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The 140th Anniversary of Korea–France Diplomatic Relations and a New Blueprint for Cooperation among Major Middle Powers — A Strategic Partnership in an Era of Uncertain Extended Deterrence — |
| March 26, 2026 |
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Seong-Chang CheongVice President, Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org
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The year 2026 marks the 140th anniversary of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the Kingdom of Joseon and the French Republic, signed on June 4, 1886 (Traité d'Amitié et de Commerce Franco-Coréen). French President Emmanuel Macron is scheduled to visit South Korea on April 2 for a summit with President Lee Jae-myung.1)
This will be the first visit by a French president to South Korea in eleven years, since President François Hollande’s visit in 2015, and is expected to serve as a milestone signaling a new leap in bilateral relations.
President Macron’s visit goes beyond a commemorative event. In a complex strategic environment characterized by the unilateralism of the second Trump administration, the prolonged Russia–Ukraine war, the restoration of the Russia–North Korea alliance and expansion of military cooperation, U.S. and Israeli military actions against Iran, and China’s military rise, both South Korea and France face an urgent task: strengthening solidarity with like-minded states while preserving their respective strategic autonomy. Against the backdrop of the 140th anniversary, this paper reviews the trajectory of Korea–France relations with a focus on foreign and security affairs and proposes strategic directions for the future. -
1. From the Byeongin Yangyo (the French expedition to Korea in 1866) to Diplomatic Relations: From Conflict to Initial Engagement
The first encounter between Korea and France began in tragedy. In 1866, following the execution of nine French missionaries during the Byeongin Persecution2) , the French Navy under Admiral Roze launched an expedition against Ganghwa Island. The resulting mistrust ran deep, and France established formal diplomatic relations with Korea only in 1886, later than the United States (1882) and the United Kingdom and Germany (1883).
Nevertheless, following the establishment of diplomatic ties, France contributed to introducing Korea to the international community. Maurice Courant3) , interpreter to Victor Collin de Plancy, the first French minister to Korea appointed in 1887, compiled the4) , laying the foundation for Korean studies in France. This work classified and catalogued 3,821 Korean texts, ranging from the Goryeo-period Sangjeong Gogeum Yemun to the late Joseon-era Hansung Sunbo, and provided detailed annotations on content, publication context, and authorship. As the first comprehensive bibliographic compendium on Korean literature distributed globally at a time when the very concept of “Korean studies” had yet to be established, it remains a critical source for reconstructing the circulation and collection of Korean rare books in the late nineteenth century.
However, following Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, bilateral relations were effectively suspended for approximately four decades. Even during this period, the foundations of Korea–France relations endured. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was able to establish itself in the French Concession in Shanghai in 1919 largely because French authorities provided what amounted to a safe haven. Independence leaders such as Kim Gu and Yi Dong-hwi were able to continue their activities under French acquiescence, and the Provisional Government maintained diplomatic efforts through its Paris Commission (Commission de Paris)5) to appeal for independence in the international community. Despite repeated Japanese demands for the extradition of independence activists, France’s protection of the Provisional Government within the concession remains a significant historical legacy in bilateral relations.
2. The Korean War: Solidarity Forged in Blood
In 1949, France became the second European country, after the United Kingdom, to officially recognize the Republic of Korea. When the Korean War broke out the following year, France dispatched about 3,400 troops under General Ralph Monclar,6) who had held the rank of Général de corps d’armée but voluntarily demoted himself to lieutenant colonel in order to lead the French battalion under the UN Command. The French contingent was attached to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division’s 23rd Regiment and fought on the Korean Peninsula for three years. Approximately 260 soldiers were killed in action and over 1,000 were wounded, meaning that roughly one in three French troops deployed either fell or were injured in defense of South Korea’s freedom.7)
The most emblematic contribution of the French battalion was the Battle of Chipyong-ni in February 1951. Fighting alongside the U.S. 23rd Regimental Combat Team, French forces withstood and repelled repeated assaults by numerically superior Chinese forces over three days. This battle marked the first tactical victory of UN forces against Chinese troops and is widely regarded as a strategic turning point, often described as the “Gettysburg of the Korean War.” The victory contributed to the recapture of Seoul, and the French battalion was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation by the United States. The South Korean government also honored their sacrifice with its highest decorations. France was among the few European countries, alongside the Netherlands and Belgium, to deploy combat-ready infantry units at the battalion level. The inscription of “Korea” in the ceremony of the eternal flame at the Arc de Triomphe stands as a testament to the enduring memory of this shared sacrifice in French national consciousness.8)
3. Korea–France Relations During the Era of Military Rule: Between Pragmatism and Principles
During South Korea’s authoritarian period from the 1950s through the 1980s, Korea–France relations were characterized by recurring tension between pragmatism and principle. Under President Charles de Gaulle, France pursued an independent foreign policy, including establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1964, and maintained a degree of distance on Korean Peninsula issues, avoiding alignment with either North or South Korea. It was not until the 1970s, as South Korea’s economic development accelerated, that bilateral relations began to expand more visibly. Cooperation in the nuclear energy sector was particularly notable. France’s Framatome participated in the construction of the Kori Nuclear Power Plant, and in 1981, the Korea–France Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was concluded, establishing an institutional foundation for bilateral cooperation in energy technology. The potential of contemporary Korea–France nuclear cooperation remains closely tied to the foundations laid during this period.
