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The War in Ukraine and Europe’s Challenge - From Free-Rider to Guardian - |
| December 17, 2025 |
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Yeocheol YoonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | yoon.yeocheol@gmail.com
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Since World War II, NATO, the security alliance between the United States and Europe, has been sustained as a largely unilateral structure in which the United States protected Western Europe from the threat of the Soviet Union, with military capabilities and the burden of costs concentrated disproportionately on the United States. As a result, Europe came to take its reliance on U.S. defense capabilities for granted and to focus on the advancement of its own economic and social development, while dissatisfaction within the United States over Europe’s free riding accumulated.1)
At the same time, as Europe enjoyed a prolonged period of peace after the end of the Cold War, perspectives also emerged that questioned the very rationale for NATO’s existence.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally shattered the rules-based international order that had taken shape after the end of the Cold War and, in practical terms, confronted European states with their most serious security threat since World War II. However, a divergence in threat perceptions emerged, ranging from the view that implicitly accepted Ukraine as falling within Russia’s sphere of influence to the view that the United States under President Biden should concentrate on what it regarded as a more urgent threat, namely systemic competition with China.2) European countries, including the United Kingdom, emphasized the importance of deterring Russia in order to defend the international order and thereby sought to invite more active U.S. support for Ukraine.3) While U.S. assistance, initially cautious in light of Putin’s threatened use of nuclear weapons, was gradually strengthened to include medium and long range strike capabilities, Russia’s invasion also created momentum for European countries, which had been largely indifferent to U.S. pressure during Trump’s first term, to undertake a substantive increase in their defense expenditures.
Following President Trump’s reelection in November 2024 and the resulting increase in uncertainty regarding U.S. support for Ukraine, the EU, NATO, and individual European states moved to strengthen assistance to Ukraine and to take on their own measures, including increases in defense spending and troop levels. After the Alaska meeting between Trump and Putin and subsequent telephone conversations, the United States initially presented a draft peace plan that reflected Russian demands and effectively required sacrifices from Ukraine. In response to opposition within the Republican Party and persistent persuasion by European countries, however, the draft was revised to place greater emphasis on security guarantees for Ukraine, while NATO membership and territorial issues were left for direct consultations between Trump and Zelensky.
Russia has continued to maintain a maximalist negotiating posture, and with both sides unable to find common ground, the final ceasefire agreement remains elusive as of mid December 2025. While Europe and Ukraine feel that they will somehow have to accept Trump’s mediation, they will also strive to include mechanisms that safeguard Ukraine’s sovereignty and provide security guarantees in their negotiations on the ceasefire proposal.
Although Europe lacks the military capabilities required to assume the role of the world cop that has traditionally been borne by the United States and therefore continues to require basic U.S. support, Trump’s retreat from America’s global role has compelled Europe to prepare to shoulder a greater share of its own defense. This has entailed not only increases in defense spending and troop levels but also Europe’s emergence as a principal actor responsible for upholding the liberal order on the international stage.
At a time when the future trajectory of U.S. domestic politics after Trump’s second term remains uncertain and it is unclear whether a subsequent administration will return to America’s traditional international role, South Korea will have to continue efforts to strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance regardless of who holds power in Washington. At the same time, South Korea should also reinforce close communication and substantive cooperative relations with European countries that defend liberal democracy, the market economy, and the rules-based order, and seek to coordinate and cooperate with them on their responses to the new strategic environment, including changes in the United States and the redefinition of relations with China and Russia. -
NATO, established after World War II to deter potential aggression from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, was organized under U.S. leadership around the assumption of a war against the Soviet Union and accordingly stationed U.S. forces and U.S. nuclear weapons across major European countries.4)
After the end of the Cold War in 1991 and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, however, the United States witnessed a situation in which Europe rapidly reduced its defense budgets and Europe came to reap the peace dividend, while its own burden rose once again.5)6)
- In the post–Cold War period, U.S. defense spending remained in the high three percent range of GDP and rose to around four percent during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while European defense spending declined to about 1.5 percent by 2014, thereby widening the gap between the two sides. Although the 2014 NATO Wales Summit reaffirmed the guideline that member states should spend two percent of GDP on defense,7) the lack of European follow-through meant that this disparity persisted.
