File
|
Analysis of the Impact of the War in Ukraine on Europe’s Security Landscape |
| November 4, 2025 |
-
Jeong-kyu LeeVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jklee87@mofa.or.kr
-
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the most serious crisis facing Europe’s security order since the end of the Cold War. The war is not merely a territorial dispute; it has fundamentally shaken the foundations of international law and the cooperative security paradigm that Europe had sought to build. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe pursued the ideal of a “continent without war,” aiming to build peace through economic interdependence and institutional cooperation. The current conflict, however, has revealed how fragile those optimistic assumptions truly were.
Russia continues to pursue a strategy of attrition, seeking incremental territorial gains along the front lines. Ukraine, for its part, is focused on defending key supply routes, protecting cities and critical infrastructure, securing sustained military and financial support from the West, and conducting selective counterattacks and limited breakthroughs. Ukraine insists on the restoration of occupied territories and on guarantees of its sovereignty and security, while Russia aims to maintain control over significant portions of seized territory. The wide gap between the sides’ desired outcomes has made compromise exceedingly difficult.
This paper examines the structural changes brought about by the war in Ukraine to Europe’s security landscape. It focuses on five key developments: the strengthening of NATO, the renewed debate over the European Union’s strategic autonomy, Russia’s growing international isolation, shifts in energy security, and the broader trend toward a more multipolar European security environment. It further considers the future prospects of European security and explores the implications for regions beyond Europe, including the Korean Peninsula. -
Background of Europe’s Security Architecture
During the Cold War, Europe’s security structure was defined by the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact (WTO) sustained mutual deterrence through opposing military alliances. Nuclear weapons became a central component of Europe’s security environment, underpinning a stable balance of terror known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Europe pursued a cooperative security model. Institutions such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the NATO–Russia Council, and successive rounds of European Union enlargement supported this vision. German reunification and EU enlargement were widely regarded as flagship achievements of the post–Cold War era. However, these cooperative frameworks failed to fully address Russia’s growing sense of grievance. The 2008 war in Georgia and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea signaled Moscow’s willingness to challenge the existing order. Western responses centered on economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, while military measures remained limited. This reinforced Russia’s perception of Europe’s security vulnerabilities and ultimately contributed to its decision to launch the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Development of the War in Ukraine
Russia’s motivations for waging the war are multilayered. Three factors interact: first, security anxieties stemming from NATO’s eastward enlargement; second, the desire to block Ukraine’s turn toward the West; and third, Russia’s ambition to reassert its imperial sphere of influence.
The first factor concerns Russia’s perception of NATO expansion as a threat. After the end of the Cold War, Russia lost the strategic buffer zones that had historically separated it from Western military power. NATO enlargement began in 1999 with the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and expanded further in 2004 to include the three Baltic states, bringing NATO’s military presence directly to Russia’s borders. From Moscow’s perspective, the steady advance of a Western military alliance into its traditional buffer space constituted a significant security threat. When the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest formally raised the possibility of future membership for Ukraine and Georgia, Russia defined Ukraine’s potential entry into NATO as a “red line” that would directly infringe upon its core security interests. Given Russia’s historical experiences of invasion from the West by figures such as Napoleon and Hitler, the maintenance of a buffer zone between Western powers and Russian territory has long been central to its security strategy. Ukraine, which provides access to the Black Sea and sits adjacent to Russia’s western front, is seen by Moscow as a strategic gateway. Should NATO forces be stationed in Ukraine, Russia’s key cities, including Moscow and St. Petersburg, would fall within close range. For these reasons, Russia viewed Ukraine’s moves toward NATO not as a routine foreign policy choice but as a direct challenge to its regime security.
The second factor is Russia’s intent to halt Ukraine’s westward orientation. Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has oscillated between pro-Russian and pro-Western governments. The 2014 Maidan Revolution, which overthrew the pro-Russian Yanukovych administration and brought a pro-Western government to power, marked a turning point. Ukraine began to deepen cooperation with the European Union and NATO. Russia interpreted this shift as “Western geopolitical encroachment” and responded by annexing Crimea in an effort to curb Ukraine’s integration with the West. As Ukraine continued to participate in NATO exercises, modernize its military, and strengthen ties with Western states, Russia felt an increasing need to adopt more forceful deterrent measures, including military action. The 2022 full-scale invasion can therefore be seen as an attempt to preempt Ukraine’s complete alignment with the West.
