| Introduction

Trump's return to the presidency following his re-election in November 2024 has posed challenges to America's allies and adversaries alike. Rooted in the "America First" doctrine, the policies of the Trump administration have not only rejected the United States' traditional role as guardian of the liberal international order, but have also proven difficult to deal with through conventional means, owing to Trump's characteristic unpredictability and his willingness to break with established frameworks. While allies have sought to accommodate Trump's transactional demands and to soften pressure through personal flattery, authoritarian leaders in geopolitical competition with the United States, such as Putin and Xi Jinping, have well studied Trump's temperament, exploited his weaknesses, and steered circumstances to their own advantage, resulting in an erosion of American leadership.

President Trump appeared to be executing a coherent sequence of steps aimed at reshaping the international order underpinned by military force: imposing tariffs on countries worldwide (Liberation Day) in April 2025; jointly striking Iranian nuclear facilities with Israel (Operation Midnight Hammer) in June; brokering a Gaza ceasefire in October; articulating his administration's priorities in the December National Security Strategy (NSS); followed in January by a surprise invasion of Venezuela and the transfer of President Maduro into U.S. custody.

The military operation against Iran, launched through joint airstrikes with Israel on February 28, initially appeared to achieve rapid dominance through cutting-edge artificial intelligence and overwhelming military force. However, Iran's asymmetric strategy of depleting costly U.S. systems with low-cost weapons, compounded by its disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, precipitated a global economic crisis. In response, the Trump administration declared a two-week ceasefire with Iran on April 7 and has since repeatedly extended it under ambiguous conditions, while applying pressure through threats targeting civilian infrastructure and a counter-blockade of Hormuz, with negotiations remaining deadlocked. Since peaking with the Venezuela operation, however, Trump's momentum has entered a phase of decline. Allies, having recognized the limits of personal flattery, are increasingly attentive to the legal legitimacy of U.S. military actions, deepening domestic divisions within the United States, and Trump's erratic temperament. As a result, they are displaying a degree of resistance to his pressure, marking a clear departure from their earlier responses.

In particular, King Charles III's addresses during his state visit to the United States attracted global attention for recalling the values and principles that the United States under Trump has set aside, and for articulating a vision of the direction the United States and the broader free world should pursue. These remarks give voice to the international community's hope for a reorientation of U.S. policy during Trump's remaining term, as well as for a return to its role as a guardian of the international order.

Within South Korea, domestic reporting and commentaries on the U.S.-Iran operation have at times been characterized by criticism of the United States, rooted in concerns over the legal legitimacy of military action and Trump's lack of consistency, alongside expressions of sympathy for Iran reflecting a traditional inclination to side with weaker parties. South Korea should not lose sight of the Iranian regime's record of domestic human rights abuses and its role in fueling instability across the Middle East. At the same time, it requires a clear-eyed approach that separates Trump's individual conduct from its relationship with the United States, its sole military and values-based alliance partner. Furthermore, rather than dismissing the utility of the alliance under the banner of "pragmatism," the South Korean government should instead focus on how the alliance can be sustained and strengthened over the long term.

| Trajectory of Trump's Foreign Policy

During the campaign, President Trump criticized the Democratic administration for being mired in "forever wars," pledged to break free from this cycle, and articulated the broad contours of his foreign policy by emphasizing the utility of tariffs in foreign economic relations. Following his inauguration on January 20, 2025, he offered little in the way of a coherent framework beyond withdrawing from major international organizations, before launching his policy agenda in earnest on April 2 by declaring Liberation Day and imposing arbitrary tariff rates on individual trading partners. Statements about making Canada the 51st state, annexing Greenland, or seizing the Panama Canal amounted to little more than rhetoric, and strikes in parts of Africa were similarly isolated incidents.

In the Middle East, however, several significant developments occurred. At Israel's urging, the United States participated in the joint U.S.-Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 under Operation Midnight Hammer. In October, strong pressure on Prime Minister Netanyahu, following his attack on Qatar, a U.S. ally, led to the conclusion of a Gaza peace agreement. The administration also lifted sanctions on the new Syrian government that had overthrown the Assad regime. These actions, however, were largely regarded as reactive responses to unfolding circumstances rather than proactive policy initiatives.