- Alongside this imbalance in defense spending, the weakening of cohesion among NATO members also accelerated. Whereas in the early Cold War period European countries had expressed doubts about whether the United States would be willing to sacrifice New York or Washington in order to defend London or Bonn, they began to raise more fundamental questions about NATO’s utility itself. Ultimately, French President Macron went so far as to describe NATO as “brain dead,” thereby characterizing the erosion of the Alliance’s role.8)
Elected in 2016 by capitalizing on American resentment toward China’s economic encroachment and Europe’s security free-riding, President Trump pressured NATO member states to hike their defense spending from the very start of his term. However, the tepid response from Europe only reinforced the free-riding narrative. As of 2018, this imbalance persisted, with U.S. defense spending at 3.5 percent of GDP compared to Europe’s 1.5 percent,9) until an event occurred that abruptly shifted this dynamic.
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, heightened alarm in the international community, particularly in Europe, in two principal respects. First, by launching an armed attack against a sovereign state and seizing its territory, it shattered the international order that had been sustained since World War II. Second, it demonstrated the possibility that an aggressor might resort to the use of physical force, a risk that had been largely neglected since the end of the Cold War.
- Accordingly, increases in defense spending by NATO member states, which had shown little response to pressure during Trump’s first term, were already set in motion during President Biden’s tenure. Amid a sense of existential threat that the fall of Ukraine would expose them to the risk of Russian aggression, countries along Russia’s borders moved to the forefront and led the drive to strengthen defense capabilities.10) Moreover, Sweden and Finland, which had long maintained neutrality and sought to avoid involvement in conflicts, joined NATO, becoming a symbol of heightened vigilance against Russia’s aggressiveness.11)
During President Biden’s tenure, the United States initially maintained a cautious posture to avoid a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO and to prevent the conflict from escalating into the nuclear war threatened by President Putin. However, spurred by Ukraine’s unexpectedly strong performance and encouragement from European allies, notably the United Kingdom, U.S. and Western material and institutional support steadily intensified. This led to the provision of increasingly advanced and long-range weaponry, including Javelins, HIMARS, Storm Shadows, ATACMS, Abrams tanks, F-16s, and NASAMS air defense systems.12)
Meanwhile, to avoid a direct clash with Russia triggered by Article 5 collective security obligations, the UK proposed a framework for bilateral security agreements at the 2023 G7 meeting as an alternative to immediate NATO accession.13) Following the UK's lead in January 2024, 27 countries and the EU concluded similar bilateral pacts. In January 2025, the UK further deepened this commitment by signing a 100-year partnership agreement to provide enduring support for Ukraine.14) Additionally, since July 2022, the UK has bolstered Ukraine’s combat readiness through "Operation Interflex," a program conducted on British soil to train Ukrainian commanders and instructors. -
During his campaign, Donald Trump boasted that he could end the war in Ukraine in a single day. Following his reelection in November 2024, which cast doubt on the continuation of U.S. support for Ukraine, European nations launched efforts to persuade Washington to sustain its assistance, efforts that at times bordered on sycophancy. The United Kingdom, in particular, extended an unprecedented invitation for a second state visit during a meeting shortly after his inauguration15) and confirmed the visit for September, moves that temporarily led Trump to voice support for Ukraine and express dissatisfaction with Russia.16) In addition, remarks by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, who was known for communicating relatively well with Trump during his time as prime minister of the Netherlands, praising Trump’s role in increasing European defense spending, were leaked.17) This sequence of developments illustrates Europe’s evolution from a passive follower within a U.S.-led NATO framework to an actor that seeks to persuade and draw in a United States that has grown less attentive to the European front. Photographs of European leaders lined up before Trump’s desk in the Oval Office, appealing to him, symbolically capture this shift.18)
Trump has shown an impatient posture toward achieving an early ceasefire in Ukraine, and his position has shifted frequently. This appears to reflect, first, his desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize by claiming that he has resolved eight conflicts, including the Gaza situation, since taking office for his second term19) , and second, his pro-Putin perspective, shaped by an admiration and respect for authoritarian strongmen.20)
Until recently, Trump sought to persuade Putin through his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, in pursuit of a ceasefire in Ukraine, and he himself held a summit with Putin in Alaska, where he listened to Putin’s views on the terms of a ceasefire. However, as there was no change in Putin’s position, Trump canceled the follow-up summit that had been planned to be held in Hungary21) and imposed sanctions, briefly adopting a tougher stance, only to return once again to a pro-Russian position by aligning himself with Putin’s perspective.
