1. Introduction: The Advent of the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Era and the Strategic Importance of Workforce Development

At the ROK-US summit held in Gyeongju on October 29, 2025, President Trump announced that the United States would approve South Korea's construction of nuclear-powered attack submarines. That approval was formalized in the ROK-US joint fact sheet issued the following month. The Ministry of National Defense subsequently announced the "Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarines" on May 26, 2026, and officially designated the project the "Jangbogo-N Program."¹⁾ The Basic Plan laid out five principles: (1) development of a long-cycle reactor fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU); (2) domestic construction; (3) active use of civilian nuclear and shipbuilding technologies; (4) full life-cycle management from design through decommissioning; and (5) launch of the first boat in the mid-2030s. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had reportedly already established a requirement for at least three 8,000-ton-class submarines.²⁾

Yet the success of a nuclear-powered submarine program is not determined by reactor and hull technology alone. A nuclear-powered submarine is a weapon system that carries what amounts to a "miniature nuclear power plant" within a confined, sealed space while maneuvering in three dimensions in the deep ocean. Without crews capable of operating it safely, personnel trained in maintenance and radiological protection, and an education and training system able to produce such specialists on a sustained basis, even the most capable vessels cannot enter operational service.

The ROK Navy has world-class conventional submarine operating capabilities, and Korea has extensive experience operating nuclear power plants. Operating a reactor in the extreme environment of the deep sea, however, is fundamentally different from running a land-based power plant: "Even if we could launch a nuclear submarine tomorrow, without a crew capable of operating it safely and a maintenance system able to sustain it, it would be nothing more than a time bomb beneath the sea."³⁾ This was the same logic behind Admiral Hyman Rickover's insistence on uncompromising accountability and relentless training. It also explains why Professor Moon Keun-sik, a former head of the ROK Navy's nuclear-powered submarine program office, has urged the government to establish a national workforce-development plan and a government-wide "Nuclear-Powered Submarine Workforce Development Committee" before announcing plans for securing a reactor or setting a construction schedule.⁴⁾

The scale of the personnel requirement is also substantial. A US Navy Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarine typically carries a crew of approximately 130, many of whom are nuclear-trained personnel who must pass through the Navy's nuclear training pipeline. By the author's rough estimate, if Korea operates at least three 8,000-ton-class boats under a multi-crew system, several hundred personnel will be required in the initial phase. Over the longer term, that number could grow to around 1,000 once instructors, maintenance personnel, and safety regulators are included. Since qualifying a crew normally takes two to three years or longer, workforce development must precede ship construction rather than merely proceed alongside it.

This raises an important question: why should Korea, which can manufacture its own reactors and build its own submarines, rely on foreign cooperation to train its crews? The ability to design and build submarines and reactors is fundamentally different from the ability to operate a reactor safely in a sealed deep-sea environment. The latter cannot be acquired without extended hands-on training on an operating reactor. Korea, however, has no operational naval reactor that can serve as a training platform, which means that the first practical training platform would otherwise have to be the first boat itself. Yet safe sea trials and acceptance of that boat require a fully qualified crew to be in place beforehand—creating a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma. This is precisely why even the United States, with the NPTU's land-based prototype and moored training ships, and France, with the CEA facilities at Cadarache, maintain dedicated shore-based training infrastructure. Even if Korea began building a land-based prototype reactor today, completing and licensing it and developing an instructor cadre would take roughly a decade. Unlike Australia, which depends broadly on foreign partners for both reactor production and submarine construction, Korea's external dependence would therefore be limited to bridging the training gap until its own hands-on infrastructure is complete. In practical terms, only the United States and France possess naval nuclear propulsion training systems and have experience admitting foreign personnel to them.

This paper examines the US Navy's nuclear propulsion training system and Australia's experience under AUKUS, assesses the prospects and constraints of ROK-US cooperation in workforce development, and proposes a direction and roadmap for moving such cooperation forward.

