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Outlook for North Korea’s Military Cooperation with China and Russia Following the ROK-U.S. Summit |
| December 10, 2025 |
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Jang Won JoVisiting Research Fellow | jjo@sejong.org
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Following the ROK-U.S. summit held on October 29 in Gyeongju on the margins of APEC, a joint explanatory release on November 14 outlined a series of measures to strengthen the alliance, including the reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence, enhanced cooperation within the Nuclear Consultative Group(NCG), and approval related to the construction of nuclear powered submarines. In response, North Korea issued a commentary through the Korean Central News Agency on November 18, stating that the United States and the ROK had “reconfirmed a hostile policy toward the DPRK” and criticizing the strengthening of trilateral military coordination among the United States, the ROK, and Japan as “inducing a regional arms race” and “undermining regional security stability.” This was followed by another KCNA commentary on November 28 asserting that “the United States is engaging in actions that destroy the regional security balance,” continuing its criticism.
An analysis of the tone of these commentaries suggests that North Korea is highlighting the “strengthening of trilateral military cooperation among the United States, the ROK, and Japan aimed at regional bloc formation,” while emphasizing the need to reinforce a “DPRK-China-Russia security cooperation framework” in response at the level of military strategy. In this context, Pyongyang may be more likely to cite “U.S. military power projection in the region” and the ROK’s pursuit of nuclear powered submarines as grounds to request from China and Russia “support for the expansion of North Korea’s conventional military capabilities” and “the transfer of key technologies necessary for the development of nuclear-powered submarines or strategic weapons.” Against this backdrop, this paper examines potential changes in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula that could result from North Korea’s response measures to the outcome of the ROK-U.S. summit, as well as related issues that warrant consideration. -
U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Fritz’s Remarks on “Strengthening Collective Deterrence“
Jonathan Fritz, U.S. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, stated in a keynote address at a forum co-hosted by the Korea Foundation(KF) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies(CSIS) in Washington D.C. on December 4 that “President Trump has expressed U.S. support for South Korea’s construction of nuclear powered submarines armed with conventional weapons, and we will continue bilateral cooperation to address the associated requirements and challenges.” He emphasized that “this (President Trump’s approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction) is a clear example of bilateral cooperation that strengthens our collective deterrence capability against regional threats.” The reference by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz to “strengthening collective deterrence capability” can be interpreted as reflecting expectations that the ROK-U.S. alliance will assume a strengthened role in countering China’s efforts to expand its military influence in the South China Sea and the Taiwan area.
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz also stated that “the fundamentals of the ROK-U.S. alliance are stronger than ever, and firm continuity is being maintained in key areas, including ironclad extended deterrence, the denuclearization of North Korea, and ensuring peace and security in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the broader region.” He added that “we will work with South Korea and partners across the region to uphold international maritime law and to ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and beyond.” These remarks suggest that U.S. approval of South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered submarines is intended not only for the Korean Peninsula but also as part of broader efforts to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of regional partners in response to China’s expanding military influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
UNC/CFC/USFK Commander Brunson’s Remarks Describing South Korea as an “Aircraft Carrier”
Gen. Xavier Brunson, Commander of UNC/CFC/USFK, stated at the Association of the U.S. Army Pacific Land Forces Symposium held in Hawaii on May 15 that South Korea is “a fixed aircraft carrier floating between Japan and the Chinese mainland.” He added, “U.S. Forces Korea do not focus solely on deterring North Korea. We are also focused on regional operations, activities, and investments as a small part of a larger Indo-Pacific strategy.” This statement has been interpreted as assigning South Korea a strategic role as a base from which operations oriented toward China could be conducted.
