation with France is significant because it broadens Korea's options for designing multinational, function-specific contributions consistent with international law and domestic procedures, including mine countermeasures, ship protection, intelligence and surveillance, and logistics and medical support.⁹⁾

That said, the summit should not be judged by headline numbers such as the "16 cooperation documents." Agreements, MOUs, letters of intent (LOIs: early-stage documents confirming an intention to cooperate before a definitive contract), and corporate investment agreements differ in legal force and implementation requirements. They should therefore be managed in distinct categories: documents with immediate institutional effect, such as the amendments to the military information protection agreement and the air services agreement; documents whose substantive results depend on follow-on contracts, such as the KHNP-Orano LOI; and documents that require subsequent budgets, projects, and personnel allocations, such as MOUs between research institutions. Going forward, the performance indicator for Korea-France summit diplomacy should not be "How many documents were signed?" but "How many were converted into contracts, joint projects, and standing institutions?"

Marianne Péron-Doise of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) has assessed the visit as marking a clear qualitative advance in Korea-France relations, while noting that institutionalized and structured exchanges remain insufficient relative to the convergence of interests in defense, energy, quantum technology, and semiconductors. She also points out that the two countries are both promising partners and competitors in nuclear energy, defense, and advanced industries, and that the relationship's vulnerabilities could resurface without sustained implementation. Her observation underscores the need for Korea-France cooperation to move from "personal rapport between leaders" to "repeatable institutions and projects."¹⁰⁾

3. A Leap in Nuclear Cooperation: From Supply Chains to Long-Term Strategic Cooperation

One of the most strategically important outcomes of the September summit was cooperation in civil nuclear energy. Korea and France are both leading nuclear-energy powers, but their strengths are not identical. Korea excels in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and in manufacturing supply chains, whereas France has accumulated a long-standing industrial base across the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment and the treatment and recycling of spent fuel. These differences can create competition in overseas reactor bids, but they can also provide a basis for complementarity in supply chains and the back end of the fuel cycle. Here, the "nuclear fuel cycle" refers to the entire process from the acquisition, conversion, and enrichment of uranium and the fabrication of fuel, through its use in reactors, to the storage, treatment, and recycling of spent fuel and its final disposal.

In April, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (hereinafter "KHNP") and France's Orano signed an MOU on cooperation across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. On September 8, they gave concrete form to this cooperation through a letter of intent (LOI) on long-term cooperation in uranium enrichment. According to Orano's official press release, KHNP seeks to broaden its access to new Western enrichment capacity and strengthen the security and diversification of its fuel supply. Orano, for its part, explained that the cooperation reflects the two countries' determination to deepen strategic cooperation beyond a partnership between companies. KHNP also holds a 2.5% stake in France's Georges Besse II enrichment plant. In this respect, the September LOI should be seen less as the start of a new relationship than as an extension of an existing equity relationship into long-term cooperation in the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle.¹¹⁾

An even more important institutional outcome was the two leaders' decision to launch a "High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy." Business-to-business cooperation can move at different speeds depending on market conditions and individual contracts, whereas a high-level dialogue allows governments to manage long-term issues—supply chains, R&D, safety regulation, and the back end—on a continuing basis. The dialogue should ideally be organized into working groups on (1) enrichment services and fuel supply, (2) spent fuel management and the back end, (3) next-generation reactors, safety, and radiation protection, and (4) joint R&D and cooperation in third countries. Over time, it should become a regular, preferably annual, mechanism that reports progress in each area to summit meetings and ministerial dialogues.

