File
|
Political Background and Policy Impact of the Ishiba Minority Government |
| November 18, 2024
|
-
Myon Woo LeeSenior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | mwlee@sejong.orgKitae LeeSenior Fellow, The Sejong Institute | ktleekorea@sejong.org
-
On November 11, in a special session based on the results of the October 27 general election for the House of Representatives, Japan‘s National Diet reelected Shigeru Ishiba, the current prime minister and president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as Japan’s prime minister. However, due to the defeat in the general election, the coalition cabinet led by Prime Minister Ishiba has been launched as a minority coalition government. Unlike in the past, this coalition includes not only the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito but also the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) as a policy-specific coalition partner.
This article outlines the background and process leading to the launch of the Ishiba minority government and its potential impact on Japan‘s foreign and security policies as well as Korea-Japan relations. It begins with a brief overview of the results of the October 27 general election for the House of Representatives. -
Defeat of the LDP-Komeito Coalition
The “50th House of Representatives general election,” held on October 27, ended in a crushing defeat for the former LDP-Komeito ruling coalition. Not only did the LDP and Komeito fall significantly short of their previous seat count, but also failed to secure a majority, which they had declared as their "victory line" at the start of the election. As shown in Table 1 below, the LDP won 191 seats, and Komeito secured 24 seats, for a combined total of 215 seats — 18 seats short of the 233 seats needed for a majority. In particular, the LDP’s loss of 50 single-member district seats is a clear indication of the crushing defeat of both the LDP and the LDP-Komeito coalition.
Rise of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) succeeded in greatly increasing its seat count. However, as the main opposition party seeking a regime change, this increase fell short of securing a majority, by reaching only 148 seats, making the term “rise” more fitting than “victory.” With the 148 seats secured, the CDP would need to form a coalition with nearly all other opposition parties to achieve a regime change and take control of the government.
Victory for the Democratic Party for the People and Reiwa Shinsengumi
At the same time, the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP) increased its seat count from the previous 7 to 28, gaining an additional 21 seats. The DPFP’s share of the proportional representation vote even exceeded its candidate list, forcing it to cede some seats to the LDP and other parties. Similarly, Reiwa Shinsengumi increased its seat count from the previous 3 to 9, gaining an additional 6 seats. While the term “victory” may seem somewhat exaggerated and therefore inappropriate, given the strong positive response to the party’s policies aiming to address the daily hardships caused by inflation, which is a major concern for voters, it is not unreasonable to describe it as a “victory.” This is also likely the reason that Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the small (fourth-ranked) DPFP party, was briefly considered for prime minister following the general election.
Lackluster Performance of the Japan Innovation Party
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP), initially a regional party based in Osaka, has sought to transform itself into a national party by gradually expanding its influence in Tokyo and among proportional representatives. However, considering the party’s momentum stalled in this election, its performance can be described as "lackluster." Even though the 38 seats secured by the JIP solidified its position as the third-largest party, it was still a loss of 6 seats. Additionally, even though the JIP won all Osaka district seats, the overall decrease in the number of seats and the party’s reinforced image as a regional party somewhat overshadowed this achievement. -
The results of the general election, marked by the crushing defeat of the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition, can be attributed to three main factors.
The first factor, and the central issue of the recent election, is the “money and politics” scandal, specifically the “slush fund” scandal, which the LDP failed to address effectively, resulting in distrust of both the LDP and the ruling coalition. In particular, the "20 million yen“ incident that occurred during the election — in other words, the revelation that the party had provided financial support to lawmakers involved in the ”slush fund“ scandal — further fueled this political distrust. The significance of the political distrust is evident from the fact that more than half the lawmakers implicated in the "slush fund" scandal were defeated in the election. Signs of this political distrust were already apparent in the results of the earlier Tokyo gubernatorial election, which saw a surge in support for independent candidate Shinji Ishimaru, and in the by-election losses suffered by the LDP. As shown in Table 2, the rise in support for the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) among independent voters underscores how this political distrust was primarily directed at the LDP-Komeito coalition.
