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ROK–China Summit in 2026 and the Lee Jae-myung Government’s Strategic Choices: Redesigning Bilateral Relations Through Mutual Respect and Strategic Autonomy |
| December 26, 2025 |
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Seong-Chang CheongVice President, Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org
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The years 2025 and 2026 are expected to represent a new turning point in ROK–China relations. Since the launch of the Lee Jae-myung government, the two sides have sought to move beyond the legacy of disputes tied to THAAD deployment and explore renewed cooperation. The November 1, 2025 summit in Gyeongju carried particular symbolic value, as it marked Xi Jinping’s first trip to South Korea in 11 years. The leaders met for roughly 100 minutes and agreed to pursue the “mature development of the strategic cooperative partnership.” The summit reportedly produced concrete deliverables, including the extension of a won–yuan currency swap arrangement (five-year term; KRW 70 trillion, approximately RMB 400 billion) and MOUs across six cooperation areas, which together provided a foundation for stabilizing bilateral relations.1)
The two governments are also reported to have agreed to hold a second leaders’ summit in Beijing in early January 2026, potentially adding momentum to the recovery of bilateral ties.2)
Meanwhile, broader geopolitical conditions are changing quickly. With the second Trump administration, U.S. foreign policy has become more explicitly “America First,” a shift that may expand the space for strategic autonomy among U.S. allies. The October 2025 ROK–U.S. summit—widely reported to have addressed U.S. support for South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine program as well as expanded enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing—suggests that South Korea’s security capabilities may be entering a new phase.
Against this backdrop, China policy under the Lee government is not solely a question of bilateral management. It is increasingly linked to South Korea’s effort to redefine its strategic standing within a changing Northeast Asian order. This paper evaluates the Lee government’s external policy line and the outcomes of the 2025 summit, reviews the likely agenda and negotiating direction for the 2026 summit, and proposes potential new pathways for ROK–China cooperation reflecting South Korea’s evolving position. -
The Core Philosophy of Interest-Based Pragmatic Diplomacy
The Lee Jae-myung government’s foreign policy orientation can be summarized as “interest-based pragmatic diplomacy.” This approach seeks to move beyond the rigidity of ideology- or values-driven diplomacy and instead prioritize the national interest of the Republic of Korea and the well-being of its people.3) As a guiding philosophy, “Pragmatic Realism” maintains the ROK–U.S. alliance as the central axis of foreign policy while expanding the space for “strategic autonomy” that avoids subordination to great power politics.
Amid intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, the Lee government aims to move beyond pressure to choose sides and instead pursue “selective cooperation” and “issue-based alignment” in accordance with national interests. This represents a balanced approach that avoids being trapped in bloc politics while maintaining core alliance relationships.
Core Principles of China Policy
The Lee government’s China policy sets as its central objective the “mature development of the strategic cooperative partnership”4) based on mutual respect and shared interests. This entails respecting China’s core interests while expressing South Korea’s position firmly and confidently on matters concerning its sovereignty. In particular, the government seeks to maintain stability in bilateral relations by adhering to the principle of separating security issues (such as North Korea’s nuclear program) from economic cooperation, thereby maximizing the benefits of economic interdependence.
For South Korea, the United States is its sole treaty ally, while China is its largest trading partner—accounting for approximately 19.5% of total trade—and a key partner in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. A binary choice between the two is neither feasible nor desirable. The presidential office’s statement on August 5 affirming the principle of “advancing ROK–China relations on the basis of a robust ROK–U.S. alliance”5) accurately reflects this new framework. The Lee government operates on the conviction that maintaining the ROK–U.S. alliance and developing cooperation with China are compatible objectives, and it is seeking a new equilibrium in bilateral relations based on this understanding.
Recognizing South Korea's Changed Status: Identity as a Major Power
The Lee government recognizes that South Korea’s international standing has fundamentally changed. In objective terms of national power, South Korea is not a “superpower” like the United States or China in terms of territory or population, yet it is no longer merely a middle power. In military terms, South Korea ranks within the top five globally according to the 2025 Global Firepower (GFP) index and is assessed as surpassing the United Kingdom and France in conventional capabilities.