France also signaled openness to cooperation on spent fuel in relatively explicit terms. In the September joint statement, President Macron said that Orano-KHNP cooperation reflects stronger cooperation in the upstream segment of the fuel cycle and expressed support for discussions between the two countries' companies on spent fuel treatment and recycling, as well as for a shared vision for the future of the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. With Korea's spent fuel storage facilities approaching saturation, it is significant that the political conditions are now more favorable for systematic study at the government, industry, and research-institution levels of France's La Hague treatment and recycling system, as well as its approaches to transport, waste management, regulation, and cost structure. Political statements fade over time, but documents remain. The substance of Macron's statement should therefore be formally incorporated into the agenda and joint minutes of the first meeting of the High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy.¹²⁾

What must be avoided above all in this field is an approach that views France as a "channel for circumventing U.S. constraints." Korea's enrichment, reprocessing, and nuclear-material management issues are bound up with a complex set of conditions, including the ROK-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, nonproliferation obligations, transport and waste-return arrangements, and economic viability. Cooperation with France should be designed not as a substitute for negotiations with the United States, but as a complementary means of deepening Korea's technical understanding of the fuel cycle and its back end, strengthening its negotiating leverage, and diversifying its supply chains. The same principle should apply to SSN cooperation.

The next steps in the nuclear field are therefore clear. First, the High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy should be convened as soon as possible and placed on an annual footing. Second, the government should provide institutional support for commercial negotiations to convert the KHNP-Orano LOI into an actual long-term supply contract. Third, spent fuel treatment and recycling, radiation protection, nuclear safety, next-generation reactors, and nuclear fusion should be managed not as separate projects, but as a long-term portfolio of Korea-France nuclear cooperation. If the April summit opened the scope of cooperation, the September summit created policy channels and project pathways. What is needed now is a track record of contracts, joint research, and regulatory cooperation.

4. Institutionalizing Defense Cooperation: SSNs as the "Next Test"

The revision of the military information protection agreement, the acceleration of ACSA negotiations, the PÉGASE-linked exercises, and the reciprocal naval port calls discussed above have begun to form a coherent trajectory. Once an ACSA is concluded and exercises and port calls are regularized, the two militaries can move from a relationship of "meeting when necessary" to one of "operating together routinely in peacetime." Despite this progress, however, no starting point for government-to-government cooperation has yet been established in the SSN field—for which Korea must prepare over the long term—even in relatively non-sensitive but urgent areas such as personnel training, nuclear safety culture, radiation protection, operations, and maintenance. This is one of the most important unfinished tasks of the September summit.

Defense-industrial cooperation also calls for caution. The two countries compete directly in third-country markets. The markets entered by Korea's K9 self-propelled howitzer, K2 tank, and FA-50 light combat aircraft overlap considerably with the potential markets of French defense companies. It is therefore realistic to design cooperation beginning in areas where direct competition is limited. A desirable sequence would be to select two or three pilot projects in fields that do not clash with bids for complete systems—such as core aero-engine components, components of naval combat systems, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul), and shared test and evaluation infrastructure—and then move toward joint development on the basis of the results. France's strength in ITAR-free design, noted earlier, is likewise more likely to be leveraged first in components and materials than in complete systems.

SSN cooperation is discussed in this assessment of the summit not simply because France operates nuclear-powered submarines. The "Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarines," announced by the Ministry of National Defense on May 26, 2026, defines the SSN as a core capability for countering North Korea's submarine-based nuclear and missile threats and states that the "Jangbogo-N Project" will be pursued as a national strategic project spanning some 40 years. The ministry set a target of launching the first boat in the mid-2030s and identified nonproliferation, nuclear safety and security, and radioactive-waste management as basic elements of the program. In addition, a pan-governmental consultative body is discussing a nuclear-safety regulatory framework, consultations with the IAEA, and special legislation, with the aim of putting the program's institutional and policy foundations in place by 2027. The program has also entered the budget phase. The government has allocated a new &won;96.6 billion in its FY2027 budget proposal to launch the SSN program and begin design work. This is the first time that SSN development funding has been directly included in a government budget proposal, marking a transition from conceptual discussion to actual design work. What must be prepared from now on, therefore, is not only the hull and reactor design, but the entire system of personnel, organization, regulation, maintenance, and emergency response.

Training SSN personnel is not simply a matter of "educating a certain number of crew members." It requires an entire ecosystem: reactor operators; mechanical, electrical, and nuclear maintenance personnel; radiation-protection staff; quality-assurance and safety-regulation specialists; instructors; and emergency-response organizations. These personnel cannot be trained at short notice once the boats are completed. A pipeline covering selection, basic theoretical education, simulator training, hands-on practice, qualification, and recurrent training must be established in advance and developed in parallel with construction. Because an SSN program is a long-term undertaking in which construction may take about ten years while operations continue for more than thirty, the early "design of people and institutions" will shape safety and availability for decades to come.

