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North Korea’s Ninth Workers’ Party Congress and Prospects for the Formalization of Kim Ju-ae’s Successor Status - An Analysis of Scenarios Involving Continued Lack of Official Post, First Secretary of the Party Central Committee, and Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission- |
| January 2, 2026 |
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Seong-Chang CheongPrincipal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org
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On January 1, 2026, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, marking his first New Year visit there in three years since 2023. The significance of this visit, however, lies not simply in the resumption of a New Year ritual. Kim Jong-un’s eldest daughter, Kim Ju-ae, accompanied him and was positioned at the exact center of the front row, a place traditionally reserved for Kim Jong-un himself. While the Korean Central News Agency did not explicitly mention Kim Ju-ae’s presence, publicly released photographs clearly show her standing between Kim Jong-un and Ri Sol-ju in the central position.
The Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the bodies of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il are enshrined, is a site that symbolizes the ideological legitimacy of the North Korean regime. During visits by Kim Jong-un, the front row is typically occupied by the most senior figures of the Workers’ Party of Korea, including members of the Politburo Presidium and the Politburo. Kim Ju-ae’s placement in this space, and specifically in the central position normally occupied by Kim Jong-un, carries strong symbolic meaning. It can be interpreted as an act of reporting or presenting Kim Ju-ae as his successor to the “forefathers of the revolution,” Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, in anticipation of the Ninth Party Congress.
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that Kim Jong-un resumed the New Year visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun this year after skipping it in both 2024 and 2025, and that he did so together with Kim Ju-ae. Although Kim Ju-ae has appeared in North Korean state media since November 2022, this marked her first publicly confirmed visit to the Kumsusan Palace. This timing strongly suggests a deliberately staged political gesture ahead of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea.
The Ninth Party Congress is expected to be convened in early 2026, five years after the Eighth Congress held in January 2021. This congress will serve as a major political milestone, concluding the second five-year plan under Kim Jong-un’s leadership and presenting a new national development line. In this context, how Kim Ju-ae’s official status may change at the congress has emerged as a central issue for assessing the future trajectory of North Korea’s power structure. Her appearance at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun thus constitutes a powerful signal pointing toward that direction. -
Analysis of Public Appearances: From the Military Sphere to Overall State Affairs
Since her first public appearance on November 18, 2022, at the launch site of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, Kim Ju-ae has primarily accompanied Kim Jong-un at major military-related events. In 2023, she attended the 75th anniversary banquet of the Korean People’s Army, military parades, and inspections of Hwasong-17 missile launch drills. In 2024, her activities expanded beyond the military domain to include interactions with the Russian ambassador and participation in party-related events. During this period, she was observed being escorted by Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Party Central Committee, or accompanied by Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, developments that were widely interpreted as indicating a partial elevation of her status.1)
An analysis of 49 reported instances of Kim Ju-ae’s public appearances between her initial emergence in 2022 and December 28, 2025 shows that military-related activities accounted for 31 cases, or 63.3 percent of the total, while economic and livelihood-related events comprised 11 cases, or 22.4 percent. However, a closer look at her 17 public appearances in 2025 reveals a notable shift: military and economic or livelihood-related activities each accounted for six cases, representing 35.3 percent respectively. This change suggests that Kim Ju-ae’s role is gradually expanding from a predominantly military focus to broader involvement in overall state affairs.
The Politics of Protocol and Forms of Address
In terms of protocol, Kim Ju-ae is increasingly positioned immediately after Kim Jong-un. According to a 2024 report by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, she is accompanied by a dedicated security detail and has been featured in officially released photographs alone with Kim Jong-un, signaling a firmly established status.2) A particularly striking image showed Pak Jong-chon, Director of the Military Political Guidance Department of the Party Central Committee, kneeling on one knee while speaking with Kim Ju-ae, a scene that symbolically underscores the level of deference shown to her by senior North Korean officials.
North Korean state media have also begun using highly elevated honorifics when referring to Kim Ju-ae, including expressions such as “most august” and “respected.” The term “most august” was historically reserved exclusively for Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un, and Kim Jong-suk, marking it as the highest level of honorific usage. The term “respected” was previously used for Kim Jong-un during his period as heir apparent and is currently employed by Kim Jong-un primarily when referring to foreign leaders or exceptionally prominent figures such as Hyon Chol-hae. In March 2024, Kim Jong-un and Kim Ju-ae were jointly described in Rodong Sinmun as “the great leaders who provide guidance.” Taken together, this evolving politics of protocol and nomenclature strongly suggests that Kim Ju-ae is being positioned not merely as the leader’s daughter, but as a designated successor.