The third factor is Russia’s ambition to restore its imperial sphere of influence. The Putin administration has linked Russia’s national identity to the concept of the “Russian World,” viewing the former Soviet space as Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. This ambition extends beyond military interests to encompass a broader “civilizational space” rooted in shared history, culture, and language. Putin has repeatedly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” underscoring his determination to reestablish Russia as a great power. Ukraine carries deep symbolic and historical significance as the heartland of ‘Kievan Rus’, making it a strategic and ideological focal point for this project. From this perspective, the war in Ukraine is not only a reaction to perceived security threats but also an effort to restore Russia’s dominance over the former Soviet region.
In sum, the war in Ukraine is the product of three interacting forces: the structural driver of NATO’s eastward expansion, the immediate trigger of Ukraine’s westward realignment, and the ideological and strategic ambition of Russia to reclaim its imperial sphere of influence.
Development of the War and the International Response
The war in Ukraine can be divided into three broad phases. The first phase, from February to April 2022, involved Russia’s full-scale invasion and its failed attempt to seize Kyiv, followed by a shift toward concentrated operations in the eastern and southern fronts. The second phase, from May to December 2022, was marked by intense fighting in the Donbas region and Ukraine’s counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson. The third phase, from 2023 to the present, has been characterized by a prolonged stalemate, the emergence of a long-war trajectory, and a significant escalation in Western military support.
The international response to the outbreak of the war has generally fallen into two categories: active involvement by Western countries and a more neutral stance by China, India, and many states in the Global South.
First, Western countries supported Ukraine primarily through economic sanctions, military assistance, and intelligence cooperation. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Japan, and others imposed extensive financial and trade sanctions on Russia. More specifically, major Russian banks were removed from the SWIFT international payment system, the Russian central bank’s foreign reserves were frozen,1) and exports of advanced technologies, including semiconductors, were blocked.2) The European Union also moved to phase out imports of Russian crude oil and adopted energy-diversification measures to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas.3) On the military front, the United States provided HIMARS multiple-launch rocket systems, the Patriot air defense system, M1 Abrams tanks, long-range ATACMS missiles, and training support for F-16 fighter aircraft. Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and other European states supplied Leopard tanks and various air-defense systems to Ukraine.3) At the same time, Western countries supported Ukraine by using intelligence assets to share satellite and signals intelligence on Russian troop movements and strike targets, and by strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defense capabilities.5)
Second, China maintained a posture of strategic ambiguity. Just before the war began in 2022, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin declared a “no limits partnership,” and China refrained from characterizing Russia’s actions as an “invasion.” Instead, Beijing partially accepted Russia’s argument that it was acting on “legitimate security concerns.”6) However, China did not directly violate Western sanctions. Instead, it significantly increased imports of Russian oil and gas, providing Moscow with an economic buffer. In 2023, Beijing also released a 12-point peace proposal in an effort to project itself as a mediator on the international stage, but Western governments largely viewed the initiative not as genuine mediation, but as a statement aligned with Russia’s position.7)
Third, India pursued a policy of strategic autonomy. Building on its long-standing non-aligned foreign policy from the Cold War era, India maintained its traditional military and energy ties with Russia, while simultaneously adopting a balancing strategy by participating in the Quad with the United States, Japan, and Australia.8) After the outbreak of the war, India imported large quantities of discounted Russian oil and then refined and exported it to third countries, maximizing its economic gains. In the international arena, India abstained from many United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia and maintained a neutral position between Moscow and the West.9)
Fourth, many countries in the Global South adopted neutral or pragmatic positions. States such as Brazil, South Africa, and Indonesia did not join Western sanctions against Russia, taking into account their economic and energy ties with Moscow as well as their dependence on Russian grain and fertilizer.10) Some countries also refrained from directly criticizing Russia, pointing instead to what they viewed as double standards on the part of the United States and Europe, reflecting broader dissatisfaction with the Western-centered international order.11) Some Middle Eastern states also questioned the moral authority of the West, drawing comparisons with the Iraq War. These countries pursued a pragmatic foreign policy by securing inexpensive energy and fertilizer from Russia while simultaneously maintaining trade and investment ties with Western partners.