In December 2025, the Trump administration released the White House's National Security Strategy (NSS), followed in early 2026 by the State Department's Agency Strategic Plan (ASP) and the Department of War's National Defense Strategy (NDS), thereby giving concrete form to the priorities and direction of U.S. foreign and security policy. Of particular significance, the "Donroe Corollary" advanced in the NDS was put into practice through Operation Absolute Resolve, the surprise operation on January 3 to arrest Venezuelan President Maduro, demonstrating American dominance across the Western Hemisphere while showcasing the United States' overwhelming military power through the deployment of advanced technologies. This confirmed that the Trump administration possessed both the will and the capability to realize the vision set out in its strategy documents, generating considerable international attention regarding when and how the strategy's remaining elements would be pursued.

Emboldened by the success of the Venezuela operation, the Trump administration shifted its focus to Iran, seeking to advance NSS objectives of Middle East peace and energy dominance by leveraging concentrated military force while simultaneously pursuing nuclear negotiations. In the midst of those negotiations, the United States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, killing Supreme Leader Khamenei. The United States once again demonstrated overwhelming military superiority, minimizing the time from target identification to strike through cutting-edge artificial intelligence. However, Iran's mosaic command system ensured that even as numerous senior figures were killed, pre-designated successors immediately assumed their posts and continued to resist. Through the asymmetric use of missiles and drones, Iran was able to threaten vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz and destabilize international oil prices, prolonging the conflict beyond initial expectations.

Declaring that its war objectives had been substantially achieved, the United States announced a ceasefire with Iran beginning April 9 and entered into negotiations. As of mid-May, sporadic localized clashes continue while both sides nominally maintain a ceasefire. The United States has repeatedly suspended and resumed talks, while Iran continues to reject U.S. proposals, and the two sides have yet to reach any clear basis for an agreement.

| Recent Responses of U.S. Allies and Trump's Backlash

In March, Trump requested that seven countries, including South Korea, Japan, and the United Kingdom, dispatch warships to escort oil tankers through the Iranian-blockaded Strait of Hormuz. Most responded cautiously, while NATO allies refused outright, giving rise to a cycle of friction. This response reflects a combination of factors: (1) discontent among governments and publics with the United States' unilateral posture of demanding support without prior consultation; (2) international and domestic concerns regarding the uncertain objectives, legal legitimacy, and procedural basis of the war against Iran; (3) risks to the safety of national forces and vessels, as well as considerations related to bilateral relations with Iran; (4) domestic constraints on Trump, including judicial checks, declining approval ratings, and divisions within the MAGA movement; and (5) accumulated experience in dealing with Trump, along with his own erratic and quickly shifting temperament.

Spain's Prime Minister Sánchez of the Socialist Party refused, at the outset of the war, a U.S. request to permit the use of NATO bases on Spanish territory, 1) prompting criticism from Trump. He has since maintained a consistently anti-Trump posture, issuing statements critical of Israel and urging the European Union to suspend cooperation with Israel, 2) and in doing so has consolidated his domestic political standing.

The United Kingdom, one of America's closest allies, refused both the use of its bases 3) and participation in the Iran war, 4) placing strain on the traditionally close "special relationship." Prime Minister Starmer rejected participation on the grounds of British national interest and international law, while subsequently permitting the use of British bases for defensive purposes. 5) At the same time, he emphasized that the special relationship is not one that would be fundamentally affected by such individual issues, signaling a determination to preserve bilateral cooperation while managing emerging tensions. 6)

Even Italian Prime Minister Meloni, the leader of a far-right party widely regarded as close to Trump, has moved to distance herself in response to domestic public opinion surrounding his public dispute with Pope Leo XIV over war and peace. 7) Last month, she declined to authorize the use of Sigonella Air Base in Sicily for U.S. combat operations 8) and, in a parliamentary address, criticized the war as "a unilateral intervention outside the bounds of international law." These decisions appear to reflect both the surge in energy prices resulting from the conflict and the fact that more than two-thirds of the Italian public opposes the war.

France, which has long emphasized European "strategic autonomy" from U.S. leadership and influence, was predictably opposed to the war against Iran. President Macron criticized the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes as being conducted outside the framework of international law, 9) underscored that the war was a decision taken solely by the United States and Israel, and stated that France is under no obligation to participate. 10)

German Chancellor Merz, elected last year and confident in his ability to establish a cooperative relationship with Trump, achieved what could be considered a satisfactory outcome during his first visit to Washington. 11) Unlike Meloni or Macron, he sought to maintain a minimum level of cooperation as an ally by permitting the use of U.S. military bases in Germany and overflight rights. 12) Recently, however, Merz remarked at a domestic event that the United States had entered the war without an exit strategy and is suffering national humiliation at the hands of Iran's seasoned negotiating tactics, 13) prompting President Trump to announce the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. troops stationed in Germany. Germany, which has recently been focused on strengthening its independent military capabilities, has received this development with equanimity, viewing it as an anticipated development.

