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Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 2024 Presidential Election Results: Analysis and Implications |
| October 10, 2024
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Myon Woo LeeSenior Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | mwlee@sejong.org
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On October 1, 2024, the new Ishiba Cabinet was inaugurated in Japan. After a close runoff in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election on Friday, September 27, Shigeru Ishiba, a 12-term Diet member and former secretary-general of the LDP, was elected as the new party president. Under Japan's cabinet system, the LDP president, as the head of the ruling party, was customarily elected prime minister through a vote by the National Diet.
Although finally achieving success after five attempts, it was far from an easy journey for the former LDP secretary-general. In his previous two bids, he gained substantial support from party members (including members of the Liberal National Congress and National Political Association) but was ultimately unsuccessful due to insufficient backing from fellow Diet members. As a result, in the 2021 presidential election, he had to withdraw his candidacy after struggling to secure the required 20 nominations and instead supported former Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono. Even in this election, as more than nine candidates initially expressed their intention to run, there were doubts about whether Ishiba could secure the necessary nominations to enter the race, let alone win, given the LDP's requirement for each candidate to secure 20 nominations to participate.
This brief will provide an overview of how Ishiba, after suffering four previous defeats, managed to secure a win in this election, and will provide a preliminary assessment of his expected next steps and the potential impact of his long-sought victory as LDP president. -
In the LDP presidential election, a candidate must secure a majority of votes to win. When more than two candidates run, as is often the case––and especially in this election with nine candidates–—the winner is determined through a runoff election between the top two candidates. In the first round of voting, the total votes are divided equally between votes from LDP Diet members and those from rank-and-file party members. In the second-round runoff, the votes consist of those from LDP Diet members along with the 47 prefectural chapter votes.
As shown in Table 1 below, in this presidential election, a total of 736 votes were cast in the first round: 368 votes from LDP Diet members and an equal 368 votes from party members. Ishiba received a total of 154 votes, with 46 coming from Diet members and 108 from party members. This placed him second behind Sanae Takaichi, who led with 181 votes, allowing him to advance to the runoff. In the runoff, Ishiba secured a total of 215 votes–—189 Diet member votes and 26 prefectural votes–—narrowly defeating Takaichi, who led in the first round, by a margin of 21 votes to become the new LDP president. Takaichi received 173 Diet member votes and 21 prefectural votes, totaling 193.
The following three factors can explain how Ishiba came to be elected. Firstly, support for Shinjiro Koizumi––a popular candidate among the general public—–gradually declined throughout the campaign period, partly due to his performance in the debates. Despite his father, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, advising him to "wait until he's at least 50 before running," the 43-year-old, five-term Diet member ultimately decided to enter the race, largely influenced by the unexpected success of Shinji Ishimaru in the Tokyo gubernatorial election this past July.
In that election, the LDP’s unofficially endorsed incumbent candidate, Governor Yuriko Koike, was re-elected. However, in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election held at the same time, the LDP performed poorly, winning only two races and losing six. 1) This defeat, along with Ishimaru's success, reflected strong voter dissatisfaction with the established political parties, including the LDP, creating an expectation within the party for the rise of a younger generation of leaders like Koizumi. This sentiment likely paved the way for 49-year-old, four-term Diet member Takayuki Kobayashi to also launch his bid for the presidency. However, as support for Koizumi waned over the course of the debates, 2) Ishiba was able to capitalize on the gap left behind by his declining popularity.
Secondly, as briefly mentioned above, Ishiba has had long-standing support from regular voters and LDP party members, and this support continued in this election. For instance, in the first round of the 2012 LDP presidential election—–when former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe returned to seek reelection––Ishiba received 165 votes from party members and 34 from Diet members, totaling 199 votes and placing him in first. Similarly, in the first round of this election, Ishiba garnered 108 votes from party members, allowing him to advance to the runoff against Takaichi, despite Koizumi leading him in Diet member votes.
Thirdly, a behind-the-scenes power struggle among three former prime ministers––Aso, Suga, and Kishida––helped lower the resistance of fellow Diet members toward supporting Ishiba. As mentioned above. despite his popularity among rank-and-file party members, Ishiba has struggled to gain votes from fellow lawmakers. In the first round of this election, he received only 46 Diet member votes. However, support from Suga and Kishida––stemming from the competitive dynamic of Aso versus Suga and Kishda—–enabled him to secure enough votes to win the runoff.