In particular, the draft ceasefire proposal that the United States renewed in November 2025 reflected Russia’s demands and contained numerous provisions unfavorable to Ukraine, to the extent that it was widely referred to as virtually a Russian version of a ceasefire plan. In response, European countries actively put forward their views and worked to revise the draft22) , while within the United States, lawmakers holding traditional Republican views also expressed clear opposition23) , leading to the development of a revised proposal more favorable to Ukraine. In this process, although Europe cannot replace the United States in terms of military power, it has, through a sustained diplomatic voice, advised Washington and provided diplomatic support so that options more favorable to Ukraine could be adopted.
Ukraine has recently faced significant setbacks as Russian drones increasingly target Ukrainian drone operators in rear areas, and it is also struggling with domestic political turmoil. In this context, Ukraine appears to recognize that, despite the perceived bias, accepting the Trump administration’s peace mediation has become unavoidable. Nevertheless, until a final agreement is reached, Ukraine is expected, with diplomatic assistance from European countries, to seek to persuade Washington to (1) secure more robust security guarantees and (2) minimize territorial losses resulting from the end of the war. Meanwhile, regarding potential limits on Ukrainian troop levels, some argue that concessions may be acceptable given Ukraine’s manpower shortages, since even meeting the 600,000 figure initially proposed by the United States would be difficult. From this perspective, there is also a view that, rather than focusing on troop ceilings, greater emphasis should be placed on securing weapons to counter any future Russian re-invasion.24)
For its part, Russia has thus far maintained what is often described as a maximalist posture, rejecting mediation from the United States and the West while employing negotiating tactics aimed at pressing its own position. However, Moscow is also suffering severe casualties, and the situation is moving in an increasingly unsustainable direction. After showing growth of 3.5 to 4 percent over the past three years, the wartime economy appears to be reaching its limits, with growth projected to slow to 0.5 to 1.5 percent next year25) . As domestic support for the war is also declining, a prolonged continuation of the conflict does not appear to be favorable for Russia26) . Taken together, these factors suggest that reaching a compromise at an appropriate point may be in Russia’s interest, and that it may seek an exit while creating circumstances that provide a rationale for doing so. Ultimately, the decisive factor lies in the design and credibility of the mechanisms built into the settlement to prevent a renewed Russian invasion.
As Europe’s role expands, the previously U.S. led deterrence structure against Russia is being realigned into a configuration that integrates “U.S. contributions, European capabilities, and NATO’s institutional deterrence framework.”27) Consequently, European nations are pursuing a comprehensive buildup, including increases in defense budgets, the strengthening of defense industrial bases, troop expansions, and the completion of mobilization systems.
First, at the NATO Summit held in The Hague in June 2025, member states pledged to raise defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. In May 2025, they launched the 150 billion euro SAFE, Strategic Autonomy for European Defense, framework, with the aim of fostering a European defense industrial ecosystem to support weapons procurement and production. Second, after decades of post Cold War downsizing, with total troop strength declining from 3.39 million in 1990 to 1.91 million in 2020, Europe is now acutely aware of the urgency of addressing manpower shortages. While formal conscription is not being considered for the time being in light of socioeconomic constraints, countries have begun laying the institutional groundwork for future mobilization.28)
On a country by country basis, France, as of November 25, has decided to promote voluntary enlistment and is pursuing a plan to expand its force from 200,000 active personnel and 47,000 reservists to 210,000 and 80,000, respectively, by 2030.29) Germany aims to increase its current force of 180,000 to 270,000 by 2029, alongside securing 200,000 reservists, by improving incentives for voluntary enlistment.30) The United Kingdom seeks a modest increase from 73,000 to 76,000, with the actual implementation to be reviewed after the 2029 general election.31)
While Europe still relies on the United States to backstop high end reconnaissance assets and the ultimate nuclear deterrent, Trump’s position against providing further U.S. budget funded support for Ukraine has led to a shift in roles, with Europe moving into the leading position. In effect, Europe now faces a situation in which it must purchase U.S. weapons with its own budgets and provide them to Ukraine.32) Notably, Europe had considered using frozen Russian assets within Europe to secure funding for assistance to Ukraine,33) but after this approach was rejected by the European Central Bank, the European Commission has been seeking alternative ways to make use of those assets.34) -
In its new National Security Strategy (NSS) released on December 5, the Trump administration declared its intent to pursue “burden sharing,” or what it calls a “burden shift,” toward its allies. Considering that the United States has strained its national power through its long standing role as the global policeman, this strategic pivot toward delegating responsibilities to allies can be understood as a pragmatic adjustment. However, Trump’s inclination to divide the world with authoritarian regimes such as China and Russia, and to adopt similar patterns of behavior, is not a direction that U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are likely to welcome or follow.
