1. Introduction: People Before Vessel - Building Training Infrastructure Is a Must

On May 26, 2026, the Ministry of National Defense announced the "Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine," known as the Jangbogo-N Program. The plan calls for Korea to develop domestically a low-enriched uranium (LEU)-fueled reactor capable of extended operation after a single core loading and to launch the lead submarine in the mid-2030s. It also envisions Korea assuming responsibility for the entire life cycle, from design and construction to operation, maintenance, and decommissioning. Nuclear-powered submarine development is therefore not merely a project to build a single vessel—it is a national strategic undertaking that must integrate Korea's capabilities in nuclear engineering, shipbuilding, defense science, diplomacy, and national security.¹⁾

The most urgent challenge determining the program's success, however, is neither the vessel nor the reactor itself, but the people who will operate them safely. Nuclear-powered submarine crew members must master reactor principles, heat transfer and coolant circulation within the reactor, reactor operations, radiation protection, the vessel's propulsion plant and electrical power system, and maintenance and emergency-response procedures. Only after completing foundational theory, simulator training that accurately reproduces actual reactor and vessel operating conditions, practical training on a land-based reactor, and submarine-class-specific training can they qualify for service aboard an operational vessel. This process takes years. Building the cadre of instructors and safety managers who will train succeeding generations, as well as the maintenance workforce and the quality-assurance personnel who verify that equipment and maintenance meet safety standards, takes even longer.

The "Basic Plan for the Establishment of the Korea Armed Forces Academy," announced by the government on July 16, offers a new opportunity to address the Jangbogo-N Program's workforce-development requirements. The government plans to establish a four-year Korea Armed Forces Academy at Jaun-dae in Daejeon by consolidating the Army, Navy, and Air Force academies, while combining advanced science and technology education with service-specific specialist training. Media reports have suggested that some facilities at the Naval Academy in Jinhae and the Air Force Academy in Cheongju could be used for service-specific professional training. The Ministry of National Defense's official basic plan, however, does not yet specify how the existing academy sites and facilities will be used—those details are to be developed through further consultation and the legislative process.²⁾

Until now, the establishment of the Korea Armed Forces Academy and the Jangbogo-N Program have been discussed as separate policies. Viewed from the perspective of reorganizing military education while developing a specialized nuclear-powered submarine workforce, however, the two initiatives can be connected as elements of a single national strategy. Once the academies are consolidated in Daejeon, a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center could use education, housing, and support facilities at the Naval Academy in Jinhae that are no longer required for their current purposes or can be repurposed. This could reduce the time and cost required to secure a new site and construct every facility from the ground up.

This does not mean that all functions and facilities of the Naval Academy will necessarily disappear. The age and structural condition of the existing buildings, along with their security and communications infrastructure, must first be assessed. Before simulators capable of reproducing reactor and vessel operations can be installed, planners must confirm that electrical power and cooling capacity are sufficient and that the buildings can support heavy equipment. Nevertheless, unless the government begins now to examine whether Jinhae's existing military-education assets can serve as the workforce-development base for the Jangbogo-N Program, it risks leaving usable facilities idle while constructing comparable facilities elsewhere.

This article first examines how France's School of Military Applications of Atomic Energy (EAMEA) and its naval nuclear propulsion training system operate. It then compares the French system with those of the United States and Australia, identifies the lessons France can offer Korea, and assesses both the realistic scope of and the constraints on Korea-France cooperation. Finally, it proposes using the establishment of the Korea Armed Forces Academy as an opportunity to create a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center by repurposing suitable facilities at the Naval Academy in Jinhae.