Taken together, the international response to the war has split into two broad patterns: active engagement by Western countries and strategic neutrality among many non-Western states. Western governments, identifying themselves as a “community of norms and security,” concentrated their efforts on isolating Russia and supporting Ukraine. In contrast, China, India, and much of the Global South adopted neutral positions based on their own economic and strategic interests, reinforcing the perception that the conflict represents not a global clash of values but a struggle among major powers. -
Reaffirmation of NATO’s Purpose
After the end of the Cold War, NATO increasingly faced questions about its continued relevance. Throughout the 1990s, the Alliance sought new roles through interventions in the Balkans and counterterrorism missions, yet its core function as a collective defense organization appeared less central than before. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, brought renewed attention to the value of a collective security system and demonstrated that NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe’s security architecture. The war reaffirmed that NATO is not merely a vestige of the Cold War, but an indispensable multilateral security institution within the twenty-first-century strategic environment.12)
Strategic Shifts Among Neutral States
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO marks one of the most dramatic changes in Europe’s security order. For roughly two centuries, both countries maintained policies of neutrality and pursued independent security paths without joining military alliances. Russia’s invasion, however, exposed the limits of neutrality as a means of guaranteeing national security, prompting both states to make historic decisions. Finland joined NATO in 2023, followed by Sweden in 2024, bringing the entire Nordic region under the Alliance’s collective defense umbrella. The Baltic Sea has effectively become a NATO-controlled space. This development represents a fundamental shift in Northern Europe’s security landscape and has further isolated Russia politically and strategically as NATO’s expansion continues.13)
Strengthening of Deterrence
NATO has moved actively to reinforce its deterrence posture in order to counter Russia’s threat. The Alliance increased the forward presence of multinational forces along the eastern flank, particularly in Poland and the three Baltic states, and decided to expand the NATO Response Force from roughly forty thousand troops to more than three hundred thousand. These measures constitute a clear deterrent signal against Russia’s military adventurism and provide tangible reinforcement for NATO’s collective defense commitment under Article 5.14) These steps, combined with the rise in defense spending across Europe, have also contributed to strengthening NATO’s collective military capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. -
Shifts in Energy Security
The war in Ukraine fundamentally reshaped Europe’s energy security landscape. Prior to the conflict, the European Union relied heavily on Russian natural gas, with more than 40 percent of its gas imports coming from Russia as of 2021.15) However, Russia’s use of energy as a strategic weapon pushed the EU to reduce its dependence on Russian supplies and diversify its import routes.
The EU expanded its imports of liquefied natural gas, sought long-term supply contracts with the United States, Qatar, and other major producers in the Middle East, and accelerated investment in renewable energy such as wind and solar power. This approach reframed the energy transition as part of Europe’s security strategy. These efforts represented more than an adjustment in energy policy; they constituted a strategic choice aimed at diminishing Russia’s geopolitical leverage.
Joint Investment in the Defense Industry
The deterioration of the security environment has increased the need for greater cooperation within Europe’s defense industry. Centered on the European Defence Fund (EDF), established in 2017, the EU has been expanding joint weapons development and joint procurement initiatives.16) These efforts are intended to reduce redundant investments among member states and build Europe’s own long-term military technological capabilities. Yet in practical military terms, dependence on NATO remains substantial. In key areas such as advanced command-and-control systems, strategic lift, and nuclear deterrence, Europe still cannot move beyond the NATO framework, which continues to be led by the United States.17)
Debate on Strategic Autonomy
“Strategic autonomy” refers to the EU’s ambition to develop its own defense capabilities and reduce excessive security dependence on the United States, an idea that has been strongly promoted by France.18) However, substantial differences in interests among member states persist, and Eastern European countries continue to face a direct threat from Russia, making them heavily reliant on NATO’s collective defense system. As a result, the concept of strategic autonomy may serve as a meaningful long-term vision for the EU, but its short-term feasibility remains limited. In this sense, the EU’s security strategy can be understood as an ongoing effort to balance between the pursuit of greater autonomy and the practical necessity of relying on its alliance commitments. -
International Isolation
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Russia has faced an unprecedented level of isolation in the international community. Major Western states and institutions, including the G7, the European Union, and NATO, have effectively severed their political, economic, and military ties with Moscow. Russia’s removal from the SWIFT international payment system severely restricted its ability to conduct financial transactions abroad, leading to blocked foreign exchange flows and reduced investment. The large-scale withdrawal of multinational companies also created significant gaps in Russia’s consumer-goods supply chains and industrial sectors. These measures have become key drivers of Russia’s long-term economic decline.