South Korea’s position is even more prominent in strategic industries. As the world’s second-largest shipbuilding power, South Korea trails China in overall volume but leads globally in high-value, advanced vessels—particularly LNG carriers and eco-friendly ships. At the October 2025 ROK–U.S. summit, South Korea committed to investing $150 billion in the U.S. shipbuilding sector, a move central to the “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA)” initiative and a reflection of Korea’s emerging role as a key partner in U.S. industrial revitalization. According to data from the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), U.S. shipbuilding capacity is estimated to be only about 1/233 that of China.6)
South Korea ranks first globally in memory semiconductors and second overall in semiconductor manufacturing capacity after Taiwan. The Lee government has set the goal of raising Korea’s comprehensive AI competitiveness to third in the world by 2030 and expanding national R&D investment and personnel to fifth globally.
In the defense industry, South Korea has established itself as ranked 9th–10th among global arms exporters, and the Lee government aims to elevate the country into the world’s top four defense exporters (G4) by 2027. Based on these objective indicators and strategic ambitions, both the Korean government and public have increasingly begun to view the country as a “major power” comparable to leading European states.
Assessment of the ROK–China Summit in 2025 on the Sidelines of APEC
The ROK–China summit held on November 1, 2025, on the margins of the APEC Leaders’ Meeting was historically significant, marking President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to South Korea in 11 years. The meeting lasted 97 minutes—longer than the ROK–U.S. summit (87 minutes) and the ROK–Japan summit (41 minutes)—indicating in-depth discussions on key issues. President Lee stated that “regional stability cannot be overemphasized,” while President Xi expressed his commitment to promoting the stable and long-term development of the strategic cooperative partnership.7) The two leaders also agreed to strengthen strategic communication regarding North Korea. Although substantial differences remain between the two sides on the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization, the reaffirmation of the importance of bilateral cooperation on this matter constitutes a meaningful outcome.
The growing severity of North Korea’s nuclear threat further underscores the need for cooperation. According to a presentation at a recent Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) seminar, North Korea is estimated to possess between 127 and 150 nuclear warheads as of 2025, with projections of 201–243 by 2030 and 344–429 by 2040. At the 80th anniversary parade of the Workers’ Party of Korea in October 2025, the Hwasong-20 ICBM—reportedly a three-stage solid-fuel missile capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs)—was unveiled. On December 25, images were released of Kim Jong-un inspecting the construction of an 8,700-ton strategic nuclear-powered submarine. In light of the increasing and largely uncontrollable expansion of North Korea’s nuclear and strategic weapons capabilities, close strategic communication between South Korea and China is essential to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Of course, the 2025 ROK–China summit did not resolve all outstanding issues in bilateral relations. Disputes remain over maritime boundaries in the West Sea and restrictions on Korean cultural content in China, among other matters. These issues require continued dialogue and consultation. The recent restoration of relations should therefore be understood as the beginning of a new paradigm characterized by the coexistence of managed competition and cooperation. -
Cooperation for Peace on the Korean Peninsula and the Resumption of Inter-Korean Dialogue
China’s government officially maintains that it has not abandoned the objective of denuclearization of North Korea or the Korean Peninsula. In practice, however, China is moving toward a posture in which it no longer presses North Korea to denuclearize, prioritizing stable ties with Pyongyang as the latter strongly rejects the international community’s denuclearization demands. At the China–North Korea summit held on September 3 on the margins of China’s Victory Day commemorations, President Xi Jinping—unlike in the previous five summits—did not call for North Korea’s denuclearization. About twenty foreign leaders attended the Victory Day military parade, and Kim Jong Un reportedly received protocol treatment second only to President Vladimir Putin. This suggests that China is beginning to treat North Korea as a “de facto nuclear-armed state.”8)
Against this backdrop, it has been confirmed that China’s white paper released on November 27, titled “China’s Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the New Era,” omitted the phrase “supporting the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” A line contained in a September 2005 white paper—stating support for “relevant countries’ establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the Korean Peninsula, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, etc.”—was replaced with language calling for “upholding a fair position and the correct direction on the Korean Peninsula issue.” In addition, the joint declaration of the China–Japan–ROK trilateral summit issued in Seoul in May 2024 did not include the phrase—present in most previous declarations—that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the goal,” reportedly because China opposed its inclusion.9)
At the China–ROK summit held in November 2025, President Lee Jae-myung presented Seoul’s concept for denuclearization and peace and requested China’s constructive role in restarting dialogue with North Korea. President Xi, however, responded that China would “continue efforts for peace on the Korean Peninsula and stability in Northeast Asia,”10) thereby avoiding direct mention of “denuclearization.” Given China’s growing reluctance even to publicly reference denuclearization of North Korea or the Peninsula, a more realistic approach for the 2026 summit would be to urge China to exercise its influence to prevent North Korea from further escalating tensions—such as by conducting a seventh nuclear test or test-launching a new MIRV-capable intercontinental ballistic missile.