II. Characteristics of France's Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training System and Lessons for Korea

1. A "Nuclear School" Established Fifteen Years Before the First Submarine

Known as France's "nuclear school," the École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA; School of Military Applications of Atomic Energy) is the central institution overseeing nuclear education and training across the French defense establishment. Its curriculum covers not only naval nuclear propulsion, but also operational support for nuclear weapons, nuclear safety, protection of personnel and facilities from radiation, and applied nuclear science. According to the French Ministry of Armed Forces, approximately 1,000 military personnel, civilian defense employees, and other relevant personnel participate each year in some fifty courses. The programs span a broad range of levels, from two-year postsecondary technical programs to advanced professional courses undertaken after a master's degree.³⁾

France established EAMEA in Paris in 1956 and relocated it in 1958 to Cherbourg, the center of French submarine construction. In other words, France began preparing crews and technical personnel roughly fifteen years before its first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, Le Redoutable, formally entered service in 1971. What France built first was not the submarine itself, but the people and institutions required to operate it safely.⁴⁾

A defining feature of the French system is that no single institution delivers every stage of training. EAMEA provides foundational and advanced theory, including reactor operating principles, heat transfer and coolant circulation, radiation safety, nuclear safety, and accident response. Actual vessel operations and submarine-class-specific team training are conducted by the École de navigation sous-marine et des bâtiments à propulsion nucléaire (ENSM-BPN), which operates in Brest and Toulon. Using twenty-three full-scale or partial-task simulators that accurately reproduce vessel-control, propulsion, and electrical systems, ENSM-BPN trains about 500 personnel each year through more than seventy courses.⁵⁾

Completion of EAMEA coursework alone therefore does not qualify a trainee for service aboard a nuclear-powered vessel. After theoretical instruction, trainees must apply what they have learned in simulators and practical-training facilities, and then complete submarine-class-specific training, operational unit training, and duty-specific assessments in sequence. The French model is not a single all-encompassing school, but an integrated pipeline linking theory, reactor training, submarine-class-specific simulator instruction, qualification for operational shipboard duty, and periodic refresher training for serving personnel.

2. A System That Trains Technicians and Instructors, Not Only Officers

One of the principal advanced programs in which EAMEA participates is the Génie Atomique (GA) specialist nuclear-engineering program, administered by the National Institute for Nuclear Science and Technology (INSTN), the education and training institute of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). EAMEA is responsible for the program's naval-propulsion component. Intended primarily for master's-degree holders, the twelve-month, 1,400-hour program covers reactor operating principles, pressurized-water and naval-propulsion reactors, nuclear safety, radiation safety, and the full nuclear-fuel cycle from production and use to treatment. The program is conducted in French.⁶⁾

Since 1966, EAMEA has also operated a reactor-training site at Cadarache, where the CEA and the naval-reactor specialist TechnicAtome maintain relevant facilities. Theory and hands-on reactor training take place at different locations but are connected through a single training and qualification system. This demonstrates that Korea's theory and simulator-centered training hub need not be located on the same site as the facility used for practical training on an actual reactor.⁷⁾

France systematically develops not only advanced engineers and officers, but also the technicians who operate and maintain equipment in the field. In 2023, EAMEA introduced a two-year advanced technician program (BTS) in nuclear-equipment maintenance and a three-year University Bachelor of Technology program (BUT) in industrial engineering and maintenance, both undertaken by students serving in the military. The system recruits promising high-school graduates at an early stage, trains them in reactor instrumentation, electrical systems, mechanics, and maintenance, and subsequently assigns them to naval-reactor operations and maintenance duties.⁸⁾

This has an important implication for Korea. Nuclear-powered submarine workforce development must not be viewed narrowly as a matter of sending a small number of Naval Academy graduates or nuclear-engineering majors abroad. In addition to reactor-operations officers and engineering officers, Korea must train personnel by functional specialty, including instrumentation, electrical systems, mechanics, radiation safety, maintenance, and quality assurance. It must simultaneously prepare the instructors and evaluators who will train and certify them.

3. The Structural Problems Addressed by France's Distributed Training System

Detailed budgets and past internal operating problems at France's military nuclear-training institutions are largely undisclosed. The direction in which France has reformed its system, however, reveals the structural challenges it has sought to address.

- First, because advanced engineering education alone could not supply the growing number of field technicians required, France created new two- and three-year military-linked technical programs.

- Second, because no single institution could effectively provide theoretical instruction, reactor training, and vessel-operations training, institutions in Cherbourg, Cadarache, Brest, and Toulon divided those responsibilities among themselves.

- Third, because hazardous accident scenarios cannot be rehearsed repeatedly on actual reactors and vessels, France made extensive use of simulators capable of reproducing conditions ranging from normal operations to equipment failures and emergencies.