Failure of Energy Weaponization
Russia has traditionally used its energy resources as a central lever of foreign policy. Following its full-scale invasion in 2022, Moscow sought to extract political concessions by cutting natural gas and oil supplies to Europe. However, European states rapidly expanded their imports of liquefied natural gas, secured alternative suppliers such as Norway, the United States, and Qatar, and accelerated the shift toward renewable energy. As a result, Russia’s attempt to weaponize energy failed to produce the intended outcomes and instead fundamentally weakened its long-term influence over the European energy market.
Tactical Nuclear Threats
As Russia’s energy leverage diminished, Moscow increasingly emphasized military threats, notably the potential deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, to maximize coercive pressure. President Putin repeatedly alluded to the possible use of nuclear weapons, heightening security anxieties across Europe. While these nuclear threats are intended to deter Western military involvement, they have also prompted NATO to strengthen its deterrence posture, producing the opposite of Russia’s intended effect. In the long run, Russia’s tactical nuclear rhetoric, despite its short-term coercive impact, has contributed to deepening instability in Europe’s security environment. -
Is the Strengthening of U.S. Leadership a Success?
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the United States has reestablished its central role in European security across both the military and economic domains. Militarily, Washington has provided Ukraine with key systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), the Patriot air-defense system, and advanced unmanned platforms, all of which have influenced the balance on the battlefield. Economically, the United States has delivered significant financial assistance and supported the restoration of Ukraine’s energy and infrastructure systems, allowing the Ukrainian state to sustain core functions during the war.
These combined measures have reaffirmed the United States’ indispensable role in Europe’s security architecture and, in effect, have deepened Europe’s reliance on American leadership. This shift has rolled back much of the discussion on a “European autonomous security architecture”19) that gained traction during the first Trump administration, and it has reaffirmed a security order anchored in U.S. leadership and NATO. At the same time, the prolonged nature of the war has intensified support fatigue in the United States, driven by polarized domestic politics and the mounting fiscal cost of continued aid. The limits of U.S. leadership are also apparent in the reluctance of key Global South states such as India, Brazil, several African countries, and parts of the Middle East to join Western sanctions or adopt the Western framing of the conflict. Meanwhile, the war has contributed to tighter alignment among authoritarian states including Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.
Taken together, the United States has succeeded in reinforcing its leadership within the Western alliance system, yet it has not recovered the broader global authority it once exercised. The outcome is more accurately described as a partial and regionally concentrated success. Whether Washington can fully achieve its strategic objectives remains uncertain and will depend on the sustainability of its resource commitments, the consistency of its policies, and the degree of cohesion it can maintain among its allies.
Germany’s Zeitenwende (Historic Turning Point)
Russia’s full-scale invasion triggered a fundamental shift in German security policy. In February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende,20) a historic turning point, announcing the creation of a 100-billion-euro special defense fund and a commitment to raise defense spending to more than 2 percent of GDP. Germany also decided to purchase U.S. F-35 fighter aircraft, signaling a move toward more active participation in NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. This marked a major departure from the long-standing postwar posture in which Germany prioritized economic strength while relying on deterrence rather than military capability as a primary policy tool. Germany’s shift goes beyond increased defense spending. It represents a structural change that directly affects the balance of European security and Berlin’s strategic position within NATO.
Military Expansion in Eastern Europe
Eastern European countries, particularly Poland and the three Baltic states, view Russia’s invasion as a direct security threat and have taken the most assertive steps to strengthen their military capabilities. Poland has raised its defense spending to more than 4 percent of GDP and is procuring large quantities of U.S. military equipment, including Abrams tanks, HIMARS, and the Patriot missile system. Warsaw also plans to expand its armed forces to a force of 300,000 personnel, positioning itself to become the most formidable military power in Eastern Europe. The Baltic states have likewise increased defense spending to above 2 percent of GDP, strengthened their air-defense and artillery assets, and actively supported the rotational deployment of NATO forces. Given their geographic proximity to Russia and their historical experience of military coercion, these states regard military expansion not simply as a matter of enhancing defense capabilities but as a strategic choice tied directly to national survival.
