File
|
Kim’s Denial: What’s Next for Trump |
| November 5, 2025 |
-
Taewon HaVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | taedee99@gmail.com
-
A dramatic encounter that had drawn global attention did not take place. Despite the persistent overtures from President Donald Trump, Chairman Kim Jong Un did not respond. Trump made remarks that seemed to signal acceptance of the regime’s long-standing aim of retaining nuclear weapons and indicated a willingness to ease sanctions, which had been a central cause of the 2019 Hanoi “no deal.” Even so, a fourth meeting did not materialize. Trump explained that the “timing” did not align, but the failure of a U.S.–North Korea summit appears to reflect structural problems rather than a technical issue. The Lee Jae Myung administration had hoped to use an improvised Trump–Kim encounter as a catalyst for reviving the stalled process of easing tensions and advancing denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, but its approach now requires some adjustment.
This paper compares the process of the Panmunjom meeting in June 2019, which occurred under the first Trump administration, with the current failure to hold a meeting, identifying both similarities and differences. Through a comparison with the situation six years ago, this analysis examines the reasons for the present unfulfilled meeting from the perspectives of Washington's intent and Pyongyang's strategy. Following this, it attempts to forecast the potential impacts on future US-North Korea relations and the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Trump's vision for peace on the Korean Peninsula has not yet been concretized, and its harmonization with the Republic of Korea's national interests remains uncertain. Furthermore, the strengthening of the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral cooperation, on which North Korea is currently concentrating, presents a major challenge to the foreign policy vision of the Lee Jae-myung administration. -
The Panmunjom meeting in June 2019, which took place immediately following the G20 Summit in Osaka during Trump's visit to Korea, exhibited a similar pattern to the recent proposal for a meeting coinciding with the APEC Summit in Gyeongju. Although six years ago the format involved using Twitter (now X) while this time it was responding to reporters' questions aboard Air Force One, the element of "spontaneity"was identical.
The similarity also lies in the messages being delivered informally, almost casually. However, the significance differed in terms of the substance of the proposal. Whereas the 2019 Twitter message was a light suggestion, merely asking to "shake hands and say hello at Panmunjom," the recent offer constituted a "love call (serious approach)" because it touched upon the preconditions for U.S.-North Korea negotiations desired by Chairman Kim Jong Un, thereby indicating a possibility of acceptance. This was followed by his reference to North Korea as a "Nuclear Power" and an explicit mention of potential sanctions relief. This can be interpreted as a direct response to Kim Jong Un's statement at the Supreme People’s Assembly in September: "If the United States abandons its vain obsession with denuclearization and desires true peaceful coexistence based on the recognition of reality, there is no reason not to face the U.S.“
A more noteworthy difference is the persistence demonstrated by Trump. Unlike 2019, when he sent a single tweet, during his recent Asia tour—moving from the United States to Malaysia, Japan, and then South Korea—he continuously and consistently relayed messages expressing his desire to meet with Kim Jong Un. He even hinted at the possibility of extending his two-day visit to South Korea and explicitly stated that he could go "there." This was interpreted as meaning he might visit the North Korean area, including the North side's 'Panmungak' in the DMZ, for a meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Un if necessary. Regarding North Korea’s strategic cruise missile launch, which coincided with his visit, he commented that it was "something they've been doing for decades; they launched one more." This signaled a powerful determination to meet Kim Jong Un regardless, treating the missile launch as insignificant.
While the processes of message delivery and initiative exhibited some residual similarities, the resulting outcomes were diametrically opposed. In 2019, North Korea responded to the proposal in merely five hours, and the meeting itself—counting Kim Jong Un walking across the line at Panmunjom—took place within 32 hours, or a day and a half. The meeting was achieved with lightning speed, but this time, only silence followed. President Trump officially confirmed the failure of the meeting during the U.S.-ROK summit in Gyeongju on October 29th, stating, "We just couldn’t get the timing right this time." In a brief press conference upon his return following the summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, he left the door open for future direct U.S.-North Korea summit dialogue, commenting, "I was too busy, so I didn't have a chance to talk. I will come back regarding Kim Jong Un.“ -
President Trump is showing a strong desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize. From his first year in office, he has concentrated his personal influence and U.S. diplomatic resources on resolving conflicts around the world. The situation remains unstable, yet he secured a Gaza ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and brokered a Thailand–Cambodia truce on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. He also claims credit for opening paths toward resolving border disputes and armed clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Pakistan and India, and Egypt and Ethiopia. Although stalled, he is also involved in efforts to end the Russia–Ukraine war. On 12 October he issued “Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.” At the Gyeongju Summit he stated that he had ended eight wars in eight months, and President Lee Jae Myung praised him as a peacemaker.1)
Trump’s persistent demand to meet Kim Jong Un, even at the risk of appearing to be refused, stemmed from a personal desire to be remembered as a leader who advanced a peace initiative for the last remaining Cold War zone on the globe. Ahead of a planned meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping, he also intended to show that he still held the lead role in resolving the Korean Peninsula issue.