Although not part of Europe, Japan, an economic powerhouse, a potential military power, and the United States’ closest ally in Asia, is regarded as a successful case of skillfully navigating requests to participate in military operations in the Strait of Hormuz without provoking a U.S. backlash. During her visit to Washington in March 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi explained in detail to President Trump that, given the limitations of Japan's Peace Constitution and the Self-Defense Forces Act, it was legally impossible to dispatch Self-Defense Force vessels to the Strait of Hormuz, and that deployment to an active combat zone in particular carried a high risk of being unconstitutional. Prime Minister Takaichi also proposed an additional investment of approximately $73 billion (approximately 108 trillion won) as a second tranche of investment committed during tariff negotiations with the United States, 14) offering to strengthen the alliance on economic and energy fronts rather than through military contributions. Meanwhile, Japan strongly urged Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and pursued a diplomatic solution, while joining a joint statement with the United Kingdom, France, and others pledging to make "appropriate efforts to ensure freedom of navigation," committing to contribute within an international framework rather than through unilateral military action. As a result, Prime Minister Takaichi is credited with eliciting a positive assessment from President Trump that "Japan is stepping up with a sense of responsibility," while successfully navigating domestic anti-war sentiment and constitutional constraints.

| The Heart of Western Allies' Perspective: King Charles III's Message During His State Visit to the United States

It is well understood that the British monarch, since the establishment of constitutional monarchy in the seventeenth century, has served as a symbolic figurehead with no real executive power. The so-called King's Speech, delivered at the State Opening of Parliament, serves merely to introduce the policies of the governing party in the monarch's capacity as head of state; yet the people listen attentively to the monarch's voice, for it carries with it historical tradition and moral authority. It is all the more remarkable, then, that Charles III, long described as a weak monarch overshadowed by Queen Elizabeth II, who reigned for over seventy years, delivered speeches of such unexpected impact during his state visit to the United States. This appears to owe to the King's characteristic blend of humor and an inner strength beneath a gentle exterior, as well as to the way he reminded his audience of Britain's contribution to the shaping of the modern world order, and in particular of what role the Enlightenment philosophy and principles of liberal democracy that Britain has cultivated have played, and how they must continue to guide all our lives toward order and peace. The numerous assessments offered of King Charles's successful address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress 15) 16) 17) 18) share the following core elements.

1) The United Kingdom and the United States as a Community of Values

While celebrating the 250th anniversary of American independence from Britain, the King noted that the United States has ultimately inherited Britain's Enlightenment tradition, and that the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1689, born of the British people's efforts to establish a constitutional monarchy, have been cited countless times in the United States as the foundation of its constitutional spirit. He thereby emphasized that the two nations form a community of values sharing the same democratic spirit, principles, and ideals. He further noted that, notwithstanding the historical fact of independence from Britain, it is the United States that has effectively succeeded Britain in the international community, and by referring to the U.S. Congress as a "citadel of democracy," underscored America's role as a guardian of these values. He also recalled the importance of bilateral cooperation for the peace and prosperity not only of both nations but of the entire world, and the mission this entails for both.

- His observation that this tradition includes that of "checks and balances" on executive power was assessed as carrying a paradoxical meaning: that the monarch of the kingdom America had left behind was reminding a republic of the democratic principles it is duty-bound to uphold.

2) The United Kingdom and the United States as a Security Community

King Charles recalled that the only instance in which NATO invoked the collective security obligations of Article 5 was when the United States came under attack on 9/11, and European nations fought shoulder to shoulder with the United States on the front lines in Afghanistan under a UN Security Council resolution. He also emphasized that the two nations have been bound by shared security for over 100 years, including during the two world wars and the Cold War, and stressed all the more the importance of the Anglo-American alliance in "the current uncertain environment that no single nation can resolve on its own."