In particular, the United States has criticized Europe for departing from what it calls its “classical” identity through openness to majority non-European populations, and has warned of a “civilizational erasure.” Under the pretext of preventing this, Washington has indirectly signaled a willingness to interfere in domestic politics by aligning with right wing populist parties, described as “patriotic forces” akin to the MAGA movement, in order to undermine incumbent European governments.
This offensive by Trump and the MAGA movement suggests two interpretations. First, as the United States struggles to resolve internal challenges such as immigration, “wokism,” and declining birth rates, it appears to be projecting these problems onto Europe, claiming to correct others while in reality lamenting its own difficulties35) and demanding that Europe unconditionally follow the U.S. position.36) Second, it also underscores that Europe remains the foremost bastion of the traditional international order and universal values, values that the United States itself once created but is now seeking to dismantle.
As Trump has recently suffered defeats in some local elections and seen his domestic approval ratings decline, and as the likelihood of setbacks in next year’s midterm elections increases, there are also growing arguments that his political peak has passed, the so called view that “Trump has peaked.” This assessment is reinforced by the improbable prospects for a successful bid for a third term and by the absence of a clear successor capable of carrying forward Trumpism after him.37) However, in light of the impact that the MAGA movement, built around Trump’s intuitive and simplified logic of “America First,” has had on public discourse in the United States, it appears unlikely that the country will immediately return to its traditional values and leadership role after Trump’s term. Rather, the United States is expected to redefine its position somewhere along the spectrum between a more inward looking, Trump influenced perspective and the perceived need for its traditional role as a leading power.
It is also worth noting that the current governments of major European countries are under domestic pressure from the rise of far right populist parties, such as Reform UK in the United Kingdom, Rassemblement National in France, and AfD in Germany, which adds further uncertainty to their own political futures, alongside the trajectory of U.S. domestic politics. Nevertheless, as seen in their stance on the war in Ukraine, European countries are likely, for the time being, to continue to shoulder the role of defending the traditional rules-based international order and liberal democracy in the international community. -
Since its founding, the Republic of Korea can be regarded as one of the principal beneficiaries of the rules-based international order, liberalism, and multilateralism underpinned by the ROK–U.S. alliance, as this stable international environment made it possible both to pursue economic development and to sustain the continued expansion of domestic democratization and liberalization. In the face of North Korea’s past advocacy of unification through communist conquest, and more recently its continued threats through nuclear and missile development under a new rationale, successive South Korean governments have adopted a diplomatic approach centered on a defense posture based on the ROK–U.S. alliance and on securing support from surrounding major powers. In this process, however, Europe, which has contributed alongside the United States to the establishment and maintenance of the liberal international order, has been relatively neglected. Moreover, within the so-called G2 framework shaped by China’s rise, Europe has often been regarded merely as a region that is “losing ground and in decline,” reinforcing a tendency to further downplay its significance.
As a result, without a sufficient understanding of Europe’s position in the international community or of its principles and independent perspectives on security issues, South Korea has at times focused primarily on its own needs, making self-centered demands38) or revealing a lack of awareness of European concerns.39) Meanwhile, countries such as the United Kingdom often describe the Korea–Japan region as the “Far East,” the most distant part of the world from their perspective, while South Korea has shown a degree of indifference to Europe’s geopolitical role.40) This mutual lack of affinity and understanding, stemming from geographic distance and limited historical interaction, appears to be a challenge that must be overcome.
