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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2025- Special Issue No.3] Emergence of a New International Order and Examination of China’s Domestic and Foreign Affairs |
| December 20, 2024
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Jae Hung ChungSenior Fellow, The Sejong Institute | jameschung@sejong.org
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Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, a new international order has emerged, and the strategic competition between the United States and China has intensified. In line with these developments, the Two Sessions (两会) held from March 4 to March 11, 2024, outlined China's domestic and foreign policy directions. Through this event, Xi Jinping’s centralized leadership, which is based on the party-state system, has been firmly established. A newly amended State Council organization law was announced, which lays out the leadership of the party and the principles of democratic centralism, consolidating the power structure under Xi Jinping’s leadership. All party-state institutions were reorganized under this more integrated structure. The consolidation of Xi Jinping's one-man leadership not only strengthens the party's leadership and internal political cohesion but also reflects China’s response to the emergence of a new multipolar international order and the intensification of US-China strategic competition, demonstrating China’s commitment to achieve the modernization of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the transformation into a strong socialist power in the new era. Additionally, the traditional press conference by the Premier of the State Council, which had been a routine after the National People's Congress closing ceremony, was abolished, signaling changes in the relationship between the Party and the State Council. After Xi Jinping's third term, this shift has consolidated a new power structure where party, government, and military control and authority are focused on Xi Jinping. As a result of this consolidation of Xi Jinping’s one-man leadership system, China has focused on maintaining domestic consumption recovery, attracting foreign investment, expanding entry into emerging markets, reforming state-owned enterprises, shifting the economic development model, relaxing real estate regulations, and strengthening the protection of people's livelihoods, with an eye toward addressing various challenges and crises in 2025.
Since the successful completion of President Xi Jinping's third term at the 20th Party Congress, all sectors of the Party, government, and military became concentrated around President Xi, establishing a Party-state system where the Party leads and governs both the government and the military. Compared to the past, the authority of the Xi Jinping-centered system has significantly increased. As part of consolidating the power structure, a continuous anti-corruption campaign has been carried out, targeting high-ranking officials, business leaders, and military personnel, to eradicate corruption and misconduct on a broad scale. On December 16, Xi Jinping published an article in the party's theoretical journal, Qiushi (求是), emphasizing the importance of ‘deepening the party's self-revolution.’ He warned that contradictions and issues within the party would inevitably arise but stressed the need to act courageously to eliminate any corrupt influences and maintain the party's vitality. Moreover, the article highlighted the need to eliminate hidden corruption, risks, and conspiracies that undermine the party’s leadership, ensuring its long-term rule. On November 28, an official report revealed that Miao Hua (苗華), a member of the Central Military Commission and head of the Political Work Department of the Chinese military, ranked fifth in the military hierarchy, was placed under administrative detention and is being investigated for corruption. Already, Rocket Force Commander Li Yuchao (李玉超) and Zhou Yanning (周亞寧) have been purged, and former Defense Minister Wei Fenghe (李尙福) and Li Shangfu (李尙福) have had their Party memberships revoked and are undergoing anti-corruption investigations. With this intense anti-corruption campaign, the Xi Jinping-centered system is expected to further solidify.
Meanwhile, Li Qiang (李強), Premier of the State Council of China, proposed a GDP growth rate of around 5% for China's economy in 2024 in his government work report. Despite facing domestic challenges such as a sluggish real estate market, weak domestic consumption, and a dampened economic outlook, as well as external factors like the intensifying US-China strategic competition and global geopolitical risks, the government has set this growth target. However, some economic experts have expressed concerns that the growth may fall short of 5%. To achieve this growth target, the Chinese government plans to focus on eco-friendly technologies, digital economy, and infrastructure investments, but it faces challenges such as intensified US-China strategic competition, reduced exports, and the decline of private enterprises due to sluggish internal consumption.
