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[Outlook on Global Affairs 2026-Special Issue No.8] Outlook for Russia in 2026: The Ukraine War, Domestic and Foreign Policy |
| December 11, 2025 |
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Andrei LankovVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | andreilankov@gmail.com
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Throughout 2025, the war in Ukraine remained the central issue shaping both Russia’s domestic politics and foreign policy.
The battlefield situation in 2025 developed in a manner relatively favorable to Russia, although overall Russian military gains were limited. According to multiple assessments, Russian offensive operations during the year resulted in the capture of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 square kilometers of territory, equivalent to roughly 0.4–0.8% of Ukraine’s total territory. Nevertheless, Russian forces continued to advance steadily westward over the course of 2025. Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts failed to achieve meaningful results.
Russian forces also succeeded in expelling Ukrainian troops from Kursk, which is recognized under international law as Russian territory. Ukrainian units had entered Kursk in August 2024 and seized approximately 1,000 square kilometers of territory. Operations to remove these forces were completed in early 2025. North Korean troops actively participated in this operation, and their involvement was officially announced, albeit with some delay.
One of the events that had a significant impact on Russia’s strategy in 2025 was the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. During the 2024 U.S. presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump repeatedly emphasized that, if elected, he would “end the war between Russia and Ukraine within 24 hours.” In practice, throughout 2025 he devoted considerable effort to pursuing an end to the conflict. His approach combined pressure on both Russia and Ukraine with promises of concessions. Overall, President Trump made clear his willingness to pursue a settlement that was more favorable to Russia than those advocated by his predecessors and that would compel Ukraine to accept substantial territorial concessions. In addition, Trump sharply reduced the scale of U.S. assistance to Ukraine.
Washington’s new policy toward Ukraine was welcomed by the Russian leadership. In Moscow, expectations began to spread that the Zelensky government in Ukraine, having lost U.S. support, would be unable to sustain prolonged and long term resistance against Russia.
Nevertheless, Russia continued to make efforts to improve relations with China. In September, China held a large scale commemoration marking the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, which was attended by delegations from Russia and North Korea. The appearance of Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un together at Tiananmen Square was intended to demonstrate solidarity among Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang.
Contrary to the expectations of most analysts, the outbreak of the war in 2022 and the introduction of exceptionally strong international sanctions did not lead to a rapid deterioration of Russia’s economic conditions. Moreover, in 2023 and 2024 the economy recorded relatively strong growth. In 2025, however, the Russian economy entered a clear phase of slowdown, with GDP growth limited to approximately 0.6%. At present, economists assess that Russia is entering a period of long term economic stagnation. Nevertheless, the scale of Russia’s economic difficulties should not be overstated. The Russian economy retains the capacity to sustain the current level of military operations for an extended period, and it is unlikely that this will lead to a significant decline in the living standards of the majority of the population. -
At present, the Putin government faces no form of meaningful political opposition. Over the past three to five years, most politicians and public intellectuals with anti-government views have left Russia and relocated abroad. Alexei Navalny, who had been the most prominent opposition leader, was arrested and sentenced to a lengthy prison term and ultimately died while in custody. In some cases, individuals can be arrested merely for publicly criticizing government policy. Public demonstrations and picket protests are prohibited.
State controlled mass media has proven highly effective in disseminating the official narrative. The government has taken steps to restrict internet access in order to shield the population from opposition influence. Priority has been given to blocking access to social media platforms that Moscow cannot fully control or censor. As a result, platforms such as Facebook, X(Twitter), and Instagram are currently inaccessible in Russia. Under these conditions, a majority of the Russian population continues to support the Putin regime.
Even sociologists with anti-government views assess that 60-70% of the Russian population supports Putin’s current policy line including the war against Ukraine. This level of support reflects a wartime rally around the flag effect combined with sustained and intensive state propaganda. Another important factor is that living standards in Russia have not declined since the outbreak of the war.
At the same time, Russian society is experiencing an increasingly pronounced trend toward conservatism. State centered nationalism is gaining influence while skepticism toward the outside world continues to deepen. Although the Russian economy remains highly dependent on migrant labor, immigration policy is becoming steadily more restrictive.