Changes in the National Intelligence Service’s Assessment
The South Korean National Intelligence Service’s assessment of Kim Ju-ae has evolved noticeably over time. When she first appeared publicly in November 2022, the NIS characterized her primarily as a “symbol of the future generation.” By July 2024, however, the agency formally revised its position, stating that “Kim Ju-ae is undergoing successor training.” Following her visit to China in September 2025, the NIS further assessed her public exposure as “part of a process to complete a narrative designed with hereditary succession in mind.”3)
The Three Stages of Power Succession and the Position of First Secretary of the Party Central Committee
Power succession in North Korea generally proceeds through three stages: designation of the successor and initiation of successor training, internal formalization, and external formalization. Kim Jong-il’s successor status was externally formalized at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, while Kim Jong-un’s succession was publicly confirmed at the Third Party Conference in 2010. Kim Ju-ae is currently assessed to be in the stage of successor designation and training,4) with the Ninth Party Congress potentially serving as a critical juncture for both internal and external formalization.
At the Eighth Party Congress in January 2021, the Workers’ Party of Korea revised its party rules to establish the position of First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Although the existence of this position was not publicly disclosed at the time, it was later confirmed through a revised version of the party rules obtained by South Korean authorities. According to the party rules, the plenary session of the Party Central Committee may elect a First Secretary, who is defined as the “representative of the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea.”
North Korean dictionaries define a “representative” as “a person who exercises the authority and responsibilities of another on that person’s behalf.”5) Accordingly, an individual elected as First Secretary would be authorized to exercise the powers and duties of the General Secretary in a representative capacity. Given that the party rules stipulate that the General Secretary concurrently serves as Chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, the First Secretary would also be positioned to exercise control over military authority. The creation of the First Secretary position is therefore interpreted as an institutional measure designed to ensure regime stability in contingency situations and to provide a formal mechanism supporting hereditary succession by the Paektu bloodline.6) -
Scenario Overview
The first scenario envisions that, at the Ninth Party Congress, Kim Ju-ae is not assigned any formal position and that her name continues to be withheld from official disclosure for an extended period thereafter. Under this scenario, Kim Ju-ae would remain in an informal state of “successor training,” as at present, while gradually increasing her visibility and public recognition over time. North Korean state media would refrain from officially naming her and would continue to refer to her using indirect honorific expressions such as “the respected child.”
Rationale and Plausibility
The most important factor supporting this scenario is Kim Ju-ae’s young age. She is estimated to have been born in early 2013 and would be approximately 13 years old in 2026. By comparison, Kim Jong-il was 38 years old when his successor status was formally established in 1980, and Kim Jong-un was 26 when his succession was officially confirmed in 2010. Kim Ju-ae’s age is therefore exceptionally young by historical standards. Assigning a formal party position to an individual in their early teens would be unprecedented in North Korean history and could raise questions about internal acceptance and legitimacy.
The Workers’ Party of Korea rules stipulate that party membership is open only to individuals aged 18 and above. This implies that Kim Ju-ae would not even meet the minimum eligibility requirements for party membership at the time of the Ninth Party Congress, as at least five more years would be required before she reaches that threshold. However, this constraint could be altered if the party leadership were to revise or remove the age requirement at the Ninth Party Congress, or if a political decision were made to grant Kim Ju-ae an exceptional status.
Although North Korea formally espouses socialist ideology, strong Confucian and patriarchal social norms continue to shape its political culture. Internal resistance to the prospect of a female supreme leader cannot be ruled out, and overcoming such resistance would likely require considerable time and preparation. From this perspective, Kim Jong-un may choose not to rush the formalization of Kim Ju-ae’s successor status, instead opting to invest time in cultivating broader social acceptance before moving toward official institutionalization.
Assessment of Plausibility
The likelihood of this scenario materializing is assessed as relatively low. Given Kim Ju-ae’s young age and the sociopolitical characteristics of North Korean society, a gradual approach rather than rapid formalization would appear more rational. However, Kim Ju-ae’s placement at the exact center during the January 1, 2026 visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun strongly suggests that some form of status change will occur at the Ninth Party Congress. With her protocol treatment and honorifics already elevated to a level consistent with that of a designated successor, and with South Korea’s National Intelligence Service having officially confirmed that “successor training” is underway, passing the Ninth Party Congress without any visible institutional advancement would be difficult to reconcile with the apparent intentions of the North Korean leadership. -
Scenario Overview
The second scenario envisages Kim Ju-ae being elected as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee at the Ninth Party Congress, accompanied by the official disclosure of her name. Under this scenario, Kim Ju-ae would assume the role of the General Secretary’s proxy, effectively positioning her second in the power hierarchy and providing an institutional foundation for immediate succession in the event of a contingency. It is also possible, however, that North Korea could appoint Kim Ju-ae to the position of First Secretary while refraining from publicly disclosing the appointment for a certain period.