Taken together, these developments indicate both a tightening of Western alliance cohesion under U.S. leadership and a broader strategic reconfiguration within Europe. The renewed centrality of the United States has weakened earlier discussions about a more autonomous European security approach, while Germany’s Zeitenwende has signaled a shift in NATO’s internal military balance. At the same time, the rapid buildup of military power in Eastern Europe is reshaping the continent’s security order and further elevating the prominence of NATO’s collective defense framework. In effect, Europe’s response to the Russian threat reflects a dual trend: a renewed consolidation around a U.S.-centered security structure and the emergence of new regional military powers such as Germany and Poland. -
NATO–EU Coordination
A key variable shaping the future European security order will be the division of roles between NATO and the European Union. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine reaffirmed the security function of NATO as a traditional military alliance, and under U.S. leadership the Alliance has regained its position as the core pillar of European defense. At the same time, the energy crisis and the challenge of economic sanctions required institutional capabilities that lie primarily within the EU. The EU played a central role in coordinating sanctions, managing energy-security measures, receiving refugees, and supporting reconstruction efforts. These functions complemented NATO’s military deterrence. As a result, Europe’s security architecture is likely to stabilize into a dual framework in which NATO leads the military dimension while the EU assumes responsibility for non-military domains. This division of labor is expected to broaden the concept of security from a narrow military focus to one that encompasses economic, social, and energy-related dimensions.
Energy and Economic Security
Russia’s attempt to weaponize energy accelerated Europe’s drive toward diversification. Increased LNG imports from Norway, the United States, and Qatar, along with EU-wide efforts to expand renewable energy, carry implications that go well beyond reducing dependence on Russian supplies. These shifts enhance Europe’s economic resilience, sever structural reliance on Russia, and encourage deeper ties with energy producers in the Middle East and North Africa. Energy security now intersects with industrial competitiveness, supply-chain stability, and climate policy, providing a foundation for Europe to play a leading role in shaping global economic and environmental standards. Consequently, energy security is poised to become a central component of Europe’s broader pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Prolonged Confrontation and the Need for Dialogue
Meaningful normalization between Russia and the West is unlikely in the near term. The war has entrenched structural antagonism between Europe and Russia and points to a prolonged period of confrontation. Yet, as the Cold War experience shows, channels for arms control and crisis management are essential for reducing tensions and preventing escalation. A core task for Europe’s future security environment will be to deter Russia’s military threats while institutionalizing mechanisms that prevent uncontrolled escalation. Such mechanisms will be necessary for managing risks related to nuclear use, tactical nuclear deployments, and localized military incidents. In the long run, Europe will need to rely on a combined strategy of deterrence and dialogue to maintain stability. -
The war in Ukraine has triggered a fundamental restructuring of Europe’s security order, well beyond the level of a regional conflict. Even before the invasion, NATO had pursued enhanced security for Eastern European members and continued enlargement. Russia’s aggression, however, sharply underscored the need for stronger allied defense capabilities and renewed attention to the collective defense obligations enshrined in Article 5. NATO has since expanded troop deployments in its eastern member states, increased joint exercises, and strengthened rapid-response forces. These measures have led the Alliance to assume a more active and forward-leaning role in deterrence and strategic engagement, reaffirming its organizational cohesion and central importance in Europe’s security architecture.
The European Union, for its part, has pursued strategic autonomy with greater urgency through economic and political integration. While the early stages of the war exposed Europe’s dependence on U.S.-led military and security support, the EU strengthened its multi-layered security policies by diversifying energy supply chains, expanding investment in defense industries, building strategic reserves, and protecting critical infrastructure. These efforts reflect a broader push to enhance both military independence and economic resilience. Yet the EU still faces limits in deterring Russia’s military threat on its own, and continued cooperation with NATO and sustained strategic alignment with the United States remain structural necessities.
Although Russia faces mounting political and economic isolation, it continues to rely on its strategic deterrence capabilities, including nuclear forces, to prolong instability in Europe. Russia’s nuclear posture shapes security decisions across NATO and the EU, prompting Eastern European states to accelerate military modernization and reinforcing the United States’ role in extended deterrence. Consequently, Europe’s security order has evolved into a complex stability challenge that extends beyond military balances to encompass energy, economic, and diplomatic dimensions.
Looking ahead, Europe’s security landscape is likely to develop along three core pillars. First, NATO and the EU will refine their division of responsibilities in a complementary manner. NATO will continue to lead on collective defense and strategic deterrence, while the EU strengthens resilience in non-military domains such as energy, economic security, cyber protection, and information security. Second, enhancing energy and economic resilience will remain central to building Europe’s ability to withstand external shocks, particularly those posed by geopolitical rivals such as Russia. This will require parallel efforts in energy diversification, renewable energy expansion, protection of vulnerable economic sectors, and the development of robust financial and industrial safety nets. Third, managing long-term confrontation with Russia will require a multi-dimensional strategy beyond military deterrence, incorporating diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to reduce tensions where possible while preventing escalation. Long-term stability will depend on a balanced approach that maintains deterrence while institutionalizing channels for crisis management and dialogue.