In conclusion, Russia is unlikely to face serious internal political challenges in 2026. Vladimir Putin will retain firm control over the domestic political environment, and the likelihood of large scale anti-government protests remains extremely low. -
Contrary to the expectations of many analysts, 2023 and 2024 marked a period of exceptionally rapid growth for the Russian economy. According to the IMF, Russia’s GDP growth rate reached 4.3% in 2024, raising concerns about economic overheating. In 2025, however, clear signs of deceleration emerged and actual growth is estimated at around 0.6%.
Most experts expect the Russian economy in 2026 to show some improvement compared to 2025 although overall growth is projected to remain modest. IMF analysts forecast Russia’s GDP growth at approximately 1% in 2026. Projections by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development are broadly similar with an estimated growth rate of 1.3%. The IMF also expects Russia’s inflation rate in 2026 to stand at 5.2%.
Accordingly, Russia in 2026 will experience a certain degree of economic difficulty. However, the situation does not rise to the level of an economic crisis. Russia’s projected growth rate of 1.0% as forecast by the IMF is not dramatically different from the average growth outlook for advanced economies which stands at around 1.6%. This suggests that the Russian government will face no particular difficulty in financing military expenditures. It also indicates that fiscal resources will remain sufficient to sustain a range of social programs which play a key role in maintaining grassroots public support.
The war and the deterioration of relations with Western advanced economies have brought about a sharp transformation in Russia’s external trade structure. In 2020, trade with the European Union accounted for 38% of Russia’s total trade volume but by 2025 this share had fallen to 8%. By contrast, the share of trade with China rose from 18% to 33% making China Russia’s largest trading partner. China’s continued imports of Russian oil and raw materials despite sanctions have been one of the key factors underpinning Russia’s economic stability. This situation is unlikely to change in 2026. China will remain Russia’s central trading partner, and Russia’s dependence on China is highly likely to deepen further. -
China
Russia’s ability to sustain a large scale war against Ukraine while maintaining domestic economic and political stability rests to a considerable extent on the willingness of China and India to continue purchasing Russian raw materials.
At the same time, Russia has entered a state of dependence on China for the first time in its history. The Russia-China relationship is highly asymmetric. Russia has no alternative external markets that could replace China and India. For China, by contrast, Russia represents only a secondary market. In 2024, China’s exports to Russia amounted to 115 billion dollars while its exports to the United States reached 450 billion dollars. Moreover, China can at any time identify alternative suppliers for most of the goods it currently imports from Russia.
For these reasons, the Russia-China relationship is characterized by deep structural asymmetry. In addition, the two countries share a long history of accumulated disputes and profound mutual distrust. Historical experience in Russia China relations has been marked more by conflict than by sustained cooperation.
Nevertheless, there is little basis to expect a serious confrontation, or a visible deterioration in relations between Russia and China in 2026. As long as long term strategic rivalry with the United States continues China will seek to keep Russia firmly within its sphere of influence. Russia’s growing dependence on China and the asymmetric structure of the relationship also enable China to secure increasingly favorable terms in bilateral trade.
United States and Europe
Relations between Russia and the United States in 2026 are likely to be broadly contradictory. On the one hand, Putin and Trump display a degree of personal affinity. Both leaders are skeptical of the liberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War, and regard it as misaligned with their national interests. Both view an international order based on a balance of power among great powers and the division of the world into spheres of influence, which reached its peak in the late nineteenth century, as a more natural form of order. The United States also does not perceive Russia as a dangerous enemy or a primary competitor. On the other hand, friction between Russia and the United States will be unavoidable, particularly over the Ukraine issue.
Relations between Russia and Europe will remain tense. Russia will seek to exploit divisions both among European states and within individual countries. It is likely to support Eurosceptic and far right forces, especially in countries where such groups possess political influence, such as the AfD in Germany. Russia will also attempt to strengthen cooperation with European governments that oppose support for Ukraine (e.g. Orbán administration in Hungary).
North Korea
North Korea–Russia relations in 2026 will be shaped largely by developments on the battlefield in Ukraine. Russian forces will continue to procure weapons and ammunition from North Korea’s defense industry, a trade that is highly beneficial for Pyongyang. However, exports of large caliber artillery shells, which constituted the core of North Korea–Russia military cooperation until recently, are likely to decline in 2026. This reflects changes in the character of the war. Over time, the role of heavy artillery on the front lines has diminished, while drones have emerged as the most critical weapon system. As a result, Russia will no longer require large scale imports of artillery shells from North Korea, increasing the likelihood that the overall volume of bilateral arms and ammunition trade, as well as North Korea’s associated export revenues, will decrease in 2026.