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump signaled a departure from the denuclearization principle by referring to North Korea as a “nuclear power” in January 2025, and Kim Jong Un stated in September that he would have no reason to avoid dialogue with the United States if Washington withdrew its denuclearization demand. In a recent column, Ankit Panda of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace assessed that if Trump seeks to meet Kim again, “early 2026 could be the biggest opportunity.”11)
If, during Trump’s expected visit to China in April 2026, President Xi were to invite Kim Jong Un and President Lee to Beijing and actively facilitate U.S.–DPRK and inter-Korean summits immediately after a U.S.–China summit, it could contribute to easing tensions and promoting peace on the Peninsula. It would also be possible to consider a concept in which the leaders of the United States, China, North Korea, and South Korea consult on launching negotiations to transform the armistice system into a peace regime.
At present, six South Korean nationals—including three defectors—have been detained in North Korea on charges such as espionage between 2013 and 2016. Among them, three are South Korean citizens: missionaries Kim Jeong-uk, Kim Kuk-ki, and Choi Chun-gil, detained since 2013–2014; Kim Jeong-uk has been held for twelve years. The South Korean government should request China’s cooperation at the summit to secure their repatriation. At the same time, it would be desirable to arrange, in parallel, the return to North Korea of unconverted long-term political prisoners who wish to go back.
Institutionalizing Summit Diplomacy and Building an Equal Partnership
To sustain momentum, it would be desirable to institutionalize annual China–ROK summits and a formal “shuttle diplomacy” arrangement. “Shuttle diplomacy” refers to a practice in which the two leaders frequently travel to each other’s countries, keeping channels of dialogue continuously open. Regular leader-level meetings enhance stability in bilateral relations and preserve the possibility of resolving sudden disputes through dialogue. Given that President Xi’s overseas travel is reportedly limited each year, it could also be considered that, if Xi cannot visit, the Chinese premier could travel to South Korea instead.
At the core of advancing China–ROK relations is building an equal partnership. If China continues, by inertia, to view South Korea as merely one of many surrounding “small states,” or seeks to “discipline” Seoul, meaningful progress will remain difficult even under the Lee Jae-myung government. The THAAD episode left deep scars among the South Korean public; if such experiences are repeated, restoring relations will become even harder. If China recognizes South Korea’s elevated national capabilities and status and accepts equal cooperation grounded in mutual respect, South Korea can become a reliable neighbor. South Korea does not wish to be forced to choose sides in U.S.–China strategic competition; rather, it seeks to maintain constructive relations with both and contribute to regional peace and stability. A genuine strategic cooperative partnership becomes possible only when China understands and respects this position.
The West Sea Artificial Structures Issue
South Korean experts and public opinion have expressed strong concerns regarding the buoys and artificial structures China is installing in the West Sea, suspecting that Beijing is attempting to “internalize” the sea as its de facto inland waters. China has reportedly deployed three additional large buoys up to the 124°E longitude line, including near the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) and Ieodo, bringing the total to thirteen buoys positioned along major maritime routes in the West Sea. While China claims the buoys are for meteorological observation, most are reportedly equipped with advanced composite sensors capable not only of collecting oceanographic data but also of supporting military reconnaissance functions. The South Korean government suspects that the buoys may be used to monitor ROK–U.S. naval strategy. According to military authorities, the systems are capable of submarine tracking, current analysis, and underwater acoustic detection, thereby enabling the collection of military intelligence.12)
Some South Korean experts argue that a pattern similar to that observed in the South China Sea—namely, the installation of lighthouses, bases, and observation facilities followed by strengthened claims of administrative jurisdiction and maritime rights—is gradually being replicated in the West Sea. Given that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundary in the West Sea remains unsettled, China’s forward deployment of structures may be intended to accumulate “physical evidence” that could strengthen its bargaining position in future boundary negotiations.