Looking ahead to 2025, China's projected GDP growth rate is around 4.0-4.2%. This forecast incorporates the positive effects of policies initiated in September 2024, including real estate regulation relaxation and investment support for high-tech industries aimed at stimulating domestic consumption and economic recovery. However, the growth of the Chinese economy will likely be affected by external factors such as the intensification of US-China strategic competition, tariffs on Chinese products, global economic uncertainty, and the strengthening of protectionist trade policies.
Of course, the Chinese government is pushing forward with continuous economic policy adjustments and structural reforms. Based on the three key principles outlined at the Central Economic Work Conference — ‘stability while seeking progress’ (穩中求進), which focuses on achieving growth within stability; ‘promoting stability through growth’ (以進促穩), which aims to foster stability through economic growth; and ‘first progress, then break’ (先立後破), which emphasizes making progress first before addressing challenges — the economic policy direction for 2024-2025 is now aligned with the goal of recovering domestic consumption and ensuring stable economic growth. Especially, major real estate companies closely linked to local government finances and debt issues, such as Evergrande (恒大) and Country Garden (碧桂園), have seen a sharp decline in market confidence due to defaults on their debts. In response, the government is pushing for measures like relaxing real estate regulations and expanding loans. However, these efforts are not easily resolving the problems, as they are hindered by issues such as oversupply in the real estate market and a decline in consumer confidence. Additionally, with the youth unemployment rate for those aged 16-24 exceeding 20%, it has become a social issue. The government is actively pursuing economic stimulus and job creation, but the socioeconomic structure is undergoing significant changes due to factors such as population decline, shifts in economic structure, the transition to AI (artificial intelligence) and high-tech industries, and the emergence of the digital economy. As a result, some experts suggest that the 'Peak China' phenomenon, referring to the peak of China's economic development, is emerging and may be difficult to resolve in the short term.1)
Currently, China, in terms of a major economic transition, emphasizes the importance of high-quality development and new-quality productivity while responding to US-led economic and technological sanctions and pressures. The government has set a policy of focusing on intensive investments in key high-tech industries. In particular, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the government has prioritized the development of future high-tech industries and high-quality technological progress as the nation’s primary development goals, and plans to lead technological and industrial innovation tailored to different regions. To achieve this, the government aims to focus on △ advancing, smartening, and promoting green development in manufacturing industries, △ creating clusters of strategic emerging industries, △ developing next-generation information and communication technologies (6G), artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, new energy, new materials, and advanced manufacturing equipment, △ promoting the integrated development of modern high-quality services, advanced manufacturing, and modern agriculture, and △ fostering the growth of the digital economy. These plans aim to transform the country's economic development model, with expectations of increased investments and policy support by 2025. Furthermore, to gain an edge in the technological rivalry with the United States, China has selected semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, batteries, and aerospace as key strategic industries, committed to leading the global high-tech sector through sustained budgets and research and development (R&D) investments, setting out a long-term strategy for this purpose.
Due to the continuous research and development efforts and investments by the Chinese government, China's dependence on domestic technology in the semiconductor supply chain has significantly increased by 2024, demonstrating its technological self-reliance. It is expected that by 2025, China will lead the expansion of a high-tech supply chain network system. Additionally, in 2025, China plans to integrate the digital yuan economy with its internal consumption stimulation and digital economy activation policies. With artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors combining with the digital economy, the potential for the sustained development of China-led advanced digital technology and economic sectors appears to be high. -
The current foreign policy of China emphasizes the need for and importance of building a new multipolar international order, distinct from the US-led rules-based international order. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China advocates for creating a more equal and orderly multipolar international system by collaborating with Russia, India, the BRICS nations, and Global South countries. This effort aims to actively reshape the US-led international order, which is in decline, particularly after the Ukraine crisis. China believes that a new era of major transformations (百年大變局) is underway, with key forces in the international order shifting away from the US and the West. As part of its mid- to long-term foreign strategy, China intends to expand economic and security cooperation with Russia, India, and other BRICS and Global South nations.