The second factor is the rise in distrust caused by Ishiba’s shift in policy stance. During the LDP presidential race, Ishiba stated that he would not immediately proceed with a general election for the House of Representatives but reversed course after being elected as prime minister, setting an election for just one month later. Furthermore, his stance on issues like allowing married couples to use different surnames also differed somewhat from the views he had expressed during his campaign. After being elected as party president, his approach to the general election was likely influenced by considerations of what would be more advantageous for the LDP. However, considering that political distrust was already an issue among voters, his actions likely further reinforced that perception.
This raises the question of whether former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s strategy of withdrawing his candidacy in the LDP presidential election held on September 20 was indeed successful. Kishida’s strategy was primarily aimed at addressing the ongoing decline in approval ratings and resulting pressure within the party by putting forth a new candidate as party president to minimize losses or even secure victory in the upcoming general election. Given the crushing defeat suffered by the LDP, which failed to achieve a majority, it would be difficult to conclude that Kishida’s strategy was ultimately successful. However, considering that without this strategy, the result could have been even worse — with the party possibly securing fewer seats than the Constitutional Democratic Party — it did potentially help the LDP avoid the worst-case scenario.
The third factor is the weakening of the LDP and Komeito’s support base, which is evident in the disparity between party support and actual voting behavior. According to a survey by Nippon Television, only 58% of those who identified as LDP supporters voted for LDP candidates, while 10% voted for the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and 9% for the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP). In contrast, 79% of those who identified as CDP supporters voted for CDP candidates, and this tendency was even stronger among DPFP supporters, with 84% voting for DPFP candidates. -
With no party securing a majority, the composition of any potential coalition government hinged on the results of the November 11 prime ministerial vote in the National Diet and subsequent policy alignments between parties. Leading up to that, as shown in Table 3, there were three potential scenarios considered to be likely in terms of what kind of coalition government might form.
The first is the formation of a coalition led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with the LDP forming a coalition government not only with Komeito but also with the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), or both. Since a coalition of three parties alone cannot form an absolute majority, a coalition of four parties is also possible. The second is a coalition led by the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP), which can be broadly divided into two scenarios based on whether the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is included or not. Even if the JCP is excluded, the coalition can still secure a majority if all the other existing opposition parties unite. However, considering how the National Diet operates, if the JCP is excluded, it may be necessary to include Komeito in the coalition to secure a stable majority or an absolute majority. The third is a grand coalition between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). Although this is considered the least likely scenario, it cannot be entirely ruled out considering Japan’s domestic economic and social circumstances or its perceptions of the changes in the international order.
Among these possible scenarios, Japan’s political parties reelected Ishiba as prime minister in a prime ministerial vote on November 11 amidst careful political calculations leading up to the runoff vote. In the first round of voting in the House of Representatives, Ishiba received 221 votes; Yoshihiko Noda, leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), received 151 votes; Nobuyuki Baba of the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) received 38 votes; and Yuichiro Tamaki of the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) received 28 votes. Since none of the candidates surpassed the majority threshold of 233 out of a total of 465 votes, a runoff was held between Ishiba and Noda, the top two candidates. In the runoff, Ishiba secured 221 votes, while Noda received 160 votes, with 84 invalid ballots cast, resulting in Ishiba being elected as Japan’s 103rd prime minister.