In terms of human rights and democracy, France adopted a pragmatic approach, favoring quiet diplomatic engagement rather than overt criticism of South Korea’s military regimes. During the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980, France, like the United States, refrained from active intervention. However, French intellectuals and media consistently expressed solidarity with South Korea’s democratization movement, contributing to the formation of international public opinion supportive of democratic reform. Following democratization in 1987, Korea–France relations entered a more mature and balanced phase. -
1. Korea–France Summits: Achievements and Limitations
The first summit-level exchange between South Korea and France took place in September 1993, when President François Mitterrand visited South Korea. As the first sitting French president to visit the country, Mitterrand reached agreement in principle on the return of the Oegyujanggak royal archives and discussed the transfer of high-speed rail (TGV) technology. During the visit, he personally presented to President Kim Young-sam at the Blue House the upper volume of the Uigwe of the Office for the Royal Tomb of Huigyeongwon (徽慶園園所都鑑儀軌). However, the transfer of even a single volume was not without difficulty. On the French side, a female museum staff member reportedly clutched the volume and refused to hand it over, forcing embassy officials and even the ambassador to engage in lengthy persuasion.9)
During his European tour, President Kim Young-sam visited France in March 1995 as his first stop and held a summit with President Mitterrand, discussing international developments, including those on the Korean Peninsula, as well as measures to expand bilateral cooperation. This visit contributed to further consolidating bilateral relations. The Sorbonne conferred an honorary doctorate on President Kim, marking the first time in its 700-year history that such a degree had been awarded to a sitting head of state.10)
President Roh Moo-hyun is known to have held Charles de Gaulle in high regard. His interest in Gaullist leadership was evident in his appointment of Lee Joo-heum, then a senior director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (and later Ambassador to Myanmar), author of a study on de Gaulle's leadership, as Presidential Secretary for Leadership Affairs. At the time, Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang-ung also reported plans to pursue French-style defense reform. President Roh’s political posture—his willingness to speak candidly to the United States and assert greater autonomy—bore similarities to de Gaulle’s emphasis on national independence.11) During President Roh’s visit to France in December 2004, the two countries declared a “Comprehensive Partnership for the 21st Century” and agreed to expand bilateral trade from approximately $5 billion to $10 billion within five years.
In 2010, during President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visit to Seoul for the G20 Summit, an agreement was reached on the return of 297 volumes of the Oegyujanggak Uigwe, bringing closure to a long-standing historical issue. However, following President François Hollande’s visit to South Korea in 2015, there was an eleven-year gap in visits by French presidents. During this period, summit-level engagement continued primarily on the margins of multilateral meetings. The 2018 Moon Jae-in–Macron summit focused on coordination on Korean Peninsula denuclearization, while President Yoon Suk Yeol’s visit to Paris in 2023 resulted in agreements on cooperation for restoring peace in Ukraine and expanding collaboration in advanced technology and defense industries.
At the November 2025 G20 Summit, President Lee Jae-myung and President Macron agreed to elevate bilateral relations to a “Global Strategic Partnership”, marking a significant development. President Macron emphasized cooperation across a range of sectors, including security, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, space, nuclear energy, and renewable energy, and pledged to visit South Korea within the year.12)
However, a critical assessment of summit outcomes reveals a recurring limitation: the depth of implementation often falls short of the declaratory scope of agreements. While the fifth Korea–France Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue in March 2025 confirmed that “the security of both countries is interconnected,” concrete institutional mechanisms to operationalize this recognition remain underdeveloped.