Rationale and Plausibility
First, the symbolic signal conveyed by the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun visit is critical. Kim Ju-ae’s placement at the center during the January 1, 2026 visit can be interpreted as Kim Jong-un formally reporting to the “preceding leaders” his intention to designate her as his successor at the Ninth Party Congress. The decision to resume the New Year visit, which Kim Jong-un had skipped for two consecutive years, and to do so together with Kim Ju-ae, appears to have been a deliberately choreographed political act. This makes it the strongest indicator pointing toward the possibility of her appointment as First Secretary.
Second, Kim Jong-un’s strong commitment to fourth-generation hereditary succession must be considered. He appears to view the preservation of rule by the Baekdu bloodline as a paramount task for regime survival. Kim Jong-un’s own experience of assuming power under conditions of insufficient successor training, following Kim Jong-il’s sudden health deterioration and death, is likely to have left a lasting imprint. It is therefore reasonable to assume that Kim Jong-un is determined to provide his own successor with ample time and a robust institutional foundation. The creation of the First Secretary position itself can be interpreted as an expression of this intent.
Third, concerns regarding Kim Jong-un’s health may accelerate the formalization of the succession process. Kim Jong-un’s severe obesity and associated health risks constitute a factor that could prompt earlier institutionalization of a successor. In July 2024, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reported to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee on Kim Jong-un’s health status, noting that he weighed approximately 140 kilograms and had a body mass index in the mid-40s, far exceeding the normal threshold of 25.7)
In a 2020 contribution to the North Korea–focused outlet 38 North, former U.S. State Department medical officer Kenneth Dekleva assessed that Kim Jong-un faced a greater than 30–33 percent probability of developing serious cardiovascular conditions, such as a heart attack, within the next decade.8) Following a stroke in August 2008, Kim Jong Il secretly designated Kim Jong Un as his successor and formally unveiled the succession arrangement two years later, in 2010. He died little more than a year after that formalization. If Kim Jong Un is mindful of this precedent, he is likely to seek to institutionalize a succession framework of his own before any significant deterioration in his health occurs.
Possibility of Non-Public Appointment
It is also necessary to consider the possibility that North Korea could appoint Kim Ju-ae as First Secretary while withholding public disclosure for a certain period. A precedent exists in the Eighth Party Congress in 2021, when the position of First Secretary was created but not publicly revealed at the time. Given Kim Ju-ae’s young age and potential internal resistance to a female leader, the regime may opt to first establish an institutional safeguard and only later move toward external disclosure. In such a scenario, her name might continue to be omitted from official announcements.
Assessment of Plausibility
Among the scenarios considered, this option appears the most likely. Taken together, Kim Ju-ae’s central placement during the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun visit, Kim Jong-un’s commitment to fourth-generation hereditary succession, the elevated level of protocol accorded to her, and ongoing concerns regarding Kim Jong-un’s health all point to a high probability that her status will be institutionalized in some form at the Ninth Party Congress. The position of First Secretary appears to have been designed precisely with Kim Ju-ae in mind. -
Scenario Overview
The third scenario envisions Kim Ju-ae being awarded the rank of General (Daejang) during the Ninth Party Congress and appointed as Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission. This would replicate the pathway followed by Kim Jong-un in September 2010, when he was granted the rank of General together with figures such as his aunt Kim Kyong-hui shortly before the Third Party Conference, and was subsequently elected Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission. That appointment served as the moment when Kim Jong-un’s status as successor was formally acknowledged externally.9)
Rationale and Plausibility
To date, Kim Ju-ae’s public appearances have been heavily concentrated in the military domain. Her first public debut occurred at the launch site of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile, and subsequent appearances have largely involved missile launch observations, Armed Forces Day commemorations, military parades, naval destroyer launch ceremonies, and other defense-related events. This consistent pattern suggests a deliberate strategy to build her power base through the military sphere.
Kim Jong-un himself was appointed Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission at the Third Party Conference in September 2010, a move that publicly formalized his status as successor. That position provided him with an institutional foundation for consolidating control over the armed forces and facilitated a relatively smooth transfer of power following Kim Jong-il’s death. If Kim Jong-un intends to apply the succession model he personally experienced to Kim Ju-ae, appointment to the Party Central Military Commission would represent a logical and historically grounded option.
Assessment of Plausibility
The likelihood of this scenario is assessed as moderate to moderately high. Kim Ju-ae’s sustained focus on military-related activities, the precedent set by Kim Jong-un’s own succession process, and the logic of a phased transfer of power all support its plausibility. If appointing Kim Ju-ae as First Secretary is viewed as conferring excessive authority too rapidly, the position of Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission could function as an intermediate step. That said, given that the First Secretary position has already been institutionalized, it remains unclear whether the leadership would see a compelling need to pursue an alternative route. The possibility that North Korea could assign Kim Ju-ae to both positions simultaneously cannot be ruled out. -
Comparative Assessment of Scenarios
A comparative assessment of the three scenarios suggests that Scenario 2, election as First Secretary, is the most likely outcome. This is followed by Scenario 3, appointment as Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission, with Scenario 1, the maintenance of no formal position, assessed as the least likely. Kim Ju-ae’s placement at the exact center during the January 1, 2026 visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun is widely interpreted as Kim Jong-un’s symbolic act of reporting his intention to formalize her status as successor to the “preceding leaders,” making it a strong precursor to her elevation as First Secretary.