II. The US Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Training System

US naval nuclear personnel are trained under the strict control of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP), which is jointly administered by the Department of Defense through the Navy and the Department of Energy. The principal training hub is the Naval Nuclear Power Training Command (NNPTC) at Goose Creek, South Carolina, within Joint Base Charleston. Its 226-acre campus can accommodate up to 3,600 students and 480 faculty and staff.⁵⁾

The training pathway for enlisted personnel consists of three stages. First, at the Nuclear Field "A" School, students receive three to six months of basic technical instruction in the mechanical, electrical, and electronics ratings. Second, at the Nuclear Power School (NPS), they complete twenty-four weeks, or six months, of comprehensive theoretical instruction on pressurized-water-reactor naval propulsion systems. The curriculum covers reactor physics and nuclear principles, heat transfer and fluid systems, plant chemistry and materials, mechanical and electrical systems, and radiological controls. With 40 to 45 hours of classroom instruction per week supplemented by 10 to 25 hours of self-study, it is regarded as one of the most demanding academic programs in the US military.⁶⁾ Third, at a Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU), students undergo twenty-six weeks of hands-on training on an operating reactor. NPTUs are located in Charleston, where three Moored Training Ships converted from decommissioned nuclear submarines are operated, and at Ballston Spa, New York, which has a land-based prototype reactor. Only after completing this stage do trainees become qualified to stand nuclear watches in the fleet.⁷⁾

For officers, college-level coursework in calculus and physics is a prerequisite. Candidates are selected through interviews at Naval Reactors in Washington and final approval by the Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, a four-star admiral appointed to an eight-year term. They then complete NPS and NPTU, while submarine officers also attend the Submarine Officer Basic Course (SOBC) in Groton, Connecticut.⁸⁾ According to official US Navy sources, the program has operated 273 reactors and accumulated more than 7,700 reactor-years of safe operation, with a reactor-year representing one year of operation aggregated across multiple reactors.⁹⁾ In essence, the US system rests on three principles: rigorous selection, the integration of theory with hands-on training on operating reactors, and uncompromising safety discipline and qualification management. Together, these principles have sustained its long record of safe operation.

III. How the United States Is Training Australia's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Workforce

AUKUS is effectively the first case in which the United States has systematically integrated the officers and enlisted sailors of a non-nuclear-weapon ally into its naval nuclear training pipeline and linked that training to service aboard US nuclear-powered submarines. This was made possible through special agreements and legislation. The three countries first established a basis for sharing naval nuclear propulsion information through the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement (ENNPIA), signed in November 2021 and in force since February 2022.¹⁰⁾ In June 2022, the AUKUS Working Group in the US House of Representatives introduced the "Australia-US Submarine Officer Pipeline Act," which provided for at least two Australian submarine officers each year to attend Nuclear Power School and then serve aboard operational US Navy submarines. The measure was incorporated into the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in December 2022 and thereby enacted into law.¹¹⁾ The three countries subsequently broadened the legal framework to cover the transfer of nuclear material and equipment through the Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion (ANNPA), signed in August 2024 and in force since January 2025. The first lesson from the Australian case is therefore clear: US cooperation in nuclear-powered submarine workforce development cannot rest on an executive-branch political decision alone. It must pass through the twin gateways of congressional authorization and intergovernmental agreements.