During 2024 and 2025, North Korean military units were deployed only to Kursk, which is recognized under international law as Russian territory. It remains unclear which side initiated this restriction. Nevertheless, this degree of caution suggests that either Russia or North Korea, or both, view the deployment of North Korean troops on internationally recognized Ukrainian territory as problematic. While a change in this stance cannot be ruled out, the likelihood that North Korean combat troops will directly participate in fighting in 2026 remains very low. By contrast, the deployment of noncombat personnel, such as demining units, engineering troops, and military construction workers, appears considerably more plausible.
Despite official rhetoric, there is little likelihood that nonmilitary cooperation between North Korea and Russia will expand in any meaningful way in 2026. The economic structures of the two countries remain largely incompatible. Most goods that North Korea can export for profit on international markets face virtually no demand in Russia. As a result, nonmilitary cooperation will be limited mainly to symbolic events or cultural exchanges. At most, Russia may provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea, particularly in the medical sector.
In contrast, the number of North Korean workers entering Russia is expected to increase significantly in 2026. The import of North Korean labor is one of the few areas of cooperation where clear economic incentives exist for both sides. By the end of 2026, the number of North Korean workers in Russia is likely to reach between 30000 and 50000. They will be employed primarily in the construction sector, but the share working in manufacturing is expected to rise. The proportion of female workers will also increase noticeably. In addition, the geographic distribution of North Korean labor will expand considerably. Whereas North Korean workers have so far been concentrated mainly in Russia’s Far East, in 2026, a substantial number are expected to work in western regions of Russia as well.
“Global South”
In 2026, Russia will portray itself in official discourse as one of the leaders of the Global South. Such claims should be treated with caution. They reflect the Russian government’s aspirations and serve a propagandistic purpose rather than demonstrating actual capabilities.
In his Valdai Club speech in October 2025, President Vladimir Putin outlined the core principles of Russia’s new foreign policy. According to these principles, Russia presents itself as one of the central states in a post-global world. It rejects the liberal international order and argues that a new world order should be grounded in state sovereignty. Russia also characterizes its confrontation with the West as “long term“ and “structural.“
This perception accurately reflects the worldview of President Putin and the Russian elite. Yet, despite Russia’s claim to leadership of the Global South, its policies toward the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America in 2026 will remain largely restrained. As the Russian economy slows, Moscow lacks the resources to pursue an active agenda in these regions. A clear example was Russia’s near complete non-response to Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Despite rhetoric emphasizing close ties with Iran, Russia showed little willingness to intervene and demonstrated no readiness to commit meaningful resources.
Russia’s behavior during the 2023 Armenia Azerbaijan conflict offers an even starker illustration. Although Armenia is formally a Russian ally, Moscow was preoccupied with the war in Ukraine and provided virtually no military, diplomatic, or economic support when Azerbaijan moved to seize Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, Armenia lost control of the territory and public opinion within Armenia turned sharply against Russia. This episode shows that Russia is currently unwilling and unable to bear the costs of an active foreign policy except in a small number of regions that it considers militarily and politically essential.
At the same time, Russia will continue to emphasize solidarity with the so-called “global majority” through symbolic gestures and rhetorical messaging.
Outlook on Korea-Russia Relations
From the perspective of the Russian government, South Korea is viewed as a Western democratic country that is “the least hostile country among those designated as unfriendly.” It is not coincidental that senior Russian officials have described Korea as “the least hostile country among those designated as unfriendly.” Accordingly, Russian diplomacy is likely to advance various proposals aimed at a partial restoration of bilateral relations. Key areas of interest may include the resumption of direct flights and the revitalization of trade.
However, expectations for a substantive improvement in Korea-Russia relations should remain limited. Given South Korea’s relations with the United States, Japan, and other Western allies, even if Seoul were inclined to restore ties with Moscow, implementation would be difficult. In addition, in the short-term Russia is expected to prioritize its relationship with North Korea over relations with South Korea. As a result, while limited normalization in a few peripheral areas may be possible in 2026, the likelihood of major change is low. Even if a ceasefire were reached in Ukraine in 2026, it would not have an immediate impact on Korea-Russia relations. Addressing concrete issues such as the lifting of international sanctions would require additional time even after a ceasefire.
| Reflecting on 2025
| Russia’s Domestic Political Situation in 2026
| Russia’s Economic Outlook in 2026
| Russia’s Foreign Policy in 2026
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