- He went on to address the war in Ukraine, which had been overshadowed by the ongoing war with Iran, stressing that the unity of NATO, similar to that seen after 9/11, is necessary to defend Ukraine and achieve a just and lasting peace. This was interpreted as, on the one hand, a reminder to President Trump, who had long argued that NATO was obsolete, that NATO, and the UK in particular, had stood with the U.S. at critical moments; and, on the other hand, given the Trump administration's refusal to provide support to Ukraine, a direct appeal to Congress, which holds the authority to appropriate such aid.

3) The United States as a Leading Nation in the Free World

In concluding his speech, King Charles stated, "America's words carry weight and meaning... but the actions of this great Nation matter even more," and, quoting President Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, added, "the world may little note what we say, but will never forget what we do." This was interpreted as conveying the anxiety the world currently feels toward the United States and the hope that America will return to being true to its original ideals.

While the broad framework of King Charles's speech was similar to the address Queen Elizabeth delivered to the U.S. Congress 35 years ago, it should be noted that the speech carried a different significance because the context of the international situation had changed since that visit, and the United States itself had changed. In particular, the speech diagnosed the current situation, in which the fundamental premise of the past 80 years since World War II, namely safeguarding the liberal order and shared values (democracy, the rule of law, collective security, and the protection of weaker nations) through an exchange of American military power for European legitimacy, has been lost, and is regarded as a serious effort by the UK and Europe to restore it, despite the Trump administration's persistent disparagement of Europe. Furthermore, it is assessed that the speech, delivered in such a warm and honest manner that ordinary political leaders cannot achieve the same, and grounded in the moral authority of a monarch without executive power, garnered even broader resonance.

| Debates Surrounding the Assessment of the Iran War and the Need for a Balanced Perspective

Generally speaking, most assessments of Trump's Iran policy are negative. Criticism includes accusations that the U.S. bears responsibility for triggering an unnecessary war of choice; that it launched a war with unclear strategic objectives without providing a clear explanation to the public; domestic controversy over restrictions under the War Powers Act (with claims that the deadline for seeking congressional approval was suspended due to the ceasefire); requests for allied participation in a war launched without consultation, followed by the allies' refusal; damage to Gulf states with whom the U.S. did not consult before launching attacks; the deaths of Iranian civilians, particularly students, due to U.S. military strikes, especially those resulting from mistaken targeting; accusations that only China and Russia are reaping geopolitical benefits due to U.S. missteps and President Trump's blunt remarks and erratic behavior on social media, along with his capricious shifts in position from day to day. All of these have fueled negative public opinion not only within the U.S. but also in countries around the world, including South Korea.

Meanwhile, domestically in the U.S., concerns have been expressed by senior Republican lawmakers accustomed to America's traditional role. 19) Furthermore, even within the MAGA movement, Trump's core support base, key figures such as broadcaster Tucker Carlson 20) and Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene 21) are raising their voices in opposition, accusing Trump of betraying his campaign pledge to extricate the United States from "forever wars," which also appears to be a cause for concern.

On the other hand, some observers point to Trump's "strategic boldness," 22) noting that the United States is acting as a provider of public goods by playing the role of global policeman, using its own taxes and resources to control and normalize revisionist states that instigate war and terrorism. Some argue that the United States acting as a hegemonic power aligns with South Korea's national interests. 23) Reports also suggest that the invasion of Venezuela, which sparked legal and political condemnation for the extradition of a foreign head of state, is being welcomed by locals. 24) This perspective recalls the fundamental background to the outbreak of war (the Iranian government's human rights abuses, including the massacre of some 40,000 protesters; threats to Middle East peace through proxy forces in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq; and the development of nuclear weapons through its nuclear enrichment program).

While emphasizing the positive effects of a new Middle Eastern order that may emerge as a result of this war, some voices express sympathy for U.S. disappointment regarding the lack of cooperation from allies who have long benefited from the international order the United States has built. This perspective argues that the actual threat posed by Iran must be confronted head-on, and that the ongoing military operations are part of a process to eliminate these threats through the restructuring of the Middle Eastern order. It further emphasizes that, geopolitically, this also serves to contain Iran, another major energy source for China following Venezuela, thereby blocking the influence of China, a revisionist power that undermines the liberal order. Additionally, contrary to common perception, studies have argued that the Trump administration's actions in the Iran War carry a certain degree of legitimacy under international law, while Iran's attacks on neighboring countries, its blockade of the Strait, and its imposition of tolls lack any basis in international law. 25)