The training program has progressed as follows. Three Royal Australian Navy (RAN) officers completed Nuclear Power School in July 2023 and then entered the NPTU practical training course, becoming its first Australian graduates in January 2024. After completing the Submarine Officer Basic Course at Groton in April 2024, they were assigned as division officers aboard US Virginia-class submarines and began operational service. The US Navy has described their sea duty aboard Virginia-class boats as a critical career-development step toward becoming the executive officers and first commanding officers of Australia's future nuclear-powered submarines. In 2024 alone, approximately 100 Australian officers and enlisted sailors entered the submarine and naval nuclear training pipelines. On the enlisted side, the first seven sailors entered Nuclear Power School in October 2023 and graduated in October 2024 alongside five officers. In April 2025, the first NPTU cohort to include enlisted sailors—eight enlisted sailors and five officers—completed the prototype training course. In parallel, civilian technicians employed by an Australian state-owned enterprise are receiving training in radiological controls and nuclear-powered submarine maintenance at the naval shipyards in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and Norfolk, Virginia.¹²⁾

Workforce development is also being integrated with the transfer of maintenance know-how and capabilities. Beginning in 2027, the United States plans to operate Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West), under which US and UK nuclear-powered submarines will rotate through HMAS Stirling in Western Australia. In preparation, Australia carried out its first domestic maintenance work on a Virginia-class submarine, USS Hawaii, at Stirling in August 2024 with support from the submarine tender USS Emory S. Land. From October 2025, Australian personnel took the lead in a more complex maintenance availability on the Virginia-class USS Vermont, this time without tender support. Thirteen RAN sailors are embarked among Vermont's crew of 134 as part of their preparation for Australia's acquisition of Virginia-class boats in the 2030s. The Australian government is investing up to A$8 billion in port infrastructure at Stirling¹³⁾ and is separately pursuing investments totaling A$30 billion to strengthen its submarine maintenance and parts industrial base.¹⁴⁾

The Australian case offers three lessons for Korea. First, workforce development begins roughly a decade before submarine delivery. If Korea intends to launch its first boat in the mid-2030s, negotiations over personnel dispatch and the selection process must begin immediately. Second, the Australian model establishes a comprehensive pipeline encompassing officers, enlisted sailors, civilian technicians, and maintenance personnel, while combining at-sea training with participation in maintenance at Australian bases. Third, the absorptive capacity of the US pipeline is limited. With the US Navy itself facing delays in Virginia-class construction and shortages of qualified crews, accommodating Australian personnel already imposes a considerable burden. Whether the system could also accept Korean personnel on a large scale remains uncertain.

IV. How Fuel Differences Affect ROK-US Cooperation: Comparing the US and French Training Systems

The most important structural factor in assessing the prospects for ROK-US workforce-development cooperation is the difference in reactor fuel. US and UK naval reactors use weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) enriched to 93.5 percent, whereas France and China use low-enriched uranium (LEU). The latest US submarine HEU cores are designed for long-life or life-of-ship operation, and their operating and maintenance concepts therefore differ from those of French LEU reactors, which require periodic refueling. France shifted to LEU in the mid-1990s. According to published specialist analyses, the K15-series reactors used in its latest Suffren-class submarines employ LEU estimated at approximately 6 percent enrichment, are refueled at roughly ten-year intervals, and incorporate a dedicated logistics hatch for that purpose.¹⁵⁾

Korea's Basic Plan adopted LEU use and long-cycle operation as its first principle. This is both an unavoidable and prudent choice for complying with nonproliferation norms, but it creates a structural mismatch with the US training system. First, the US curriculum, prototype reactor, and moored training ships all assume sealed HEU cores. Refueling procedures, reactivity management across refueling cycles, and spent-fuel handling areas essential to the operation of Korea's long-cycle LEU reactor are therefore not covered in the US curriculum. Second, US reactor design and operating information falls within the most tightly controlled categories under the Atomic Energy Act and has been shared even with Australia only in limited form through special legislation and agreements. US training alone therefore cannot provide comprehensive mastery of the fuel-management, refueling, and maintenance doctrine required for a Korean LEU reactor.¹⁶⁾ Third, because the fuel supplier, enrichment level, and associated legal obligations have yet to be settled, the reactor design should not be tied to any single supplier. The fuel-procurement pathway should be clarified and established at an early stage, in parallel with reactor development.

