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Implication of the Trump Administration’s Suspension of Military Aid to Ukraine |
| February 19 , 2025 |
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Peter WardResearch Fellow, The Sejong Institute | pward89@sejong.org
Seong-Chang CheongSenior Fellow, The Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org -
The war between Russia and Ukraine, which has lasted for more than three years, has reached a turning point. On March 4, the Trump administration decided to suspend military aid to Ukraine. This decision followed a heated exchange during the summit between Ukrainian President Zelensky and U.S. President Donald Trump held at the White House on February 28, which resulted in the collapse of the U.S.-Ukraine mineral deal. The deal was intended to grant the U.S. development rights to strategic minerals, such as rare earth elements buried in Ukraine, in return for continued support in the war effort.
Subsequently, on March 12, Ukraine—despite its previous opposition—accepted a 30-day ceasefire agreement in exchange for military assistance and intelligence sharing. However, the Trump administration’s coercive diplomacy toward Ukraine may also be applied to Europe, and even to South Korea.
During the U.S.-Ukraine summit at the end of February, President Zelensky stressed the need for security guarantees to prevent a potential reinvasion by Russia should a peace agreement be signed. In response, President Trump threatened to walk away from negotiations if Ukraine did not agree to the terms demanded by the U.S. When Zelensky refused, citing distrust in Russian President Vladimir Putin, both Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance harshly criticized Zelensky for being ungrateful and disrespectful, leading to a breakdown of the summit.
These tensions were somewhat foreshadowed on February 12, when Trump had a lengthy phone call with Putin and agreed to initiate peace negotiations over the Ukraine conflict. Later, on February 24, the U.S. opposed Ukraine’s draft resolution condemning Russia’s invasion at the UN General Assembly, causing friction with Ukraine and European nations.
This series of events has not only strained U.S.-Ukraine relations but has also significantly heightened tensions between the U.S. and Europe. There is growing skepticism, concern, and even fear about the U.S.'s commitment to European security through NATO. Within Europe, there is a rising sentiment that the region must take responsibility for its own defense. This was particularly evident in a speech by Friedrich Merz, leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), after the party emerged as the leading force in the German federal elections.
The Trump administration, skeptical of alliances and holding a negative view of Europe, is expected to move closer to Russia and, whether openly or behind the scenes, work to weaken NATO’s defense commitments in Europe. However, Trump's skepticism about alliances is not limited to Europe—it also poses a serious threat to the security of other U.S. allies, particularly South Korea. -
1) Trump and Ukraine
The relationship between President Trump and President Zelensky was far from smooth. In 2019, Trump called Zelensky and asked him to find potentially damaging information related to Hunter Biden, the son of Joe Biden, and his business dealings. This led to the first impeachment attempt against Trump by the U.S. Congress. However, Zelensky tried to stay out of U.S. domestic political conflicts and refrained from publicly criticizing Trump’s actions.
Ironically, it was during Trump’s first term that the U.S. approved the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. While the Obama administration had withheld aid out of concern that it might provoke Russia, the Trump administration approved of it. Nevertheless, given Trump’s favorable stance toward Russia and President Putin, it’s unlikely that the decision came directly from him. Still, the military support provided before 2021—particularly training and limited ammunition—played a crucial role in preventing the collapse of Ukrainian forces in the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war.
By 2024, the war and the issue of U.S. support for Ukraine had become a major partisan issue in American politics. This wasn’t solely due to cost concerns, but was deeply tied to the Biden administration’s approach and Trump’s posture toward Russia. Trump had often been criticized by the Democrats for being too close to Russia, and the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election became a major flashpoint in his presidency.
Trump directly raised this issue again during a heated exchange with Zelensky at the White House on February 28, 2025, showing that it continues to influence his stance on the war. He also believed that Zelensky unfairly interfered in the 2024 U.S. presidential election—specifically by participating in events linked to Democratic candidate Kamala Harris’s campaign—which Trump interpreted as an act of election interference that hurt his chances.
2) The Trump Administration’s Attempted Geopolitical Shift and Concerns Over U.S. Economic Recovery
This background helps explain part of the conflict that erupted between Trump and Zelensky at the White House. However, to fully understand the current situation, two additional key factors must be considered.
First, President Trump has shown a strong desire to improve relations with Russia—an approach that some have dubbed the "reverse Nixon strategy." Just as Richard Nixon normalized relations with China to isolate the Soviet Union, Trump appears to be attempting to normalize ties with Russia in order to pull it away from China's sphere of influence, thereby isolating China diplomatically.
