The 'two hostile states doctrine' declared by North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un at the 9th Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party in December 2023 and in his policy speech to the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024 did not end as a mere political declaration. The work of codifying it at the level of the supreme normative instrument was completed through the amended constitution passed at the 1st Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in March 2026. The core elements of this constitutional revision may be summarized as the complete deletion of the unification provisions, the newly added territorial provisions, and the monopolization of nuclear forces command authority by State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong Un. However, the provision designating South Korea as the 'number one hostile state,' which Kim Jong Un had directly directed, was not explicitly incorporated into the constitutional text. What implications does the legalization of the most fundamental change in external policy and policy toward South Korea since the establishment of the North Korean regime carry for the government's North Korea strategy and the security landscape on the Korean Peninsula? Can the omission of the hostile state declaration provision be interpreted as presenting an initial basis for peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea?

| I A Blueprint for 'Entrenching Division' Enshrined in the Supreme Law

The new North Korean constitution obtained and analyzed by the Government of the Republic of Korea in May 2026 signifies that the 'two-state' doctrine that Kim Jong Un had been publicly advocating since the end of 2023 has finally achieved institutional completeness. The most conspicuous change is the territorial provision newly inserted as Article 2 of the constitution. The new constitution stipulates that "the territory includes the land bordering the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south, and the territorial waters and airspace established on the basis thereof." 1) This means that for the first time since the establishment of the regime in 1948, North Korea has delimited the scope of its sovereignty not to the entire Korean Peninsula but to the northern region.

It is noteworthy, however, that the new constitution does not specify the maritime boundary line, which lies at the core of military conflict between the two Koreas. This is interpreted as reflecting an intent to maintain its posture of refusing to recognize the Northern Limit Line established by the United Nations Command in 1953, while managing the risk of diplomatic isolation and the possibility of immediate military conflict that could arise from explicitly inscribing specific coordinates in the constitution. In other words, it represents a calculation to maintain leverage for pressure against South Korea by combining 'territorial clarity' with 'military ambiguity'.

Simultaneously with the newly added territorial provision, references in the preamble and Article 9 to 'the unification achievements of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il,' 'the complete victory of socialism in the northern half,' and 'the struggle for the realization of national reunification on the principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity' were deleted from the amended constitution. 2) This signifies that the 'legitimacy of unification' that the North Korean system had maintained for nearly 80 years has been erased, at least from the constitution. It may be viewed as a landmark event that legally confirmed the opening of a new era of governance in which 'Kim Jong Un-style statism' takes precedence over the 'dying instruction' of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

The most dangerous aspect of this constitutional revision is the constitutionalization of the nuclear forces command system. Article 89 of the new constitution explicitly stipulates that the authority to command nuclear forces rests with the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, while simultaneously adding a new provision that allows this authority to be delegated to the 'State Nuclear Forces Command Organization.' Analysis has emerged suggesting that this constitutes a powerful legal deterrent mechanism against a ROK-U.S. 'decapitation operation.' By stipulating that nuclear use authority is automatically delegated and executed by the system even in the event of the supreme leader's incapacitation, this represents the concretization of a 'Nuclear Trigger' strategy designed to fundamentally foreclose any external attempt to eliminate the leadership. 3)

At the same time, the constitution formally designates the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission not merely as 'supreme leader' but as 'head of state,' placing him ahead of the Supreme People's Assembly in the ordering of state organs. This is unprecedented in North Korean history and constitutes a proclamation that Kim Jong Un has brought to completion a 'Kim Jong Un state' grounded in his own independent ideology of 'the people-first principle,' ending the era in which he governed by borrowing the authority of predecessor leaders. North Korea has now become a 'state of absolute nuclear power' in which the nuclear button can be pressed by the will of a single individual, with no institutional mechanism in existence to check this authority.

| Background to the Abandonment of the Unification Framework: A Triple Strategic Motivation

North Korea's designation of South and North Korea as separate states is not an entirely new assertion. Kim Il Sung put forward a two-system unification formula of 'one nation, one state, two systems, two governments' in the early 1990s, and Kim Jong Il also emphasized that rather than pursuing unification immediately, improvement of inter-Korean relations within a two-state framework should be practiced first. The first condition North Korea attached to the simultaneous UN membership of South and North Korea was also 'one nation, two systems.' While the so-called 'Our State First' discourse replaced the concept of the nation, and the expression 'By Our Nation Ourselves' was deleted from the Party rules at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, 4) Kim Jong Un's 'two-state doctrine' differs in character in that it comprehensively negates the necessity of dialogue between the authorities of the two Koreas. The background to Kim Jong Un's abandonment of the unification framework, despite bearing the political burden of deleting the behests of predecessor leaders from the constitution, is multilayered.