From South Korea’s perspective, it is worth noting that since the NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022, the Korean president has continued to be invited, a development that reflects recognition of South Korea, as one of the Indo-Pacific Four, as an important partner, given its strong economic clout and its status as an exemplary democracy.41) At the same time, it should also be borne in mind that, although South Korea possesses defense industrial base that could effectively support the liberal camp, its relatively cautious stance toward providing full-scale support to Ukraine, often justified by various reasons, may lead European countries to harbor doubts about South Korea’s strategic direction. North Korea’s large-scale supply of weapons to Russia and its direct involvement in the war are feared to have further deepened this contradiction. Such negative perceptions in Europe may have already posed obstacles in negotiations on the handover of captive North Korean soldiers from the Ukrainian front to South Korea, and they are also likely to have ramifications for South Korea’s future defense exports.
In light of changes in the United States’ international role and mounting geopolitical instability, it is necessary for us to reaffirm that Europe has long been our strategic partner in defending liberal democracy together with the United States.42) On the basis of the shared position that, as U.S. allies, we must adapt to the significant changes reflected in the National Security Strategy, there is a need for South Korea and Europe to exchange views on strategies toward the United States, the strengthening of defense capabilities, and other responses, and, where necessary, to make efforts to provide mutual support.
Specifically, in our future diplomacy, first, Europe should be engaged as a “partner in values,” and cooperation mechanisms should be established through closer communication with the United Kingdom and other European countries and through the development of appropriate institutional arrangements. Second, South Korea should regularly express strong support for the key security issues facing Europe’s liberal democratic states, thereby creating space to secure their support for Korea in the future. Third, if it becomes possible to secure the consent of the United States, exchanges should be expanded through joint military and security strategic consultations linking NATO with trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan, and efforts should be made to build trust as a global security partner. Furthermore, as Europe faces the immediate task of strengthening its military capabilities and South Korea possesses defense industrial capacities that Europe needs, it is expected that South Korea can demonstrate empathy and sincerity as a value sharing partner, while also pursuing practical gains by entering Europe’s large defense market being formed around the SAFE system.
South Korea is in a relatively favorable position, given its advanced capabilities in shipbuilding, manufacturing, and semiconductors, all of which are critical to the United States. As the United States adjusts its approach in ways that reflect broader shifts in the international environment, South Korea should adapt accordingly. Nevertheless, it is important that South Korea also carefully manage its own core principles and strategic orientation by continuing to play a role in upholding a stable international order and the values of liberal democracy. Just as the United States has described its new approach as “flexible realism,” South Korea should adhere to its own version of “principled pragmatism.” By going beyond uncritically aligning itself with U.S. positions for the sake of short-term gains, South Korea should seek to position itself as a more respected Global Pivotal State in the international community.
| Executive Summary
| U.S.-Europe Divergence on NATO and Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
| Trump’s Return, Ceasefire Efforts, and Changes in Support for Ukraine
| The Surfacing of U.S.–Europe Tensions and the Changing Role of Europe
| Implications for Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula
1) 한국경제(2019.04.03.) 나토 70년 생일에…"유럽, 분담금 더 내라" 청구서 내민 트럼프
2) The Week (2022.10.13.) Biden national security strategy calls China biggest threat, sees Russia diminished by Ukraine invasion
3) Mark Lyall-Grant, former UK Ambassador to the United Nations, told the author that, early in the war, when the United States was hesitant to intervene, Prime Minister Boris Johnson sent Matthew Collins, Deputy National Security Adviser, to press the case in Washington for the need for full U.S. support.
4) During the Cold War, the United States stationed up to 450,000 troops in Europe and deployed as many as 7,300 nuclear weapons. U.S. defense spending amounted to roughly 6 percent of GDP, compared to about 3.5 to 4 percent in Europe.
5) Atlantic Council (2024.6.20.) Rethinking the NATO burden-sharing debate
6) In absolute terms, NATO’s total budget fell from USD 561.3 billion in 1990 to USD 468.1 billion in 1998.
7) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2015.9.1.) The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe
8) BBC (2019.11.8.) Nato alliance experiencing brain death, says Macron
9) BBC (2018.7.12.) Trump urges Nato members to double military funding target
10) US Department of War (2025.7.25.) Baltic States Pledge to Meet NATO's 5% GDP Military Target
11) The Guardian (2024.3.7.) Sweden finally joins Nato after nearly two-year wait
12) BBC (2025.2.18.) Ukraine weapons: What arms are the US, UK and other nations supplying?
13) Reuters (2023.7.12.) G7 nations unveil security framework for Ukraine
14) UK Government Press Release (2025.1.16.) UK and Ukraine sign landmark 100 Year Partnership to deepen security ties and strengthen partnership for future generations
15) Global News (2025.2.28.) King Charles invites Trump for unprecedented 2nd U.K. state visit
16) CBS News (2025.9.18.) Trump says Putin has "really let me down," as he wraps up historic second state visit to U.K.
17) CNN World (2025.6.25.) Inside the NATO charm offensive that shocked as much as it delivered
18) Global Times (2025.8.20.) Newly released pictures reveal ‘embarrassing’ power play: Major European leaders sit around US president
19) USA Today (2025.10.10.) Nobel Prizes announced this week. Trump says he won’t get one, but he’s been nominated
20) NYT (2025.8.13.) Trump’s Affinity for Putin Will Be Tested at High-Risk Summit in Alaska
21) CNBC (2025.10.23.) Stony silence from Moscow after Trump turns on Russia, says talks with Putin ‘don’t go anywhere’
22) The Guardian (2025.11.25.) Ukraine makes significant changes to US ‘peace plan’, sources say
23) NYT (2025.11.25.) Republicans Fight With Trump’s Team Over Ukraine Talks
24) The Economist (2025.11.28.) Insider, Is Ukraine being sold out?
25) NYT (2025.12.2.) Tensions Rise Among Russia’s Elite as Economic Growth Slows
26) The Economist (2025.12.10.) Russian economy is not as resilient as it wants you think
27) 이성원, [세종정책브리프] ‘유럽 안보질서 재편을 둘러싼 동상이몽’
28) The Guardian (2025.11.26.) As France prepares military expansion, how is Europe beefing up its armies?
29) The Guardian (2025.11.27.) France to introduce voluntary military service amid threat from Russia
30) The Guardian (2025.11.27.) Germany decides against conscription to replenish post-cold war military
31) The Guardian (2025.6.1.) British Army will not be increased in size this parliament, John Healey says
32) NYT (2025.8.29.) Weapons to Start Flowing Into Ukraine Under European Deal With Trump
33) 러시아 자산이 대부분 예치된 Euroclear사가 소재한 벨기에는 법적 문제 발생 가능성으로 부정적 입장을 지속해 옴, EuroNews (2025.7.11.) ‘EU Commission and Belgium see no breakthrough in Ukraine reparation loan talks’
34) European Pravda (2025.12.2.) EU comments on European Central Bank's refusal to provide funds to Ukraine using frozen Russian assets
35) Financial Times (2025.12.6.) Janan Ganesh, Maga’s strange rage against Europe
36) Financial Times (2025.12.8.) Gideon Rachman, Trump’s America and a clash of civilisations with Europe
37) The Economist (2025.11.25.) John Bolton thinks America is past “peak Trump”
38) 중앙일보 (2018.10.16.) 문 대통령, 마크롱에 “대북제재 완화 힘써달라”
39) 중앙일보 (2025.11.23.) 獨총리 "한국의 중국 인식 궁금"…李대통령, 답 않고 화두 돌렸다.
40) Some members of the British public recognize China and Japan as distinct, independent entities, but lack a clear understanding of South Korea’s geographical position, in some cases perceiving it as part of Southeast Asia.
41) VOA (2022.6.10.) 윤석열 대통령, 한국 정상 첫 나토 정상회의 참석, 민주 진영 협력 강화, 대북 공조 촉구 예상
42) Of the 16 countries that participated in the Korean War and the six that provided support, European countries accounted for six participants and four supporting states.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
