The successive revisions to the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea (hereafter "Party Rules") and the Constitution at the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea and the First Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in 2026 have drawn attention to their content and significance. The changes that have attracted the greatest attention are the redefinition of inter-Korean relations and national objectives. However, examining the 2026 revisions to the Party Rules and Constitution solely from the perspective of institutionalizing relations between two states makes it difficult to fully grasp the scope and implications of these revisions. It is therefore necessary to examine more broadly how the political line and system of state governance that have taken shape during the Kim Jong Un era are being reflected in the Party Rules and Constitution, alongside changes in inter-Korean relations.

The revisions specify the structure of authority within the Party and the state centered on the supreme leader, while also strengthening systems for policy implementation, oversight, and accountability across Party and state organs and at the local level. At the same time, they reflect efforts to adjust the role of the state and the operation of institutions in line with changes in economic and social policy. These changes warrant attention as part of a process through which the system of state governance that has taken shape during the Kim Jong Un era is being institutionalized in the fundamental norms of the Party and the state. This article analyzes the major revisions to both the Party Rules and the Constitution and, on this basis, examines changes in state governance under Kim Jong Un and their implications for South Korea's future North Korea policy.

| Major Trends in the Revisions to the Party Rules and Constitution

North Korea revised the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea at the Ninth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in 2026, followed by revisions to the Constitution at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in March. The Party Rules and the Constitution differ in character as the fundamental norms of the Party and the state, respectively. However, they are closely interconnected given the characteristics of North Korea's political system, in which the Party sets policy direction and state organs implement it through laws, institutions, and the administrative system. Examining the revisions to these two fundamental norms together therefore provides a more comprehensive understanding of the principles and methods by which North Korea intends to govern the state following the Ninth Party Congress.

The most notable change in these revisions is the redefinition of inter-Korean relations and national objectives. After defining inter-Korean relations as "relations between two hostile states" at the end of 2023, North Korea dismantled organizations related to unification and South Korea. In June 2024, it removed from the preamble of the Party Rules provisions concerning immediate objectives that distinguished between the "northern half of the Republic" and the "entire national territory," as well as provisions related to the united front. In the revised 2026 Constitution, provisions concerning national reunification were removed, along with references in the former Article 9 to the "northern half," the "complete victory of socialism," and the three principles of national reunification: independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity. The Republic of Korea was also specified for the first time in the main text of the Constitution and defined as a separate state bordering North Korea to the south. (Article 9 of the 2023 Constitution; Preamble and Article 2 of the 2026 Constitution) However, given that the expression "two hostile states" was not directly codified in the Constitution, the revisions can be understood as constitutionally institutionalizing relations between two states and the territorial character of the state, while at the same time redefining the previous national objectives that had been premised on unification.

A series of changes has also emerged in how the fundamental norms of the Party and the state are structured. In the Party Rules, the 2021 revisions adopted at the Eighth Party Congress substantially streamlined provisions that had separately described Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's achievements in the revolution, Party building, state building, and national reunification. The preamble to the 2026 Constitution also removed references to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's achievements in state building and national reunification. The title of the Constitution was also changed from the "Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" to the "Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." However, the Constitution retains the state's socialist character and the basic principles of socialist construction, making it difficult to interpret the change in title itself as indicating a change in the socialist character of the state. Provisions concerning Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and revolutionary traditions were also retained. The Three Revolutions in ideology, technology, and culture, which the Party Rules had already defined as the general line of socialist construction, were likewise given the same status in the revised 2026 Constitution.

The 2026 revisions to the Party Rules and Constitution can therefore be understood as a process of more concretely incorporating into the fundamental norms the principles of Party and state governance and policy tasks that have taken shape during the Kim Jong Un era, while maintaining the succession of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and revolutionary traditions. In particular, an important feature running through these revisions is the simultaneous concentration of political decision-making and control in the central leadership and the supreme leader, while more clearly defining the implementation functions and responsibilities of Party organizations, state organs, and local authorities that carry out policy in practice.

| Strengthening the Party's Operating System and Policy Implementation and Management Functions

A notable feature of the 2026 revision to the Party Rules is that it translated the Party's leadership into more concrete processes of policy implementation and organizational operation. While the 2021 revision to the Party Rules focused on establishing the basic organizational framework for Party operations in the Kim Jong Un era, including the restoration of the General Secretary system and the Secretariat, the 2026 revision more specifically defined the standards and procedures by which these organizations operate and manage policy implementation.