Key Variables
Several key variables will shape the trajectory of Kim Ju-ae’s status. First is Kim Jong-un’s health. A rapid deterioration would likely accelerate the formalization of succession, whereas relative stability would allow for a more gradual approach. Second is elite acceptance within North Korea. The degree of internal resistance to formally designating a teenage female successor will be a critical factor. Third is the external environment. Developments on the Korean Peninsula, including levels of military tension and the trajectory of U.S.-North Korea relations, may influence the timing and manner in which succession arrangements are made public.
Implications for Security on the Korean Peninsula
The Ninth Party Congress, expected in early 2026, is likely to serve as a pivotal moment for Kim Ju-ae’s formal elevation. Of particular note is the precedent set at the Eighth Party Congress, when the position of First Secretary was established but not disclosed externally. Accordingly, even if Kim Ju-ae is elected to a formal post at the Ninth Congress, North Korea may choose to confirm the decision internally while delaying public disclosure.
Regardless of which scenario ultimately materializes, the elevation of Kim Ju-ae would underscore North Korea’s determination to maintain its nuclear posture and preserve dynastic succession based on the Paektu bloodline. Given that Kim Ju-ae’s public activities have been concentrated in the military sphere, the possibility cannot be excluded that a post-succession North Korea could adopt an even more confrontational external posture.
Historical precedent reinforces this concern. After Kim Jong-un was internally designated as successor in late 2008, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, followed by the Daecheong naval clash in November of the same year. In March 2010, the sinking of the Cheonan occurred, and in November the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island followed. These episodes illustrate how North Korea has historically heightened tensions with South Korea during periods of leadership transition in order to consolidate internal cohesion. Preparing for a range of security contingencies is therefore essential.
Kim Ju-ae’s position during the Kumsusan Palace visit was not merely a matter of protocol. It functioned as a compass indicating the direction of North Korea’s succession strategy. The South Korean government and the policy community should closely monitor the outcomes of the Ninth Party Congress and draw clear policy implications from the evolving structure of power in Pyongyang.
| Problem Statement: Signals Sent by Kim Ju-ae’s Visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun
| Current Status of Kim Ju-ae and the Institutional Foundations of Succession
| Scenario 1: Kim Ju-ae Remains Without an Official Position
| Scenario 2: Appointment as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee
| Scenario 3: Appointment as Vice Chair of the Party Central Military Commission
| Conclusion: The Direction Indicated by Kumsusan
1) Jeong Geum-min and Han Eun-jin, "NIS: 'North Korea Raises Security Level in Response to Possible Kim Jong-un Assassination...Kim Ju-ae's Status Elevated,'" Newsis, October 29, 2024
2) Ji Seong-rim, "NIS: 'North Korea Elevates Security Level in Preparation for Possible Kim Jong-un Assassination,'" Yonhap News TV, October 29, 2024.
3) Kim Pil-guk, "[Unification Watch] Three Years Since Kim Ju-ae's Emergence: Between 'Successor' and 'Symbol,'" MBC News, November 17, 2025.
4) CHEONG Seong-Chang, The Kim Jong-un We Don’t Know: His Politics and Strategy (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2024), pp. 281–330.
5) Chosun Grand Dictionary (Expanded Edition), Vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Social Sciences Publishing House, 2017), p. 1583.
6) CHEONG Seong-Chang, "An Assessment of Revisions to North Korea’s Workers’ Party Rules and Changes in Domestic and Foreign Policy: Focusing on Key Issues," Sejong Policy Brief, No. 2021-13 (2021.07.05), pp. 5–7.
7) Yoon Ye-won, "NIS: 'Kim Jong-un Weighs 140 kg, Super Morbidly Obese...Kim Ju-ae Undergoing Successor Training,'" Chosun BIZ, July 29, 2024.
8) Park Hyung-ju, "Former State Department Medical Officer: 'Kim Jong-un's Smoking, Obesity, and Family History Increase Risk of Heart Disease,'" VOA, April 30, 2020.
9) Regarding the significance of the Workers’ Party of Korea Central Military Commission in the context of power succession and its status as the supreme military command authority in North Korea, see CHEONG Seong-Chang, A Study on the Status and Role of the Workers’ Party Central Military Commission as the Supreme Military Command Authority in the Kim Jong-un Era, Sejong Policy Study 2025-06 (Seongnam: Sejong Institute, 2025).
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