- Fourth, France made its permanent training institutions responsible not only for preparing new crews, but also for periodic refresher training, instructor development, and the incorporation of operational incidents and equipment failures into training materials.

The essence of the French model does not lie in copying particular courses or buildings. Its central achievement was to establish in advance a system that continues to produce the personnel required after vessel construction is complete and feeds operational and maintenance experience back into the training process.

4. The U.S., French, Australian Models and Korea's Choice

The training systems of the United States, France, and Australia differ according to the nuclear fuel they use, the way they acquire submarines, and their alliance relationships. French naval reactors use uranium fuel enriched to below 5 percent, and France has developed an operational and maintenance model built around major technical refits conducted roughly every ten years, during which reactor cores are removed and replaced and reactor equipment undergoes comprehensive inspection. The United States, by contrast, uses highly enriched uranium (HEU) and long-life cores; its newer submarines employ cores designed to minimize or eliminate refueling over the vessel's service life. These technical differences are reflected in each country's training, qualification, and maintenance systems.⁹⁾

The U.S. Navy's Naval Nuclear Power Training Command (NNPTC) brings basic nuclear occupational training and advanced theoretical instruction together at a single facility. According to official U.S. Navy sources, the command can accommodate more than 3,600 students and 480 staff members when operating at full capacity. The strength of the U.S. model lies in rigorous examinations and re-evaluations at each stage of training, and in linking land-based reactor training directly to qualification for operational shipboard duty.¹⁰⁾

Through AUKUS cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia sends officers, crew members, and industrial personnel to schools, submarines, and shipyards in both countries for extended periods. At the same time, Australia is building a domestic training center equipped with simulators that replicate reactor and submarine operations. This demonstrates that overseas training must not substitute for a domestic system. It should serve as a transitional means of developing the initial instructor cadre and other core personnel.¹¹⁾

Korea should not replicate either the U.S. or the French system wholesale. From the United States, it should draw rigorous safety standards, staged training, formal qualification, and periodic recertification. From France, it should absorb experience in operating LEU-fueled reactors, radiation protection, periodic fuel management, and maintenance training. The ultimate objective, however, must be to establish Korea's own training institutions and qualification regime.

III. Prospects and Limits of Korea-France Cooperation on Workforce Development

1. A Complement to Korea-U.S. Cooperation Not a Substitute

The United States is a key counterpart in nuclear-fuel procurement and nuclear-nonproliferation consultations. In training and qualification as well, Korea should draw on the rigorous safety standards and staged qualification-management experience accumulated by the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy, however, operates HEU-fueled reactors that require virtually no refueling over a vessel's service life, whereas Korea is pursuing an LEU-fueled reactor. U.S. training institutions must also meet the needs not only of American personnel but of Australia's AUKUS workforce.

France is uniquely positioned to help bridge this gap. It is the only Western country with long-standing experience operating an LEU-fueled naval nuclear propulsion system. Beyond reactor operations, France has experience training personnel in radiation protection for crews and maintainers, periodic fuel management, and major maintenance. The April 2026 agreement to elevate Korea-France relations to a "Global Strategic Partnership" and strengthen defense and security cooperation provides the political foundation for cooperation on naval nuclear propulsion workforce development.¹²⁾

The objective of Korea-France cooperation, however, should not be defined as gaining access to France's core reactor technologies or to sensitive information on nuclear-fuel configuration and reactor design. A realistic objective is to incorporate and adapt within Korea's training system the curricula, instructor-development methods, simulator practices, radiation-protection expertise, maintenance planning, and safety culture that France has accumulated.