China has already proposed three major global initiatives—Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI)—to promote the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), positioning itself as a leader in accelerating the creation of a multipolar international order. Xi Jinping's leadership sees the US hegemonic unilateralism and its policies of pressure and containment on China as the biggest barriers to China's development, emphasizing the necessity and significance of a new multipolar (多極化) world order. In this context, China critiques the US-led rules-based order and presents a new stance on the global order. In order to counterbalance US hegemony and unilateralism, as well as to respond to anti-China alliances led by the US, China plans to further expand its discourse on the multipolar international order through diversified economic and security cooperation.
Xi Jinping's leadership has increasingly pursued "Modernization of Chinese-style socialism“ (中國式社會主義現代化) in response to crises in Ukraine and the Middle East, strengthening China’s identity politics and constructing a new discourse on the international order. This includes emphasizing mutual respect for core interests, equality, and reciprocity in its relationship with the US, especially in the context of the new great-power relationship under the second Trump administration. China’s vision for a new type of international relations calls for respecting sovereignty and core interests, proposing an alternative international order based on multipolarity. While some experts believe the likelihood of a China-led alternative international order is low, the emergence of a new multipolar order centered on BRICS after the Ukraine crisis shows the potential for change. China continues to assert that it is pursuing this transformation in the international order under the long-term strategy of "fighting without breaking the great framework" (鬥而不破).
Beginning in 2024, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China aims to further strengthen its alliance with BRICS and Global South countries in the pursuit of a multipolar international order based on universality, reciprocity, and inclusiveness. China has already criticized the US dollar’s hegemony, pushing for de-dollarization and expanding trade settlements in local currencies through cooperation with Russia, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Global South nations. Additionally, the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, in November 2024 adopted the Kazan Declaration, marking a milestone with 134 points of agreement. The main discussions focused on strengthening the new multipolar international order, enhancing cooperation for global security, promoting economic and financial cooperation among member countries, expanding human and social exchanges, boosting political and economic cooperation with the Global South, and broadening the BRICS bloc by designating 13 new partner countries. Furthermore, China has pointed out the issues with a rules-based international order in which a few Western countries, including the United States, unilaterally determine the global economic and security order, reflecting only the interests of Western nations. In fact, China is actively expanding its solidarity and cooperation with emerging powers such as Russia and India, as well as with BRICS and Global South countries.
As is well known, China and Russia, leading BRICS and SCO, have joined forces to establish a new China-Russia economic-security partnership for the 21st century. They are opposing US and Western-led unilateralism and hegemony, and are expected to accelerate the restructuring of an Eurasian-centered international order. In April 2024, during a meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, it was stated that 'We will uphold the mutual equality of countries large and small around the world, oppose the manipulation of international issues by a few Western nations through hegemony and coercive politics, and both China and Russia will work together to actively promote the multipolarization and democratization of international relations.' To achieve this, China, under a close strategic partnership with Russia, is positioning BRICS, SCO, and the inclusion of the Global South as core capabilities in building a multipolar international order. In December 2024, 2) As a result, after the new Trump administration is inaugurated, the United States and China will likely engage in an intense power struggle and competition for global leadership, with the Global East (led by China) and Global West (led by the United States) competing over key global issues and hegemony.
The arrival of the second Trump administration, expected in January 2025, will have significant implications for US-China relations. With the re-election of Trump, there are forecasts for intensified strategic competition, particularly as Trump’s administration is expected to adopt a similarly hardline stance toward China as it did during his first term. The newly appointed National Security Advisor, Mike Waltz, has expressed strong opposition to Chinese-linked cyber threats to US security and emphasized imposing higher costs on China. As such, US-China relations are expected to be characterized by increasing uncertainty.