2. Cooperation and Competition: A Dual Trajectory
The 140-year history of Korea–France relations reflects a complex interplay of cooperation and competition. There are numerous examples of constructive cooperation, including collaboration in nuclear technology, the Korea–EU Free Trade Agreement concluded in 2009 (and entering into force in 2011), the launch of the Arirang-7 multipurpose satellite from French Guiana, cooperation in nuclear security in 2021, and the 2025 agreement between South Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and France’s Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) on cooperation in space and defense industries. At the United Nations Security Council, France has consistently supported sanctions resolutions against North Korea, serving as a reliable partner for South Korea. Following Russia’s veto in 2024, South Korea, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly established the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) to oversee the implementation of sanctions against North Korea.
At the same time, areas of competition and tension are also evident. The defense industry is a prominent example. South Korea’s selection of the F-35 over France’s Rafale for its next-generation fighter program, as well as competition between South Korean systems such as the K9 self-propelled howitzer and K2 tank and French defense firms (including Nexter, Dassault, and Thales) in Eastern European markets such as Poland and Romania, illustrate the competitive dimension of the bilateral relationship. Competition in nuclear power exports is another sensitive issue. South Korea’s successful bid in 2024 for the Dukovany nuclear power plant project in the Czech Republic, defeating France’s EDF, highlights the coexistence of cooperation and rivalry in the nuclear sector. The 2021 AUKUS submarine agreement, which resulted in the cancellation of France’s €56 billion contract with Australia, dealt a significant blow to France’s defense industrial strategy. Paradoxically, this development has also contributed to France’s increased interest in strengthening strategic cooperation with South Korea.
In contrast, cooperation in the cultural domain has been particularly positive. Paris has emerged as a hub of the Korean Wave in Europe, and France is an enthusiastic consumer of Korean films, television dramas, and K-pop. This cultural affinity serves as an important foundation for public support, reinforcing the social basis of bilateral cooperation in foreign and security policy. -
1. South Korea’s Elevated Status and the Challenge of Strategic Autonomy
Today, South Korea’s international standing is incomparably higher than it was at the time diplomatic relations were first established. With a top-10 global economy, a position as the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest defense exporter, advanced technological capabilities in nuclear energy, space, semiconductors, and shipbuilding, and soft power grounded in democracy and the rule of law, South Korea is no longer merely a recipient of aid or an object of protection in a conflict-prone region.
Against this backdrop of heightened international status, the transactional alliance perspective of the second Trump administration poses a fundamental strategic question for South Korea. Although U.S. extended deterrence remains in place, the possibility of weakening political trust is growing. In an era in which uncertainty surrounding extended deterrence is becoming structural, South Korea must pursue a hedging strategy that prepares for potential gaps without undermining the institutional continuity of extended deterrence itself. Part of the answer to this question may be found in deepening strategic cooperation with France.
2. Core Agendas for Strategic Cooperation
The historical experience accumulated over 140 years—solidarity forged in blood, the precedent of the 1981 nuclear cooperation agreement, and France’s new strategic needs in the wake of the AUKUS shock—demonstrates that deeper Korea–France strategic cooperation is not merely aspirational, but a realistic and mutually beneficial option. Above all, it must be made clear that the deepening of Korea–France strategic cooperation discussed below is not intended to replace the U.S.–ROK alliance, but rather to broaden South Korea’s strategic options by diversifying its alliance portfolio. The essential strategy South Korea must now pursue is to further develop strategic cooperation with the United States in the areas of nuclear energy, shipbuilding, defense industry, and economic security, while at the same time expanding the space for cooperation with France.
First, cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines. France is the only country in the Western world that operates nuclear-powered submarines based on low-enriched uranium (LEU). LEU technology has the decisive advantage of minimizing proliferation concerns, unlike the U.S. and British approach, which relies on highly enriched uranium (HEU). Although President Trump approved South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered submarines in October 2025, legal barriers under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act and uncertainties surrounding congressional procedures remain. In this context, LEU-based submarine cooperation with France does not replace cooperation with the United States, but holds strategic value as a complementary option in the event of institutional delays on the U.S. side. A cooperative framework combining France’s operational know-how in LEU-based nuclear submarines with South Korea’s world-class shipbuilding infrastructure would constitute 'Big Deal' capable of significantly strengthening the strategic autonomy of both countries.13)
Second, cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle. Orano’s uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies address areas of urgent need for South Korea. South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel storage capacity is projected to reach saturation by 2031–32, and without a solution to this problem, the country’s entire nuclear energy policy could face a serious crisis. Establishing a civilian nuclear fuel cycle partnership is therefore a cooperative agenda that would simultaneously strengthen energy security and strategic autonomy.