Second, Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, while Ukraine remains heavily reliant on U.S. military aid and support. These factors together have made the Trump administration’s policy direction increasingly complex.
Regarding the "reverse Nixon strategy," it remains unclear how actively Trump intends to pursue it. It's uncertain whether his strategic instincts are genuinely aimed at geopolitically isolating China, or if he is more focused on normalizing relations with Russia to secure economic benefits and bolster his record on economic achievements.
Trump has appointed hardline China hawks to key positions in his administration—such as Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, and Elbridge Colby as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, Trump has generally maintained a skeptical stance toward deploying U.S. ground forces and has expressed particular reservations about military intervention in the event of a Taiwan contingency.
As of March, the Trump administration is also reportedly considering easing sanctions on Russia. In earlier high-level talks, the Russian side suggested that if the war were to end, rare earth elements and other business opportunities could open up. A close associate of Putin even proposed that once the war concludes, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline—linking Europe and Russia—could be rebuilt with the involvement of American investors.
From many angles, it appears that President Trump is more interested in ending the war to strengthen the U.S. government’s fiscal position and stimulate the American economy through new business opportunities. In the end, normalizing relations with Russia seems less like a grand geopolitical strategy to diplomatically isolate China and weaken its security influence, and more like a move aimed primarily at economic deals and addressing domestic economic challenges—particularly the national debt. -
1. Impact on Ukrainee
On March 4, 2025, the U.S. government announced a temporary halt in the supply of additional weapons to the Ukrainian military. The following day, March 5, information sharing, including satellite data, was also suspended, further complicating the battlefield situation for Ukraine.
On March 12, a ceasefire agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine was reached, and military aid and information sharing were set to resume. However, there is no guarantee that such coercive diplomacy will not occur again in the future. Additionally, if the 30-day ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine is actually implemented, it remains uncertain how U.S. military assistance will be adjusted afterward. In a ceasefire situation, the Trump administration may claim that the war has effectively ceased and, citing budgetary reasons, drastically reduce the provision of military aid.
If U.S. military aid were to be completely halted, Ukraine's battlefield situation would likely worsen significantly. Despite suffering considerable casualties and depletion of military resources over the past year, Russia has made substantial territorial gains. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia currently spends about 40% of its federal budget and roughly 7.5% of its GDP on defense, and in 2024 alone, it captured around 4,000 square kilometers of territory. Without U.S. military support, Russia’s pace of territorial occupation in Ukraine could accelerate.
Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided approximately $65 billion in military aid to Ukraine. This support includes various weapon systems essential for defending Ukraine's major cities from Russian attacks and launching counteroffensives. In comparison, Germany, the second-largest military aid contributor, has provided only about $13 billion, while the entire European Union has contributed approximately $52.5 billion. If U.S. aid were to disappear entirely, Europe would likely need to dramatically increase its military assistance to Ukraine.
The U.S. provided essential air defense systems, including Patriot missile systems and launchers, NASAMS, Hawk missile systems, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, air defense radars, and integrated air defense systems. Additionally, artillery systems like 105mm and 155mm howitzers, mortars, HIMARS multiple rocket launch systems, Javelin and other anti-tank weapons, small arms, and ammunition were supplied. Various military vehicles, including Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and Humvees, were also provided.
Moreover, cutting-edge electronic warfare equipment and jamming systems were delivered, and Ukraine has received ongoing maintenance and repair support for equipment that could not be managed independently. In short, large-scale logistical support, including both offensive and defensive operations, has been essential to Ukraine’s war effort.
Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal particularly emphasized two crucial U.S. weapons systems that are difficult to replace. The first, is the Patriot missile system, which is vital for intercepting Russian ballistic missiles, and the second, is the M142 HIMARS multiple rocket system, which is essential for striking Russian command posts, ammunition, and fuel storage facilities in Russia's rear.
The HIMARS system may be partially replaced by French and British systems, such as the Storm Shadow, but these systems are inferior to HIMARS in terms of performance (particularly speed), and their mass production potential is uncertain. On the other hand, the Patriot missile system is essentially irreplaceable. If the U.S. were to halt military aid again and stop supplying missiles to Ukraine, or even prohibit their sale to Europe, Ukrainian cities would lose much of their defensive capabilities.