It is also worth noting that even the New York Times, a traditionally progressive newspaper, published an editorial 26) listing the same issues highlighted by the aforementioned critical assessments and condemning the Trump administration, yet nonetheless making clear that "that said, it is wrong for any American to root for Iran; all Americans have their fate bound to this country led by Trump, and so does the rest of the free world. The United States is the only country with the economic and military power to check China and Russia, and if the U.S. weakens, only authoritarian regimes will benefit." The editorial reaches a balanced conclusion, urging the Trump administration to correct its unilateral approach and minimize the damage of a wrongly initiated war through congressional involvement and cooperation with allies.

| Considerations for South Korea

President Trump's unique background, his style of speech that differs from that of traditional politicians, and his tendency to impose tougher conditions on allies while seeking economic gains for the United States 27) have generated widespread aversion. However, such impressions should not cause us to forget the role the United States has played over the past 80 years in maintaining the international order, the sacrifices it has borne, and the importance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. In other words, while Trump is currently the leader of the United States, we must not view "Trump as synonymous with America." The America whose return King Charles hopes for, a champion of democracy and guardian of the international order, existed before Trump and will continue to exist after him. Even now, as those currently in power in the United States denounce the "rules-based international order" as a mechanism through which Europe has exploited America and declare it to be over, 28) the United States, even as it projects its power in the name of ridding the world of evil, may unwittingly be continuing to sustain that very order.

Having grown accustomed to invasions by powerful foreign forces throughout history, the Korean public tends to instinctively root for the "underdog." Whether due to antipathy toward Trump or the sheer might of U.S. military power, there appears to be a prevailing sentiment in media coverage and commentary regarding the Iran conflict, one that sympathizes with Iran for its clever resistance despite being at an overwhelming disadvantage. While this distinctively Korean sentiment is understandable, we must not only remember that the Iranian regime has been a principal perpetrator of human rights abuses and regional instability, but also develop the perspective to distinguish between the regime and the Iranian people, and the judgment to discern which war outcome would truly serve our national interests. Furthermore, while there is some merit to the argument that America's war with Iran could justify invasions by Russia and China of neighboring countries, we must also remember that there is a fundamental difference between this and Russia's 19th-century-style behavior of invading neighboring independent nations to rewrite history and permanently occupy their territories.

The fact that European leaders have developed a resilience to Trump's unpredictable pressure and are presenting independent positions as described above has the positive effect of preventing unnecessary entanglement by moving beyond blind allegiance. It also clearly demonstrates that the value of an alliance is assessed not only in terms of "contribution" but also in terms of "moderation." 29) However, whether South Korea can indeed adopt the same approach as these European NATO member states requires careful consideration of our own environment and position. 30)

The pressure diffused among the 32 members of NATO and our situation within a bilateral alliance are difficult to compare, and moreover, faced with the rapidly escalating threat from North Korea, which has completed its nuclear and missile capabilities and advocates the "two hostile states" concept, ROK-U.S. solidarity is all the more urgent. Given that European nations, while not simply complying with U.S. demands, are nonetheless making efforts to shoulder their proper share as middle powers in the international community, 31) South Korea too must find appropriate groupings or channels through which to contribute at a level commensurate with its economic scale and international standing. Only then will it be able to stand with confidence and secure room for diplomatic maneuvering in the future.

In light of Trump's "America First" policy, transactional approach, and foreign and security policies based on power, terms like "survival of the fittest" and "every man for himself" are frequently used in the Korean media and academic circles. At first glance, this is true. However, can we really say that such changes have given us more room to maneuver? Previously, there was restraint and favorable consideration stemming from the framework of alliance with the superpower, the United States, and from a multilateral order in which all participants adhered to the same rules. However, due to the limits of U.S. national power and its domestic political environment, there is no longer the leeway to offer the restraint and consideration of the past. Since a price now accompanies the assistance that was once "given for free," the relationship has become "transactional." Rather than complaining about why things aren't given for free as before, we must face this new calculus and strive to make it a transaction that satisfies both sides. While it is impossible to predict how the United States will evolve in the post-Trump era, we must proceed with necessary preparations under the assumption that the current "low-cost, high-efficiency" formula, which increases the burden on allies to reduce America's burden and broaden its strategic options under "flexible realism" and "strategic flexibility," remains advantageous to the United States, and that this overarching framework is unlikely to change in the near future. 32)