Third, strengthening Indo-Pacific security coordination. France is, in both name and substance, an Indo-Pacific power, with overseas territories such as New Caledonia and French Polynesia. At a time when South Korean and European security are becoming directly linked through deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation, the establishment of Korea–France joint exercises and intelligence-sharing mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific would serve the interests of both countries. Today, as weapons exported by North Korea to Russia threaten NATO soldiers on the European front, there is ample strategic reason for France to become more actively engaged in Korean Peninsula issues.
3. Key Recommendations for Institutionalization
If Korea–France strategic cooperation is to be elevated from the declaratory level to the level of a substantive quasi-alliance, concrete institutional measures will be required. The following three proposals are central.
First, the regularization of Korea–France summits and 2+2 foreign and defense ministers’ meetings. At present, the two countries operate a foreign ministers’ strategic dialogue and a defense strategic dialogue separately, but the level of institutionalization remains low and the intervals between meetings are irregular. A regular channel should be established, modeled on the U.S.–ROK 2+2 framework, in which foreign and defense ministers meet jointly to discuss comprehensive security cooperation. This should be elevated into a core item of agreement in the joint statement of the 2026 summit.
Second, the creation of an MP5 (Middle Power 5) security consultative mechanism. A security cooperation framework involving five “major middle powers”(中强國)14) —South Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—could become a new multilateral security architecture capable of compensating for gaps in the U.S. role and defending a rules-based international order grounded in democratic values. The feasibility of this concept is already partly visible. The United Kingdom and Germany have adopted Indo-Pacific strategies and are expanding their engagement in the region, while Japan is also actively pursuing security cooperation with the G7 and NATO partner states. In the 2026 Global Firepower (GFP) ranking of conventional military strength, South Korea, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom ranked between fifth and eighth, while Germany ranked twelfth. These are major middle powers in the true sense of the term. The combined defense budgets of the MP5 states—$50 billion for South Korea, $71.5 billion for the United Kingdom, $63.7 billion for France, $57 billion for Japan, and approximately $90 billion for Germany based on its projected 2026 increase—amount to roughly $330 billion, exceeding China’s $266.9 billion and ranking second globally after the United States at $895 billion. Moreover, if one takes into account France and the United Kingdom’s possession of nuclear weapons, the advanced conventional capabilities of Japan and South Korea, and Germany’s large-scale armored forces and defense industrial capacity, the grouping could be regarded as ranking around third or fourth globally in terms of combined conventional and nuclear capabilities. These are, of course, rough estimates based on the GFP index and defense spending. Nonetheless, the launch of MP5 would mark the emergence of a new strategic actor with the potential to reshape the existing international order. Accordingly, the South Korean government should use the Korea–France summit as an opportunity to formalize this concept, while France should be called upon to take on the role of persuading its European partners.15) If the secretariat of the MP5 security consultative mechanism could be established in Seoul, South Korea would be able to play a more leading role in driving strategic cooperation among the MP5 countries. Of course, if the participating states agree, the framework could begin as or expand into an MP6, MP7, or MP8 by including countries such as Canada, Australia, and Italy in addition to the five countries mentioned above.
Third, the strengthening of the Korea–France High-Level Joint Committee on Defense Industry and Logistics. At present, bilateral defense industrial relations remain in an ambiguous state in which competition and cooperation are intermingled. In order to shift from a competitive to a cooperative framework, it will be necessary to institutionalize specific models of cooperation that take into account the future requirements of next-generation weapons systems, including joint development, joint production, and joint marketing and entry into third-country markets. -
Over the past 140 years, Korea–France relations, beginning with the cannon fire of the Byeongin Yangyo, evolving through the provision of refuge to the Korean Provisional Government, deepening into a blood-forged alliance at the Battle of Chipyong-ni, and culminating in today’s partnership grounded in advanced technology and shared strategic interests, have followed a far from linear trajectory. Marked by alternating phases of cooperation and competition, trust and misunderstanding, rupture and restoration, this history reflects a complex evolution. The most significant transformation, however, lies in the fact that the Republic of Korea has now attained a level of international standing that enables it to engage France, the United Kingdom, and Germany on an equal footing.
President Macron’s visit to South Korea in April represents a critical opportunity to elevate bilateral relations to a new level. The central task of this summit is to give substantive content to the declaration of a “strategic partnership,” including the institutionalization of regular summits and 2+2 foreign and defense ministers’ meetings, initial steps toward cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines, and the formalization of the MP5 security consultative framework. These initiatives are not intended to replace the U.S.–ROK alliance, but rather to complement and reinforce it while expanding South Korea’s range of strategic options. In an era of increasing uncertainty surrounding extended deterrence, the diversification of partnerships and the layering of alliances are no longer optional, but essential.