France—the only other country with a dedicated naval nuclear propulsion training system—operates a dual structure. The École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA) in Cherbourg provides nuclear theory, engineering, and safety education to approximately 1,000 trainees each year,¹⁷⁾ while the École de navigation sous-marine (ENSM) in Toulon and Brest conducts submarine operating training using twenty-three simulators.¹⁸⁾ The table below compares the US and French systems.

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As the table shows, the two systems share several core principles: the integration of theory with hands-on reactor training, a pipeline encompassing all ranks, and close links with industry and research institutions. They differ, however, in reactor fuel and in the degree of legal and institutional openness. Because Korea has chosen a long-cycle LEU reactor, its operating environment is structurally closer to that of France, giving ROK-France cooperation a comparative advantage in the acquisition of refueling and maintenance doctrine.¹⁹⁾ This does not, however, diminish the value of ROK-US cooperation. In cross-cutting fields unaffected by fuel type—including nuclear safety culture, radiological controls, watchstanding discipline, crew qualification management, and submarine tactics—US training remains world-leading. ROK-US workforce-development cooperation is also indispensable for interoperability with the US Navy in combined undersea operations and for participation in the US-UK-Australia nuclear-powered submarine maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) market discussed below. In short, cooperation with the United States and France is mutually complementary: the United States offers a comparative advantage in transferring safety culture and operating discipline, while France offers one in developing LEU reactor operating and maintenance doctrine.

V. Direction and Roadmap for ROK-US Cooperation in Developing a Nuclear-Powered Submarine Workforce

Before turning to the implementation agenda, it is necessary to ask why the United States would cooperate in developing Korea's nuclear-powered submarine workforce. First, political momentum already exists. President Trump's approval of construction in October 2025 and the explicit reference in the November 2025 ROK-US joint fact sheet to cooperation in shipbuilding-sector maintenance, repair, and overhaul and workforce development mean that such cooperation is not an entirely new request, but an implementation task arising from an agreement between the two leaders. Second, Korea can offer clear reciprocal value. ROK-US shipbuilding cooperation under MASGA, aimed at revitalizing the US shipbuilding industry, together with efforts to relieve the US-UK-Australia nuclear-powered submarine MRO bottleneck discussed below, would mobilize Korea's industrial capacity to address problems the United States cannot solve on its own. Training Korean personnel would therefore be an investment in the very capacity needed to make that contribution. Third, fielding Korean nuclear-powered submarines would expand alliance capabilities, help shoulder the US Navy's Indo-Pacific undersea operational burden, and strengthen interoperability in combined operations. Opening the US training pipeline should therefore be designed not as a favor, but as a strategic bargain based on these reciprocal benefits. This is the guiding premise of the roadmap presented in this paper. France's incentives to cooperate with Korea in workforce development—including its Indo-Pacific strategy, the expansion of defense-industrial cooperation, and links with civil nuclear cooperation—will be examined in detail in a subsequent paper.

On the basis of this structure of mutual benefit, this paper proposes four implementation tasks for ROK-US workforce-development cooperation. First, the two countries should establish a legal foundation. Because the November 2025 ROK-US joint fact sheet specifies cooperation in maintenance, repair, and overhaul and workforce development through a working-level consultative mechanism on shipbuilding, Korea should use that commitment as the basis for pursuing a "ROK-US Special Agreement on Nuclear-Powered Submarine Workforce Development," modeled on Australia's submarine-officer pipeline legislation and ANNPA.²⁰⁾ The agreement should specify the number of trainees, information-security arrangements, and cost-sharing, while also providing a legal basis for Korean personnel to embark and train aboard US SSNs.