First, there is Identity Reconstruction. North Korea no longer conceals its intent to stand proudly in the international community as a completed sovereign state that pursues equal status with the United States through nuclear possession. By designating the relationship as 'state to state' rather than the 'special relationship oriented toward unification' stipulated in the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, North Korea has constructed the logical foundation for framing South Korea's involvement as 'interference in internal affairs' and neutralizing the denuclearization discourse itself.

Second, it may be viewed as Institutional Immortalization for regime security and the institutional perpetuation of one-person rule. This constitutional revision originated from an internal necessity on the part of Chairman Kim Jong Un to inscribe in the supreme normative instrument a new regime legitimacy of 'completed nuclear forces and independent absolute power,' in place of relinquishing the unification legitimacy that had been 'dying instruction' of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Ultimately, it may be viewed as a domestic strategic positioning aimed at perpetuating the permanence of power by filling the space vacated by the abandonment of the predecessor leaders' unification discourse with the framework of a state of absolute nuclear power with no checking mechanisms whatsoever.

Third, there is Offensive Realignment of external strategy. This reflects a determination to make maximum use of the restoration of the 'DPRK-Russia alliance' and the new Cold War framework between the southern triangle and the northern triangle, while no longer employing inter-Korean dialogue as a means of regime maintenance. There is also a perspective that views this as an attempt to fundamentally foreclose South Korea's involvement even if U.S.-DPRK dialogue resumes under the Trump administration, by reinforcing the adversarial character of the inter-Korean relationship. 5)

December 2023 Declaration vs. March 2026 Constitution

A discernible temperature differential exists between Kim Jong Un's belligerent statements that have continued since late 2023 and the actual constitutional text. Through his January 2024 policy speech, Kim Jong Un issued specific directives to the effect that "the Republic of Korea must be explicitly designated as the number one hostile state and immutable principal enemy, and it is appropriate to inscribe in the relevant provisions the strengthening of education and ideological cultivation work." The Supreme People's Assembly had already at that time decided to abolish the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, the National Economic Cooperation Bureau, and the Mount Kumgang International Tourism Bureau, and follow-on measures proceeded apace, including the demolition of the inter-Korean family reunion facility at Mount Kumgang and the inter-Korean liaison office and integrated support center at the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 6) At the 30th Plenary Session of the 14th Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly in early February 2024, the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Law, the Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone Law, and their implementing regulations were abolished, and in early March the Monument to the Three Charters for National Reunification in central Pyongyang was dismantled. Anti-tank barriers and landmines were additionally installed along the Military Demarcation Line. The northern sections of the Gyeongui Line and East Sea Line railways were blown up. The demolition of the Gyeongui Line railway, which had been a symbol of inter-Korean exchange for decades, demonstrated through action that the 'two-state doctrine' was not declaratory rhetoric but a substantive policy transformation.

Kim Jong Un's remarks at the 1st Session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in March 2026 were even more strident. Kim Jong Un declared that "South Korea will be officially recognized as the most hostile state and will be thoroughly rejected and ignored with the clearest words and actions, and for any act by South Korea that touches our Republic, we will make it pay the price mercilessly without the slightest consideration or hesitation." 7) This was a proclamation of intent to further intensify the hostile posture toward South Korea, even as the Lee Jae-myung administration signaled its commitment to a 'Korean Peninsula peaceful coexistence policy' and its intention to pursue inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation.

Yet the constitutional text made public in May did not reflect the explicit codification of 'number one hostile state and immutable principal enemy' that Kim Jong Un had so emphatically stressed. How is this phenomenon to be understood?