Another reason can be read as an expression of his deal-maker instinct, which he sees as his greatest strength, to remove in one move the obstacles that had blocked dialogue with an authoritarian leader. The interpretation is that Trump, who favors dramatic scenes and has confidence in one-on-one negotiations, sought to pull Kim onto a stage watched by the entire world. As the agenda had not been coordinated in advance and there was no need to produce immediate results, he may well have viewed it as a low-risk “diplomatic show.“ Fox News assessed that “For Trump, it's less in new breakthrough and more in reviving an old diplomatic gamble.”2)
The main reason for the failure of this meeting must still be seen as Kim Jong Un’s refusal. Why, then, did Kim Jong Un reject Trump’s request?
The first reason is that the meeting with Trump or his spontaneous proposal held little appeal for Kim Jong Un. Judging that a simple photo opportunity would not bring Kim out, Trump offered two cards: recognition as a nuclear power and the possibility of altering the status quo of sanctions. These offers failed to draw Kim Jong Un’s interest. North Korea, which has tightened its alignment with Russia and China and has found detours around United States led sanctions, appears to have already built resilience. In his September 21 speech at the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Jong Un stressed that “there will be no negotiations that trade anything with hostile countries in pursuit of lifting sanctions, and there will never be such negotiations in the future.”3)
The second reason lies in the changed value that North Korea commands compared to six years ago. Even against the standards of 2019, North Korea is assessed to have made significant progress in advancing its nuclear and missile capabilities. In particular, during the military parade in Beijing on September 3 that commemorated the “80th anniversary of China’s Victory Day,“ North Korea strengthened what is now described as a nuclear triad alliance with China and Russia. North Korea has traditionally pursued equidistance diplomacy between the former Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. Yet the current situation, in which cooperation among the three states has solidified, appears to have created a foundation that allows North Korea to secure maximum political, economic, and military support from both allies.4)
Another reason is that, given the most active pattern of North Korea-China-Russia relations since the Korean War and what appears to be the most stable internal and external situation in North Korea since Kim Jong Un took power in 2011, there is little incentive for Pyongyang to seek change in the current environment. The decision to send Choe Son Hui, North Korea’s foreign policy chief, to Russia and Belarus ahead of Trump’s visit showed where Kim Jong Un’s external strategic priorities lie. The relationship between the two states, which concluded a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement that includes provisions equivalent to a mutual defense treaty following North Korea’s dispatch of troops to the war in Ukraine and President Putin’s visit to Pyongyang last year, is poised to move toward a blood alliance. It is also likely that Kim Jong Un judged that he had no need to play the villain in a new drama while President Xi Jinping visited South Korea for the first time in eleven years to hold what was framed as a historic negotiation with Trump. -
When President Trump stated publicly that he wished to meet Chairman Kim Jong Un, expectations and concerns rose at both home and abroad. During the first ROK-U.S. summit on August 25, President Lee proposed a meeting with Kim Jong Un and said that “if Trump stepped forward as a peacemaker he would support him as a pacemaker.” Chung Dong Young, who is serving his second term as Unification Minister after his initial tenure under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, and Democratic Party congressman Park Ji Won, who played a key role in the success of the first inter Korean summit under the Kim Dae Jung administration in 2000, showed the strongest support for a meeting between North Korea and U.S. They expected it could serve as a signal for the resumption of dialogue on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and could become a catalyst for improved inter Korean relations.
Concerns about a sudden meeting largely stemmed from the worry that Trump’s remarks on recognizing “nuclear power” status and easing sanctions on North Korea could set a new direction. Critics argued that if North Korea were acknowledged as a nuclear-armed state, the future framework of negotiations could shift from denuclearization to arms reduction or a freeze. Others warned that if the United States offered measures such as the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea or a halt to joint military exercises, it would inevitably inflict serious damage on South Korea’s security.5)
Coincidentally, the removal of the phrase “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” from the North Korea–China summit held in Beijing on 4 September 2025 fueled the debate. Some argued that China had shifted toward effectively acquiescing to North Korea’s nuclear status. From 2018 to 2019, all five Kim Jong Un–Xi Jinping summits had included the phrase without exception.6)
In the end, “Panmunjom Deal 2025” did not materialize, and concerns about Trump’s retreat from denuclearization proved unfounded for now. National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac stated in the summit briefing that “President Trump said he will play the necessary role to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula based on the 2018 Singapore agreement.”7) Article 3 of the joint statement at the time declared that “the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea reaffirmed the Panmunjom Declaration of 27 April 2018 and committed to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Both countries agreed that their North Korea policy would be based on engagement rather than pressure.