Second, personnel should be dispatched in phases. Applying the Australian model, Korea should pursue three tracks in parallel: (1) an initial cohort of officers completing NPS (24 weeks), NPTU (26 weeks), and SOBC, followed by operational assignments aboard US Virginia-class submarines as prospective first commanding officers and executive officers of Korean nuclear-powered submarines; (2) enlisted personnel completing NPS and NPTU; and (3) shipyard and maintenance technicians receiving radiological-control and maintenance training at the Pearl Harbor and Norfolk naval shipyards. The program should begin at a realistic scale of 20 to 30 personnel per year and follow a train-the-trainer model under which more than half of those dispatched are prepared to serve as instructors at a future Korean naval nuclear training center. Given the capacity constraints of the US pipeline, a dual-track strategy is the most rational approach: Korea should concentrate its demand for US training on areas of American comparative advantage—safety culture, operating discipline, and submarine tactics—while relying on cooperation with France for LEU-reactor-specific training.²¹⁾

Third, workforce development should be linked to MRO cooperation. Korean shipyards are already performing MRO work on US Navy surface ships, and this cooperation could expand to the United Kingdom and Australia and, over the longer term, to the submarine sector.²²⁾ Because qualified personnel are a prerequisite for participation in the maintenance of nuclear-powered vessels, training maintenance personnel at US shipyards should be framed not merely as educational cooperation, but as an investment in opening a new market for the Korean shipbuilding industry and strengthening Korea's contribution to the alliance. The experience gained would feed directly into the design of Korea's own maintenance yard and the development of personnel who will eventually be responsible for depot-level maintenance and fuel management of the Jangbogo-N boats.

Fourth, the initiative should be expanded strategically into a joint ROK-US-Australia MRO concept. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia all face serious nuclear-powered submarine maintenance challenges. As of 2024, roughly 34 percent of US attack submarines were unavailable for operations because they were undergoing or awaiting maintenance.²³⁾ The United Kingdom has likewise faced persistent criticism over maintenance delays, low availability, and shortages of specialist personnel across its submarine force, including the Astute class.²⁴⁾ Both countries have even resorted to cannibalizing parts because of shortages of spares.²⁵⁾ Australia, meanwhile, has yet to develop the industrial base and nuclear workforce required to conduct long-term depot maintenance independently after it receives Virginia-class boats in the 2030s. To address this structural bottleneck, this paper proposes that the three countries jointly build and operate a nuclear-powered submarine MRO facility in Australia—a location trusted by the United States and readily accessible to Korea—with Korea, which possesses the world's second-largest shipbuilding capacity, making a core contribution. Expanding existing facilities in the United States would be inefficient because of strict regulatory requirements, high costs, and restrictions on foreign personnel. Nor would it eliminate the months-long operational gaps created when submarines in the Western Pacific must transit to Hawaii or the continental United States for maintenance. Australia, by contrast, is already developing a regional maintenance hub through SRF-West and investments at Stirling and Henderson.²⁶⁾ Korean participation would therefore join and reinforce an initiative already under way rather than begin from scratch.

Because access to reactor compartments is currently limited to the three AUKUS countries, however, a phased approach is essential. Korea could initially participate under a functionally separated maintenance model, taking responsibility for non-nuclear areas such as hull, mechanical, and electrical work and for dock and infrastructure construction, including the early provision of Korean-built floating dry docks. Nuclear areas would remain the exclusive responsibility of certified personnel from the three AUKUS countries, with the scope of Korean participation expanding as Korean personnel acquire the relevant qualifications. It is also important to note that the AUKUS Authorised User Community (AUC) is merely a mechanism for easing defense export controls: naval nuclear propulsion plants and related test and maintenance equipment are excluded from its coverage. Korean participation in nuclear-powered submarine MRO would therefore require a separate ROK-US or ROK-US-Australia intergovernmental agreement and authorization under US law, rather than simply admission to the AUC.²⁷⁾ Washington should be persuaded that this concept is not intended to offshore American work, but to absorb excess demand that US nuclear-powered submarine maintenance facilities cannot handle, thereby reducing maintenance backlogs and allowing US private shipbuilders to devote more capacity to constructing new submarines. Canberra, for its part, should be assured that the concept would not substitute for Australian capability, but would create a partnership capable of achieving a scale and speed that Australia could not attain on its own.

