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Military Characteristics and Implications of North Korean Troops Deployed to Russia |
| November 4, 2024
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Jang-Won JoVisiting Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | jjo@sejong.org
- Recent media reports indicate that some North Korean troops deployed to Russia have already been moved to the frontlines of combat zones, sparking significant interest in understanding the military characteristics and roles of these deployed forces. Regarding this development, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated during a press conference on October 31 that some of the approximately 10,000 North Korean troops sent to Russia had already moved to Russia’s Kursk region, which is near Ukraine. As attentions are focused on future developments—such as whether these North Korean troops will directly engage in combat with Ukraine—this paper seeks to examine the characteristics, missions, and implications of the deployed North Korean troops, drawing on recent confirmed facts from South Korea and Ukraine’s intelligence agencies and various foreign media sources, as well as information disclosed through North Korea’s Rodong Sinmun and other media outlets.
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On October 26, Kyodo News reported, “Kim Yong-Bok, Deputy Chief of the Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff, entered Russia as the leader of the dispatched unit.” Understanding Kim Yong-Bok’s career history and the roles he has been tasked with is key to assessing the characteristics and missions of the deployed North Korean troops. Starting in 2014, Kim Yong-Bok served as commander of the 11th Corps, a special forces unit also known as the Storm Corps. Until 2016, he was frequently observed accompanying Kim Jong Un in his capacity as commander of the 11th Corps, and, in May 2016, he was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea during the 7th Party Congress. On April 15, 2017, he appeared at a military parade leading a column of special forces soldiers as the Commander of the Korean People’s Army Special Operations Forces (SOF), overseeing light infantry, commando, and airborne (paratrooper) units. Following this, in 2021, he was appointed as Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Director of the 2nd Combat Training Bureau, and, since this appointment, is believed to be responsible for training the SOF and enhancing their operational capabilities.
As the official responsible for SOF combat training, Kim Yong-Bok has conducted four combat training demonstrations for Kim Jong-Un in 2024, during which he received direct guidance from the North Korean leader. The first was held on March 6 at a Korean People’s Army special forces training base in the western area and was a demonstration of the unit’s combat training process. The second, held on March 15, was a combat training demonstration of an airborne (paratrooper) unit. The third, held on September 11, was a training guided by Kim Jong Un at the special operations forces training base. The fourth demonstration occurred on October 2, when Kim Jong Un revisited the SOF training base in the western area to inspect and evaluate the combat readiness of several special operations brigades. During the earlier two training sessions on March 6 and March 15, Kim Yong-Bok reported to Kim Jong-Un about plans to conduct training for the Special Operations Forces. At the time, this training appeared to be part of North Korea’s response to the Korea-U.S. joint military exercises held in early March. However, in light of the recent deployment of North Korean troops to Russia and the dispatch of high-ranking military officials, including Kim Yong-Bok, these training sessions can be reinterpreted as preparation for deploying the SOF to Russia. The subsequent two training sessions on September 13 and October 2 can now clearly be seen as inspection and assessment exercises for the SOF prior to their deployment to Russia. -
Established in 2017, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) were built on the foundation of the existing 11th Corps (also known as the Storm Corps) by assimilating and integrating other special forces units from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As a result, the North Korean troops deployed to Russia are expected to consist not only of soldiers from the 11th Corps but also combat unit members from other special forces units.
The SOF has a different structure than regular military branches. While regular military branches are organized into companies, platoons, and squads, with squads typically consisting of 7 to 10 soldiers, the SOF has three to five teams under each company, and these teams are designed to execute independent special missions. Each team has a team leader and deputy leader, both of whom are officers, and consists of approximately 10 to 15 members. To enable these teams to carry out independent missions, they are prioritized over regular military branches in the supply of equipment and war supplies, such as machine guns and rocket launchers.
It has been reported that the SOF comprises over 10 brigades, including light infantry, commando, and airborne brigades, with an estimated core force of 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers. Among these, units with exceptional combat capabilities and those well-suited to participate in the Ukraine conflict were reportedly selected to participate in the special operations combat training.
Special forces units like the 11th Corps are known to select soldiers with superior physical strength and backgrounds compared to regular troops, and since these soldiers undergo longer training periods and are provided with better weapons and equipment, they maintain a higher level of combat capability than soldiers from ordinary units. Moreover, it is believed that the dispatched North Korean soldiers are far superior to Russian soldiers in terms of ideological principles, mental fortitude, and command and control structures due to their basic education, military training, and ideological education. However, as they lack combat experience and familiarity with the terrain in Ukraine, and given that weather conditions could be a variable, various unforeseen factors are likely to impact their effective combat performance.