France is a particularly useful benchmark and potential partner because its experience differs from that of the United States and the United Kingdom. France has long operated naval reactors fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU) and has integrated periodic refueling and major overhauls of its nuclear-powered vessels into its operational system. Korea, too, has formally adopted the use of LEU in the Ministry of National Defense's Basic Plan.

The French Navy's School of Military Applications of Atomic Energy (EAMEA: École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique) is an important reference point when considering such cooperation. EAMEA trains military and civilian nuclear personnel of the French Ministry of the Armed Forces, offering some 50 courses to about 1,000 trainees each year. Its fields of instruction include nuclear science and technology, nuclear safety, radiation protection and risk management, and naval nuclear propulsion. Although this model cannot simply be replicated in Korea, it is highly useful to examine the training systems and qualification structures that an SSN-operating country puts in place before its boats are deployed. How far France would be willing to open its courses to a foreign military is a matter for separate consultation. As a first step, therefore, policy and educational exchanges focused on non-sensitive, shareable aspects of training systems, instructor development, and safety culture could be considered.¹³⁾

Maintenance and sustainment are equally important. MCO (maintien en condition opérationnelle) is a comprehensive sustainment framework encompassing the maintenance, spare parts, personnel, quality control, and contract management required to keep vessels and equipment genuinely mission-ready. IPER (indisponibilité périodique pour entretien et réparations) refers to the major scheduled overhauls that French nuclear-powered vessels undergo at set intervals. Even if Korea succeeds in building SSNs, their actual availability could fall sharply unless maintenance facilities, radiation control, reactor-maintenance personnel, spare parts, quality assurance, and long-term contracting arrangements are in place. The criteria for the success of the SSN program should therefore extend beyond "when the first boat is launched" to include "how many boats can be operated reliably over thirty years."¹⁴⁾

In this regard, the principle of "ROK-U.S. first, ROK-France in parallel" is important. With the United States, Korea should give priority to securing LEU fuel, establishing nonproliferation arrangements, completing legal procedures, and reaching political understandings at the alliance level. With France, parallel cooperation could be explored in areas relatively unlikely to clash directly with fuel and technology negotiations with the United States: personnel training, safety culture, radiation protection, maintenance organization, MCO and IPER, and experience with certain forms of technology verification. This is not an "alternative choice" that weakens ROK-U.S. cooperation, but a form of diversification that complements the alliance, spreads the risks of a national strategic project, and accelerates learning.¹⁵⁾

From a policy perspective, rather than waiting for the next summit, the two sides should first identify "what is possible and where the red lines lie" at the working level. Korea could initiate closed-door preliminary consultations between the two countries' defense ministries and navies and propose a joint feasibility study covering educational exchanges in non-sensitive, shareable areas with institutions such as EAMEA, instructor development, safety culture, radiological emergency response, maintenance organization, and quality assurance. Even if France regards certain areas as sensitive and limits cooperation, identifying where those boundaries lie would itself provide useful input for designing Korea's own training and maintenance systems.

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5. Lessons from Japan-France Relations: Turning Summit Diplomacy into Institutions

To assess the development of Korea-France relations in a balanced way, comparison with Japan-France relations is instructive. The point is not that Korea should replicate Japan's institutions wholesale, since the two countries differ in history, alliance structure, and industrial interests. Rather, the key is to examine how Japan and France have translated leaders' agreements into ministerial consultative mechanisms, legal agreements, roadmaps, standing committees, and joint projects.