VI. Conclusion

The US naval nuclear propulsion training system is the world's most thoroughly proven framework for developing naval nuclear personnel. Australia's AUKUS experience demonstrates that access to this system can be extended to allied personnel when supported by special legal arrangements and a high degree of alliance trust. Korea's decision to adopt a long-cycle LEU reactor creates a structural mismatch with the US system, but this should lead not to the conclusion that ROK-US cooperation is unnecessary, but to a rational division of labor. Korea should draw on the United States for nuclear safety culture, operating discipline, and interoperability in combined undersea operations, while learning LEU reactor operations and maintenance doctrine from France. On that foundation, Korea should build an independent training system of its own. The strategic value of ROK-US workforce-development cooperation would be further enhanced by expanding it into a joint ROK-US-Australia MRO initiative. Such an initiative would use Korea's industrial capacity to alleviate alliance-wide maintenance bottlenecks affecting US, UK, and Australian nuclear-powered submarines. It would also make workforce-development cooperation more feasible by offering the United States a concrete reciprocal benefit for opening its training pipeline to Korea. Negotiations on a workforce-development agreement and the dispatch of an initial cohort cannot wait until the first submarine is launched—they must begin now.

1. Ministry of National Defense, press release announcing the "Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarines," May 26, 2026.
2. Lee Jong-yoon, "Jangbogo-N' Unveiled—Virginia-Class Displacement Likely: 'It Will Transform the Undersea Operational Landscape of the Indo-Pacific," Financial News, May 27, 2026.
3. Won Tae-ho, "Fielding Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Developing the Required Workforce: Lessons from Australia's AUKUS Experience," Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), KIMS Periscope, No. 432 (June 21, 2026).
4. Moon Keun-sik, "The First Investment Required for a Successful Nuclear Submarine Program Is in Design Personnel," Sisa Journal-e, July 8, 2026.
5. Naval Nuclear Power Training Command (NNPTC) official website, US Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/NNPTC/
6. U.S. Navy, "Training & Advancement: Nuclear Operations," https://www.navy.com/node/1443
7. Naval Nuclear Power Training Command (NNPTC) official website, US Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/NNPTC/; U.S. Navy, "Nuclear Power Training Unit Instructor," https://www.navy.com/careers-benefits/careers/science-engineering/nptu-nuclear-power-training-unit-instructor
8. U.S. Navy, "Nuclear Power Training Unit Instructor," https://www.navy.com/careers-benefits/careers/science-engineering/nptu-nuclear-power-training-unit-instructor
9. U.S. Navy, "First Royal Australian Navy Enlisted Students Graduate Nuclear Power Training Unit," April 18, 2025. https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/display-news/Article/4160817/first-royal-australian-navy-enlisted-students-graduate-nuclear-power-training/
10. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United States of America for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (ENNPIA), signed November 22, 2021, entered into force February 8, 2022. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukaustraliausa-agreement-for-the-exchange-of-naval-nuclear-propulsion-information-ms-no82021; Agreement among the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of Australia, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion (ANNPA), signed August 5, 2024, entered into force January 2025. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/66d1e4198df4724cad1aeb05/MS_8.2024_Agreement_UK_Australia_USA_Cooperation_Naval_Nuclear_Propulsion.pdf
11. "Courtney, Gallagher and AUKUS Working Group Introduce New Bill to Establish Officer Training Pipeline for Australian Submarines," press release, Office of US Representative Joe Courtney, June 16, 2022. https://courtney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/courtney-gallagher-and-aukus-working-group-introduce-new-bill-establish. The bill was incorporated into the FY2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) in December 2022, completing its passage into law.
12. "Enlisted Australian sailors trained to use US nuclear attack subs," Navy Times, April 23, 2025. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2025/04/23/enlisted-australian-sailors-trained-to-use-us-nuclear-attack-subs/