The U.S. has also provided ongoing information support, including signal intelligence (SIGINT) and satellite data. This information has been crucial for targeting medium-and long-range missiles, tracking Russian troop movements, and ensuring the real-time operation of Ukraine’s air defense systems (including the Patriot system). While information sharing was suspended on March 5, it was announced that it would resume on March 12. However, in preparation for a potential future disruption, Ukraine is likely exploring alternative options through Europe.
Finally, a critical factor that could possibly have an impact on Ukraine's communication networks is Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite internet service. While Musk and White House officials have claimed that such a withdrawal is not expected, if this service were to be discontinued, Ukraine’s communication systems would suffer significant damage. Fortunately, European satellite communication company Eutelsat is reportedly discussing ways to provide services to Ukraine in the future.
Given the scale and scope of U.S. support, it would be an immense challenge for Europe to fill the gap. However, the shock of a complete withdrawal of U.S. financial support could be somewhat mitigated for Ukraine if Europe were able to purchase ammunition from the U.S., support funding for maintaining existing weapon systems, and acquire alternative weapons with U.S. permission.
However, this possibility remains uncertain. It is unclear whether the Trump administration would allow such European support. This is particularly the case because even if the ceasefire is implemented, there is a significant risk that the war could resume after 30 days, as Trump has publicly opposed such an extended ceasefire. Additionally, a complete U.S. withdrawal from supporting Ukraine could significantly impact U.S.-Russia relations and have severe strategic consequences for Europe.
2. Impact on Europe and NATO
Ukraine, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, gave up its remaining nuclear weapons in 1994 and, under the Budapest Memorandum, received security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the UK that it would not face military threats or the use of force. However, Russia violated this agreement with its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its initiation of the war in the Donbas region after the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. Furthermore, the Minsk agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015 between Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to stop the fighting in Donbas.
What we can see here is that the security assurances and agreements did not prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine. Additionally, it became clear that the U.S. hesitated to intervene directly due to the risks of war between nuclear powers.
Until President Trump’s potential re-election, the question of whether the U.S. might abandon NATO was not widely raised. The Biden administration has consistently emphasized, through NATO meetings and statements, that if any of its member states were to be attacked, the U.S. would honor its Article 5 commitment and engage in war with Russia to defend its allies.
However, during his 2024 election campaign, President Trump made statements suggesting that if NATO members do not meet their defense spending obligations (spending at least 2% of GDP), he would allow Russia to act as it pleased. While he also stated he would defend countries that fulfill their obligations, his pro-Russian stance and the fact that NATO views Ukraine's security as an extension of European security have made trust in the U.S. providing collective security far more uncertain than before.
Regardless of how the short-term developments of the Russia-Ukraine war and U.S. NATO policy evolve, it seems that NATO member countries will be forced to significantly increase their defense spending. Furthermore, if Europe perceives U.S. security guarantees as no longer reliable, Europe will need to reassess America's strategy of extended deterrence. The future German Chancellor has indirectly referred to this possibility, and on March 5, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed the idea of operating France’s nuclear deterrent at the European level.
The UK also possesses an independent nuclear deterrent, but its reliance on the U.S. is much greater. Therefore, such measures could be temporary solutions, but given Russia's nuclear capabilities far exceed those of European nuclear powers, if Europe can no longer rely on the U.S. for extended deterrence, strengthening Europe’s nuclear forces will become essential. -
The suspension of U.S. military aid to Ukraine under the Trump administration highlights a significant point: U.S. foreign policy can shift dramatically with the change of administration every four years. This change raises doubts about whether agreements made under President Biden, such as the Washington Declaration, which was adopted during the April 2023 summit between President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea and President Joe Biden, will be upheld under a future Trump administration. The declaration aimed to strengthen the U.S. extended deterrence for South Korea in the face of North Korea's nuclear threats, but it remains uncertain whether such assurances would remain in place should Trump return to office.
Unlike Ukraine, which has a complex relationship with the U.S., South Korea is a formal ally of the United States. However, President Trump’s transactional approach to international relations, which views alliances from an economic and calculative perspective, poses a challenge. For Trump, “alliances” and “democratic values” are secondary to national interests. This is evident from his past stance of cooperating with authoritarian regimes like Russia, North Korea, and Iran if it serves U.S. interests, as seen when the U.S. opposed a UN resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
The Trump administration’s demand for a mineral agreement from President Zelensky, which would allow the U.S. to participate in the development of Ukraine's rare-earth minerals, indicates a shift from previous U.S. policies where the U.S. would bear the cost of maintaining the liberal international order alone. This approach suggests that if North Korea, which possesses nuclear weapons, were to launch a tactical nuclear strike or an EMP attack on South Korea, the U.S. would likely support South Korea militarily. However, South Korea could face significant human and economic losses and, eventually, a "bill" from the U.S. for such assistance, potentially increasing the financial burden on South Korea.