First, the "Five Lines of Party Building," comprising political building, organizational building, ideological building, discipline building, and work-style building, were formally stipulated in the preamble to the Party Rules. This elevated the direction of Party building in the new era, which had been presented since 2022, into a fundamental norm of the Party. It demonstrates that the scope of Party building is being defined more concretely to encompass not only ideological education and organizational life, but also the actual operation of the Party and policy implementation, including cadre management, discipline, and work style.¹⁾

The system for regularly reviewing policy implementation was also strengthened. The frequency of plenary meetings of the Party Central Committee was changed from at least once a year to at least once every six months. This incorporates into the Party Rules the practice of holding semiannual plenary meetings that has continued since the Eighth Central Committee and can be understood as institutionalizing an operating system for regularly reviewing the implementation of policies decided at Party congresses and plenary meetings and taking necessary follow-up measures. The Political Bureau organizes and guides work to implement the decisions of the Party Congress and the Party Central Committee. The Presidium of the Political Bureau handles important issues arising between Political Bureau meetings and subsequently reports on their status to the plenary meeting. The Secretariat is responsible for internal Party affairs, including cadre affairs, as well as matters concerning local Party organizations, and is required to meet at least once a month. (Articles 26-29 of the Party Rules) These provisions more specifically define the functions and relationships among the Party leadership bodies responsible for policy decision-making and implementation, reporting, and review.

National defense affairs were also incorporated into this system of policy implementation and review. The Central Military Commission of the Party is required to convene at least once every six months, review the implementation of the Party's national defense policy before a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee, and report the results to the plenary meeting. Provincial, city, and county Party military commissions are likewise required to report on the implementation of national defense policy to plenary meetings of the respective Party committees. (Articles 30 and 39 of the Party Rules) This demonstrates an effort to manage national defense affairs within the regular system of policy decision-making, implementation, and review conducted by the Party Central Committee and Party committees at each level.

The organizational, personnel, and disciplinary powers granted to the General Secretary were also specified in greater detail. The General Secretary is authorized to directly appoint and dismiss important Party cadres; directly admit as Party members or candidate members citizens who have "rendered outstanding service or are politically and ideologically prepared"; expel Party members; and dissolve Party organizations and departments of Party organs that seriously violate the Party's organizational principles and discipline. (Article 24 of the Party Rules) This can be understood as more clearly stipulating in the Party Rules the General Secretary's authority to exercise direct organizational control over Party organizations and members, while maintaining the collective decision-making system at the Party Central Committee level.

Discipline over Party members and Party organizations was also specified in greater detail to encompass not only ideology and organizational life but also responsibility for policy implementation and the management of property. Illicit accumulation of wealth was explicitly identified, alongside abuse of authority, bureaucratism, and corruption, as conduct against which Party members must struggle, while reprimand and suspension from work were newly added as forms of Party disciplinary punishment. (Articles 4 and 7 of the Party Rules) Party organizations that cause serious consequences through irresponsible performance of their assigned duties may also be subject to disciplinary measures including warning, severe warning, suspension from work, and reorganization. (Article 20 of the Party Rules) These changes warrant attention because they more directly link the implementation of Party policy to the evaluation and discipline of Party organizations and cadres.

Cases have also emerged in which this strengthening of discipline has been applied to actual Party operations. The case involving the illicit accumulation of wealth by Pak Hui Chol, a cadre of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People's Army, which North Korea disclosed in June and July 2026, led to an investigation by the Central Military Commission of the Party, his recall by a plenary meeting of the Party Central Committee, and a trial by the Supreme Court.²⁾ This can be seen as a case demonstrating the linkage between investigation under Party discipline, the imposition of political responsibility, and judicial proceedings.