Since the launch of the first Trump administration, the conflict and confrontation between the US and China have reached what is considered the worst period since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972. This situation has extended beyond core interests (核心利益) such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang (新疆), Xijiang (西藏), and the South China Sea, and has expanded into areas of advanced technology, economic trade, and political-ideological conflicts, leading to a situation resembling a new Cold War (新冷戰). Of course, within the United States, there have been alternative viewpoints on China policy. Some, like Henry Kissinger, have suggested recognizing China’s rise as a reality and advocating for the construction of a US-China G2 system or a coexisting framework based on mutual cooperation. Similarly, Kurt Campbell has proposed a coexistence system based on cooperation and competition. However, the Trump administration viewed China's rise as directly threatening the US global hegemonic dominance, which led to a strong adoption of the viewpoint from the 'realist' faction (克罗学派), advocating for countering and containing China. In other words, the Trump administration initially expected that China’s continued economic development would lead to the adoption of a more open democratic political system and integration into the rules-based international order. Instead, China expanded its economic and military power, becoming the strongest challenger and competitor to the US in the 21st century. This shift in perception of China has led to a completely new, hardline policy approach.
Currently, the United States is implementing a very comprehensive and strategic China policy in close cooperation and coordination with its regional allies and partner countries, including trilateral security cooperation between the US, South Korea, and Japan, the formalization of QUAD and AUKUS, expanding cooperation with IP4 (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand), and strengthening ties with NATO. Despite the launch of the second Trump administration under the banner of 'America First,' the basic framework of the US strategy toward China is expected to remain the same. Furthermore, President Trump, who has emphasized maintaining sustained superiority over China in the fields of economic trade and technology, has outlined a continued policy of sanctions and strong responses in key areas such as semiconductors, AI, and batteries, in reaction to China's rise in advanced technologies (崛起). Already, Marco Rubio, who was nominated as the first Secretary of State in the second Trump administration, is regarded as a prominent hardline figure against China, advocating for a very tough policy on issues regarding Xinjiang (新疆), Hong Kong human rights, and Xijiang (西藏). Rubio had previously spearheaded the passage of several hardline China policies, including thein September 2019, the in December 2019, and the in January 2020. In April 2021, Rubio also led the introduction of the 'Strategic Competition Act of 2021,' co-sponsored by both Democratic and Republican lawmakers, which called for the enforcement of tough policies toward China in all areas, including advanced technology, economy, finance, political diplomacy, and military security.
Moreover, in the November US elections, held simultaneously with the presidential race, the Republican Party, which advocated for a hardline policy toward China, won a significant number of seats, greatly weakening the factors that could control the China policy of the second Trump administration. Notably, many of the newly appointed key foreign and security advisors in the second Trump administration are former US senators and representatives, most of whom are anti-China figures, which suggests that the strategic competition between the US and China will intensify further. President Trump has emphasized 'America First' in the economic and trade sectors, particularly in advanced technology, food, tariffs, exchange rates, and energy, signaling the emergence of the second round of US-China strategic competition. As a result, China is not particularly optimistic about the launch of the second Trump administration. Given the rapid deterioration of bilateral relations over economic, trade, and diplomatic-security issues, China will likely adjust its policy toward the US in crisis management to avoid direct confrontation or physical conflict, while continuing the strategic competition between the two countries. -
Recently, the changes in China’s foreign policy under Xi Jinping's leadership have directly impacted the shifts in the Korean Peninsula order, particularly after the Ukraine and Middle Eastern crises. In particular, the Xi Jinping leadership has announced a more proactive foreign policy strategy, highlighting the advent of a great transformation (百年大變局), marking a shift in the international order that has not been seen in 100 years since the Opium War. China is now moving away from being a participant in the US-led rules-based international order and positioning itself as the leader (策劃者) of a new multipolar international order. With the war in Ukraine stretching into its third year, and Russia gaining the upper hand, if the Ukraine conflict concludes with a Russian victory in 2025, significant changes to the order on the Korean Peninsula, located at the far eastern edge of Eurasia, are expected.
