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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2026-Special Issue No.1] Preface: 2026 Outlook on Global Affairs |
| December 11, 2025 |
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Sang Hyun LeePrincipal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | shlee@sejong.org
- The inauguration of the second Donald Trump administration in the United States has generated significant international repercussions and is bringing about fundamental changes in the international order. The current international order can be assessed as having reached an “inflection point,” a phase of major transformation or the beginning of an unprecedented period of change. As of 2025, the core features of the international environment include the intensification of U.S.–China strategic competition, the protracted nature of the Russia–Ukraine war and conflicts in the Middle East, shifts in U.S. foreign policy following the launch of the second Trump administration, and the expansion of economic and security uncertainty amid multipolarization and bloc formation. As a multipolar system advances, with multiple centers of power such as the United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and India rising simultaneously, the influence of the Global South (emerging and developing countries), is also increasing through developments such as the expansion of BRICS. Within this broader trend, issues related to energy, security, and supply chains are becoming increasingly intertwined, further sharpening the boundaries between cooperation and competition among states. This situation is unlikely to change significantly in 2026. Ultimately, preparing for unprecedented levels of uncertainty and risk has become a critically important task for all countries.
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America First Policy has evolved from the phenomenon of American exceptionalism that underpinned its role as a global leader during the Cold War in the twentieth century into MAGA (Make America Great Again) in the twenty first century era of U.S.–China competition. Following the end of World War II, the emergence of the Soviet Union at the international level and the rise of anti-communism at the domestic level functioned as decisive variables in shaping the foreign policy orientation of the United States, which had assumed global leadership for the first time since its founding in 1789. For example, opposition to President Wilson’s internationalist initiatives after World War I led the United States to revert to isolationism during the 1920s, illustrating the deep historical roots of unilateralist sentiment and America First Policy within American political culture. An important exception to these longstanding preferences emerged in the aftermath of World War II with the onset of the Cold War and the establishment of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus. Central to this consensus were an ideological orientation grounded in anti-communism and the maintenance of American economic prosperity.
Following the failure of the Vietnam War, the U.S. economy entered a period of relative decline and experienced stagflation. During this period, elements of an America First Policy began to reappear, particularly during the Nixon administration. As concerns grew regarding the erosion of U.S. national power, policy debates emerged over how to manage declining power resources. These debates emphasized the need to preserve U.S. influence through adjustments in alliance policy and international economic strategy rather than through expansive global commitments. The current MAGA approach may be understood as the latest manifestation of this America First Policy, representing a Trump era adaptation of earlier U.S. policy responses to perceived relative decline.
The contemporary international environment is undergoing a major structural transformation as multiple factors converge, including intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition and decoupling, the Russia-Ukraine War, U.S.-led tariff war, and growing competition over technological leadership. In general terms, the existing international order established under U.S. leadership after World War II is commonly described as the “liberal international order” or rules-based international order. This order has been grounded in liberal principles such as open markets and trade, democracy, and the rule of law, while also seeking collective security through international institutions such as the United Nations. It has contributed to the maintenance of postwar peace and stability. At its core, rules -based international order was made possible by the presence of the United States as a hegemonic power. The United States functioned as a so called “benign hegemon,” serving both as the principal architect of the postwar international system and as the primary beneficiary of that system. It would not be an overstatement to characterize post-World War II international order as one “U.S.-led, shaped by the U.S., and serving U.S. interests.” The United States has provided essential public goods necessary for sustaining the international order, including alliance treaties and security commitments with numerous countries, the provision of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency, and the largest financial contributions to most international organizations and institutions.
In this context, the rules-based international order that has underpinned World War II international system is now facing profound change and mounting pressure. The most significant driver of change in the international order is the transformation in the role identity of the United States, which has historically created and led this system. Since its founding, U.S. foreign policy discourse has long been shaped by the belief in American exceptionalism, the notion that the United States is an exceptional nation. Exceptionalism refers to the belief that the United States is not only different from other states but also superior, possessing a unique and extraordinary role in human history. As a core component of U.S. national identity and nationalism, American exceptionalism has historically provided a dominant cultural and intellectual framework shaping the formulation and direction of U.S. foreign policy. Particular attention should be paid to the strong universalist and revolutionary character embedded within American exceptionalism. When the United States is treated as the normative standard, this worldview generates a sense of mission that perceives the U.S. domestic political and social system as a universal model that humanity as a whole should emulate, and that should be actively promoted and disseminated on a global scale.