13. "Upgrades at HMAS Stirling Pave the Way for Submarine Rotational Force-West," Australian Submarine Agency (ASA), December 2, 2025. https://www.asa.gov.au/news/upgrades-hmas-stirling-pave-way-submarine-rotational-force-west
14. Australian Submarine Agency, Australia's AUKUS Submarine Industry Strategy: Building a Strong and Resilient Industrial Base for Australian Submarines, Canberra: Department of Defence, 2025. https://www.asa.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/2025-03/Australias-AUKUS-Submarine-Industry-Strategy.pdf
15. Alain Tournyol du Clos, "The Feasibility of Ending HEU Fuel Use in the U.S. Navy," Arms Control Today, October 2016. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2016-10/features/feasibility-ending-heu-fuel-use-us-navy; "Australia should take another look at France's nuclear submarines," Pearls and Irritations, July 2026. https://johnmenadue.com/post/2026/07/australia-should-take-another-look-at-frances-nuclear-submarines/
16. Cheong Seong-Chang, "Korea-France Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation: Strategy and Roadmap—A Model for LEU-Based Submarine Platform Integration and a Mutually Beneficial Partnership," Sejong Focus, February 10, 2026.
17. Ministère des Armées, "L'École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA)" (official introduction to France's military school of atomic energy applications). https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/mieux-nous-connaitre/ecoles-formations/lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique-eamea
18. Ministère des Armées, "[14 juillet 2025] École de navigation sous-marine et des bâtiments à propulsion nucléaire," https://www.defense.gouv.fr/14-juillet-2025-ecole-navigation-marine-batiments-propulsion-nucleaire
19. A detailed analysis of France's naval nuclear propulsion training system and EAMEA, along with the direction of ROK-France workforce-development cooperation and a roadmap for establishing a Korean naval nuclear training center, will be presented in a subsequent paper.
20. See Won Tae-ho, "Fielding Korean Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Developing the Required Workforce: Lessons from Australia's AUKUS Experience."
21. A detailed analysis of France's naval nuclear propulsion training system and EAMEA, along with the direction of ROK-France workforce-development cooperation and a roadmap for establishing a Korean naval nuclear training center, will be presented in a subsequent paper.
22. See Peter Ward, "AUKUS Supply Chains and Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Conditions and Challenges for Cooperation," Sejong Focus, July 6, 2026.
23. Ronald O'Rourke, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine (Pillar 1) Project: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL32418, Congressional Research Service, updated January 26, 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL32418
24. House of Commons Library, UK Submarine Fleet, CDP-2025-0005, January 10, 2025, pp. 4-5. The report identifies persistent concerns regarding maintenance and availability across the UK submarine force, as well as shortages of personnel and specialist skills. https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2025-0005/CDP-2025-0005.pdf; House of Commons Defence Committee, AUKUS, HC 841, April 28, 2026, para. 95. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmdfence/841/report.html
25. See Peter Ward, "AUKUS Supply Chains and Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Conditions and Challenges for Cooperation."
26. "Australia Getting Set for Submarine Rotational Force-West," press release, Australian Department of Defence, October 29, 2025. https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2025-10-29/australia-getting-set-submarine-rotati­onal-force-west; "Upgrades at HMAS Stirling Pave the Way for Submarine Rotational Force-West," Australian Submarine Agency (ASA), December 2, 2025. https://www.asa.gov.au/news/upgrades-hmas-stirling-pave-way-submarine-rotational-force-west
27. UK Department for Business and Trade, "Open General Licence (AUKUS Nations)," April 8, 2026. Although the licence establishes the Authorised User Community (AUC), it excludes naval nuclear propulsion plants, related test and maintenance equipment, and test models from its coverage. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/69d4f0a7826d774e7b263e70/open-general-licence-auku­s-nations.pdf

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.