These shifts in Europe’s security order carry meaningful implications for the security environment in Northeast Asia. South Korea can draw lessons from Europe’s multi-layered approach to energy security and economic resilience, while reinforcing its own defense capabilities alongside reliable extended deterrence from the United States. The complementary NATO–EU model may also provide insights for shaping trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, or for designing broader regional security architectures in Northeast Asia. More broadly, Europe’s response to complex security threats highlights the value of integrated and multi-dimensional strategies that combine military preparedness with economic and political resilience. Taken together, the war in Ukraine represents not only a turning point in Europe’s security architecture but also a source of strategic insight for Northeast Asia.
| Introduction
| European Security Structures and the War in Ukraine
1) Before the war, the Central Bank of Russia held about USD 640 billion in foreign reserves, which were distributed across U.S. and European financial institutions. Western countries froze the foreign currency, sovereign bonds, and financial assets that Russia had deposited within their jurisdictions, preventing Moscow from converting them into cash or using them in international financial markets.
2) Daniel Gros, The Western Sanctions on Russia: Effectiveness and Economic Impact, CEPS Policy Brief, 2022.
3) European Commission, REPowerEU Plan, 2022.
4) Michael Kofman & Rob Lee, “Ukraine’s Counteroffensive and Western Military Aid,” War on the Rocks, 2023.
5) U.S. Department of Defense, Fact Sheet on U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, 2023.
6) Yun Sun, “China’s Strategic Ambiguity on the Ukraine War,” Brookings Institution, 2022.
7) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis, 2023.
8) Happymon Jacob, “India’s Balancing Act in the Russia-Ukraine War,” Carnegie India, 2022.
9) UN General Assembly, Voting Records on Ukraine-related Resolutions, 2022–2023.
10) Oliver Stuenkel, “The Global South and the Ukraine War,” Foreign Affairs, 2023.
11) Steven Erlanger, “Many Countries in Global South See West’s Double Standards in Ukraine War,” The New York Times, 2022.
| NATO’s Resurgence and Expansion
12) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022, pp. 5–7.
13) Mikael Wigell, “Finland’s NATO Membership and the Future of Nordic Security,” Journal of Baltic Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2023), pp. 11–14.
14) NATO, “Madrid Summit Declaration,” June 29, 2022, available at: https://www.nato.int.
| EU’s Strategic Autonomy and Its Limits
15) Eurostat, EU Energy Statistical Yearbook 2022, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022, pp. 45–48.
16) European Commission, “The European Defence Fund,” Official Website, 2023, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu.
17) Jolyon Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU–NATO Relations: The Enduring Dilemma,” Journal of European Security Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2022), pp. 221–224.
18) Thierry Tardy, “European Strategic Autonomy: What It Is, Why We Need It, How to Achieve It,” EU Institute for Security Studies Brief, No. 12 (2019), pp. 1–4.
| Russia’s Isolation and the Reversal of Energy Weaponization
| The Multipolar Turn in European Security
19) Europe’s idea of “strategic autonomy” has been discussed steadily since the 1990s, but it rose to prominence during the first Trump administration, when President Trump called NATO outdated and pressured Europe to increase its defense spending. In response, European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, openly stated that “Europe must be able to defend itself,” and the concept formally appeared in EU policy documents. Although the war in Ukraine has once again made Europe heavily dependent on the United States for security, institutional initiatives such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), the European Defence Fund (EDF), and the EU Rapid Deployment Capability (targeted for completion by 2025) continue to move forward. Therefore, Europe’s pursuit of “strategic autonomy” can currently be seen as a transitional phase characterized by short-term reliance on the United States and a long-term search for greater autonomous security capacity.
20) In a special address to the German Bundestag on February 27, 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared, “Wir erleben eine Zeitenwende” (“We are witnessing a historic turning point”). This expression soon became a key term symbolizing a new security paradigm in German and European political discourse.
| Outlook for Europe’s Security
| Conclusion: Implications for the Future European Security Order and the Security Environment in Northeast Asia
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