As seen in Table 1 above, comparing first-round and runoff votes suggests that Ishiba gained support from Diet members who had initially backed Koizumi, Hayashi, and Kato, bolstered by Suga and Kishida’s support. Meanwhile, Takaichi’s support seems to have come from Diet members who initially backed Kobayashi, Motegi, Kamikawa, and Kono, under the influence of former Prime Minister Aso. This was later reflected in Ishiba’s post-election appointments, with Suga replacing Aso as LDP Vice President, a key position in the party, and Hayashi from the Kishida faction retaining the post of Chief Cabinet Secretary in Ishiba’s Cabinet.
In other words, despite the LDP’s declaration to dissolve its factions following the political funding scandal, factional politics are clearly alive and well. Considering that the primary purpose of factions is to elevate their leader to the presidency, the re-emergence of factions in this presidential election was a predictable development.
Fourth, despite these power struggles, another key factor influencing Diet members not affiliated with a faction was a sense of caution and unease toward Takaichi. Although Takaichi, the former Economic Security Minister, received strong support both in this election and in her 2021 bid, reports suggest that her staunch conservative stance––including a hard-line position on China and support for visits to Yasukuni Shrine–—has raised concerns and apprehensions among voters, who are worried about instability in the regional security environment and relations with the U.S., which seeks to maintain trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea. Consequently, with a general election of the House of Representatives fast approaching (Prime Minister Ishiba has announced it will be held on October 27), many first-term Diet members withheld their support for Takaichi. -
How will the launch of Prime Minister Ishiba's new Cabinet affect Japan's domestic and foreign policies, especially its relationship with South Korea? To answer this question, it is necessary to first briefly examine Prime Minister Ishiba’s political leanings. This is because while Japanese bureaucrats are generally recognized as having substantial influence in policymaking, it is ultimately political leaders who drive policy changes. The newly elected prime minister's policy preferences and leadership style can be analyzed through the following three lenses.
First, Ishiba is strongly committed to constitutional reform and the introduction of the right to collective self-defense. Ishiba was first elected as a Diet member for the LDP in the 38th House of Representatives General Election in 1986. However, he left the party in 1993 due to then-President Yohei Kono's decision to "suspend discussions on constitutional reform," a policy aimed to soften the party’s image after suffering an election defeat and losing its majority. Ishiba subsequently joined the Japan Renewal Party and later the New Frontier Party under Ichiro Ozawa, motivated by these new parties' support for collective self-defense and constitutional reform, which he saw as embodying “true conservatism.” Ishiba eventually rejoined the LDP in 1997, citing dissatisfaction with Ozawa’s unilateral leadership style and the lack of genuine commitment to constitutional reform and collective self-defense, which these new parties had initially claimed to support.
Ishiba's drive to revise Article 9 (2) of Japan’s constitution––the so-called “peace clause” that prohibits Japan from maintaining military forces––to formally establish the Self-Defense Forces as a military force and introduce the right to collective self-defense stems from his self-reliant, modern state nationalist posture. The war in Ukraine has reinforced this stance, leading Ishiba to call for the creation of a collective security framework in Asia—–a so-called "Asian NATO." He argues that Ukraine was invaded by Russia because it was not a part of NATO, and that because today's Ukraine could be tomorrow's Asia, Asia also needs a binding collective security arrangement similar to NATO. Ishiba's self-reliant, modern state nationalist stance also aligns with his support for revising the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). He suggests that revising SOFA to foster a more equal U.S.-Japan relationship would strengthen bilateral relations. This offers a glimpse of the elements of ethnic nationalism embedded in his modern state nationalist posture.
Second, Ishiba places a high value on communication. For example, reflecting on his involvement in passing security bills as the minister responsible for security legislation, he commented, “Whether public understanding (of discussions surrounding security legislation) has progressed is shown by opinion polls in news articles, but I cannot yet confidently say that progress has been made... I’m not sure that public understanding has been achieved just by looking at the numbers (in opinion polls),” highlighting his view on the need for thorough communication.