Japan and France held their eighth Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting ("2+2") in April 2026. The 2+2 is a mechanism through which the two countries' foreign and defense ministers address diplomatic and security issues together, giving it greater political weight and policy-coordination capacity than separate ministry-to-ministry consultations. On the same day, the two defense ministers signed a "Japan-France Defense Roadmap" and confirmed that, when necessary for their security and for regional peace and stability, the two countries would consult each other and consider appropriate responses. The Japan-France ACSA was signed in 2018 and entered into force in 2019, while an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology has been in force since 2016. A multilayered structure linking intelligence, logistics, training, defense technology, and policy consultation is thus already in place.¹⁶⁾

Institutional development in the nuclear field is even more pronounced. Building on a leaders' agreement in 2011, Japan and France have operated a Nuclear Cooperation Committee since 2012 and held its 14th meeting in July 2026. That meeting covered a wide-ranging agenda, including nuclear policy, fast reactors and the fuel cycle, nuclear fusion, the back end and final waste management, and nuclear safety and radiation protection. At their April 2026 summit, the two countries also agreed to strengthen cooperation on fast reactors, the fuel cycle, and fusion. In other words, their nuclear cooperation has been institutionalized not through one-off MOUs, but through more than a decade of recurring committee meetings and accumulated R&D and industrial projects.¹⁷⁾

The first lesson of this comparison for Korea-France relations is that "the political energy of summit diplomacy must be converted into recurring interministerial mechanisms." The trust between the Korean and French leaders in 2026 and their reciprocal state visits have generated strong momentum. But unless that momentum is channeled into a regular 2+2 or an equivalent high-level strategic dialogue, an ACSA, a defense cooperation roadmap, and an annual High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy, it could dissipate under the next government. More important than the formal name of the relationship is a structure in which the responsible ministries meet every year to review tasks and sustain budgets and projects.

The second lesson is the ability to manage competition and cooperation on separate tracks. Japan and France also compete in industry and technology, yet they have built long-term cooperation in core areas. In Korea-France relations as well, competition is unavoidable in overseas tenders for complete nuclear power plant projects and in some defense markets. By contrast, if areas in which complementarity is possible—the nuclear fuel supply chain, spent fuel management, nuclear safety, joint R&D, MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul), space and AI standards, and joint entry into third-country markets—are grouped together and institutionalized, competition can be prevented from damaging the relationship as a whole. Designing "cooperation that endures despite competition" matters more than pursuing "cooperation in every field."

The third lesson is that the longer the time horizon of a strategic project, the more important it is to build people and institutions first. Just as Japan-France nuclear cooperation took concrete shape through repeated committee meetings and joint research, Korea-France SSN cooperation cannot wait until the first boat has been built. Because Japan does not operate SSNs, a direct comparison with Japan-France relations is not possible. Yet the underlying principle is the same: long-term, sensitive nuclear and security cooperation must be built through repeatable institutions and sustained personnel exchanges.

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6. Next Steps: Institutionalization, Project Implementation, and Strategic Deepening by 2027

The September Korea-France summit clearly marked a step forward from April. Rather than merely reiterating the upgrade to a "Global Strategic Partnership," it produced a revised framework for protecting military information, accelerated ACSA negotiations, actual exercises and port calls, an Industrial Strategy Dialogue and advanced-technology cooperation, the Lumière Partnership, and a High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy, together with a long-term enrichment-cooperation LOI. In particular, the strong political will shown by France to expand Korea-France relations—actively linking President Macron's April visit to Korea with President Lee's state visit in September—is an important asset. The task now is to convert this political momentum into institutions and projects that will continue to function beyond 2027.

First, Korea-France ACSA negotiations should be concluded promptly, and procedures should be developed for applying the agreement in actual exercises and port calls. More important than the conclusion of the agreement itself is establishing standard procedures specifying which supplies and services will be provided to each other, in which activities, and by what methods. Only when the ACSA is actually applied to PÉGASE, naval port calls, and future exercises in maritime security, mine countermeasures, and search and rescue will it become a living institution.

Second, an annual high-level strategic dialogue between the foreign affairs and defense authorities—or a vice-ministerial 2+2—should be institutionalized, and a Korea-France defense cooperation roadmap covering a three-to-five-year period should be drawn up. There is no need to replicate Japan's institutions, but bundling defense intelligence, logistics support, training, the defense industry, cyber, space, and maritime security into a single medium- to long-term plan with clear priorities and lead agencies would prevent summit agreements from becoming fragmented across ministries.

