South Korea’s Withdrawal from GSOMIA and Future Foreign Policy Strategy

[Current Issues and Policies 2019-18]

Dr. Hong Hyun-ik

Director of the Department of Diplomacy Strategy Studies,

the Sejong Institute

hyunik@sejong.org

Executive Summary

On August 22, the South Korean government decided not to extend General Security of Military Intelligence Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan upon its annual appraisal for extension.

Since the early 1990s, the United States and Japan has continuously tried to engage South Korea in their missile defense system against China and North Korea; in addition to installing THAAD in South Korea and the advanced military information-sharing systems between the U.S. and South Korea and the U.S. and Japan, the two countries pushed the Park Geun-hye administration (at the brink of her impeachment) to sign GSOMIA between South Korea and Japan. With the deployment of THAAD a few months later, South Korea became an outpost and cannon fodder to check North Korea, Russia and China, protecting Japan and the U.S.. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Abe was far from grateful to Korea for shielding Japan from being China’s primary target, and practically scrapped GSOMIA by accusing Korea of being untrustworthy as a security partner and imposing the trade restrictions. With no mediation or efforts to persuade Japan by the U.S., the South Korean government inevitably decided to exit from GSOMIA.

Our gain from GSOMIA has been rather minor, so there will be little harm to our military readiness against North Korean missiles without GSOMIA. Also, since the US-ROK alliance exists for our own national security, it is unwise to modify the alliance only to spoil the so-far friendly relationship with China and turn the country into a rival and possible aggressor.

As the United States is making demands based on the ‘America First’ policy, so should we respond to them with the ‘Korea First’ policy. We must establish the principle that the US-ROK alliance is for deterrence against North Korea and peace in the Korean peninsula, not for an anti-Chinese alliance, and that therefore deployment of intermediate-range missiles is unacceptable. If they demand an excessive increase in our share of defense costs, we may propose a reduction of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) by about 10,000 personnel. Since South Korea overpowers North Korea in terms of conventional military capability, the key purpose of the alliance for us is to deter the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, as long as the nuclear umbrella is guaranteed, the current size of USFK troops can be considered superfluous.

Still, the South Korean government may console the U.S. government by purchasing high-tech military equipments necessary for the wartime operational control. Because of the bilateral alliance to deter North Korea, in fact, we have been placed in competition with China, distanced from Russia, and disregarded by North Korea. As for our optimal foreign policy strategy, we must retrieve the wartime operational control, secure independent deterrence against North Korea based on mass retaliation capability, redefine the alliance with the U.S. to be reciprocal, and restore the strategic partnership with China.

Lastly, the South Korean government should keep the door for dialogue open to Japan while maintaining our principle. If the U.S., who would hope to extend GSOMIA, succeeds in convincing Japan, who would feel security anxiety without GSOMIA, to revoke the trade restrictions, we must reconsider the extension of the agreement with discretion.