It remains unclear when and in what form a fourth U.S.–North Korea summit will take place, even though President Trump has announced a visit to China next April. If his proposal for an improvised meeting failed not because of scheduling issues but because of a fundamental gap between Kim Jong Un and Trump in how they approach future nuclear negotiations, the prospects for renewed dialogue will narrow. Trump ordered the resumption of nuclear weapons testing aimed at Russia and China just before the U.S.–China summit, and the nominee for commander of U.S. Strategic Command defined North Korea as a credible threat, which may add to the difficulties.8) In this situation, any plan to restart peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula or reopen inter-Korean dialogue by relying on personal rapport between Trump and Kim will require a full reassessment. The 2018 Singapore Joint Statement of the first Trump administration lost effectiveness in the aftermath of “the Hanoi No Deal 2019,” and after the third meeting at Panmunjom, which was intended to rekindle dialogue, U.S.–North Korea relations entered a period of regression.
The current policy line of the Lee Jae Myung administration toward North Korea can be summarized as a bold and broad effort to rebuild trust and create a foundation for dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas. Through the “END Initiative,” which stands for Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization, the government aims to open a new era on the Korean Peninsula defined by peace, coexistence, and shared growth.9) The United States remains the most important actor, yet the administration has also made clear its intention to strengthen strategic communication with China.
Ultimately, the central task is coordination of North Korea policy. As Trump enters a second term with an unpredictable style and a growing desire for a legacy, it is necessary to analyze in detail how his North Korea policy may shape developments on the Korean Peninsula and to marshal all diplomatic capacity so that it proceeds in a way that aligns with South Korea’s national interests. There are projections that “preemptive measures” such as restoring the September 2018 inter-Korean military agreement or adjusting the ROK-U.S. joint military exercises are under consideration, yet there is uncertainty about whether North Korea will respond, which means more reflection is needed on the viable options. If a bipartisan North Korea policy is not a realistic alternative, conditional restoration based on reaffirming the vision of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and firm implementation of military agreements by both Koreas would be needed to strengthen the legitimacy of policy implementation. At this stage, the key virtues in advancing a peace initiative are precision and caution rather than speed and boldness.
| A Whole New Structure
| Again 2019? Disappointment for Trump
| Trump-Kim: Not On the Same Page
| Steep Challenge For Lee
1) Erika L. Green, Katie Rogers, Choe Sang-Hun, “Feted as a Peacemaker in South Korea, Trump Finds Purpose for Overtures to Kim Jong-un,” The New York Times, October 29, 2025.
2) Morgan Phillips, “Trump dangles ‘big as you get’ carrot in bid to tempt Kim and jump-start new North Korea talks,” Fox News, October 28, 2025.
3) “최고인민회의 제14기 제13차 회의에서 한 김정은 동지의 연설,” 『노동신문』, 2025년 9월 22일.
4) 이성윤, “2025년 중국 전승절 행사 이후 북·중·러 관계 변화 평가,” 세종정책브리프, No. 2025-26, 2025년 10월 15일.
5) Editorial Board, “As Trump seeks another meeting with Kim Jong Un, it’s not 2019 anymore,” The Washington Post, October 28, 2025; “The Deadly allure of a bad deal with North Korea,” The Economist, September 25, 2025.
6) 이성윤, “2025년 중국 전승절 행사 이후 북·중·러 관계 변화 평가,” 세종정책브리프, No. 2025-26, 2025년 10월 15일.
7) 한미 오찬 정상회담 관련 위성락 국가안보실장 브리핑, 『대한민국 대통령실 홈페이지』, 2025년 10월 29일
8) Senate Armed Service Committee Hearing on the Nomination of Vice Admiral Richard A. Correll, USN, “Advance Policy Questions,” October 30, 2025.
9) 임형섭, “이 대통령 ‘국방 외부의존은 자존심 문제…남북대화 대승적 노력’,” 『연합뉴스』, 2025년 11월 4일.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