Some experts argue that the restoration of the North Korea-Russia alliance could lead to a potential shift in North-China relations, and they expect China to maintain stable and friendly ties with its key neighboring countries, such as South Korea and Japan. Therefore, they believe the likelihood of a new Cold War emerging between the North Korea-China-Russia versus US-South Korea-Japan is not high. While China opposes the emergence of a new Cold War, it also maintains the view that the weakening of US power creates a historical and inevitable need for a new multipolar international order—an awareness that is somewhat contradictory. If the international community does not objectively recognize China’s evolving foreign strategy and continues to push for US-led rules-based international order through the intensification of trilateral cooperation between the US-South Korea-Japan, along with a strengthened Indo-Pacific strategy, expanded North Korea sanctions, and issues such as North Korean human rights and the possibility of North Korea's military deployment or weapons support to Ukraine, the situation on the Korean Peninsula could be approached in a way that might inadvertently strengthen the North Korea-Russia and China-Russia relationship. In such a case, some issues could even lead to a potential North Korea-China-Russia solidarity, which cannot be completely ruled out.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is entering a new turning point due to the restoration of the North Korea-Russia alliance and the strengthening of strategic cooperation. In particular, both North Korea and Russia, through a joint statement, have expressed their support for North Korea’s legitimate and reasonable security concerns. They are proposing conditions for resuming more equal and friendly dialogue, emphasizing that sanctions and pressure on North Korea have not been effective, and stressing that the fundamental solution to the Korean Peninsula issue lies in a declaration of cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a peace regime through dialogue and negotiation. Additionally, trade between North Korea and Russia, as well as between China and Russia, has naturally increased. In 2024, the total trade volume between China and Russia rose by over 30%, and despite the ongoing war with Ukraine, Russia has achieved an economic growth rate of more than 4%. In 2025, China and Russia are expected to see trade volume increase by more than 40% and achieve an economic growth rate of about 5%. At the 2024 BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, the strategic alliance and cooperation between China and Russia, based on the BRICS and the SCO, will be expanded, and the economic integration strategy for the Eurasian region will be further developed. This strategy will be linked with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (一帶一路), focusing on the development of the Far East, Siberia, the three northeastern provinces of China, North Korea (the Korean Peninsula), and the Arctic shipping routes, outlining a long-term vision.
Meanwhile, Russia has invited leaders such as Chinese President Xi Jinping, Serbian President Vučić, Slovakian Prime Minister Fico, Vietnamese President Lam, Indian Prime Minister Modi, and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to attend the 80th-anniversary Victory Day Parade in Moscow’s Red Square, scheduled for May 9, 2025, in order to secure victory in the war in Ukraine. If Kim Jong Un attends the Russian Victory Day event, there is a possibility of a summit meeting with President Putin and President Xi, and discussions are expected to focus on the three-way economic cooperation between North Korea-China, North Korea-Russia, and North Korea-China-Russia as well as North Korea’s potential participation in BRICS. Russia has already refused to participate in the UN sanctions on North Korea, and China, unlike in the past, has taken a critical and passive stance on the UN sanctions against North Korea, indicating that there may be some changes in the North Korea-China, North Korea-Russia, and China-Russia relations in 2025. As a result, the emergence of a new multipolar international order triggered by the Ukraine crisis, followed by the launch of the second term of the Trump administration and the intensification of US-China strategic competition, is expected to cause fluctuations in the situation on the Korean Peninsula in 2025, requiring efforts to prevent mutual confrontation and conflict. Especially in 2025, if a particular political atmosphere is created in South Korea, it is highly likely that domestic political changes will have a direct impact on the situation on the Korean Peninsula. If a political atmosphere in South Korea favorable to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is fostered in 2025, efforts should be made to promote the establishment of a new multilateral consultation mechanism involving all relevant stakeholder nations.