The optimistic interpretation holds that despite the belligerent rhetoric, the failure to specify concrete hostility provisions in the supreme law of the state has left room for the pursuit of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas. While the unification framework of a consanguineous relationship has been abandoned, this is an affirmative interpretation that the possibility of exchange and cooperation, or non-hostile coexistence rather than hostility, filling the space left vacant remains open at the level of the constitutional text.

The skeptical interpretation draws attention to the fact that regardless of the constitutional text, the designation of South Korea as the 'number one hostile state' that Kim Jong Un personally proclaimed in his policy speech is already operating within North Korean society through education and propaganda. The perspective holds that the hostile line has not been softened simply because it was not codified in the constitution; rather, it has already been rendered absolute through the supreme leader's instructions, which carry greater force than the constitution. The possibility of a permanent confrontation between two hostile nuclear-armed states rather than peaceful coexistence cannot be excluded.

Analysis has also emerged suggesting that Kim Jong Un's emphasis on hostility in his policy speech while avoiding it in the constitutional text is not a contradiction but a maintenance of strategic ambiguity. The observation is that this constitutes a two-track design in which the policy speech is utilized as a message for internal discipline and pressure on South Korea, while the constitution preserves external diplomatic space. The intent is to ensure that the 'number one hostile state' designation operates in the everyday consciousness of the people, while preserving at the constitutional level the diplomatic room for maneuver in response to future U.S.-DPRK negotiations or changes in the international security environment. 8)

| Structural Implication for Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula

The constitutionalization of the two-state doctrine is shaking the existing inter-Korean relations paradigm to its foundations.

First, there is the structural termination of denuclearization negotiations. In a situation where nuclear command authority has been entrenched as a constitutional power, demanding denuclearization of North Korea is tantamount to demanding the 'abolition of the constitution.' North Korea has now secured the logical basis to reject denuclearization negotiations by designating them as 'illegal interference in the armaments policy of a sovereign state.'

Second, as the environment for 'direct dealings' between the United States and North Korea becomes further consolidated, concerns are also growing regarding the indirect erosion of the ROK-U.S. alliance foundation. With the second Trump administration keeping open the possibility of a summit with Kim Jong Un, North Korea is pursuing a 21st-century version of 'tongmi bongnam' (engaging the United States while shutting out South Korea), seeking to negotiate directly with the United States while excluding South Korea. The constitutional designation of two states legitimizes the logic that "South Korea has no standing to be involved in our affairs." This is an expression of the intent to structurally exclude South Korea from all agenda items including denuclearization negotiations, a Korean Peninsula peace regime, and security assurance consultations, and to negotiate bilaterally with the United States alone. Rather than seeking to dismantle the ROK-U.S. alliance itself, this may be viewed as an attempt to weaken South Korea's voice within the alliance in order to expand the space for direct dealings with the United States.

Third, there is the disappearance and 'reset' of exchange and cooperation assets. Kim Jong Un's comprehensive dismantling of inter-Korean organizations such as the North Side Committee for the Implementation of the June 15 Joint Declaration, the Pan-National Alliance for Korea's Reunification, and the National Reconciliation Council, along with the demolition of the Gyeongui Line and East Sea Line railways, which took place around the time of the constitutional revision, constitutes a complete repudiation of the institutional and physical assets of inter-Korean agreements and exchange accumulated over the past 30 years. Even if inter-Korean relations resume in the future, South Korea now finds itself in a 'ground zero' situation where negotiations must begin on an entirely new foundation rather than on the basis of past agreements.

The Constitution of the Republic of Korea stipulates that "the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and democracy." At the same time, Article 3 of the constitution, the territorial provision, stipulates that "the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands," encompassing the North Korean region as well. While North Korea has deleted the unification provisions from its constitution and separately stipulated its own territory, South Korea constitutionally designates the entire Korean Peninsula as its territory and pursues unification. This asymmetry may become a new axis of legal and political conflict in future inter-Korean relations.