To prevent this issue from escalating into a major bilateral dispute, transparent disclosure of the location and purpose of the structures through maritime consultation channels is necessary, along with close cooperation linked to marine environmental protection, fisheries order, and maritime safety. On December 11, National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac stated in a media interview that “the West Sea should become an open, peaceful, and co-prosperous sea rather than a closed sea of confrontation and competition,” adding that boundary delimitation and fisheries issues should be addressed comprehensively.13)
Lifting Restrictions on Cultural Content (the “Hallyu Ban”)
The informal restrictions imposed by Chinese authorities on South Korean films, dramas, and games—commonly referred to as the “Hallyu ban”—have significantly worsened South Korean public perceptions of China, particularly among younger generations. Culture forms the foundation of mutual understanding and goodwill between peoples. When cultural exchanges are blocked, public sentiment deteriorates, and when public sentiment deteriorates, government-to-government relations are constrained.
The normalization of cultural exchange would constitute the first step toward rebuilding mutual trust between the two societies. If China were to lift the Hallyu ban and restore cultural exchanges, it would serve as a symbolic demonstration of Beijing’s sincerity in improving bilateral relations. The entry of Korean cultural content into the Chinese market carries significance beyond economic gain, as it strengthens emotional bonds and soft-power exchanges between the two peoples.
On December 22, the Korea Entertainment Producer’s Association announced that the live performance of “Dream Concert 2026,” to be held in February 2026 at Hong Kong’s Kai Tak Stadium, would be broadcast locally through China’s Hunan Satellite TV. Hunan Satellite TV is the top-rated satellite broadcaster nationwide. Given that the Hallyu ban has persisted for nine years, the formal broadcast of a K-pop concert through a major Chinese network is highly unusual.14)
Experts suggest that the realization of a large-scale performance with more than 3,000 attendees would constitute a meaningful benchmark for substantive lifting of the ban. If “Dream Concert 2026,” one of Korea’s representative K-pop events, is broadcast nationwide in China, it would likely have a positive effect on improving bilateral relations.
The resumption of K-pop performances in China appears closely linked to the planned China–ROK summit in Beijing in early 2026. Should the two sides reach a concrete agreement at the January summit to expand and revitalize cultural and artistic exchanges—and if a K-pop concert were to take place in Beijing—it could signal the effective end of the Hallyu restrictions.
A Cautious Approach to the Taiwan Issue
The South Korean government maintains the “One China” policy and consistently supports the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. However, following remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi in November 2025 that Chinese use of force in the Taiwan Strait could constitute a "situation that threatens Japan's survival (sonritsu kiki jitai)," China–Japan relations have sharply deteriorated. Chinese authorities are reportedly concerned about what position President Lee Jae-myung might express on Taiwan when visiting Japan immediately after the China–ROK summit. Accordingly, extreme caution will be required in addressing the Taiwan issue at both the China–ROK and subsequent Korea–Japan summits.
China is keenly interested in South Korea’s position in the event of a Taiwan contingency. From Seoul’s perspective, however, there are concerns that North Korea could exploit a security vacuum on the Peninsula and engage in miscalculation or provocation in the event of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, South Korea would be compelled to focus on deterring any North Korean attempt to alter the status quo on the Peninsula, rather than on direct military involvement in a Taiwan contingency. As South Korea’s strategic space narrows between U.S. pressure for “strategic clarity” and Chinese demands for non-involvement, a cautious and calibrated approach is required.
Diversifying Strategic Dialogue Channels
In addition to official government channels, it is necessary to institutionalize and expand dialogue among diplomatic and security think tanks. Track-two strategic dialogue enables frank exchanges on sensitive issues that may be difficult to address through official channels and can provide policymakers with diverse perspectives and information.
However, if China–ROK strategic dialogue proceeds without sufficient coordination among South Korean experts, it may send mixed or confusing signals to the Chinese side. Thorough prior coordination among participating South Korean experts—and between experts and government officials—is therefore essential. -
The 2026 China–ROK summit will serve as a test of the strategic direction of the Lee Jae-myung administration’s policy toward China. Amid the triple constraints of intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, closer alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, and uncertainty surrounding a second Trump administration, South Korea will need to stabilize bilateral relations with China by expanding economic cooperation, institutionalizing high-level communication, and restoring cultural exchanges.