The key features of the prime ministerial vote that resulted in Ishiba being elected as prime minister are as follows. First is that Ishiba's victory was due to division among the opposition parties. The second-largest opposition party, the Japan Innovation Party, and the third-largest, the Democratic Party for the People, each voted for their own party leaders. In the runoff, where votes for any candidate other than Ishiba or Noda were considered invalid, the 84 invalid ballots ultimately worked in Ishiba’s favor. Second is the implications of Ishiba receiving the exact same number of votes in both the first round and the runoff. Despite weakened support for Ishiba within the LDP following the party’s defeat in the general election, all party members ultimately voted for Ishiba. However, since Ishiba failed to secure a majority of 233 votes even in the runoff, he is expected to face governance challenges going forward. Moreover, “anti-Ishiba” sentiment remains strong even within the LDP, and this movement could become more pronounced leading up to next year’s House of Councillors election. -
After being elected as prime minister in the runoff vote, Ishiba launched his second cabinet later that same evening. However, as the first ruling party minority cabinet in 30 years since the Hata Cabinet in 1994, the Ishiba Cabinet is expected to face numerous governance challenges moving forward. First, because the LDP-Komeito coalition did not secure a majority in the House of Representatives, the second Ishiba Cabinet will be unable to pass any budgets or legislation in the Diet without the cooperation of opposition parties. In a press conference following his inauguration, Ishiba stated, “We will continue running the government on the basis of cooperation between the LDP and Komeito, and we will seek the understanding of as many parties as possible, while responding humbly to the situation.” He also identified foreign and security policy, public safety and disaster prevention, and the revitalization of Japan’s economy as the government’s top priorities. In other words, the Ishiba administration, while maintaining its coalition with Komeito, plans to manage the political situation with a "partial coalition" approach, cooperating with opposition parties, especially the Democratic Party For the People (DPFP), on a policy-specific basis.
In particular, the administration is expected to engage in substantive policy discussions with the DPFP on economic and fiscal policies, such as eliminating the “1.03-million-yen annual income threshold” and reducing gasoline taxes, as well as on security issues, including “active cyber defense.” However, the DPFP’s stance is that it will support the ruling coalition's policies only when they align with its own views and will not take responsibility for the overall management of the government. In particular, the DPFP stresses that responsibility for securing funding for policies lies solely with the ruling coalition. While the current approach is a “partial coalition,” where the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition consults with opposition parties on individual policy issues, depending on how things go, there is still a possibility that the Ishiba government could form a formal coalition with the DPFP in addition to Komeito to ensure the stability of its regime.
The second challenge is political reform. Following the illegal slush fund scandal that played a major role in the LDP’s defeat in the House of Representatives general election, Ishiba has requested cooperation from opposition party leaders at an extraordinary session of the Diet to revise the Political Funds Control Act. Within the LDP, Ishiba also plans to implement solutions to political funding issues by the end of the year, including abolishing the “policy activity funds” paid by the party to individual lawmakers and establishing a third-party body to monitor political funds. While all parties broadly agree on the framework for political reform, the extent to which the Ishiba administration takes the lead and demonstrates initiative in addressing the specifics of these reforms is expected to serve as a litmus test for whether the Ishiba government will be able to maintain power in the long term.
The third challenge is managing the National Diet. The ruling LDP-Komeito coalition lost control of the Diet as it failed to secure a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. In particular, the chair positions of the Budget Committee, the main stage for bill deliberations in the Diet, and the Commission on the Constitution, which oversees discussions on constitutional amendments, have both been handed over to the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). The defeat in the House of Representatives general election and the loss of the Constitutional Review Council chairmanship have effectively stripped the Ishiba government of the momentum needed to advance discussions on revising the constitution. The CDP has also secured the chairmanship of the Judicial Affairs Committee, which is discussing the introduction of a system to allow selective surnames for married couples. Unlike the LDP, which has taken a cautious stance on this issue, all opposition parties, including Komeito, have expressed their intention to support the introduction of such a system, raising the possibility that the debate surrounding selective surnames could disrupt the LDP. As a result, the discussions in the Judicial Affairs Committee on the introduction of a selective surname system are expected to become a central policy issue in Japanese politics moving forward.