The exceptionalist identity is first constructed through a cognitive framework that emphasizes difference from an external other and defines the self in contrast to it. In this sense, the self identity of the United States as a New World (America) distinct from the Old World (Europe) constitutes the historical foundation of American exceptionalism. This form of national identity has contributed to the development of a strong sense of superiority and chosen people consciousness vis à vis the external world, as well as a universalist aspiration to act as a kind of savior nation. Such an identity has functioned as a core element of the grand narratives of U.S. foreign policy that describe America’s role in world history, including the idea of a “city upon a hill,” 19th century Monroe Doctrine and “manifest destiny,” 20th century Wilson declaring “the world must be made safe for democracy” leading into World War I, and the post-Cold War conception of the United States as an “indispensable nation.”
U.S. national identity constitutes a critical element in shaping its grand strategic narrative. Throughout American history, an exceptionalist identity has consistently been reflected in U.S. perceptions of its international role. What has varied across different international systemic contexts is not the presence of exceptionalism itself, but whether the same exceptionalist identity has manifested in a defensive form as isolationism or in an assertive form as an interventionist foreign policy strategy.
After emerging as a superpower following World War II, the United States has generally adopted an internationalist orientation, with the Wilson administration serving as a key point of departure. The United States pursued a strategy aimed at reshaping the international order in its own image, driven by a form of missionary zeal. This approach was accompanied by an emphasis on the belief that the moral crusade pursued by the United States would bring about permanent peace in the world. In an environment characterized by increasing global interdependence after World War II, in which geographical isolation was no longer feasible, the United States found that it could no longer insulate itself from the influence of a corrupt external world. As a result, it shifted its objective toward transforming the world itself in accordance with the American image. In this context, the United States embarked on an ambitious project to construct the postwar liberal international order as a so called liberal Leviathan, guided by American political creed. At the same time, however, a pathological dimension inherent in exceptionalism also emerged, including tendencies toward unilateralism and imperial behavior.
The transformation of the United States’ role identity began to surface after the failure of the War on Terror, as the erosion of the unipolar system coincided with the intensification of partisan debates surrounding the belief in American exceptionalism. The appearance of Donald Trump revealed a shift in U.S. foreign policy away from progressive universalism toward a regressive and particularistic identity orientation. The MAGA slogan of the Trump era does not represent a liberal United States grounded in exceptionalism as a bearer of universal values and a model for the world. Rather, it encapsulates a vision of the United States as a realist great power that prioritizes national interests above all else and seeks to construct a strong state through a nineteenth century style strategy of wealth and power. Trump’s emergence both reflects long standing internal transformations within the United States and signals a fundamental reconfiguration of the international order that the United States has led for decades. -
Since the inauguration of the second Trump administration, signs of transformation in the international order have become increasingly evident. Key international issues likely to be affected by shifts in U.S. foreign policy include the following.
In the diplomatic and security domain, the evolving international order is marked by a pronounced shift away from the rules-based international order amid widespread skepticism toward its continued viability. A notable feature of this transition is the declining standing and reduced priority of traditional institutions that have long underpinned the international system, including NATO, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the case of the UN Security Council, for example, the intensification of strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia has made it increasingly rare for the Council to reach agreement on major resolutions or policy responses related to peace and international security. Frequent use of veto power resulting from conflicting interests and divergent preferences among major powers has effectively paralyzed the Security Council’s capacity to prevent and manage conflict. The Trump administration’s emphasis on an America First Policy has further deepened these divisions among great powers. At the same time, many analysts assess that the future international security order is more likely to be reshaped not through a U.S. retreat into isolationism, but through a realist and interest centered form of transactional diplomacy. Other major powers are responding in kind. The international system is now increasingly shaped not only by American first preferences, but also by China first and Russia first approaches. Under the Trump administration’s transactional diplomatic posture, confidence in the extensive alliance network constructed by the United States since World War II may be weakened. As a result, allied states are beginning to reassess their strategic assumptions and policy responses.