More recently, in an article titled “East-Up Map,” posted online on November 17, Gen. Brunson wrote that “if one flips the map of the Korean Peninsula so that the east is at the top and views the same region, the strategic value of the Peninsula and of U.S. Forces Korea becomes clear.” He stated that “the Peninsula is not an outer outpost but a core space inside the defensive perimeter, and already a key force in place.” By emphasizing that South Korea is positioned to deter not only North Korea but also parts of China and Russia simultaneously, these remarks drew considerable attention. -
North Korea, in a Korean Central News Agency(KCNA) commentary titled “Japan Is a Guide to NATO” dated February 25, 2025, criticized Japan after referring to joint exercises involving aircraft carriers conducted with the United States and France, as well as Japan’s participation in the Quad and its efforts to join AUKUS. The commentary stated that “Japan, which has extended its reach into nearly all military blocs in the region, is not stopping there but has been more zealous than anyone in jumping on the U.S. scheme to establish an ‘Asian version of NATO’ centered on ROK-U.S.–Japan trilateral military alliance and to build military cooperation ties with NATO member states.”
In addition, in a November 18 KCNA commentary, North Korea criticized the (Gyeongju APEC) ROK–U.S.–Japan summit leaders’ reaffirmation of their commitment to the “complete denuclearization of North Korea.” It stated that the substance of the current U.S. administration’s policy toward North Korea had been clearly revealed and that “by proving its determination to deny our constitution to the very end, the debate over the direction of U.S. policy toward North Korea has been brought to an end,” sharply criticizing the U.S. administration.
After emphasizing what it describes as the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea, Pyongyang criticized the outcomes of the ROK–U.S. summit on the grounds that the United States is strengthening and expanding ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral military cooperation in order to counter North Korea, China, and Russia and to pursue military bloc formation in the Indo-Pacific region. The commentary conveyed the following points:
- The United States is attempting to strategically use South Korea to establish hegemony not only around the Korean Peninsula but also in the Indo-Pacific region, including the South China Sea and Taiwan.
- To this end, the United States approved South Korea’s construction of nuclear-powered submarines, and such measures represent a serious development that destabilizes the military security situation in the Asia-Pacific region beyond the Korean Peninsula and could lead to a global situation of uncontrollable nuclear dynamics.
- South Korea and U.S. leaders emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and opposed unilateral changes to the status quo. In doing so, the U.S. strategic intent to involve South Korea in the Taiwan issue and push it to the forefront of efforts to establish hegemony across the Asia-Pacific region was, according to North Korea, laid bare, revealing an attempt to deny the core interests of sovereign states in the region and to overtly interfere in international dispute areas.
- The United States is also deepening combined military exercises, military information sharing, and military exchanges to strengthen ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral military cooperation, with the aim of adding Japan to the ROK–U.S. alliance and developing it into a global military alliance rather than a simple regional bloc.
In addition, in another KCNA commentary issued on November 28, North Korea cited (1) the ROK–U.S. combined anti submarine warfare exercise “Silent Shark” conducted near Guam on November 18 and (2) the establishment of a forward arming and refueling point by U.S. Marines on Yonaguni Island, Japan, near the Taiwan Strait on November 21. It asserted that the United States is openly engaging in military activities that seriously threaten the strategic stability of areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula and claimed these actions clearly demonstrate who is responsible for “unilateral changes to the status quo.”
Across these commentaries, North Korea places particular emphasis on its claim that the United States is overtly pursuing U.S.-led military strategic intervention in the Indo-Pacific region by utilizing South Korea and Japan. In its November 18 KCNA commentary, North Korea concluded that “the reality in which the United States’ hegemonic intentions in the region are taking more concrete form at a more practical stage demands a heightened awareness of the increasingly unstable regional and international security environment and a redoubling of responsible efforts to respond to it.”
In this manner, North Korea argues that the United States is concretizing what it describes as hegemonic intentions to encircle and deter North Korea, China, and Russia by forming a NATO-like regional security framework in the Indo-Pacific through the regionalization and realignment of the ROK–U.S. and U.S.–Japan alliances. Citing the need for preparedness in response, North Korea stated that, in line with the measures formalized and institutionalized by South Korea and the United States at their summit, it will “take more justified and realistic responsive measures to defend national sovereignty and security interests and to safeguard regional peace.” -
Amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, and in connection with the ROK–U.S. pledges on “peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific,” the reaffirmation of defense commitments toward North Korea, the expanding scope of U.S.–Japan joint exercises, and statements by U.S. Department of Defense officials regarding the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea is expected to seek to use the current situation to justify an expansion of military cooperation with China and Russia. By portraying U.S.-led efforts to construct a regional security framework, Pyongyang is likely to develop measures aimed at strengthening such cooperation.