Trump has been open about his intention to reduce U.S. military spending, calling for cuts to defense budgets. On February 13, 2024, he declared that the U.S. should not spend nearly $1 trillion on military expenses. He proposed discussing a reduction in military budgets with Russian President Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping. If such a reduction were to occur, it would likely make the U.S. less capable of maintaining its role as the "world's police," significantly altering the global balance of power.
The U.S. Department of Defense has already planned to reduce its budget by 8% annually over the next five years, primarily due to a growing national debt and fiscal deficits. With an annual fiscal deficit of $2 trillion and interest on the national debt surpassing defense spending, the U.S. faces increasing pressure to scale back its defense expenditures. This situation could lead to a rise in demands for South Korea to significantly increase its share of defense costs, potentially resulting in the scaling back or discontinuation of joint military exercises or a reduction of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
Trump has repeatedly argued that it is unfair for South Korea, a wealthy country, to rely on the U.S. for defense. In a conversation with Bloomberg’s John Micklethwait on October 15, 2024, he suggested that South Korea should be willing to pay $10 billion annually (about 13.6 trillion KRW) for the stationing of U.S. forces, which is nine times the amount agreed in the 2024 Defense Cost Sharing Agreement. This stance indicates that the U.S. might push for even greater financial contributions from South Korea.
While South Korea has no independent nuclear deterrent, its security against North Korea’s nuclear threat relies on the U.S. extended deterrence and joint military exercises. However, Trump views these joint exercises as a waste of money. His comments during the 2018 Singapore summit, where he sided with Kim Jong-un’s objections to U.S.-South Korea joint drills, suggest that if he returns to power, he may push for a halt to these exercises. If Trump were to make such a decision, it would likely persist throughout his second term. South Korea could then face the possibility of bearing the full cost of these exercises if they wish to continue.
Trump has also expressed a desire to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. According to former Defense Secretary Mark Esper, Trump repeatedly threatened to withdraw the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea during his first term. This suggests that should Trump return to office, he might pressure South Korea for greater financial contributions to keep U.S. forces stationed there or even consider reducing or withdrawing those forces.
Given this unpredictable trajectory of U.S. foreign policy under Trump, South Korea may find it increasingly urgent to develop its own nuclear deterrent to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat. The issue of South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons was even addressed by Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential campaign, where he indicated that he would be open to allowing both South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Although Trump’s position on this has not changed, experts such as Walter Russell Mead have suggested that he would be favorable toward nuclear armament in both South Korea and Japan. Victor Cha, a prominent U.S. expert on Korea, has also argued that Trump would not oppose South Korea developing long-range missiles or nuclear weapons.
In light of these circumstances, it is likely that South Korea will need to strengthen its own deterrence capabilities in order to maintain a credible defense against North Korea. This could involve developing independent nuclear capabilities or enhancing missile defense systems. Moreover, South Korea must begin transitioning its alliance with the U.S. to a more mutually beneficial relationship that also addresses shared strategic interests, such as countering China’s rise. South Korea could play a critical role in supporting the U.S. in the defense industry, as evidenced by Trump’s remarks regarding the need for cooperation in shipbuilding and defense production.
In addition, with North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear-powered submarines, South Korea’s own development of nuclear-powered submarines (nuclear subs) has become an urgent priority. To this end, South Korea will likely seek technical support and operational expertise from the U.S. to build and operate such submarines. Strengthening cooperation in nuclear, naval, and defense industries will be critical to enhancing the strategic partnership between South Korea and the U.S.
Ultimately, South Korea’s national security strategy in the coming years will need to adapt to the changing dynamics of U.S. foreign policy, particularly in relation to Trump’s potential return to office. South Korea’s efforts to develop independent defense capabilities will be crucial in maintaining its security and strengthening its position in a shifting global order.
| Behind the Decision to Suspend Military Aid
| Possibility and Implications of Long-Term Suspension of Military Aid
| Implications for South Korea
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