2. Open General Education Is Not the Same as Military Reactor Qualification Training

The fact that foreign engineers and researchers may participate in INSTN's GA program does not mean that foreign military personnel may also enter EAMEA's operational naval-reactor and maintenance courses. France's professional naval-reactor qualifications are intended for military personnel and civilian employees working for the Ministry of Armed Forces. To perform the relevant duties, an individual must be either a service member or a civilian employee of the French defense establishment and must hold a government-granted security clearance (habilitation de sécurité), issued after background screening, that permits access to classified defense information. Participation by Korean military personnel in such courses would therefore require a separate intergovernmental agreement, security and background screening, and negotiated arrangements governing the scope of training and the protection of information.¹³⁾

Brazil's nuclear-powered submarine program (PROSUB) likewise illustrates both the possibilities and the limits of cooperation with France. France supported the design and construction of Brazil's conventional submarines, the construction of shipyards and bases, and workforce training. French technology transfer, however, was limited to non-nuclear areas—the Brazilian Navy assumed independent responsibility for developing the reactor and nuclear propulsion plant.¹⁴⁾

Korea should therefore begin with areas in which cooperation is relatively feasible rather than seeking access to the most sensitive technologies from the outset. Monitoring core condition and controlling reactor power, maintaining the reactor compartment and associated systems aboard the vessel, and replacing spent reactor fuel with fresh fuel are directly connected to military secrecy and nuclear safety and should be treated as longer-term objectives. Priority areas for negotiation should include the following:

- Design of foundational and advanced nuclear-training curricula, together with instructor development

- Radiation-protection methods for crews and maintenance personnel, and the cultivation of a nuclear-safety culture

- Performance requirements for simulators that accurately reproduce reactor and vessel operations, and methods of team training

- Long-term maintenance planning, quality assurance to verify that equipment and maintenance meet safety standards, and the management of training institutions

- Systems for initial qualification, periodic recertification, and the incorporation of accident and equipment-failure experience into training curricula

3. Five Issues That Must Be Resolved Before Korea-France Cooperation Can Advance

First, the scope of training and the applicable security classifications must be clearly defined. Open courses, restricted military courses, and classified courses that will remain off-limits to foreign trainees should be distinguished, and the two sides must agree on which materials and knowledge returning trainees may use in Korea.

Second, French-language and technical-terminology training must begin in advance. Officers and researchers selected for the GA program or EAMEA training need more than conversational French. They require sufficient technical proficiency in French to understand and discuss reactor engineering and safety procedures with precision.

Third, Korea must establish common standards for harmonizing the U.S.-style safety and qualification system with the French approach to operating LEU-fueled reactors. Unless Korea determines in advance which standard will apply when U.S. and French curricula or procedures differ, trainees and domestic program organizations may end up applying inconsistent rules.

Fourth, the permissible use in Korea of knowledge acquired in France must be negotiated in advance. If teaching materials, training programs, and simulator software cannot be used without French authorization, Korea will struggle to achieve self-reliance in training. Any agreement should include the right to produce Korean-language materials, adapt curricula to Korean requirements, and authorize Korean instructors to train subsequent cohorts.

Fifth, France's capacity to accept trainees and the associated costs must be taken into account. Sending large numbers of Korean trainees abroad for extended periods would increase France's educational and security burden while sharply raising Korea's overseas training and living costs. A more efficient approach would be to provide intensive training to a small group of candidates for the initial instructor cadre and then have them train succeeding personnel after returning to Korea.

4. Cooperation Must Also Serve France's Interests

If Korea merely makes one-sided requests for technology and training, France will have little incentive to cooperate actively in sensitive military education. Korea should instead offer a comprehensive package that delivers tangible benefits to both countries, including the following:

- Joint design of Korean training curricula and simulators by French training institutions and nuclear and defense companies

- Joint research and training programs in radiation protection, nuclear safety, quality assurance, and maintenance planning

- Cooperation on non-sensitive logistics, maintenance, and port-call support in the Indo-Pacific, combining Korea's shipbuilding and maintenance capabilities with France's experience operating nuclear-powered vessels

- Regular exchanges of Korean and French naval officers and instructors, together with recurring joint seminars and maritime-security exercises

What Korea should seek is not access to core reactor design information, but the capability to establish an independent training system. In return, Korea should offer France long-term business opportunities in training, simulators, maintenance, and safety cooperation, as well as a platform for strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Only a mutually beneficial arrangement can sustain Korea-France cooperation over the long term.

