Criteria for Success of the Third DPRK-U.S. Summit and Directions of Bilateral Nuclear Agreement:

Entrusting the Interlocutors with Full Authority and Implementing the Denuclearization and Corresponding Measures Simultaneously

No. 2019-13 (April 5, 2019)

Dr. Cheong Seong-Chang

Vice President for Research Planning, the Sejong Institute

softpower@sejong.org

The collapse of the Hanoi summit in late February laid bare the limitations of the current top-down approach – setting the date of the summit first, holding the working-level talks hurriedly in accordance with the summit date, and leaving the key decisions to the leaders. As the working-level talks up to the summit were insufficient to coordinate the agendas, President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un had to negotiate the details of agreement, more than merely signing a document.

This result is primarily attributable to the fact that the North Korean leadership did not endow Kim Hyok-chul with any responsibility regarding the negotiations on the denuclearization issue. This reflects the Stalinist political structure of the North Korean regime – where power is highly concentrated on one supreme leader. As a consequence, Kim Hyok-chol is only known to have discussed issues other than denuclearization with the U.S. Special Representative Stephen Biegun.

More seriously, the North Korean interlocutors did not deliver the list of demands, which the U.S. expressed during the working-level talks, to Chairman Kim. Consequently, Chairman Kim approached the Hanoi summit with a very unrealistic and naïve attitude that North Korea could receive sanctions relief of “the article of sanctions that impede the civilian economy and the livelihood of our people from five UN sanctions resolutions adopted in 2016 and 201” in return for decommissioning the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Currently, Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol of Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea has orchestrated the overall procedure of Kim Jong-un’s denuclearization talks. Accordingly, he holds the biggest responsibility for Chairman Kim’s unpreparedness to discuss ‘denuclearization measures beyond the closure of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities’ at the summit and the collapse of the summit for demanding an excessive removal of sanctions to the U.S.

North Korea’s hardliners, including Kim Yong-chol, would view the following as their perfect scenario: North Korea remains a country possessing nuclear weapons with partial abandonment of the nuclear program while the U.S. lifts core articles of sanctions resolutions against North Korea. However, South Korea and the U.S. can never accept such scenario.

On June 12 last year at the meeting with President Trump, Chairman Kim articulated that he arrived at Singapore by boldly overcoming the situation where “old practices and prejudices have been covering our eyes and ears.” Nonetheless, Chairman Kim’s unrealistic negotiation strategy revealed at the Hanoi Summit portrayed that he failed to make rational decisions, blinded and deafened by hardliners within the leadership circle. Hence, the negotiations with the U.S. will face a rocky road unless Chairman Kim holds Kim Yong-chol accountable for the failure of the Hanoi Summit by either sacking him or reducing reliance on him significantly.

For the third bilateral summit to avert yet another ‘no deal,’ President Trump and Chairman Kim should reach an agreement on a comprehensive workout plan regarding North Korea’s denuclearization measures and the corresponding measures from the U.S. To this end, it is crucial for Kim Jong-un to entrust Kim Hyok-chol with the adequate authority necessary to negotiate the denuclearization issue and directly receive detailed reports on the working-level negotiations.

The South Korean government should actively participate in the working-level negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. so as to prevent the negotiations being broken down due to lack of sufficient discussions at the working level. For that purpose, it is desirable to pursue working-level talks between South Korea’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon and Special Representative Kim Hyok-chol and regularize these talks.

President Moon Jae-in needs to consider either meeting directly with Chairman Kim at Panmunjom or suggesting regularization of talks between the interlocutors of two sides to North Korea. It is appropriate to take turns in hosting the talks between Lee Do-hoon and Kim Hyok-chol in Seoul and Pyongyang. If Kim Hyok-chol is difficult to arrive at Seoul, the two could meet at Panmunjom (and Pyongyang) for the time being. Should North Korea refuse the inter-Korean dialogue on denuclearization, it contradicts with the spirit of ‘by our nation itself’, the slogan that it claims incessantly.

If the working level meeting between Lee Do-hoon and Kim Hyok-chol are well underway, the South Korean government should develop the meeting to include U.S. Representative Stephen Biegun. For the success of the third summit, it is sensible to establish a DPRK-U.S. bilateral or ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral working group which resembles the ROK-U.S. working group.

The appointed interlocutors from the two or three sides should regularly meet in Washington, Pyongyang, and Seoul (or at Panmunjom) and take sufficient time to prepare the draft of agreement to be signed at the third DPRK-U.S. summit. Subsequently, the summit date should be finalized only after the working-level talks narrow the gap over the draft that both President Trump and Chairman Kim can be satisfied with. With the working-level talks on a regular basis between North Korea and the U.S., Chairman Kim can avoid the embarrassing situation of returning empty-handed like the Hanoi Summit because of the lack of sufficient coordination. Therefore, it fully coincides with North Korea’s interests.

North Korea and the U.S. should put all their demands on the negotiations table and engineer a comprehensive schedule regarding North Korea’s denuclearization measures and the corresponding measures from the U.S. And such moves will be a compromise acceptable to both sides – the former claiming a ‘package deal’ and the latter stressing a ‘phased denuclearization.’

Until recently, Pyongyang asserted that it will move on to the next stage when one step toward denuclearization is completed. Even so, it did not state a denuclearization roadmap indicating what other steps it will take to reach a ‘complete denuclearization’ after the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. This ‘phased’ approach elongates not only the denuclearization process but also renders the possibility of establishing diplomatic ties between North Korea and the U.S. and signing the peace treaty uncertain.

Therefore, North Korea should take several measures of denuclearization simultaneously, including decommissioning nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and other areas, dismantling intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and abandoning nuclear warheads. It is sensible for the U.S. to take corresponding measures in line with North Korea’s progress in denuclearization. For instance, North Korea could dismantle ICBMs and nuclear warheads in two or three steps rather than one. In return, the U.S. could normalize diplomatic relations and remove sanctions progressively in accordance with North Korea’s denuclearization process.

If North Korea proceeds with several denuclearization measures in parallel, it will relieve the suspicions of the international community that North Korea tries to cement the status of a ‘nuclear-weapon state’ by biding the time. And once Pyongyang takes these measures swiftly, the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Pyongyang, the peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula, and the full removal of the sanctions regime against North Korea could be possible within President Trump’s current term.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original article that was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper. 

※ The views expressed here are author's own, and do not necessarily represent those of the Sejong Institute.