This emphasis on communication is also linked to Ishiba's pluralistic views. Pluralism, seen as an effort to understand others’ perspectives, is evident in Ishiba’s support for issues like same-sex marriage and allowing spouses to have different surnames, as well as in his approach to historical issues. For instance, in a May 19, 2017 interview with the Dong-A Ilbo, he commented on the comfort women issue, stating that “Japan should continue to apologize until South Korea accepts those apologies.” On the Nanjing Massacre, he expressed his view that “at the very least, the handling of prisoners was improper, discipline and military code were not upheld, and there is a need to objectively examine civilian casualties.“
In addition to pluralism, Ishiba’s stance on acknowledging historical issues appears to reflect a rational, realist perspective rooted in his modern state nationalism. For example, regarding the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women issue, and the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, he has questioned whether statements such as "there was no massacre," "there is no evidence of coercion," or the "crimes against peace" ruling is invalid because it was an ex-post facto law actually serve Japan’s national interests today. Concerning visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, he stated that the promise made to those who die in battle is a direct visit from the emperor, not politicians. He argued that the role of politicians is to create an environment that allows historians and legal experts to investigate such historical issues. This is why Ishiba has refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine since his first Cabinet appointment as Minister of Defense in 2002. -
This analysis suggests that there are two sides to Ishiba's inauguration as the new prime minister. Regarding historical issues, he appears more understanding of other countries' perspectives, including South Korea's. However, in diplomatic and security matters, he is likely to pursue constitutional reform, which raises concerns among many South Koreans. Recently, as noted above, his advocacy for an "Asian NATO" has attracted considerable attention.
Given this duality, Korea’s response should aim to actively leverage Ishiba’s Cabinet in line with Korea's national interests. First, constitutional reform—–a likely pursuit of Prime Minister Ishiba––poses significant challeges and is unlikely to be easily implemented. Despite his popularity, former Prime Minister Abe only managed to modify certain aspects related to national referendums and ultimately could not implement full constitutional reform. In light of this, Ishiba is currently avoiding direct references to constitutional reform with the House of Representatives election set for October 27. Instead, he is focusing on addressing voter concerns related to everday hardships caused by rising inflation without matching wage increases, along with providing solutions to address the political funding issue.
Of course, depending on the outcome of the general election, the Ishiba Cabinet may be short-lived. The reason Ishiba is pushing to dissolve the House of Representatives for a snap election is that he wants to capitalize on the spike in public approval that typically accompanies the appointment of a new prime minister. Holding elections next year when the terms of office expire would likely result in major losses for the LDP. While an immediate election might still result in losses, he anticipates that it could prevent devastating defeats comparable to those in 1993 or 2009, which resulted in the LDP losing its majority in the House. Clearly, it is not easy to address significant issues like constitutional reform under these conditions.
Additionally, even if Ishiba's administration endures and implements the constitutional amendments necessary to officially turn Japan's Self-Defense Forces into a military force, this is not necessarily a cause for South Korea’s outright opposition or concern. Considering that Japan is strengthening its defense capabilities in response to China’s assertive rise, such moves are likely to be discussed in cooperation with neighboring countries, including South Korea. This approach will enable Korea to work with neighboring countries to find solutions that enhance Korea’s security and national interests, as well as contribute to regional stability.
As for the "Asian NATO" proposal, on top of the U.S. Congress's skepticism, the prevalent view within Japan is that this initiative is likely not feasible. Critics argue that there will be limited participation due to insufficient consensus on the Chinese threat, as well as the potential inability of Japan, bound by its peace constitution, to participate in the collective security framework it is supposed lead. In this regard, the response from Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yong, indicating openness to discussion if Japan’s idea becomes more concrete, seems appropriate. This also highlights the importance of monitoring potential developments in Japan’s attempts to revise the constitution, even though these changes are unlikely in the short term.
On the other hand, the emergence of the Ishiba Cabinet, which has a positive stance on addressing historical issues, presents an invaluable opportunity for Korea to break free from the impasse on historical issues with Japan, and Korea should actively pursue this. Ishiba’s past actions suggest that, at the very least, he is capable of offering an apology to Korea. Building on a foundation of cooperation and dialogue, South Korea could seize this moment to facilitate a sincere apology from Japan, allowing diplomatic relations to move beyond historical grievances. In particular, if Korea can achieve this ahead of the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan next year, it would contribute not only to South Korea's security but also to broader regional peace and stability.
| Results Analysis: Election Outcome, Voting Trends, and Background
1) Regarding the Tokyo gubernatorial election in July 2024, see Myon Woo Lee, "The Direction of Japanese Politics as Indicated by the 2024 Tokyo Gubernatorial Election Results“
2) For example, in a public opinion poll conducted by the Japan News Network (JNN) on September 9, Koizumi ranked first with 28.5%, ahead of Ishiba and Takaichi. However, in a subsequent poll published by a leading Japanese newspaper on September 18, he had dropped to third place. (Cited in Hankyoreh, 2024.9.9.; 9.18).
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