The ROK-U.S. Summit on April 11 and South Korea’s Role for
the Nuclear Agreement between the U.S. and North Korea:
Panmunjom Inter-Korean Summit for Persuasion and
President Trump’s Visit to North Korea as a Bargaining Card

No. 2019-12 (April 3, 2019)

Dr. Cheong Seong-Chang

Vice President for Research Planning, the Sejong Institute

softpower@sejong.org

President Moon Jae-in and President Donald Trump will hold the ROK-U.S. Summit in Washington D.C on April 10-11, 2019 (local time). Important security agenda, including defense burden-sharing issue, will be discussed at the summit, but South Korea’s role in the denuclearization process of North Korea is expected to be the most critical issue.

On February 28, 2019, right after the end of the Second DPRK-U.S. Summit, President Trump called President Moon and requested him to “contact Chairman Kim Jong-un and share the result of conversation.” Therefore, it is desirable for the South Korean government to check up on Chairman Kim’s will toward denuclearization talks before the ROK-U.S. Summit through either a dispatch of special envoy for North Korea or an one-point Panmunjom inter-Korean summit as it did on May 24, 2018.

It is hard to make a hasty conclusion about whether North Korea will agree on the inter-Korean summit before the upcoming ROK-U.S. Summit. Nevertheless, if North Korea denies the dispatch of South Korean envoy or the initiation of Panmunjom inter-Korean summit with President Moon by emphasizing ‘by our nations itself’ spirit, such reaction would severely damage the credibility of Chairman Kim within the international community.

Surely President Moon needs to reconfirm Chairman Kim’s intention related to denuclearization talks. But, in fact, it is more important to persuade Chairman Kim to reveal the whole package deal of denuclearization (dismantling Yongbyon nuclear complex and other uranium enrichment facilities, forswearing intermediate- and long-range missiles and nuclear warheads, and redirecting nuclear scientists and engineers, etc.) and put all demands in return (relieving sanctions on North Korea, declaring official cessation of the Korean war, initiating negotiations for a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, establishing diplomatic relations and liaison offices between North Korea and the U.S., etc.) on the negotiation table with the U.S. If Kim Jong-un continues to stand his ground and simply request corresponding measures from international society in exchange for the dismantlement of Yongbyon nuclear complex, the future Third DPRK-U.S. Summit is much likely to collapse with another no deal.

Indeed such action requires Chairman Kim to make a bold decision to discard his original stance on a ‘phased’ denuclearization and reveal all conditions related to denuclearization measures to the U.S. However, if North Korea continues to fail to propose its detailed roadmap for a ‘complete denuclearization’ and the process after decommissioning Yongbyon nuclear facilities, as it did at the Hanoi Summit, the U.S. and international society will suspect that North Korea intends to maintain its status as a nuclear-weapon state even after eliciting sanctions relief by using the ‘Yongbyon nuclear complex’ as a bargaining card.

In addition, although the ‘permanent dismantlement of Yongbyon nuclear complex’ is certainly a critical step toward North Korea’s denuclearization, the U.S. will not be able to guarantee a convincing amount of reward for such measure, provided that North Korea continues to operate uranium enrichment facilities in other areas. Furthermore, even if Pyongyang consents to the decommissioning of all nuclear facilities including Yongbyon and other areas, Washington is still hard to accept North Korea’s proposal to “lift the articles of five sanctions resolutions – which were adopted between 2016 and 2017 and impede the civilian economy and the livelihood of our people.” Since the sanctions resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council in 2016 and 2017 are considered more influential than prior sanctions, the U.S. is highly unlikely to lift those sanctions in fear of losing a leverage to compel denuclearization of North Korea.

In other words, it is essential for North Korea to fully disclose its conditions for denuclearization to the U.S. at the negotiation table in order to bring about the sanctions relief that North Korea demanded at the Hanoi Summit. Such action would not work against North Korea. Unless both North Korea and the U.S. share their entire terms of agreement from the beginning and reach a full package deal, additional demands from the U.S. could arise during the subsequent negotiation process and hamper further progress, aggravating bilateral relations once more.

After completing a comprehensive workout plan of North Korea’s denuclearization process and corresponding measures from the U.S., both parties should proceed with an agreement which is synchronous, parallel, and progressive. Such procedure would accord with both Washington who proposed a ‘full package deal’ and Pyongyang who demanded a ‘phased denuclearization.’

Moreover, sufficient negotiations on every agenda at the working level meetings between the U.S. and North Korea should precede the third DPRK-U.S. summit in order to prevent another empty result with no signed document. It is sensible to develop an agreement, which both sides can be satisfied with, at the working-level talks and announce the date of summit, so as to achieve a successful result at the actual summit.

To this end, it is essential for Chairman Kim to entrust Kim Hyok Chol, the Special Representative for U.S. Affairs of North Korea’s State Affairs Commission, with adequate authority necessary to negotiate about the roadmap and methodology of denuclearization with U.S. Special Reprsentative for North Korea Stephen Biegun. And in order to encourage an agreement between the two sides, the South Korean government also needs to genuinely pursue working-level talks between Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon and his North Korean counterpart, Kim Hyok Chol.

Currently, U.S. President Trump and South Korean President Moon has publicly affirmed their willingness to continue dialogue with North Korea, and North Korea can hardly escape from the path of denuclearization talks due to its persisting economic plight. Therefore, Seoul needs to use the ‘sanction relief’ as a bargaining card at the forthcoming ROK-U.S. summit to elicit active participation of North Korea at prospective negotiation tables.

From such point of view, it is sensible for President Moon to persuade President Trump to affirm his stance in the form of an agreement or a press conference at the Summit that “Should the U.S. and North Korea at first concur in a roadmap to denuclearization, and should North Korea then initiates the decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and other areas and the elimination of intermediate- and long-range missiles and nuclear warheads, the U.S. ease sanctions corresponding to the denuclearization process.”

Adding to the aforementioned motion, it would be a huge diplomatic achievement if President Moon can elicit President Trump to suggest a further gesture – for instance, U.S. President is ready to visit North Korea and meet Chairman Kim, provided that North Korea is willing to make a comprehensive deal with the U.S. in regard to its denuclearization measures and corresponding measures of the international community. In Pyongyang’s point of view, President Trump’s visit to North Korea can be exploited as an “outstanding diplomatic success” of the current Chairman, and so North Korea may show more active position in future negotiations with the U.S.

Furthermore, South Korea and the U.S. also needs to prepare for the possibility of North Korea launching another satellite around the 1st session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, which is also scheduled on this April 11. If North Korea launches a new satellite rocket, additional sanctions on will be inevitable. Nevertheless, it is desirable for South Korea and the U.S. to take a flexible position and continue to open a door for negotiation that they may positively examine the permission for North Korea’s satellite launch on condition that Pyongyang agrees with abandoning nuclear weapons and intermediate- and long-range missiles.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original article that was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

※ The views expressed here are author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Sejong Institute.