Taken together, these changes demonstrate that the supreme leader's organizational control and an institutionalized system of policy implementation and management are being strengthened simultaneously. While policy direction and major decisions are concentrated in the Party Central Committee, policies are implemented through plenary meetings, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, and Party organizations at each level, with the results reported and reviewed and responsibility assigned according to implementation outcomes. In this way, the operating system for policy implementation, reporting, review, and accountability has been defined in greater detail.

| Strengthening the Powers of the Head of State and Reorganizing the State Institutional System

While the Party Rules further specified the Party leadership system and organizational control centered on the General Secretary, the Constitution more clearly defined the structure of state power and the relationships among state authorities, with the President of the State Affairs Commission at the apex. In Chapter VI on state organs, the 2026 revised Constitution placed the President of the State Affairs Commission before the Supreme People's Assembly and changed his status from the "supreme leader of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who represents the state" to the "head of state representing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." (Article 100 of the 2023 Constitution; Article 86 of the 2026 Constitution) The Supreme People's Assembly's authority to recall the President of the State Affairs Commission and the provision holding the President accountable to the Supreme People's Assembly were removed. The President of the State Affairs Commission was also newly granted veto power over laws and other enactments, as well as the authority to suspend from office, appoint, and dismiss important officials while the Supreme People's Assembly is in recess. (Articles 91, 104, and 106 of the 2023 Constitution; Articles 90 and 96 of the 2026 Constitution)

The change in the authority to issue decrees is particularly noteworthy in terms of strengthening the powers of the President of the State Affairs Commission. Previously, the State Affairs Commission was authorized to adopt decrees. Under the 2026 revision, however, the State Affairs Commission's authority to issue decrees was removed, and the President of the State Affairs Commission was instead authorized to issue orders and decrees. (Article 111 of the 2023 Constitution; Articles 91 and 108 of the 2026 Constitution) This transferred the State Affairs Commission's previous decree-making authority to its President, more directly establishing as a constitutional power of the President an authority that had previously been vested in a state organ.

These changes can be understood as concentrating the status and major state powers of the head of state in the President of the State Affairs Commission and reflecting them more clearly in the Constitution's institutional structure and allocation of powers. Viewed together with the revisions to the Party Rules discussed above, the structure has become more explicit in institutionally reinforcing the supreme leader's positions within both the Party and the state through their respective fundamental norms. The Party Rules specifically grant the General Secretary organizational, personnel, and disciplinary powers, while the Constitution strengthens the powers of the President of the State Affairs Commission as head of state.

The provisions concerning nuclear forces should also be considered alongside the strengthening of the constitutional powers of the President of the State Affairs Commission. The 2022 Law "On the DPRK's Policy on Nuclear Forces" comprehensively stipulated the mission and composition of the nuclear forces, command and control, the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons, and procedures for their execution. It granted the President of the State Affairs Commission decision-making authority over the nuclear forces while also providing for operational procedures in the event that the command-and-control system is threatened.³⁾ The 2026 revised Constitution incorporated parts of this nuclear command-and-control system into the Constitution, granting the President of the State Affairs Commission command authority over the nuclear forces and authorizing him to delegate authority for the use of nuclear forces to the state nuclear forces command organization. (Article 89 of the Constitution) The significance of this change lies in directly incorporating into the Constitution the President's authority over nuclear command and control that had previously been stipulated in law.

Provisions concerning national defense were also expanded. The chapter on national defense increased from four articles to six, with new provisions concerning the self-reliance, modernization, and scientific advancement of defense science and technology and the defense industry, as well as preparations for all-people resistance. (Articles 60 and 61 of the Constitution) These changes can be understood as specifying as constitutional state tasks the major elements of defense policy pursued during the Kim Jong Un era, including nuclear forces, defense science and technology, the defense industry, and societal mobilization.

| Changes in Local Development and Economic and Social Institutions

Another notable aspect of the 2026 constitutional revision is that local development and economic and social policies that have expanded during the Kim Jong Un era were incorporated into the fundamental norms of the state, while the roles and operating methods of state institutions responsible for implementing these policies were also adjusted. The preamble to the Constitution newly added a provision calling for the "continuous strengthening of the unified guidance and management of the people's government over society as a whole in line with the changing times and the demands of revolutionary practice." In this revision, the basic principles and tasks of major policies that North Korea has pursued over the medium to long term were incorporated into the Constitution, while the role of the state and the institutional foundations necessary for their continued implementation, operation, and management were also reorganized.