The German experience offers instructive lessons. East Germany explicitly stipulated in its 1949 constitution 'the establishment of normal relations between the two German states and unification efforts,' but deleted the unification provisions through the 1974 revision. 9) West Germany also witnessed the collision of the Christian Democratic Union-centered Hallstein Doctrine and the Social Democratic Party-centered 'Ostpolitik.' However, while recognizing the reality of substantive division, West Germany pursued the 'Deutschlandpolitik' without abandoning the 'obligation of unification' stipulated in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), ultimately bearing fruit with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 10)

| Response Strategy: Designing a 'New Normal' on the Basis of Harsh Realities

In order to respond to North Korea's provocative transformation, the government must pursue three strategic directions grounded in reality. First, a fundamental transformation of perceptions and a reconstitution of the discourse are essential. While the official acceptance of North Korea's two-state doctrine is not possible, it must be acknowledged as a realistic threat. Moving away from 'emotionally driven unification theory,' 'non-hostile peaceful coexistence' must be set as a short-term objective, and the long-term unification discourse must be reestablished on the basis of national consensus.

Second, the strategic maintenance of humanitarian channels is urgent. The more North Korea emphasizes hostility, the more persistently South Korea must propose humanitarian measures such as inter-Korean family reunions. This is the core instrument of moral high ground demonstrating that South Korea has not abandoned the values of unification and shared nationhood.

Third, minimum communication channels must be maintained to prevent accidental conflict. What remains in the space left by the nullification of the September 19 Military Agreement is not a vacuum but a danger. While the restoration of inter-Korean military agreements is realistically difficult in a situation where North Korea has declared the 'two-state doctrine,' the restoration of the Military Armistice Commission channel through the United Nations Command, which is the managing party of the Armistice Agreement, or the maintenance of a hot-line between the military authorities of the two Koreas, constitutes a viable alternative.

The constitutionalization of North Korea's 'two-state doctrine' is the most dangerous and fundamental challenge in the history of the division of the Korean Peninsula. However, the partial omission of hostile expressions from the constitution paradoxically suggests that strategic space exists in which South Korea can intervene. With a clear-eyed sense of reality that does not allow itself to be drawn into North Korea's intentions, and with an active will, South Korea must chart a new future for the Korean Peninsula.

1. 하채림·권수현, "남으로 韓과 접해" 北, 영토조항 신설·통일삭제 '두 국가' 개헌, 연합뉴스 2026년 5월 6일.
   https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260506093751504?section=search (검색일: 2026년 5월 11일).
2. 김병관, "북, 헌법서 '통일' 지우고 '영토' 조항 신설," 경향신문 2026년 5월 6일.
   https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202605061400001 (검색일: 2026년 5월 9일)
3. 신나리·권오혁, "김정은 '핵 사용 위임권'도 北헌법 명시...자동 핵타격 근거 마련," 『동아일보』 2026년 5월 7일.
   https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20260507/133874331/2 (검색일: 2026년 5월 8일)
4. 이중구, "북한의 '적대적 두 국가론'과 남북관계 전망," 『통일정책연구』 제33권 1호 (2024), pp. 29-54.
5. 성기영, "적대적 두 국가론' 이후 북한의 대남전략과 대외전략의 연계," 『INSS 전략보고』 No. 336 (June 2025), pp. 1-14.
6. 이신영, "북한, 금강산 이산가족면회소·개성 남북연락사무소 철거 완료," 연합뉴스 2026년 5월 15일.
   https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260515120800009?input=1195m (검색일: 2026년 5월 16일).
7. 김규범, "최고인민회의 제15기 제1차 회의 분석: 김정은 3기 대외전략 노선과 우리의 대응방향," 『INSS 이슈브리프』 제830호 (2026년 4월 2일), pp. 1-7.
8. 이중구, "북한의 '적대적 두 국가론'과 남북관계 전망," 『통일정책연구』 제33권 1호 2024, pp. 29-54.
9. The provisions of Article 1 of the 1949 East German constitution designating Germany as "an indivisible republic" and stipulating that "there is only one German nationality" were abolished, and a declaration was made that "the German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of the German nation" organized under the leadership of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.
10. 손선홍, "북한의 '적대적인 두 국가 관계' 선언과 우리의 대응 - 동독의 '두 민족 두 국가론'과 비교," 계간 『외교』 (2025년 1월).

※ The views expressed in this Sejong Focus are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Sejong Institute.