Return of the Philippines

Geungchan Bae

Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute 

     On February 2, the Philippine government took important steps to allow the U.S. to use four more military bases in the country. Although our media did not consider it as important, it must not be overlooked in terms of changes in the strategic environment in East Asia. In other words, it implies the Philippine government decided to make a special strategic choice regarding the U.S.-China hegemony conflicts. Above all, from Cagayan base on the northernmost island of Luzon in the Philippines is only 400km from Taiwan, which is much closer compared to the U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan, which is 600km away. In other words, the Philippines will become a strategic point for the U.S. to project its military power from the shortest distance if China invades Taiwan in the future.

     However, this shows the Philippines will be one of the front-line countries in the military conflict between the U.S. and China. Hence, as the Philippines provides a new military base to the U.S., it must be prepared for direct military strikes like U.S. military bases in Japan and South Korea. As President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. did not deny such a fact, the decision of the Philippine government should be seen as a difficult choice and a reversal of the Philippines' foreign security policy stance. Most Southeast Asian ASEAN countries are concerned about the possibility of Chinese military intervention in Taiwan and the South China Sea in the future but made a check on China to avoid direct military conflict.

     The strategic choice made by Philippine President Marcos Jr. since June 2022 is a contrast to the anti-American diplomatic stance of former President Duterte. In 2016, President Duterte made public criticism of the U.S. and in the same year, swore at U.S. President Obama during the East Asia Summit. In addition, he maintained a distance from the U.S. throughout his term, while approaching China despite the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, hence promoting relations with Russia.

     There is no doubt that the Philippines is traditionally the most pro-American of Southeast Asian countries. Although the Philippines experienced American occupation from the end of the 19th century to 1945, the relationship between the two countries can be seen as a love-hate relationship. Since the U.S. and the Philippines established an official alliance in 1951, the Philippines have provided the largest naval and air force base overseas. Even after the withdrawal of U.S. bases in 1992 after the Cold War, five Philippine bases were provided under Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), continuing relations with the U.S. Except for Duterte, all Philippine Presidents have been pro-American and have consistently maintained pro-American diplomatic stands. At the same time, the U.S. has always been the most favored and liked country by the majority of the general public in the Philippines. Even during Duterte's government, when U.S.-Philippine relations were at their worst, the favor of the U.S. among Filipinos exceeded 70%. Therefore, the inauguration of President Marcos and his strategic choice can be seen as a return to traditional pro-American foreign and security policy in the Philippines.

     Meanwhile, the Philippines' strategic return is not only toward pro-U.S. diplomacy but also cooperative relations with Japan. During his visit to Japan on February 9, President Marcos held a summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida and agreed to push for a future Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). The agreement is expected as a paramilitary alliance including visa waiver toward each other's military, large-scale arms and ammunition import, large-scale military exercise, and mutual dispatch in case of an emergency. Two countries will also consider the simplification of procedures and utilizing the military bases for rescue and humanitarian missions in the event of a disaster. In addition, the leaders of the two countries agreed to expand military cooperation with the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to participate in joint military exercises between the U.S. and the Philippines. This is expected to create an anti-China alliance with U.S.-Japan with the joining of the Philippines

     The recent diplomatic approach from President Marcos is causing China concern, leading to strong opposition to the Philippines' diplomatic moves. Moreover, China invited President Marcos to come up with a solution to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the joint resource development plans proposed by former President Duterte. However, the position between the two countries ran parallel to each other and failed to reach any progressive or meaningful agreements. Since then, the Philippines has begun to provide an additional military base to the U.S. and seek security cooperation with Japan at the level of a paramilitary alliance with Japan.

     In addition, the Philippines has strengthened its security cooperation with Indonesia regarding the territorial dispute of the South China Sea. In September 2022, the Philippines signed a defense cooperation agreement with Indonesia to strengthen maritime security, including cooperation in energy, marine development, health education as well as terrorism response, and border control. Not only the Philippines, but Indonesia's recent diplomatic and security movements are also drawing attention. Unlike the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, or Brunei, Indonesia is not a direct country to the South China Sea territorial dispute with China but is a potential subject of territorial disputes with China due to Indonesia's Natuna Islands' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) overlaps with China-claimed “Nine dash line”. Therefore, Indonesia has recently doubled efforts to strengthen military security cooperations with foreign countries in the region to proceed with natural resource development such as petroleum and natural gas around the Natuna Islands. Indonesia plans to hold joint military exercises with Malaysia and Brunei in the first half of this year and considers joint military drills with Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India in the future.

     What are the implications of ASEAN countries' movements, such as the Philippines and Indonesia? It is proof of China's weakened influence over the South China Sea and the visualization of anti-China cooperation within the regions. During the past 3 years of Covid-19, the Chinese economy, which has been the source of China's influence has entered a downward phase along with China's 'Wolf-warrior diplomacy' and 'Belt and Road Initiative' against foreign countries. In this regard, a recent report from Singapore's ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute presents interesting research about the 2023 Southeast Asia status. The annual survey of more than 1,300 opinion leaders from 10 Southeast Asian countries shows that China's political and economic influence in the region is still overwhelming but declining, while the most favored superpower in Southeast Asia is the U.S. The most notable part of the survey is that 61.1% of the respondents claimed that support for the U.S. will be conducted in case of conflict between the U.S. and China, far more than 38.9% of those who supported China. It is a point to determine the strategic structure of Southeast Asia in the future.