The 2026 revised Constitution introduced a new provision on local development, requiring the state to promote the independent and diversified development of cities and counties, advance the modernization and informatization of local industrial factories, and establish the material and technological foundations and conditions for local development. (Article 26 of the Constitution) Along with the expansion of the local development policy, the powers of local organs of state authority and the central guidance system were also reorganized. Local People's Committees were granted expanded authority to elect and recall the vice chairpersons, secretary, and members of the respective People's Committees, as well as judges and people's assessors of the courts, while the People's Assemblies are in recess. The Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly was also explicitly granted authority to guide the exercise of state authority by local People's Committees. (Articles 112 and 140 of the Constitution)

Particularly noteworthy is the change in the relationship between local People's Committees and higher-level organs from one of "subordination" to one of "working under the guidance" of higher-level organs. (Article 152 of the 2023 Constitution; Article 144 of the 2026 Constitution) This can be understood as a change intended to strengthen the function of local organs of state authority in organizing and implementing specific tasks according to their own authority and responsibilities under the unified guidance of the central authorities.

These changes are also related to the expanding range of policy tasks to be carried out at the local level. As the construction and operation of local industrial factories, local hospitals, and various public service facilities expand, the ability of local authorities to organize projects, secure the necessary resources and personnel, and continuously operate and manage them also becomes increasingly important. The fact that enhancing the functions and roles of city and county People's Committees was addressed as a separate agenda item at the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in June 2026 can also be understood in connection with this policy direction.⁴⁾

The order of provisions concerning science and technology was also adjusted. In Chapter III on culture, provisions concerning scientific research and plans for the development of science and technology were moved to an earlier position than before. However, because there were no major changes to the substance of the provisions themselves, it would be difficult to attach excessive significance to this rearrangement. (Articles 50 and 51 of the 2023 Constitution; Articles 40 and 41 of the 2026 Constitution)

Changes to provisions concerning personal ownership are also noteworthy in the economic sphere. Previously, the Constitution enumerated specific means through which personal property could be acquired, including the cultivation of private plots and sideline activities. The revised Constitution replaced these with the broader formulation of "income legally earned by individuals." (Article 24 of the 2023 Constitution; Article 21 of the 2026 Constitution) This is significant in that it allows the increasingly diverse forms of personal income found in practice to be encompassed within the constitutional scope of personal ownership. At the same time, by defining the basis for recognizing personal ownership as "legally earned income," the state's legal and policy regulation of what constitutes legitimate income may also become increasingly important.

Also noteworthy is the deletion of the previous formulations describing North Korea as "our country where taxes have been abolished" and workers as "knowing no unemployment." (Articles 25 and 29 of the 2023 Constitution; Articles 22 and 27 of the 2026 Constitution) Given that North Korea has long emphasized the abolition of taxation and full employment as important institutions demonstrating the characteristics and superiority of its socialist economic system, these changes are difficult to regard as merely editorial. By removing the previous provisions that explicitly defined the absence of taxation and full employment as fixed features of the socialist economic system, the revisions can be understood as creating greater room to respond to actual economic management and future institutional changes. Because the revised Constitution continues to maintain the socialist character of the state and the basic principles of socialist ownership and the planned economy, however, these changes themselves are difficult to interpret as indicating a fundamental change in the nature of the socialist economic system.