Allied and strategic partner states in the Asia-Pacific region, including South Korea, Japan, and Australia, are increasingly confronted with uncertainty as they observe shifts in U.S. foreign policy, particularly regarding “whether the United States will continue to uphold its traditional security commitments.” In South Korea, this uncertainty has prompted growing arguments in favor of pursuing hedging strategies or more diversified networks of cooperation to distribute risk amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, evolving ROK-U.S-Japan cooperation, and persistent nuclear and missile threats. For example, should the United States adjust the focal point of its external strategy away from the Asia-Pacific toward a more Western Hemisphere centered approach, the need for South Korea to strengthen regional cooperation with countries such as China, Japan, and Australia would become increasingly salient.
In the economic and trade domain, the most pronounced anticipated change is that the free trade system, which has contributed to global economic growth and globalization, is facing severe challenges. The worldwide tariff war initiated by President Trump has created clear momentum toward the expansion of protectionism and the strengthening of various tariff and non tariff barriers. As the U.S. dollar’s status as the primary reserve currency is increasingly questioned, the possibility of a broader reassessment of the global financial order has also emerged. The tariff war driven by the Trump administration may elevate bilateral and regional arrangements, as well as sector specific transactional approaches, over existing multilateral trade regimes such as the World Trade Organization. As the likelihood of higher tariffs and trade barriers increases, countries with high trade dependence and export oriented economies, such as South Korea, face a growing imperative to conduct systematic tariff risk assessments and pursue diversification strategies. In addition, as the dollar centered financial order experiences greater disruption, strengthening risk management related to the won dollar exchange relationship becomes increasingly critical for South Korea. At the same time, the weakening of U.S.-led global norms may also expand opportunities for South Korea to seek a more proactive role in cooperation with like minded states.
The weakening of multilateralism and the rules based order is expected to significantly erode the standing and effectiveness of various multilateral cooperation frameworks that have operated to date. Many assessments suggest that during a second Trump administration, norm based multilateral regimes such as climate change agreements, human rights conventions, and development assistance systems may be pushed down the policy priority list. If the United States reduces its exercise of leadership in sustaining the rules based order, the resulting vacuum is likely to create space for non Western powers such as China and Russia to advance alternative models, thereby accelerating the development of multipolarity. In this context, South Korea will need to pursue diversification strategies rather than relying exclusively on U.S. centered networks in areas such as the Indo-Pacific strategy, climate alliances, and development cooperation networks. The erosion of the rules-based order may also diminish the authority of international law and international organizations, underscoring the need to reassess diplomacy and corporate strategies that have been grounded in legal and institutional frameworks.
The deepening and fragmentation of great power strategic competition, already evident in intensifying U.S.-China rivalry and deteriorating U.S.-Russia relations, is likely to become further structured under a second Trump administration. At the same time, however, the United States may seek to concentrate less on global engagement in the traditional sense and instead focus on what it defines as core interest zones, while relegating other regions to negotiation or shared spheres of influence. Such a configuration points toward a multipolar order, or the reemergence of sphere of influence politics. In the Trumpian conception, the future international order is one in which multiple great powers dominate different regions of the world. At its core, this vision entails principal powers such as the United States, China, and Russia, consolidating their respective spheres of influence and constructing a stable nineteenth century style balance of power system through geopolitical bargaining and adjustment. This would resemble traditional great power politics in which major states establish spheres of influence and alternate between competition and compromise, akin to the international order exemplified by the Concert of Europe centered on the five great powers after the Napoleonic Wars. Under Trump, the United States appears to envision a stable relationship in which China and Russia are prevented from challenging U.S. primacy, while negotiations and transactional arrangements proceed within a framework of mutual recognition of status among the major powers. In this sense, Trump is not an isolationist, nor does he pursue U.S. retrenchment. Rather, it is more accurate to characterize him as an anti-multilateral, anti-globalization primacist.
