The Collapse of the Second DPRK-U.S. Summit: How China Perceives It

 

No. 2019-8 (March 1, 2019)

Dr. Chung Jae Hung

Research Fellow, the Sejong Institute

jameschung@sejong.org

 

 

The second DPRK-U.S. summit was held in Hanoi, Vietnam on February 27-28. This Hanoi summit was a historic attempt to end the vicious cycle of conflict and animosity and correspond with the new era of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Particularly, North Korea’s Chairman Kim Jong-un elucidated that he needed ever more contemplation, efforts, and endurance’ to reach the second meeting, implying that they have undergone a rocky road.

 

However, North Korea and the U.S. failed to sign an agreement at the second summit. At the press conference after the summit, President Trump said, the negotiations inevitably failed since North Koreans wanted the removal of sanctions entirely as a concessional measure for the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear complex while the U.S. asserted that the complete, irreversible denuclearization including the dismantlement of the uranium enrichment facilities located in areas other than Yongbyon, missile facilities, and nuclear warhead weapons system and the declaration of the list of nuclear sites and inventory should precede the complete removal of sanctions. As a response, North Korea rebutted the U.S. assertion by expressing that the North Korean authorities demanded a partial removal of sanctions, and not in entirety, as a corresponding measure for the permanent closure of the Yongbyon nuclear site. Accordingly, President Trump will maintain sanctions on North Korea, demanding the verifiable measure of denuclearization such as the dismantlement of other uranium enrichment plants other than the ones in Yongbyon, missile facilities, and nuclear warheads in the future and adjusting the pace of the talks.

 

As the U.S. claims a full package deal of denuclearization first and concessions later and North Korea desires a ‘dual track’ approach through progressive, synchronous measures, the talks are projected to be between a rock and hard place. Already the talks between the U.S. and North Korea have a precedent case of a breakdown in 2009 over the inspection and verification of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Hence, North Korea calls for measures from the U.S. corresponding to each process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue from debilitation to freeze, to verification, and to abolition such as relief and removal of sanctions, normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S., peace treaty, etc. Eventually, should President Trump insist on the ‘package deal’ unwaveringly while declining North Korea’s aforementioned approach, Pyongyang is unlikely to accept such a deal.

 

The collapse of the second summit between North Korea and the U.S. startled not only South Korea but also China considerably. Prior to the summit, Chinese state media urged the two sides to agree on the early normalization of bilateral relations and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as the denuclearization on the peninsula serves also China’s interests. Moreover, it expressed high hopes for the second summit, emphasizing that the neighboring countries including the U.S. need to collectively make efforts to usher in an era of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula as North Korea have the intention to achieve economic development more than ever. Highlighting Chairman Kim’s firm expression of commitment to denuclearization and allusion to the possibility of decommissioning Yongbyon nuclear complex, many Chinese experts on Korean Peninsula repeatedly stressed the U.S. to note the significance of gradual confidence-building with North Korea by lifting sanctions partially in accordance.

 

Nevertheless, as the summit ended after the two states failed to bridge the gap, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang articulated, “In fact, ups and downs on the Peninsula over the past several decades show that dialogue and consultation is the only way out, and only by meeting each other half way can ensure steady progress on the right course. We hope that the DPRK and the US will continue to engage in dialogue, show sincerity, respect and accommodate each other's legitimate concerns and jointly promote denuclearization and the establishment of a peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula.” In his regular briefing. Since Beijing underlines the ‘dual track’ approach in opposition to the U.S. proposal of ‘package deal’ and the CVID, North Korea and China are likely to enhance strategic communication and coordination.

 

As it is well reported, China emphasized that it supports the resolution to the denuclearization issue by means of dialogue and negotiations and urged the relevant countries to unravel the issue swiftly in response to North Korea’s rational concerns and interests at the fourth Kim-Xi summit on January 8. North Korea also illustrated that it will keenly seek multilateral negotiations to transition from the existing armistice into peace retime under the close association with the signatories of the truce through the New Year’s address. Thus, North Korea and China are expected to shore up cooperation and coordination.

 

After the summit collapse, the North Korean delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Ri Kil-song visited Beijing and met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and discussed the key agreements between the two countries and changes in the political climate of the Korean Peninsula. As such, it is predicted that Chairman Kim will meet President Xi Jinping, explicate the details of the collapse of the summit, and request China’s active cooperation and support. China, also in need of an ally due to the trade war with the U.S., will consolidate its relations with North Korea further to balance out the U.S. concept of anti-China containment through U.S. withdrawal from the INF and the Indo-Pacific strategy.

 

In the future, China will undoubtedly strengthen cooperation on issues regarding the establishment of the peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and the relief of sanctions against North Korea. And it has plans to expand its role, proffering a novel multi-party negotiation framework (six-party talks). Furthermore, Chairman Kim also hinted at a ‘new way’ in his New Year’s address when the U.S. refuses North Korea’s rational demands. This implies that North Korea may elevate its relations with China to the level of the former alliance to alleviate its security and economic concerns. Marking the seventh decade of diplomatic relations, North Korea and China are pursuing a new development of the bilateral relationship in a new era. Developing a new relationship is also closely linked with China mid-to-long term foreign strategy initiative to achieve the two centennial goals – the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ and ‘Chinese dream’. Therefore, once President Xi officially visits North Korea in due course, marking the 70th anniversary of the bilateral relations, the two countries will bolster bilateral ties further.

 

Meanwhile, Beijing maintains that if President Trump blames China for the causes of all issues such as pointing that China pulls the strings behind the scenes regarding the collapse of the Hanoi summit and attempts to mount extra pressure on North Korea, the U.S.-China relations and DPRK-U.S. relations will aggravate. Basically, China perceives the animosity and hostility between North Korea and the U.S. accumulated since the Korean War lie as the root cause of the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, it argues the U.S. approach to resolve the issue – a package deal of denuclearization first, and compensation later – is infeasible. In sum, the Asian giant holds that a zero-sum-based resolution is bound to fail when neglecting the ‘dual track’ approach. At this juncture, the South Korean government should increase strategic communications with the U.S. as well as China and pursue the denuclearization and the establishment of a peace regime on the peninsula in a balanced manner by hosting trilateral and quadrilateral dialogues among the two Koreas, the U.S., and China.

 

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original article that was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.

 

※ The views expressed here are the author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Sejong Institute.