Yoon-Biden Summit to mark 70 Years of Alliance: Achievements and Future Challenges
Sang Hyun Lee (President, Sejong Institute)
President Yoon Suk-yeol made a state visit to the U.S. and held a Korea-U.S. summit with U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington on April 26. The Washington Declaration, which includes the creation of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) between South Korea and the United States, was also announced.
The biggest achievement of the summit was the upgrade of extended deterrence to prevent the Korean Peninsula from becoming an international flashpoint following North Korea’s nuclear provocation. However, there are still limitations in economic and technological cooperation. South Korea has the tough task of finding a balance between alliance interests and national interests in the future.
The summit was held while the environment of the Korea-U.S. alliance was not favorable. The external security challenges facing the Korea-U.S. alliance can be summarized into three key trends.
First, in the midst of the deepening systemic fragmentation, or fractured global order after the COVID-19 pandemic, an era is unfolding in which all countries pursue foreign policies focusing on their own national interests. This hard-hearted environment is being created by the disruption of the global supply chain triggered by the pandemic, the return of geopolitics, the worsening great power competition, and the turmoil in global governance.
Second, the new Cold War trend is intensifying. In addition to the already ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and China, the prolonged war following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a united response from the West, and the world order is rapidly being reorganized into a confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism. Meanwhile, the United States and China are strengthening their efforts to rally strategic solidarity in their favor. As a result, it is expected that Korea will often face problems of choice between the two competing blocs.
Third, the possibility of unexpected contingency over many flash points in the Asia-Pacific region has increased. As the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has advanced rapidly, strengthening extended deterrence has become urgent, and military tensions in the global shatter zones are also rising in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis. As the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region became unstable, a new trend of arms race began to emerge following Japan’s revision of the three national security documents. It is understood in this context that the leaders of the two countries announced the ‘Washington Declaration’ separately, which includes strengthening extended deterrence, apart from the summit joint statement. At the summit, the economy and security were actually the two pillars. During his visit to the United States, President Yoon made efforts to expand the Korea-U.S. alliance from a military alliance to an economic and technological
alliance. The biggest challenge in the coming years is to find an appropriate balance between the interests of the alliance and Korea’s national interests in the changing context of the global situation and the alliance. The joint statement confirmed that the ROK and the United States will construct an Alliance that will provide future generations with a firm foundation upon which to build prosperity and security, guided by a shared commitment to defend universal human rights, freedom, and the rule of law. The joint statement consists of three parts: global comprehensive strategic alliance; expanding cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific; and strengthening ironclad bilateral collaboration. Under each subheadings, many cooperative activities between the United States and the ROK are listed. In order to be evaluated as success, it is necessary to look at the Yoon-Biden summit in light of four criteria.
First, how much has the level of extended deterrence against North Korea’s nuclear and Missile threats been strengthened? Recently, North Korea’s nuclear posture is rapidly evolving. One of the biggest agendas of the Korea-U.S. summit was to strengthen extended deterrence that included concrete measures. The Washington Declaration, adopted after the talks, contained a mechanism that encompasses sharing extended deterrence information, joint planning and execution. However, it is evaluated that it falls short of NATO-style nuclear sharing. This is why follow-up measures should be prepared.
Second, what are the risks South Korea will take in relation to containing China and supporting Ukraine, and how will it prepare for them? The Biden administration’s biggest concern is the situation in China and Ukraine. The two leaders of South Korea and the U.S. confirmed they strongly oppose the change in the status quo of the international order by force. South Korea will share the burden accordingly, and policy coordination related to it will be a key issue in the U.S. alliance policy.
Third, how will South Korea expand its role in the Indo-Pacific region as an ally of the United States? In particular, it is in the national interest of the Republic of Korea to make the Indo- Pacific region a rule-based space where free, open, and desirable orders and norms work. The rule-based international order naturally includes securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. It has become important to clearly establish the diplomatic identity of the Republic of Korea even at some cost in the future.
Fourth, how will the two countries agree on ways to win and win over economic and technological alliances? The two countries decided to continue consultations on strategic materials directly related to national security, core technology cooperation, and high-tech areas such as semiconductors, batteries, and biotech. South Korea must overcome the economic dilemma caused by the U.S. demand for bashing China. It is not the right way if South Korea has to unilaterally take losses for the sake of the alliance alone. Therefore, the right balance between the alliance interestsand national interests of South Korea must be maintained.
Due to intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China and the aftermath of the Ukraine war, the international order is fluctuating and strategic uncertainty is growing.
Faced with multiple uncertainties at the global and regional level, the Korea-U.S. alliance cannot afford to settle for the evaluation of old successes over the past 70 years and has the task of avoiding the hidden reefs in the future of the alliance.
The Korea-U.S. alliance is critically important for South Korea’s economy and security, but the reality at hand is not so colorful. The reality is that the Biden administration’s American First policy is not much different from the Trump administration’s, and some are rather tougher. Differences in views between South Korea and the U.S. over the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), pressure on semiconductor cooperation, and calls for participation in containing China are likely to continue to be obstacles or risks to the alliance.
Even after the Korea-U.S. summit, President Yoon should show a strong stance on the direction of the alliance, including pending issues that the Biden administration is interested in. The values and directions that the alliance should aim for are clear. The Yoon Suk-yeol government’s emphasis on liberal democracy, an open and free trade order, a world order in which norms and rules work, and reciprocal scientific, economic, and technological cooperation are also in line with the values that the U.S. aims for.
In order to become a value-driven alliance in name and reality, Korea also needs to show that its value-based identity is firm. The current relationship between South Korea and the U.S. is not the ‘patron-client’ relationship of the past. Korea has now grown enough to qualify for an equal alliance partner. The U.S. should also show its readiness and attitude to recognize Korea as an equal partner. The summit should further create an opportunity to firmly spread the perception that South Korea is the best ally and strategic partner for the U.S. The meeting left a future-oriented task in that it provided only the basis for this.