IV. Military Academy Consolidation and a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center in Jinhae

1. Turning the Naval Academy's Jinhae Facilities into a National Strategic Asset

If the Korea Armed Forces Academy is formally established and the functions of the Naval Academy in Jinhae are reorganized, some education, housing, and administrative facilities will require new missions. Immediately after the consolidation plan was announced, concerns emerged in Jinhae that the symbolic standing and economic role of the Naval Academy, which has long represented the region, could diminish. Developing the Jinhae campus into a specialized hub for maritime, submarine, and naval nuclear propulsion training would turn academy consolidation from a simple transfer of functions into an opportunity to advance professional naval education.¹⁵⁾

Jinhae contains a dense concentration of naval organizations responsible for education, logistics, and maintenance, including the Naval Academy and the Submarine Force Command. The first meeting of the Future Defense Strategy Committee, which discussed the nuclear-powered submarine development plan in May 2026, was also held at the Submarine Force Command in Jinhae. The proximity of major training, operational, and support organizations is a major advantage in connecting institutional education with the operation of actual vessels.¹⁶⁾

Nuclear-powered submarine crew training cannot be completed through classroom instruction in nuclear theory alone. Trainees must learn how the bridge team responsible for commanding the vessel and the engineering department responsible for the propulsion plant coordinate their actions, and they must master pre-embarkation training, maintenance, and safety procedures in conjunction with operational naval organizations. In this respect, Jinhae is clearly distinct from locations that contain only nuclear-research institutions.

Repurposing suitable facilities among the Naval Academy's existing lecture halls, laboratories, administrative buildings, dormitories, library, athletic facilities, military-security perimeter, and communications infrastructure could reduce the time and social conflict involved in securing a separate large site. It could also lower the cost of constructing new housing and support facilities for trainees and instructors. In addition, crew training and hands-on operational instruction could begin earlier by drawing on existing training, operational, and maintenance organizations.

The use of existing buildings, however, does not automatically guarantee lower costs. Planners must assess whether electrical power and cooling systems are sufficient to operate simulators, whether secure areas for classified work can be created, whether the buildings meet seismic and fire-safety requirements, and how severely the facilities have deteriorated. A preliminary feasibility study should compare new construction with renovation and identify which facilities should be retained, shared, repurposed, or replaced.

2. Theory and Simulator Training in Jinhae Hands-On Reactor Training at a Separate Site

Establishing a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center in Jinhae does not mean that an actual reactor and nuclear fuel must be placed on the Naval Academy grounds. On the contrary, as in France, it would be more rational to distribute training functions across several sites according to institutional responsibility.

The Jinhae main campus should focus on nuclear theory, radiation protection, reactor- and vessel-operations simulation, maintenance procedures, and team training that do not involve nuclear fuel. Training involving the operation and testing of an actual reactor should be conducted at a separate facility that satisfies nuclear-safety regulations and military-security requirements. This would not replicate EAMEA's buildings, but would apply to Korean circumstances the principle under which institutions in Cherbourg and Cadarache and the vessel-operations training school divide their responsibilities.

3. The Center's Status and Governance

The Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center must not become merely a school for submarine crews. It should be established as a specialized Navy training institution with an integrated governance and coordination framework involving the Ministry of National Defense, the Navy, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, nuclear and defense-science research institutions, the nuclear-safety authority, universities, and the shipbuilding and nuclear industries.

- Training nuclear-powered submarine crews and maintenance and safety personnel

- Developing the initial instructor cadre and the specialists who will design the curricula

- Granting initial qualifications by functional specialty, conducting periodic recertification, and providing refresher training for serving personnel

- Continuously incorporating operational incidents, equipment failures, and maintenance experience into the curricula

- Updating training materials and simulators as new vessels and reactors are introduced

Training operations and safety oversight must be separated organizationally. This separation is necessary to prevent course-completion standards and safety-assessment criteria from being lowered because of schedule delays or personnel shortages.

Appropriate official names would include "Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center" or "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Institute." Because EAMEA is responsible not only for nuclear propulsion but also for nuclear weapons and military nuclear-risk management, adopting "Korean EAMEA" as the official name could create the unnecessary misperception that the institution trains personnel for nuclear-weapons missions. EAMEA should instead be presented as a reference model for the design of Korea's training system.