If two major middle powers located at opposite ends of the Eurasian continent pursue strategic cooperation in foreign and security affairs grounded in shared values such as freedom, the rule of law, and multilateralism, such cooperation will contribute not only to bilateral relations, but also to the broader international order. The moment has come to begin writing the next chapter of Korea–France relations.
Ⅰ. Introduction: 140 Years of Diplomatic Relations and Korea–France Relations at a New Starting Point
Ⅱ. Historical Background of Korea–France Relations and the Trajectory of Security Cooperation
Ⅲ. Assessment and Challenges of 140 Years of Korea–France Foreign and Security Dialogue
Ⅳ. Strategic Security Cooperation Agendas for South Korea and France in an Era of Extended Deterrence Uncertainty
Ⅴ. Conclusion: Toward a Strategic Partnership at the Two Ends of Eurasia
1) Song Seung-seop, “French President Macron to Pay State Visit to Korea on April 2–3… Summit with President Lee,” Asia Economy, March 13, 2026.
2) The Byeongin Persecution (丙寅迫害) was the largest-scale Catholic persecution in late Joseon, beginning in 1866 (the 3rd year of King Gojong) under the regency of Heungseon Daewongun and continuing into the early 1870s. Also referred to as the Byeongin Incident (丙寅邪獄), it involved the arrest and execution of thousands to tens of thousands of Catholic believers and French missionaries, and subsequently served as a catalyst for external conflicts, including the French expedition to Korea (Byeongin Yangyo) in 1866.
3) “Maurice Courant,” Encyclopedia of Korean Culture. https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0080217 (Search date: 2026.3.21)
4) Bibliographie Coréenne “Bibliographie Coréenne,” Encyclopedia of Korean Culture. https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0080209 (Search date: 2026.3.21)
5) The Paris Commission refers to the diplomatic mission of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Europe, established in the aftermath of World War I in connection with the Paris Peace Conference. Led by Kim Kyu-sik, it operated primarily in Paris from 1919 through the early 1920s, submitting petitions for Korean independence, conducting propaganda and public diplomacy activities, and building networks with human rights and socialist groups across Europe.
6) Immediately prior to the Korean War, Ralph Monclar (Raoul Charles Magrin-Vernerey) held the rank of Général de corps d’armée in the French Army, equivalent to a lieutenant general (three-star) in the U.S. system. However, when France decided to deploy only a battalion-sized unit to Korea, he voluntarily reduced his rank to lieutenant colonel in order to assume direct command and deployed as commander of the French battalion.
7) Esther Chung, “[Heroes from afar] French, Korean soldiers forged close bonds during war,” Korea JoongAng Daily, October 4, 2020.
8) Lee Young-chang, “A French Four-Star General Who Voluntarily Demoted Himself to Fight in Korea,” Hankook Ilbo, December 4, 2025.
9) “Return of the Oegyujanggak Uigwe, François Mitterrand,” Presidential Archives, Ministry of the Interior and Safety. https://www.pa.go.kr/portal/contents/stroll/special/view.do?bd_seq=34 (Search date: 2026.3.21)
10) Ibid.
11) Park Je-gyun, “President Roh’s ‘French Code’… Resembling de Gaulle in His Assertive Diplomacy,” Dong-A Ilbo, April 29, 2005.
12) “[On-site footage+] President Lee Holds First Summit with French President Macron,” YTN, November 23, 2025.
13) Cheong Seong-Chang, “The Key to the Nuclear Submarine Era: A Korea–U.S. Nuclear Fuel Cooperation Roadmap — Realizing the ‘Korea Builds, U.S. Supplies Fuel’ Model —,” Sejong Focus, December 15, 2025; Cheong Seong-Chang, “Korea–France Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation Strategy and Roadmap — An LEU-Based Platform Integration and Mutually Beneficial Partnership Model —,” Sejong Focus, February 10, 2026.
14) In this paper, “major middle powers” refers more specifically to states ranked roughly 5th to 15th in conventional military power and possessing autonomous capabilities in nuclear, space, and advanced technologies.
15) As discussed in the author’s prior work: Cheong Seong-Chang, “A New Security Architecture in the Post–Extended Deterrence Era — A Proposal for an MP5 (Middle Power 5) Security Consultative Mechanism among Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany —,” Sejong Focus, February 24, 2026.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