If sphere of influence politics becomes a defining feature of the international system, U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific, particularly South Korea and Japan, will be required to pursue more sophisticated strategies within the narrowing space between the United States and China. In the realm of industrial strategy, semiconductors, batteries, and energy supply chains will have both China related risks and exposure to U.S. sanctions, elevating the importance of supply chain diversification and the protection of strategic assets. Moreover, just as Europe has significantly increased defense spending in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Asia-Pacific region should also prepare for a trend toward expanded defense expenditures and heightened security investment. In the domain of international development, climate, and energy policy, a key anticipated feature is the potential reduction of U.S. contributions to the provision of global public goods, including efforts to address climate change and advance carbon neutrality. Official development assistance (ODA) and the broader international development architecture may also be restructured or scaled back in accordance with an “America First“ logic. The Trump administration has already significantly reduced U.S. contributions to international organizations. As South Korea advances its carbon neutrality, energy transition, and renewable energy policies, it will need to shift attention from U.S.-centered multilateral cooperation frameworks toward Europe and Asia based partnerships. From the perspective of energy security, securing alternative strategic partners beyond reliance on U.S. diplomatic and security alliances will become increasingly important. -
The second Trump administration is expected to maintain an America First Policy, minimizing international engagements that are not directly tied to U.S. national interests while concentrating on issues perceived to have an immediate impact on those interests and evaluating them through a largely transactional lens. Externally, the central focus of the Trump administration remains China. Efforts to contain China and to advance decoupling (separation of supply chain) are likely to continue with little substantive change in the near term. Although security alliances are expected to be preserved, growing demands for adjustments in trade relations and alliance burden sharing are reinforcing a structure in which allies are increasingly pressed to choose between security commitments and economic interests. The Russia-Ukraine war shows little prospect of a near term conclusion and continues to evolve as a prolonged and stalemated conflict, with sustained repercussions for the European security architecture and energy markets. In response, European states are expanding defense spending, strengthening deterrence vis a vis Russia, and pursuing energy diversification, while simultaneously intensifying debates over strategic autonomy amid uncertainty regarding shifts in U.S. policy. Tensions in the Middle East, including the Israel-Palestine (Hamas), remain unresolved, with intermittent clashes and persistent political instability. These conditions, interacting with the policies of major oil producing states, continue to heighten volatility in global energy prices and to increase energy security risks, prompting states to recalibrate their energy transition and security strategies.
Transformations in the global economic and technological order are also becoming increasingly evident. Amid intensifying U.S.-China tensions, the strengthening of protectionism, and the restructuring of supply chains, the world economy is simultaneously exhibiting trends toward slower growth and bloc formation (U.S.-Europe axis vs China-Russia Global South axis). In advanced technology sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, and artificial intelligence, competition over regulation, export controls, and subsidies is deepening, underscoring a pattern in which technology is increasingly treated as both a security asset and an instrument of power. At the same time, the convergence of civil wars in places such as Sudan and Myanmar, refugee and migration pressures, and climate crises and disasters is reinforcing an expanded conception of security in which military, economic, climate, and humanitarian dimensions are increasingly intertwined. This broader understanding of security is likely to move to the center of the international agenda in the period ahead.
The South Korean government has stated that it will respond to these challenges through a policy of “pragmatic diplomacy.” At its core, pragmatic diplomacy seeks to secure the greatest possible degree of autonomy within given structural constraints. Applying the structure-agency framework in international politics, pragmatic diplomacy refers to an approach that seeks to maximize national agency and, through it, national interests, by navigating, adapting to, or selectively overcoming structural constraints that cannot be altered at will. This will, of course, be far from straightforward. As the international order becomes increasingly fragmented into spheres of influence and the United States more explicitly presses its allies to prioritize security alignment with Washington while aligning economically with the United States, South Korea faces the critical challenge of pursuing its national interests without becoming rigidly confined within a single sphere of influence.
| A Changed United States, Changing International Order
| Indications of Change in the International Environment by Sector
| International Order at a Critical Point of Inflection
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