Meanwhile, reports indicate that Ri Chang-Ho, Director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau of the KPA, has also been dispatched to Russia. This suggests that elite special forces units under the Reconnaissance General Bureau, specialized in missions such as infiltration and reconnaissance, may be part of the deployment, and the potential role of these forces is also attracting significant attention. -
On March 7, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong-Un visited a “major operational training base of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) in the western area” on March 6 to inspect the training facilities and guide the field training of units. During the visit, he stated, “The valiant combatants, being boundlessly loyal to their noble mission of defending the security of the country and the people, fully displayed their actual war capability, staking the honor of their units.” At this time, the training plan for the Special Operations Forces was presented to Kim Jong-Un, under the supervision of Kim Yong-Bok, Director of the 2nd Combat Training Bureau. In response, Kim Jong-Un highlighted the importance of training in an environment that reflects the actual conditions on the battlefield and called for more intense, practical training to ensure that soldiers can confidently secure victory in actual combat situations. Notably, this was the first time the term “major operational training base in the western area” appeared in official reports, and the photos published in Rodong Sinmun showed the soldiers conducting exercises that resembled actual combat and wearing uniforms with a distinctly different design and camouflage color than existing North Korean military uniforms. Additionally, Kim Yong-Bok, who is responsible for overseeing the training of Special Operations Forces, attended as the main commander. Considering that Kim Yong-Bok was recently dispatched to Russia as the leader of the deployed forces, the visit appears to have been an inspection and guidance session specifically for training units slated for deployment to Russia.
Furthermore, given that the overall results of the training were demonstrated to Kim Jong-Un on March 6 of this year, it is estimated that plans to establish the “major operational training base in the western area” were already in place around the middle of last year and that the selection of units to be trained at the base and the development of training plans were also already complete. Preliminary training for the soldiers is believed to have been conducted from the second half of last year through early March of this year, leading up to the final demonstration. -
On March 16, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un guided training for airborne units under the Special Operations Forces on March 15, stating that the large-scale training “was aimed at assessing the paratroopers’ readiness to be mobilized for any operational plan in surprise wartime circumstances and judging their actual war capabilities adapted to different combat action procedures.” The report also conveyed that during the training, Kim Jong-Un “set forth important tasks for the entire army to enhance its militant might in every way by conducting training more intensively with the main emphasis placed on steadily studying and applying realistic and scientific training methods for achieving maximum fighting efficiency on actual battlefields as required by modern warfare.” Military officials who accompanied Kim during the visit included Ri Yong-Gil, Chief of the KPA General Staff, and Kim Yong-Bok, Deputy Chief of the KPA General Staff. Rodong Sinmun published a photograph of Kim Young Bok standing next to Kim Jong-Un and taking notes of his instructions in a notebook. Other photos depicted airborne unit soldiers parachuting into a field and engaging in simulated combat operations, appearing to break through enemy lines as if in a real battlefield scenario.
It appears that on March 6, training was conducted for light infantry soldiers and commandos within the SOF, while on March 15, training guidance and assessments focused on airborne units within the SOF. The March 15 training featured several notable elements: the airborne units parachuted into an environment resembling the fields on Russian battlefields, the soldiers wore camouflage uniforms (designed to blend into field terrain) different from standard North Korean military uniforms, and Kim Yong-Bok, who is responsible for training the SOF units, observed the training while standing next to Kim Jong-Un. Considering these factors, the purpose of Kim’s visits is believed to have been to guide, inspect, and assess the training for airborne units set to be dispatched to Russia. -
On September 13, Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong-Un inspected the “training base of the special operation forces” on September 11 and observed the combatants conducting a “modern and realistic” drill of scouting and raiding objects. During the visit, Kim Jong-Un remarked, “As seen in today’s training, such competent and stalwart fighters are needed in the KPA. We need to cultivate core combatants capable of courageously sweeping battlefields where bullets and shells rain thick and fast without the slightest hesitation in case of emergency,” adding, “Considering the mode and character of modern warfare, to make well-trained and prepared special operation forces as the main combat force in the battlefield has an important influence on the outcome of battles, and sweating a lot in training is the way to shed less blood in a war.”
In the photos released by Rodong Sinmun that day, three North Korean generals — Kim Yong-Bok (Deputy Chief of the General Staff), Ri Chang-Ho (Director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau), and Major General Shin Geum-Cheol could be seen observing the training session next to Kim Jong-Un. These same three generals were reported by the Ukrainian government to have entered Russia in a report submitted to the United Nations Security Council on October 30, confirming that the purpose of Kim’s visits was to provide training guidance to combatants before their deployment to Russia.