V. Phased Implementation Plan

The Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center should be aligned with the vessel-construction schedule but established ahead of the vessel-building phase. Just as France founded EAMEA roughly fifteen years before its first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine entered service, Korea must complete the preparation of its initial instructor cadre and lead-submarine crew before the first vessel is launched.

Phase 1: Linking the Two Government Implementation Frameworks

The government's first task is to establish a joint working group that brings together the organization responsible for creating the Korea Armed Forces Academy and the interagency organization directing the Jangbogo-N Program. The former will determine how existing academy facilities and personnel are to be reassigned; the latter will determine what facilities and how many personnel are required for nuclear-powered submarine training. If the two organizations plan separately, Korea may lose the opportunity to use the Jinhae facilities strategically.

The joint working group should conduct a comprehensive survey of the Naval Academy's facilities and identify those suitable for repurposing. It should calculate personnel requirements by functional specialty, including crews, instructors, maintenance, and safety, and define the respective roles of the Jinhae main campus and the separate reactor-training site. The legal and budgetary basis for establishing the center, a Korea-France memorandum of understanding on training cooperation, and the selection and French-language preparation of candidates for the initial instructor cadre should all be incorporated into a single master plan.

Phase 2: Turning Overseas Graduates into the Initial Instructor Cadre

At the initial stage, Korea should send a small number of candidates for the initial instructor cadre—selected from among naval officers and technical specialists at nuclear-research institutions and industry—to programs such as INSTN's advanced GA nuclear-engineering course on a pilot basis. Korea should first verify the scope of material that can actually be learned, the applicable French-language and security requirements, French institutional capacity, and the educational outcomes, and only then expand participation in stages.

The mission of those sent abroad must not end with completion of an overseas course. After returning to Korea, they must develop Korean curricula and serve as the initial instructors for subsequent cohorts. Australia likewise plans to use personnel who have completed theoretical instruction, simulator training, and operational shipboard training in the United States and the United Kingdom as core members of its domestic nuclear-powered submarine program. Selection should therefore assess not only research competence, but also teaching ability, the prospect of long-term service, and suitability for handling classified military information.¹⁷⁾

Petty officers and technical personnel should be developed with reference to France's two- and three-year military-linked technical-training model. Korea should create degree-linked programs in cooperation with vocational "Meister" high schools, technical colleges, and universities specializing in nuclear engineering, and link tuition support to long-term naval service. Providing pathways into civilian nuclear power, shipbuilding, and radiation-protection employment after separation from service would help Korea maintain a stable and sustainable pool of skilled personnel despite demographic decline.

Phase 3: Building a Workforce System for the Submarine Fleet's Entire Service Life

Before the shipboard reactor reaches first criticality and undergoes moored trials, Korea must complete the qualification system for reactor operators and safety managers. Before sea trials begin, the entire lead-submarine crew must obtain vessel-operations and team qualifications. From the second vessel onward, crews should in principle be trained domestically. The training population should also expand beyond submarine crews to include technicians at maintenance depots and shipyards, as well as personnel responsible for radiation protection, nuclear safety, quality assurance, and nuclear-fuel management.¹⁸⁾

Ultimately, the Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center should become the central institution that continuously develops and manages the personnel required throughout the vessels' construction, operation, and maintenance. Training, qualification, operational shipboard duty, maintenance, safety oversight, and refresher training must form a single integrated system. Lessons from vessel operations and maintenance should be incorporated into training materials and simulators, while problems identified through training and evaluation should feed back into improvements in operating procedures and vessel design.

VI. Conclusion: Jinhae as a Hub for Future Naval Capability, Not a Symbol of Loss

The establishment of the Korea Armed Forces Academy and the Jangbogo-N Program are not unrelated defense policies. One reforms the system for educating future officers; the other creates a future operational capability for the Republic of Korea Navy. Linking the two would allow military-education assets reorganized through academy consolidation to serve a new national mission: developing the workforce required for nuclear-powered submarines.

For the past eighty years, the Naval Academy has educated officers for the Republic of Korea Navy and Marine Corps. If the Korea Armed Forces Academy is formally established and the functions of the Jinhae campus are reorganized, the campus can preserve the Navy's history and traditions while becoming a hub for training specialists in submarines, naval nuclear propulsion, and maritime security. This would turn academy consolidation from a potential erosion of naval expertise into an opportunity to strengthen and advance it, while assigning Jinhae a new national strategic function.