-
In considering the possible changes in Japan’s political landscape following the launch of the Ishiba minority government and its impact on Korea-Japan relations, the second Ishiba Cabinet will most likely maintain the same overall Korea policy framework as the previous Kishida administration and the first Ishiba Cabinet, regardless of political changes. In other words, the two countries are expected to continue cooperating on North Korea policy and the promotion of the Indo-Pacific strategy, while managing points of contention such as historical issues. One concern, however, is the potential impact of the Ishiba Cabinet’s political instability on Korea-Japan relations. The Ishiba Cabinet’s formation of a “partial coalition” raises the likelihood that a wider range of opposition party views will be reflected in Japan’s policy toward Korea. Accordingly, Korea’s response strategy to this situation can be outlined as follows.
First, Korea should closely monitor changes in Japan’s domestic political dynamics. Currently, within the LDP, a group opposing Ishiba led by former Economic Security Minister Sanae Takaichi, who also ran in the LDP presidential race, continues to promote “anti-Ishiba” sentiment. Additionally, hardline conservative media outlets, including the Sankei Shimbun, are continuously attempting to “oust Ishiba (石破おろし).” Furthermore, as the Japanese public’s negative perception regarding the transfer of power to the opposition forces replacing the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition has somewhat lessened following the recent House of Representatives general election, the likelihood of power transferring to an opposition coalition centered around the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) is also increasing. While doubts remain about the CDP’s capacity to serve as a ruling party, to dispel such concerns, the CDP is expected to intensify the policy battle surrounding the possibility of a power transfer between the ruling and opposition parties leading up to next year’s House of Councillors election. Taking these potential shifts in Japan’s domestic politics into account, Korea should conduct a thorough analysis of the policy alignments between parties that could influence the composition of future coalition governments and Japan’s policy toward Korea.
Second, Korea needs to enhance parliamentary diplomacy with Japan, including expanding exchanges with Japanese opposition parties. The Ishiba administration is taking a “partial coalition” approach, seeking to cooperate with opposition parties on specific policy issues. In particular, the LDP is expected to pursue policy cooperation with the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP), which normally takes a more conservative stance in certain policy areas unlike other parties. For example, the DPFP advocates revising the Peace and Security Legislation and actively supports amending Japan’s peace constitution. Although the LDP’s election defeat has reduced the likelihood of constitutional revision, Korea should be aware that attempts to revise the constitution could be made at any time through collaboration with the DPFP. Additionally, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDP) is expected to make efforts to seek power in the future. Therefore, Korea should move beyond its traditionally LDP-centric diplomacy with Japan and develop a comprehensive approach of parliamentary and party diplomacy that includes opposition parties. To achieve this, Korea should encourage greater participation from Japanese opposition lawmakers in the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union, which facilitates parliamentary diplomacy between Korea and Japan, and seek to expand exchanges on future issues important to both Japan and Korea that are likely to garner interest from opposition lawmakers, such as issues related to demographics, the environment, and children.
Third, considering the bipartisan consensus in the Japanese seeking to take power in U.S.-Japan relations, Korea should formulate its foreign and security policies toward Japan based on an understanding of Japan’s future foreign policy direction. Japanese society recognizes that Japan’s security environment is deteriorating, leading to a broad consensus among both the ruling and opposition parties on strengthening U.S.-Japan relations. However, Japan is concerned about the possibility that the lattice-like alliance network currently upheld by the U.S. and centered around the U.S.-Japan relationship could change after Donald Trump’s return. Similarly, Trump’s return to office could have serious implications for Korea’s security as well. Therefore, Korea should actively engage in dialogue with Japan about the potential shifts in the regional order surrounding the Korean Peninsula following Trump’s return, and continue to strengthen and solidify trilateral security cooperation between Korea, the U.S., and Japan.
| Results of the House of Representatives General Election
| Background of the General Election Results
| Background and Formation Process of the Ishiba Minority Government
| The Road Ahead for Ishiba’s Minority Government
| Impact on Korea-Japan Relations and Korea’s Response Strategy
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