Third, the High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy should be launched, preferably within six months, and working groups should be formed on enrichment services, spent fuel, next-generation reactors, safety, and radiation protection. The LOI with Orano should be converted into a long-term supply contract, while MOUs between research institutions should be translated into funded research projects. On spent fuel in particular, Korea should study France's experience while carefully assessing what is possible and at what cost and with what responsibilities within the framework of the ROK-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement and the international nonproliferation regime.

Fourth, in the SSN field, Korea should move beyond the practice of "waiting for the next summit" and propose a Korea-France joint feasibility study on cooperation in personnel, safety, and maintenance by the first half of 2027. Priority areas could include reciprocal visits focused on non-sensitive, shareable aspects of the training systems of institutions such as EAMEA; instructor development; simulator-based training; radiation protection and emergency response; maintenance organization and quality assurance; and operational experience with MCO and IPER. This stage could proceed in parallel with ROK-U.S. fuel cooperation while keeping political and technical risks relatively low.

Fifth, "shuttle summit diplomacy" should be institutionalized so that the continuity of Korea-France relations does not depend solely on the tenure of individual leaders. Because the French Constitution limits the president to two consecutive terms, President Macron cannot run for a third consecutive term in the 2027 presidential election. The French government has announced that the first round of the 2027 presidential election will be held on April 18 and the runoff on May 2. Time is therefore limited to convert the current high level of trust between the two leaders into agreements, regular consultative mechanisms, and joint projects that will continue to function under the next French president and government. President Lee Jae Myung has also observed that summit diplomacy must begin early in a leader's term if its benefits are to be sustained over time—a principle that applies equally to relations with the next French president.

A visit to Korea by the new French president should be pursued as soon as possible after the inauguration. Thereafter, the two leaders could maintain substantive annual summit consultations through reciprocal visits or meetings on the sidelines of major multilateral gatherings. Not every visit needs to be a state visit; a mix of state, official, and working visits, together with meetings on the margins of multilateral forums, would suffice. The key is to ensure that political momentum at the leaders' level drives regular reviews of the foreign affairs and defense strategic dialogue, the High-Level Dialogue on Civil Nuclear Energy, the Industrial Strategy Dialogue, and SSN cooperation in personnel, safety, and maintenance.

Finally, Korea-France cooperation need not and should not be designed as a separate strategic axis that replaces the ROK-U.S. alliance. While keeping the ROK-U.S. alliance at the center of deterrence against North Korea and combined defense, Korea can realistically broaden its options with France in P5 diplomacy, European and Indo-Pacific maritime security, the nuclear supply chain and back end, defense, space, and AI, and the ecosystem for SSN personnel and operations. France's strategic autonomy and Korea's alliance-centered strategy are not the same. But by recognizing their differences, the two countries can find ample common ground in strengthening their own capabilities and expanding their networks of cooperation.

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The two summits of 2026 opened a rare "window of opportunity" for Korea-France relations. If the question posed in April was "What should be institutionalized, what should be turned into concrete projects, and how far should the relationship be made strategic?", September provided the first substantive answer. The next step is not to increase the number of documents, but to conclude and operationalize the ACSA, establish a regular foreign affairs and defense strategic dialogue, advance joint nuclear projects, launch SSN cooperation in personnel, safety, and maintenance, and put shuttle summit diplomacy into practice. If that happens, the 140th anniversary of Korea-France diplomatic relations will be remembered not merely as a commemorative occasion, but as the point at which the relationship began its transformation from symbol into strategic substance.