Cooperation with France should be approached according to the same principle. Korea should not expect France to train Korean crews indefinitely or transfer core reactor technology. Instead, Korea should use INSTN's open programs, limited government-to-government training, and cooperation on instructors, curricula, and simulators to develop its initial instructor cadre. France's experience in LEU-fueled reactor operations, safety, radiation protection, and maintenance should likewise be adapted to Korea's own training system.

The most realistic path is to combine three elements: political and diplomatic consultations with the United States, including the resolution of nuclear-fuel procurement and nonproliferation issues; France's experience operating LEU-fueled reactors and its training system; and the land-based reactor testing and training facilities and domestic qualification regime that Korea will establish. Korea should not choose between the United States and France. It should integrate their distinct strengths within an indigenous Korean system.

A shipbuilding program eventually ends, but workforce development and the maintenance of professional qualifications continue for as long as nuclear-powered submarines remain in service. If the Korea Armed Forces Academy is formally established and the functions of the Naval Academy in Jinhae are reorganized, creating a Korean Naval Nuclear Propulsion Training Center in Jinhae should be more than an exercise in reusing idle facilities. It should become the first national strategic investment that transforms the Jangbogo-N Program from a plan into an operational reality.

1. Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, "Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine," May 26, 2026.
2. Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, "Establishment of an Integrated Korea Armed Forces Academy at Jaun-dae, Daejeon—Training Leaders for an Advanced, Strong Military," Korea Policy Briefing, July 16, 2026. The official plan states that a four-year integrated education platform will be established at Jaun-dae in Daejeon and further developed through subsequent consultation. Kim Hyo-jung and Kim Chul-sun, "'Four-Year Academy at Jaun-dae, Daejeon': Military Academy Consolidation Plan Unveiled at Party-Government Consultation," Yonhap News, July 16, 2026. Media reports discussed the possible use of some facilities at the Naval Academy in Jinhae and the Air Force Academy in Cheongju for service-specific professional training.
3. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "L'École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA)," https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/mieux-nous-connaitre/ecoles-formations/lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique-eamea
4. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "Remise d'insigne unité aux Aviateurs de l'EAMEA," December 5, 2024, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actualites/remise-dinsigne-unite-aux-aviateurs-lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique; Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "Une odyssée à la Française." France's first nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine, Le Redoutable, entered active service in 1971, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/cols-bleus/cols-bleus-magazine/passion-marine/propulsion-nucleaire/odyssee-francaise
5. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "[14 juillet 2025] École de navigation sous-marine et des bâtiments à propulsion nucléaire," https://www.defense.gouv.fr/14-juillet-2025-ecole-navigation-marine-batiments-propulsion-nucleaire
6. Institut national des sciences et techniques nucléaires (INSTN), "Ingénieur spécialisé en Génie atomique (GA)," https://instn.cea.fr/formation/genie-atomique/; Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "L'École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA)." EAMEA states that it is responsible for the "Propulsion navale" option of the INSTN-administered GA program, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/mieux-nous-connaitre/ecoles-formations/lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique-eamea
7. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "L'École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique (EAMEA)." EAMEA has maintained a Cadarache branch since 1966 and conducts practical training using CEA and TechnicAtome facilities, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/mieux-nous-connaitre/ecoles-formations/lecole-applications-militaires-lenergie-atomique-eamea
8. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "[14 juillet 2025] École des applications militaires de l'énergie atomique," https://www.defense.gouv.fr/unites-du-defile-du-14-juillet-2025/14-juillet-2025-troupes-pied/14-juillet-2025-ecole-applications-militaires