The Rodong Sinmun report also marked the first official confirmation of the existence of a “training base of the special operation forces” to train combatants for deployment to Russia. This suggests that future training for North Korean combatants to be deployed to Russia will also be conducted at this base.
Additionally, on October 4, Rodong Sinmun reported that “Kim Jong-Un revisited the training base of the special operation units in the western area on October 2 to assess the combat readiness of several special operations brigades,” and, “The drills were aimed at perfectly preparing them so that they can reliably carry out their special operation tasks under any combat situation.”
During Kim’s visit to the “training base of the special operation units in the western area” on March 6, the term “(actual war) drills” was used rather than “assessment.” However, as the term “assessment” was used on October 2, this suggests that this visit served as the final inspection and assessment of the special operations combatants before their deployment to Russia. -
As outlined above, given that (1) Kim Young-Bok is serving as the Commander of the SOF and Director of the 2nd Combat Training Bureau, (2) combatants from the SOF underwent intensive training and final inspection and assessment at the special operations training base in the western area, (3) during the training guidance process, terms such as “modern warfare,” “actual war drills,” “any combat situation,” and “unexpected combat circumstances” were used, and (4) the three North Korean generals dispatched to Russia—Kim Yong-Bok, Ri Chang-Ho, and Shin Geum-Cheol were observed alongside Kim Jong Un during training sessions for special operations combatants, it is suspected that the main forces among the dispatched troops are elite combatants from the light infantry, commando, and air assault brigades of the SOF and that these soldiers underwent highly intensive training for a minimum of six months to a year prior to deployment.
Regarding the deployment areas, foreign media reports indicate that some North Korean troops initially trained in Sergeyevka, Russia, and later moved to the Kursk region near Ukraine. Article 4 of the North Korea-Russia Treaty signed on June 19 states that, “In the event that either party is subjected to an armed invasion and enters a state of war, the other party shall immediately provide military and other forms of assistance using all means at its disposal.” Therefore, it seems that to justify dispatching North Korean troops to Russia, they are being deployed to the Kursk region, which is currently occupied by Ukraine.
Additionally, following the signing of the North Korea-Russia treaty in June, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on July 19 that Kim Jong-Un received a military delegation of the Russian Federation led by Vice-Minister of Defense Aleksey Krivoruchko (responsible for military equipment & military-technical support) on July 18. This unprecedented one-on-one meeting with the Russian Vice-Minister of Defense is reported to have included discussions about “special military operations” in Ukraine, drawing attention to the possibility of North Korean Special Operations Forces conducting rear-area infiltration missions in Ukraine.
Moreover, on February 11 this year, North Korea conducted a test firing of a new 240mm multiple rocket launcher equipped with guided control. On March 7, Kim Jong-Un guided a large-scale artillery firing drill (mobilizing various self-propelled howitzer and multiple rocket launchers) of the KPA large combined units. While inspecting the combat readiness posture and actual war capability of artillerymen, Kim emphasized that, “It is necessary to make preparations for regular combat mobilization so that all the artillery sub-units can take the initiative with merciless and rapid strikes at the moment of their entry into an actual war.” Following this, on September 12, North Korea conducted a test firing of a “super-large multiple rocket launcher with an improved driving system and maneuverability.” If the dispatched special operations combatants utilize the supplied short-range tactical missiles, including several self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launchers, to engage in fierce battles on the frontlines and the rear as part of the operation to “recapture the Kursk region,” there is a possibility of large-scale casualties..
In conclusion, there are three important factors to consider: (1) the deployed combat troops belong to an “elite combat unit” under the Special Operations Forces that have undergone a minimum of six months of specialized training, (2) Kim Young-Bok and Ri Chang-Ho (Director of the General Reconnaissance Bureau) who are close military aides of Kim Jong-Un were dispatched to Russia, and (3) Kim Jong-Un’s aggressive and ostentatious nature. Given these factors, a scenario could unfold where ideologically driven special operations combatants recklessly engage in battles, emboldened by proclamations such as, “We are different from the Russian military. We will recapture the Kursk region occupied by Ukraine under the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.” Therefore, it appears necessary to closely monitor developments as the situation evolves.
| The Role of Kim Yong-Bok, Leader of the North Korean Troops in Russia
| Evaluation of the Special Operations Forces Combat Capabilities
| Kim Jong-Un Guides Field Training for Special Operations Forces
| Kim Jong-Un Guides Field Training for Airborne (Paratrooper) Units
| Kim Jong-Un Guides Training at Special Operations Forces Training Base
| Mission of the Special Operations Forces and Its Implications
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