In this regard, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly objected to the “one theater” concept articulated by Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani in March 2025, stating that a strategy to define surrounding areas as a single integrated theater and pursue joint responses by U.S. allies constitutes an infringement on sovereignty. Similarly, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the proposal for an “Asian NATO,” advanced by Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba in September 2024, stating that “the United States and forces aligned with it (South Korea and Japan) are actively working to consolidate an aggressive military and political bloc and to intensify military competition in Northeast Asia.” Russia thus accused the United States of seeking to expand its alliance network on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia by mobilizing partner countries.
North Korea is likely to align its position with these Chinese and Russian assessments and continue to emphasize both the “strengthening of trilateral ROK–U.S.–Japan military cooperation and increased military force projection in the region” and the corresponding “need for military cooperation among North Korea, China, and Russia” in response.
Direction of North Korea Military Cooperation with China and Russia
At present, a full-scale “ROK–U.S.–Japan versus North Korea–China–Russia” military confrontation framework has not yet taken shape. However, China and Russia appear likely to share with North Korea a strategic perception regarding the strengthening of ROK–U.S.–Japan trilateral military cooperation and prospective U.S. efforts to expand military force projection in the region centered on that axis.
Accordingly, North Korea, stimulated in part by South Korea recent efforts to secure enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and to pursue the possession of nuclear powered submarines, is expected to continue emphasizing a “bloc versus bloc” confrontation framework. By underscoring the expansion of ROK–U.S. military cooperation partnerships in a broader regional context to China and Russia, Pyongyang is likely to advance the argument that China and Russia, “encircled and deterred by ROK–U.S.–Japan,” must provide military support to North Korea and thereby make it a supporting force for their side. By stressing that “as the ROK–U.S. hostile regional confrontation posture toward North Korea, China, and Russia becomes increasingly overt, urgent and realistic countermeasures are required to safeguard core regional interests,” North Korea may argue that, just as the United States is supporting the strengthening of South Korea military capabilities, China and Russia should provide military assistance to North Korea, particularly key technologies required for the development of strategic weapons and materiel needed to expand conventional forces.
In particular, North Korea is likely to seek Chinese and Russian support in areas of advanced strategic weapons development where its own capabilities face significant constraints, as well as in conventional military sectors where it remains at a severe disadvantage relative to South Korea.
For example, although North Korea conducted two test launches of a hypersonic glide vehicle in January and October 2025, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that “the trajectory of the October launch resembled that of a short-range ballistic missile rather than that of a hypersonic glide vehicle,” suggesting that technical challenges remain in integrating guidance and control technologies with the glide vehicle flight characteristics. In addition, large attack and reconnaissance drones such as the Saetbyol 4 (described as a North Korean version of the Global Hawk), publicly revealed in 2023, appear externally similar to advanced systems, but assessments indicate that the level of development of internal advanced electronic systems and key components remains limited.
With respect to nuclear powered submarines, Rodong Sinmun reported on March 8 that Kim Jong Un “provided on site guidance at major shipyards and reviewed the status of nuclear submarine construction,” and published images of the hull of a submarine under construction. However, the development of key modules such as small nuclear reactors, propulsion systems, and reduction gears used in nuclear submarines is assessed as unlikely without technological assistance from China or Russia.
Regarding reconnaissance satellites, at the December 2023 Workers’ Party plenary meeting, Kim Jong Un stated that three additional military reconnaissance satellites would be launched in 2024. However, after the failure of a satellite launch in May 2024 due to an in flight explosion during the first stage, which exposed technical deficiencies, North Korea has not yet conducted another reconnaissance satellite launch. Development of reconnaissance satellites requires technologies for satellite production, rocket engine development for space launch vehicles, and precision guidance and control to place satellites into designated orbits. Enhancing the maturity of these technologies is assessed as likely to require technical support from Russia.