China has consistently emphasized its three main principles for its Korea policy: 1) maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, 2) advocating for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula rather than North Korea’s denuclearization alone, and 3) resolving the Korean Peninsula issue through dialogue and negotiations, ensuring that military conflicts arising from the deterioration of inter-Korean relations are prevented. In particular, Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stressed in official settings that 'amid the occurrence of armed conflicts around the world, we do not wish to see the situation on the Korean Peninsula deteriorate.' He has once again emphasized China’s proposed solution for the Korean Peninsula issue, namely the 'dual-track approach' (雙軌倂進: simultaneous pursuit of denuclearization and a peace agreement) and 'gradual, simultaneous progress' (such as easing sanctions on North Korea if it halts nuclear tests). In this manner, China emphasizes that the fundamental solution to the Korean Peninsula issue is only possible through dialogue and negotiations, and stresses that North Korea's security concerns should be addressed in a manner that is mutually acceptable, not in a one-sided approach. Therefore, it is crucial to move away from a policy of hardline measures against North Korea and trilateral cooperation between South Korea-US-Japan, and to find a momentum for mutual coexistence and cooperation, leading to more active efforts for building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula from a collective security perspective.
At the same time, China is showing new changes in its foreign policy, aligning more closely with Russia, BRICS, and countries in the Global South. This has positioned North Korea, located at the far eastern edge of Eurasia, as an issue not only concerning the Korean Peninsula but also closely tied to the transformation of the global international order, making it a geopolitical issue for the entire Eurasian region. As a result, South Korea-China relations are facing difficult challenges, and the more rapidly the new multipolar international order emerges, the more complicated and difficult the situation on the Korean Peninsula will become. While South Korea and the US share an alliance and the Indo-Pacific strategy, maintaining a friendly ROK-US Alliance is essential for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. However, it is also important to balance and develop both the ROK-US Alliance and the South Korea-China strategic partnership in a stable and balanced manner. With the likely worsening of US-China relations following the launch of the second Trump administration, the US will likely demand that South Korea not only increase defense spending but also actively participate in efforts to encircle China.
While the second term of the Trump administration may pursue different policy directions compared to the Biden administration, the overall policy toward China will likely maintain continuity, requiring South Korea to play a more active role in countering China. If South Korea aligns with the second-term Trump administration and seeks a more hardline policy toward China, the China-South Korea relationship may once again face significant challenges and difficulties. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a relationship with China from a more balanced perspective and with a thorough focus on national interests. China has already been closely watching the potential for trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US, and Japan, as well as possible alliances with NATO, as part of its strategy to contain China. For regional stability, China emphasizes the establishment of an inclusive multilateralism rather than an exclusive one. Some experts believe that China’s internal and external environment is challenging. However, after the Ukraine crisis, the decline of US influence and the emergence of BRICS and the Global South are seen as new historical and strategic opportunities. Therefore, South Korea must take an objective view of the Chinese situation and come up with a new strategy toward China that responds to the internal and external policy changes of Xi Jinping’s leadership. In fact, having lived together as neighboring countries for thousands of years, both South Korea and China must recognize the emerging international order not through subjective interpretations but objectively. In addition to building a friendly bilateral relationship, more creative, cooperative, and close communication and collaboration are needed for regional peace and prosperity.
| Politics-Economy: Consolidation of Xi Jinping’s Centralized Leadership and Maintenance of 5% Economic Growth Rate
1) ‘Peak China’ refers to the notion that China’s economic growth has reached its peak and is now on a downward trajectory. This concept emerged, particularly in the United States and Western countries, following 2022, when China recorded its lowest birth rate and economic growth rate.
| Diplomatic Security: Emergence of a New Multipolar International Order and Intensification of US-China Strategic Competition
2) with the launch of the second Trump administration, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, visited China and, in a meeting with President Xi Jinping, agreed that China and Russia would strengthen their strategic cooperation and intrinsic momentum. They also decided to enhance more strategic communication and cooperation through the UN, BRICS, and SCO in order to build a new level of China-Russian relations. With the launch of the second Trump administration, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, made an unexpected visit to Beijing and, through an official meeting with President Xi Jinping, reached a unified agreement to move away from the US-centric rules-based international order. They agreed to defend an international order centered around the United Nations and work together to establish a true multipolar order.
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※ The opinions expressed in 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute.