Important changes also appeared in the health sector. Direct references in the previous Constitution to the universal free medical care system, the doctor district system, and the preventive medicine system were removed. In their place, the provision was restructured around the "consolidation and development of the socialist public health system," the "quality of medical services," and the "strengthening of the material and technological foundations of the public health sector." (Article 56 of the 2023 Constitution; Article 49 of the 2026 Constitution) Among the basic rights of citizens, the "right to receive medical treatment free of charge" was also revised to the "right to receive medical treatment," removing the reference to "free of charge." (Article 72 of the 2023 Constitution; Article 71 of the 2026 Constitution)

These changes to health-related provisions should be considered alongside the possibility that North Korea is adjusting the way in which medical coverage is provided. In particular, in his policy speech at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in March 2026, President of the State Affairs Commission Kim Jong Un proposed expanding the introduction of a medical coverage system based on a health insurance fund and announced plans to revise the public health law.⁵⁾ The removal of direct references to the universal free medical care system from the Constitution, together with the identification of expanded medical coverage through a separate fund as a policy task, can be understood as an effort to adjust financing and operating methods while maintaining the principle that the state guarantees medical services. However, it remains difficult to determine whether these changes will lead to an increase in citizens' direct medical expenses, as the entity responsible for establishing the health insurance fund, the method of financing it, its relationship with the state budget, and whether citizens will be required to contribute have yet to be specifically confirmed.

The constitutionalization of local development as a state task, the strengthening of the functions of local organs of state authority, the broader provision on personal ownership, the removal of previous references to taxation and unemployment, and the deletion of the term "free" in the health sector are changes in different areas. Taken together, however, they demonstrate that North Korea is incorporating the realities of economic and social management and its expanded policy agenda into the Constitution while adjusting the role of the state and the specific ways in which institutions operate. Particular attention should be paid to the fact that, while maintaining unified state guidance and the basic principles of the socialist system, North Korea is expanding the institutional room to adjust the respective roles of the central and local authorities, the regulation of individual economic activity, and the financing and burden-sharing arrangements required to guarantee the livelihoods of its citizens. The direction of future enactments and revisions to relevant laws and subordinate regulations will be an important indicator of how these changes are translated into actual institutions and practices.

| Assessment and Policy Implications

The changes to the Party Rules and Constitution in 2026 discussed above can be summarized in three broad trends. First, the structure of authority centered on the supreme leader has become more clearly defined by specifying the General Secretary's organizational, personnel, and disciplinary powers within the Party and strengthening the status and powers of the President of the State Affairs Commission as head of state. Second, an operating system has been established that more specifically defines policy implementation, reporting, and review mechanisms across Party leadership bodies, state institutions, and local authorities, while strengthening accountability for implementation outcomes. Third, in areas such as local development, personal ownership, taxation and employment, and public health, changes have been made to adjust the role of the state and the specific operation of institutions to reflect the realities of economic and social management and an expanded policy agenda.

These changes are difficult to explain simply as either a centralization of authority or an expansion of local autonomy. Rather, they combine stronger central control over policy direction, priorities, and political oversight with clearer responsibilities for organizations at each level, state institutions, and local authorities in implementing and managing an expanded range of policy programs. Moreover, the constitutional institutionalization of local development and economic and social policies reflects the policy priorities and institutional direction of the North Korean leadership, but does not in itself indicate the capacity to implement these policies or their actual performance. How these institutional changes are translated into subsequent legislation and policies and into the actual operation of the Party and the state will therefore be an important criterion for assessing future changes in North Korea's state governance system.

Based on this assessment, several policy implications can be drawn for South Korea's North Korea policy.

First, it is necessary to continuously examine changes in North Korea not only through the lens of its policy toward South Korea and unification, but also from the broader perspective of changes in the overall state governance system. The institutionalization of relations between two states is an important development, but the 2026 revisions also encompass changes across state governance, including the Party's operating system and power structure, the nuclear command system, local development, and economic and social institutions. These changes demonstrate the direction in which North Korea is reorganizing its policy decision-making and implementation processes and its economic and social governance system in response to a changing domestic and external environment. South Korea's North Korea policy should therefore be formulated not only in response to individual North Korean messages or actions toward the South, but also with consideration for the direction and durability of these institutional changes.