The two countries share geographic proximity, deep economic interdependence, and a common interest in peace on the Korean Peninsula. Allowing China–ROK relations to devolve into zero-sum confrontation amid U.S.–China rivalry would not serve the interests of either side.
If China recognizes South Korea’s elevated status and accepts an equal partnership grounded in mutual respect, South Korea can become a reliable and constructive neighbor to China. Through the reframing of bilateral relations on the basis of mutual respect and parity, the two countries can pursue a new phase of advancement. Rather than focusing narrowly on short-term, visible outcomes, genuine diplomatic success lies in clearly confirming China’s position on contentious issues and reaching agreements that are realistic and implementable rather than relying on uncertain promises. As the past thirty years of China–ROK relations have demonstrated, neither optimism nor pessimism, but sober realism, must serve as the compass in navigating this complex era.
Ⅰ. Introduction: A New Turning Point in ROK–China Relations
Ⅱ. The Lee Jae-myung Government’s Foreign Policy Orientation and Assessment of the ROK–China Summit in 2025
Ⅲ. Strategic Responses by Agenda for the 2026 Summit
Ⅳ. Conclusion: Reframing China–ROK Relations on the Basis of Mutual Respect
1) Jung Ji-seo, “Korea and China Sign Won–Yuan Currency Swap Agreement and MOUs in Six Areas (Comprehensive),” Yonhap Infomax, November 1, 2025.
2) Shim Eon-gi, Han Jae-jun, and Han Byung-chan, “President Lee to Visit China and Japan for ‘Second Act of Pragmatic Diplomacy’… Swift Moves at the Start of the New Year,” News1, December 21, 2025. President Lee stated on the 19th that “there is a possibility of meeting China again in the near future,” and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun officially confirmed this by announcing that “we will pursue President Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to China in the early part of next year.” However, based on what the author confirmed during a recent visit to China, these remarks were made after President Lee’s visit schedule to China had already been finalized.
3) Jeong Han-beom et al., Understanding Lee Jae-myung’s Foreign and Security Policy (Seoul: Juluseong, 2025), pp. 67–69.
4) National Policy Planning Committee (August 13, 2025).
5) Lee Hee-yeon, “Presidential Office: ‘Advancing Korea–China Relations on the Basis of a Firm Korea–U.S. Alliance,’” KBS News, August 5, 2025.
6) Ahn Ok-hee, “Trump Singles Out K-Shipbuilding, Expanding the American Dream… Will a ‘TSMC of Shipbuilding’ Model Emerge?” Hankyung Business, November 18, 2024.
7) Han Jae-jun and Shim Eon-gi, “Korea–China Leaders Conclude Schedule with 97-Minute Summit and Dinner… Shared Understanding on Economic Cooperation and Peace on the Korean Peninsula (Comprehensive),” News1, November 1, 2025.
8) Cheong Seong-chang, “The End of the Korean Peninsula Peace Process” Shindonga, October 2025 issue, pp. 240–245.
9) Kim Dong-hyun and Kwon Soo-hyun, “U.S. and China Simultaneously Remove ‘Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ from Key Security Policy Documents,” Yonhap News Agency, December 7, 2025.
10) Cho Hye-sun, “Wi Sung-lac: ‘Full Restoration of Korea–China Relations… Discussions Also Covered Peace and Denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula,’” Dong-A Ilbo, November 1, 2025.
11) https://carnegieendowment.org/programs/nuclear-policy/proliferation-news/proliferation-news-121625?lang=en (Search date: 2025.12.25)
12) Noh Seok-jo, “[Exclusive] China Installs Three Additional Military-Capable Surveillance Buoys in the West Sea,” Chosun Ilbo, May 31, 2025.
13) Han Byung-chan, “Wi Sung-lac: ‘Korea and China in Talks over Chinese Structures in the West Sea… The West Sea Should Become a Sea of Peace,’” News1, December 12, 2025.
14) Lee Da-gyeom, “‘Dream Concert 2026’ to Be Broadcast on China’s Hunan Satellite TV… ‘Unprecedented Outcome’ Amid the Korean Wave Ban,” Maeil Business Newspaper, December 22, 2025.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