9. Assemblée nationale, Commission de la défense nationale et des forces armées, compte rendu no. 33, January 11, 2023. The hearing states that French naval-propulsion reactors use uranium-oxide fuel enriched to below 5 percent, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/CRCANR5L16S2023PO59046N033.html; Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, "Paroles d'industriel et de marins." The French Navy removes submarine reactor cores and conducts comprehensive inspections of reactor equipment during major technical refits roughly every ten years, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/cols-bleus/cols-bleus-magazine/passion-marine/soutiens/paroles-dindustriel-marins; U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, "NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby at Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 75th Anniversary." The Columbia class uses a life-of-ship core capable of operating for more than forty years, https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/articles/nnsa-administrator-jill-hruby-naval-nuclear-propulsion-program-75th-anniversary
10. Naval Sea Systems Command, "Naval Nuclear Power Training Command-History." According to U.S. Navy sources, NNPTC consolidated the Nuclear Field "A" School and the Naval Nuclear Power School at a single facility, https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/NNPTC/About/History/
11. U.S. Department of Defense, "AUKUS Defense Ministers Joint Statement," April 9, 2024. At the time, Australian naval personnel were participating in the U.S. nuclear-powered submarine training system and in British reactor courses and shipboard training, while Australia was simultaneously developing training simulators and domestic capacity, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733790/aukus-defense-ministers-joint-statement/; Australian Department of Defence, "Growing & Skilling Australia's Submariner Workforce," December 9, 2024, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-12-09/growing-skilling-australias-submariner-workforce
12. Joint Statement between the President of the Republic of Korea and the President of the French Republic, April 3, 2026. The two leaders agreed to elevate Korea-France relations to a "Global Strategic Partnership" and deepen political, defense, and security cooperation. See CHEONG Seong-Chang, "The Opening of the Korea-France 'Global Strategic Partnership' Era and the Remaining Tasks Institutionalization Challenges Viewed through a Comparison with the Japan-France Summit," Sejong Focus, April 13, 2026.
13. France compétences, "RNCP38580-Atomicien de propulsion navale," https://www.francecompetences.fr/recherche/rncp/38580
14. Marinha do Brasil, PROSUB, "Transferência de Tecnologia." The source states that French technology transfer excludes the nuclear field and that Brazil is independently developing the nuclear plant, https://www.marinha.mil.br/prosub/transferencia-de-tecnologia-convencional; Marinha do Brasil, PROSUB, "Perguntas Frequentes." The Brazilian Navy states that it is independently developing the capabilities required to design, build, operate, and maintain the reactor, https://www.marinha.mil.br/prosub/perguntas-frequentes
15. Jung Jong-ho, "'Will an 80-Year Regional Symbol Disappear?' Jinhae Residents Concerned about the Establishment of an Integrated Military Academy," Yonhap News, July 16, 2026. Immediately after the consolidation plan was announced, concerns arose in Jinhae regarding regional identity and the economic consequences of relocating the Naval Academy.
16. KTV, "Card-News Summary of the Basic Plan for the Development of the Republic of Korea's Nuclear-Powered Submarine," May 26, 2026; Korea Maritime & Ocean University, Maritime Military College, official website and admissions guide for the second semester of the 2026 academic year. The university's Jinhae Education Center is located within the Naval Education and Training Command, https://www.kmou.ac.kr/navy/main.do; Kim Dong-min, "Remembering the Devotion of National Heroes Jinhae Naval Commanders Pay Tribute at the Memorial Tower on Memorial Day," Yonhap News, June 6, 2025.
17. Australian Department of Defence, "Nuclear-Powered Sub Training on Track," August 27, 2024. Australian naval officers completed six months of theoretical instruction and three months of simulator training in the United Kingdom before gaining practical qualifications aboard Astute-class submarines. They are expected to become core personnel in Australia's nuclear-powered submarine enterprise after returning home, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2024-08-27/nuclear-powered-sub-training-track
18. Ministère des Armées et des Anciens combattants, Direction générale de l'armement, "Démarrage de la chaufferie nucléaire du sous-marin nucléaire d'attaque (SNA) de Grasse," December 15, 2025, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualites/demarrage-chaufferie-nucleaire-du-marin-nucleaire-dattaque-sna-grasse; Marine nationale, "Début des essais à la mer du sous-marin nucléaire d'attaque De Grasse," February 26, 2026. De Grasse achieved first reactor criticality in December 2025 and began sea trials in February 2026, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/marine/actualites/debut-essais-mer-du-marin-nucleaire-dattaque-grasse

※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are those of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institute.