In addition, an airborne early warning aircraft revealed in March 2025, which appears to possess only an external form, would require integrated advanced technologies such as high-power radar, electronic warfare systems, command and control, data links, and software for operational use. It remains doubtful whether the aircraft disclosed by North Korea possesses actual operational capability. Other areas where support may be sought include the acquisition of new fighter aircraft to replace aging platforms and the introduction of medium to long range surface-to-air missile systems necessary to build an air defense network in which North Korea remains at a disadvantage.
Prospects for Chinese and Russian Responses to North Korea Requests
In the case of Russia, based on the close military relationship consolidated through the Russia–Ukraine war and the June 2024 Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including provisions on cooperation to strengthen defense capabilities, Moscow may have some potential to cooperate with North Korea in areas such as high resolution satellite manufacturing technology and satellite orbital insertion technologies within the framework of scientific and technological cooperation. In addition, following the end of the Russia–Ukraine war, Russia may, depending on future circumstances, provide fighter aircraft that, while considered older models by Russian standards, could still be regarded as newer than those currently possessed by North Korea. Support in the form of military materiel needed to expand North Korea conventional weapons production capacity is also conceivable. However, the provision of advanced strategic weapons technologies applied to systems such as hypersonic weapons, airborne early warning aircraft, and large drones comparable to the Global Hawk or MQ 9 may be considered only if U.S. military threats to the region become more concrete and immediate. The transfer of technologies related to nuclear-powered submarines is assessed as unlikely.
In the case of China, although North Korea may be seen as necessary to an anti-U.S. front and bilateral ties appear more favorable than in the past, as reflected in public displays of closer relations such as Kim Jong Un attendance at Victory Day commemorations, the level of U.S.–China military confrontation has not yet escalated to the point where China would need to provide close support for North Korea development of advanced military weapons, nor is U.S. military pressure in the region currently assessed as being projected at a level that would compel such support. However, if China were to factor in contingencies involving Taiwan, or if regional circumstances were to evolve in a manner that heightens Chinese concerns over perceived U.S. efforts to establish regional hegemony, thereby elevating the military strategic value of North Korea, this assessment could change. -
Following the easing of current tensions between China and Japan arising from remarks related to Taiwan by Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi, or at a stage when tangible progress is observed in ROK–U.S. cooperation on △ enrichment and reprocessing and on the △ construction of nuclear-powered submarines, China could shift its focus and concentrate economic and security pressure on South Korea in response to △ Seoul pursuit of nuclear-powered submarines and the possibility of an △ expanded regional military role for South Korea. Accordingly, in external messaging, it will be necessary to exercise increased caution regarding elements that could provoke China, while expanding advance notification and communication through diplomatic channels in order to sufficiently convey the position that “regional stability and peace are valued” and “bilateral conflict would not be beneficial to either side diplomatically or economically.”
In addition, while coordinating with the United States on the need to prevent a situation in which China, out of concern over the “military bloc formation of South Korea, the United States, and Japan in the region,” considers “providing military support to North Korea,” South Korea should seek to play a “buffering role” in the economic, technological, and supply chain domains between the United States and China, thereby enabling it to serve as a “facilitator of cooperation between the two.”
With respect to Russia, given the high likelihood that Russia–North Korea military and economic cooperation could be adjusted after the end of the Russia–Ukraine war, it will be necessary to manage future relations with Russia by closely examining both measures that could restrain Russia–North Korea military cooperation to a certain level and the conditions for economic cooperation between South Korea and Russia.
In this context, under the justification of responding to U.S. approval of △ South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine construction, △ expanded regional role of U.S. Forces Korea, and △ enhancement of South Korea’s military capabilities supported by the United States, North Korea may request military cooperation and support from China or Russia in the fields of advanced strategic weapons development and conventional military production and acquisition. Accordingly, South Korea should closely monitor related trends and make thorough preparations through preventive and multifaceted measures.
| U.S. Concept of Expanding the Role of the ROK-U.S. Alliance
| North Korea’s Criticism of “U.S.-Led Military Bloc Formation” Around the Korean Peninsula
| Prospects for North Korea Military Cooperation with China and Russia
| Considerations for South Korea
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