Second, in inter-Korean relations, it is necessary to continue policy efforts to create conditions for dialogue and cooperation while taking North Korea's institutionalization of relations between two states into account as a practical condition for policy. The revisions to the Party Rules and Constitution indicate that North Korea's shift in policy toward South Korea has been institutionalized to a considerable degree, making it difficult to design effective policies based solely on the previous framework that regarded inter-Korean relations as a special relationship. In preparation for the possibility that inter-Korean relations may resume in the future, it is necessary to examine how North Korea intends to structure inter-Korean contact, dialogue, and cooperation under its current constitutional framework and to prepare policy and institutional measures capable of responding accordingly. At the same time, the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue itself should not be interpreted as indicating a change in North Korea's strategy toward South Korea or its fundamental understanding of inter-Korean relations. Rather, it should be assessed together with North Korea's strategic interests at the time, including its relations with the United States, the external environment, and economic needs.

Third, in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, changes in the command-and-control system should be included as a major area of analysis alongside nuclear capabilities. Given that the 2026 Constitution establishes the President of the State Affairs Commission's command authority over the nuclear forces and the delegation of authority for their use to the state nuclear forces command organization as constitutional powers, it will be necessary to continuously analyze not only the advancement of North Korea's nuclear forces but also its command structure and delegation of authority, the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces, and its decision-making structure during crises. This is important both for accurately understanding North Korea's nuclear operational system and for preparing for crisis management on the Korean Peninsula and future arms control discussions.

Fourth, institutional changes in local development and the economic and health sectors should be utilized to identify potential future demand for inter-Korean cooperation and prepare possible areas of cooperation. If North Korea continues to strengthen both local implementation responsibilities and state support mechanisms, future cooperation needs may expand beyond the construction of facilities and provision of materials to operational issues such as financing, training of professional personnel, equipment maintenance, medical services, production and quality control, and informatization. Even if direct inter-Korean cooperation remains difficult at present, it is necessary to accumulate information on North Korea's local development and operation of social services and prepare various forms of cooperation in relevant areas.

Fifth, the possibility of changes in North Korea's socialist operating system should be treated as a subject for medium- to long-term observation. Rather than prematurely characterizing individual institutional changes as marketization or a retreat from socialist principles, analysis should focus on how North Korea adjusts the roles and burden-sharing arrangements between the central and local levels and between the state and institutions and enterprises in response to changing economic and fiscal conditions, while maintaining socialist state responsibility and unified guidance. In particular, it will be necessary to continuously examine how changes in language concerning taxation, employment, and public health are translated into future changes in relevant laws and fiscal and operating systems.

The 2026 revisions to the Party Rules and Constitution can be assessed as an effort by North Korea to codify the political, economic, social, and defense policies pursued during the Kim Jong Un era into the fundamental norms of the Party and the state, while establishing the institutional foundations for their future implementation. What will be important going forward is to examine not only the changes in the norms themselves but also how these provisions operate in actual Party and state governance during the Ninth Central Committee period (2026–2030). By continuously tracking how the relationships between policy decisions by the Party Central Committee and implementation by state institutions, between unified central guidance and the responsibilities of local and economic units, and between the state's social responsibilities and new financing and operating mechanisms develop in practice, it will be possible to more accurately understand the direction of state governance in North Korea under Kim Jong Un.

1. Kim Jong Un, “On the Orientation of Party Building in the New Era and the Tasks of the Central Cadres Training School of the Workers’ Party of Korea: Commemorative Lecture at the Central Cadres Training School of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” Rodong Sinmun, October 17, 2022.
2. Korean Central News Agency, “Report on the Enlarged Meeting of the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” June 23, 2026; “Joint Meeting of Party, Government, and Military Officials Held,” Rodong Sinmun, July 11, 2026.
3. “Decree of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, ‘On the DPRK’s Policy on Nuclear Forces,’” Rodong Sinmun, September 9, 2022.
4. “Report on the Enlarged Meeting of the Second Plenary Meeting of the Ninth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea,” Rodong Sinmun, June 23, 2026.
5. “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Delivers a Policy Speech at the First Session of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Rodong Sinmun, March 23, 2026.

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.