1. CHEONG Seong-Chang, "The Dawn of a ROK-France 'Global Strategic Partnership' Era and Remaining Challenges: Institutionalization and Project Development Tasks as Seen Through a Comparison with the Japan-France Summit," Sejong Focus, April 13, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?bd=22&seq=12933.
2. Présidence de la République française, "Visite d'État de Lee Jae Myung, Président de la République de Corée," 8 septembre 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/09/08/visite-detat-de-lee-jae-myung-president-de-la-republique-de-coree.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, "Korea National Diplomatic Academy Hosts Seoul Diplomacy Forum 2026," September 4, 2026 (in Korean). Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Hyun described the government's pragmatic diplomacy as a strategy in which "alliance, self-strengthening, and solidarity" reinforce one another in a virtuous cycle. https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4076/view.do?seq=372415.
4. ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) are U.S. federal regulations that control the export and third-country retransfer of U.S.-origin military technology and components. France has long pursued ITAR-free design of its defense products as an industrial strategy.
5. Présidence de la République française, "Déclaration conjointe du Président de la République française et du Président de la République de Corée," 3 avril 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/04/03/declaration-conjointe-du-president-de-la-republique-francaise-et-du-president-de-la-republique-de-coree; Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea), "Korea-France Joint Press Statement, September 8 (Tue.)," September 8, 2026 (in Korean), https://www.president.go.kr/speeches/Atpu25UE.
6. Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea), "Briefing by National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac on the Results of the State Visit to France," September 9, 2026 (in Korean).
7. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "PEGASE 26 : nouvelle projection de la puissance aérospatiale," 31 août 2026, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/pegase-26/pegase-26-nouvelle-projection-puissance-aerospatiale.
8. Lim Hyung-seop and Ko Dong-wook, "President Lee Attends Film and Audiovisual Summit – Announces &won;800 Billion Investment over Five Years (Comprehensive)," Yonhap News Agency, September 7, 2026 (in Korean).
9. Présidence de la République française, "Visite d'État de Lee Jae Myung, Président de la République de Corée," 8 septembre 2026; Cheong Wa Dae (Office of the President of the Republic of Korea), "Korea-France Joint Press Statement, September 8 (Tue.)," September 8, 2026 (in Korean).
10. Marianne Péron-Doise, "Visite d'État de Lee Jae Myung en France : où en est la coopération franco-coréenne ?," IRIS, 9 septembre 2026, https://www.iris-france.org/visite-detat-de-lee-jae-myung-en-france-ou-en-est-la-cooperation-franco-coreenne/.
11. Orano, "Orano et KHNP renforcent leur partenariat stratégique dans le cycle du combustible nucléaire en présence des dirigeants sud-coréen et français," 8 septembre 2026, https://www.orano.group/fr/actus/actualites-du-groupe/2026/septembre/orano-et-khnp-renforcent-leur-partenariat-strategique-dans-le-cycle-du-combustible-nucleaire-en-presence-des-dirigeants-sud-coreen-et-francais.
12. Présidence de la République française, "Visite d'État de Lee Jae Myung..." 8 septembre 2026; see also CHEONG Seong-Chang, "South Korea's Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Crisis and the Warning for 2030: U.S. Constraints, Japan's Precedent, and a Realistic Roadmap for Korea-France Cooperation," Sejong Focus, April 21, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?bd=22&seq=12973.
13. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "L'École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA)," https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/mieux-nous-connaitre/ecoles-formations/lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique-eamea; CHEONG Seong-Chang, "Directions for Korea-France Cooperation on Nuclear-Powered Submarine Workforce Development: Turning Military Academy Consolidation into an Opportunity to Establish a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center in Jinhae," Sejong Focus, July 21, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?bd=22&seq=13059.
14. CHEONG Seong-Chang, "Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Sustainment Matters as Much as Construction – France's IPER-MCO Sustainment System and ROK-France Cooperation," Sejong Focus, July 28, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?bd=22&seq=13082.
15. CHEONG Seong-Chang, "Korea-France Cooperation to Reduce the Time and Risk in Building Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine: A Franco-Korean Technology-Verification Roadmap Compatible with the ROK-US LEU Fuel Agreement," Sejong Focus, June 18, 2026, https://www.sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?bd=22&seq=13013.
16. See CHEONG Seong-Chang, "The Dawn of a ROK-France 'Global Strategic Partnership' Era and Remaining Challenges" (note 1).
17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "The 14th Meeting of the Japan-France Nuclear Cooperation Committee (Results)," 23 July 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/pressite_000001_02532.html; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-France Summit Meeting and Working Dinner," 1 April 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/erp_1/fr/pageite_000001_01563.html.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.