The view held by some, which, under the banner of "pragmatism," downplays the importance of existing alliances and disregards mutual obligations, is not without its risks. On the contrary, it is precisely by fulfilling the role of the alliance more faithfully than before, thereby demonstrating our usefulness and reliability, that we become a partner who meets the other side's realist criteria and can enjoy the benefits of the alliance; this is the reality we now face. At the same time, building on this trust, we must fully leverage "flexible realism" and "strategic flexibility" to our advantage during the current U.S. administration's term, 33) promoting our security and prosperity and thereby realizing our pragmatism in its true sense. Furthermore, as raised in King Charles's address, we must continue to coordinate with like-minded nations so that the free world may re-emerge as a community of values, 34) and, while preserving this as part of our own identity, deepen our philosophy as one of the leading nations guiding the world.

1. Al Jazeera (2026.3.2.) Spain refuses to let US use bases for Iran attacks
2. Time Magazine (2026.5.4.) 'No to War': Spain Rebukes Trump's Trade Threats, Refuses to Aid Iran Conflict
3. BBC (2026.2.20.) UK has not given US permission to use RAF bases for Iran strikes
4. The Guardian (2026.3.16.) Starmer defends decision not to join Iran war
5. US starts using UK bases for 'defensive' Iran operations
6. Reuters (2026.3.9.) UK and US working together 'every single day', says PM Starmer
7. PBS News (2026.4.15.) Trump decries Italy's Meloni for siding with the pope and not supporting Iran war
8. The Guardian (2026.3.31.) Italy denies use of Sicily airbase to US planes carrying weapons for Iran war
9. Politico (2026.3.3.) US strikes on Iran 'outside international law', says Macron
10. Al Jazeera (2026.3.12.) France walks 'fine line' as US-Israel war on Iran escalates
11. DW (2026.3.3.) Trump and Merz discuss Iran, tariffs and Ukraine
12. DW (2026.3.7.) Ramstein Air Base: What is Germany's role in the US war on Iran? | DW News
13. AA (2026.4.27.) Germany's Merz says Americans 'humiliated' by Iran, Trump has no exit strategy
14. 중앙일보 (2026.3.20.) 다카이치 "평화와 번영 가져올 수 있는 건 도널드 뿐"...트럼프 "위대한 여성"
15. BBC (2026.4.29.) Five takeaways from the King's historic address to Congress
16. Dean Blundell Substack (2026.4.30) King Charles Takedown Of Trump Was A MASTERCLASS
17. BBC (2026.4.30.) King's speech was a 'high stakes' moment of US visit, Palace says
18. Maureen Dowd (NYT, 2026.5.2) Your Majesty, Our Travesty
19. Politico (2026.4.17.) GOP senators urge Trump to find Iran exit plan as energy prices rise: 'The clock is ticking'
20. LA Times (2026.4.24.) Tucker Carlson's reversal on Trump is a familiar script
21. The Hill (2026.2.28.) Marjorie Taylor Greene blasts Trump's Iran strikes
22. Alex Wong, remarks at the Sejong National Strategy Forum (April 2, 2026).
23. 이근 (파이낸셜 뉴스, 2026.3.22.) '패권국 미국'이 우리 國益에 부합한다.
24. The Economist (2026.4.16.) Donald Trump has made Venezuela a better place
25. 심상민 (아산정책연구원 이슈브리프, 2026.4.22.) 미-이란 전쟁의 국제법적 쟁점에 대한 검토와 우리나라에의 시사점
26. Editorial (NYT, 2026.4.12.) Four Ways Trump's War Is Weakening America
27. Stephen Walt (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2026) The Predatory Hegemon
28. Elbridge Colby, Remarks at the Sejong Institute (January 26, 2026).
29. Bee Yun Jo and Sungwon Lee, "The Conditions of a Model Ally," Sejong Focus (April 1, 2026).
30. 강천석 (조선일보, 2026.4.10.) 한국 안보는 결국 北核 문제다.
31. BBC (2026.4.17.) UK and France to lead defensive mission in Strait of Hormuz
32. Beomchul Shin, remarks at the Sejong National Strategy Forum (April 2, 2026).
33. Beomchul Shin, ibid.
34. Yeocheol Yoon, "The War in Ukraine and Europe's Challenge: From Free-Rider to Guardian," Sejong Focus (December 17, 2025).

※ The opinions expressed in Sejong Focus are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Sejong Institute.