File
Assessing Kim
Yong-chol’s Visit to the U.S. and
ROK-DPRK-U.S.
Trilateral Talks in Stockholm
Dr. Hong Hyun-ik
Director, Department of Diplomatic
Strategy Studies at the Sejong Institute
hyunik@sejong.org
At the onset of 2019, Chairman Kim
Jong-un expressed his trust in President Trump and hope for another summit
meeting with him in his New Year address; and President Trump also articulated
his expectations to meet with Kim Jong-un, revealing the fact that he received
a personal letter from him. Afterward, Kim Yong-chol, vice-chairman of the
Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee and the Director of the WPK
United Front Department, took a direct flight to Washington D.C. and met with
U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo and President Trump on January 18.
Consequently, the White House announced that the DPRK-U.S. summit will be
held late February and President Trump stated, “That [meeting with Kim
Yong-chol] was an incredible meeting … we have made a lot of progress as far as
denuclearization is concerned.” And added, “We’ve picked the country, but we’ll
be announcing it in the future.” Moreover, U.S. Special Representative for
North Korea Stephen Biegun flew to Sweden immediately after attending the
meeting with Vice-chairman Kim Yong-chol in Washington, and had a three-day
in-depth negotiation with DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui and ROK
negotiator Lee Do-hoon. Secretary Pompeo said that he made considerable
progress in talks with North Korea through Kim Yong-chol’s visit and the
negotiations in Stockholm made further advances.
In this context, this paper explores
the post-Singapore negotiation process between North Korea and the U.S. and the
changes in U.S. strategic orientation regarding North Korea. Then, it prospects
the terms agreeable at the summit by examining the agendas expected to pop out
at the second DPRK-U.S. summit scheduled at the end of February – as probably discussed
in Kim Yong-chol’s meetings in Washington and ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral
negotiations in Stockholm – and suggests South Korea’s role in the process.
Change in U.S. Policy
Orientation on North Korea after the First DPRK-U.S. Summit
The
U.S. administration has long claimed North Korea’s denuclearization should take
place first. Since liberal politicians such as President Obama asserted on
North Korea’s denuclearization to be realized first in the name of ‘strategic
patience,’ the North Korean regime advanced its nuclear program for eight years
without any concern. It was at the historic DPRK-U.S. summit last June
organized by the Moon Jae-in administration only when the U.S. accepted that
the North Korea’s denuclearization should go hand in hand with U.S. guarantee
of North Korean regime security. However, the U.S. only suspended joint war
games with South Korea and did not take interest in fulfilling the pledges
announced at the summit, such as preliminary steps to normalize bilateral
relations and establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula – opening a
liaison office in North Korea, negotiating the establishment of diplomatic
relations, declaring an end to the Korean War, etc. – whereas North Korea
already took several measures - returned three American detainees and remains
of 55 U.S. soldiers, demolished the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, and began to
dismantle the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site, which caused concerns for
the U.S., after the summit. As such, Kim Jong-un did not meet Secretary Pompeo
who visited Pyongyang in July and the North Korean authorities deplored U.S.
unilateral demand of denuclearization as “gangster-like demand."
President
Moon Jae-in again took the driver’s seat. He visited Pyongyang in September and
signed an inter-Korean military agreement that ensures alleviation of tensions
and institutionally guarantees peace beyond a mere ‘end-of-war’ declaration
with his North Korean counterpart. He also induced North Korea’s conditional
concession to shut down nuclear facilities in Yongbyon – assumed to constitute
more than 70 percent of North Korea’s nuclear facilities - permanently and to
dismantle the Tongchang-ri missile engine test site before international
observers in return for corresponding measures from the U.S. through the
Pyongyang Joint Declaration. Accordingly, the negotiations between North Korea
and the U.S. have been associated with the possible corresponding measures from
the U.S.
Although
Secretary Pompeo, with the improving inter-Korean relations as a stepping
stone, met Chairman Kim early October in Pyongyang, Vice-chairman Kim Yong-chol
cancelled his visit to the U.S. scheduled on November 8 as the U.S. insisted on
its stance adamantly. Thereafter, North Korea avoided working- and high-level
talks with the U.S. and the two sides engaged in a war of nerves. Then, the
U.S., not North Korea, began to open some room for talks. In mid-November, Vice
President Mike Pence, a hardliner on North Korea, signaled flexibility – saying
that the declaration of the full list of nuclear and missile sites, once a
precondition for the second summit, could be actually discussed at the summit.
Early December, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, a hawk on North
Korea, said “What we need to see is performance. And when we get performance
then we can look at removing the economic sanctions.” This vastly contrasts
from his previous comments that a complete transformation in North Korea is
necessary to re-evaluate sanctions against North Korea.
The young North Korean
leader tried to take the initiative in Korean Peninsula affairs once again through
this year’s New Year address. Pronouncing that he is ready to improve relations
with South Korea and meet with President Trump and that he is willing to carry
out the complete denuclearization synchronously with the establishment of a
peace regime on the peninsula, Chairman Kim emphasized “we would neither make
and test nuclear weapons any longer” and appealingly added, “if the United
States … attempts to unilaterally enforce something upon us and persists in
imposing sanctions and pressure against our Republic, we may be compelled to
find a new way”. In an interview with Fox News on January 3, Secretary Pompeo
said, “I’m confident that in the next short period of time, President Trump and
Chairman Kim will get a chance to meet again.” Several days later, Kim Jong-un
visited China to meet with President Xi and strengthened bilateral cordial
cooperation. It alluded to the ‘new way,’ – it manifested that this ‘new way’
to assure the safety of the regime could be enhancing relations with China and
not conducting another nuclear and missile provocation.
In his another
interview with Fox News in Egypt on the 11th, Pompeo underscored, “we’re moving
forward in these conversations [with North Korea], lots of ideas about how we
might continue to decrease the risk to the American people. … at the end that’s
the objective; it’s the security of American people.” Additionally, before
meeting Kim Yong-chol, he elaborated in a conversation with a media outlet a
week later, “There aren’t nuclear tests being conducted. There haven’t been
missile tests conducted. These are things that were threatening the United
States when President Trump took office. We want to reduce that risk, reduce
North Korea’s capacity to build out their program.” He implied that the summit
will conclude with a freeze on nuclear and missile program rather than the
complete denuclearization or even ‘final, fully verified denuclearization
(FFVD)’ that the U.S. has argued for. The U.S. boasted strategic flexibility so
as to hold the second summit with North Korea successfully.
Anyhow, the course of
events has built up expectations for the second summit at the end of February
in Vietnam or Thailand and some level of agreement at the summit: the leaders
of North Korea and the U.S. have consecutively affirmed mutual trust and
determination to hold the summit and are satisfied with the exchange of letters
and development of negotiations.
Forecast on Agreement
at the Second DPRK-U.S. Summit
The
second DPRK-U.S. summit, to be held late February, is predicted to draw up some
level of agreement smoothly. This is because North Korea and the U.S. have
already articulated or suggested certain measures. First, North Korea already
replied to the suspicions from the West – whether Punggye-ri nuclear test site
is genuinely demolished in an irreversible manner – with the indication that it
is willing to accept a group of international inspectors. It also revealed that
it could dismantle the missile engine test site in Tongchang-ri ‘under
the observation of experts from relevant countries’ in the Pyongyang Joint
Declaration with President Moon. Accordingly, the upcoming summit could be a
venue to announce an action plan to implement them.
The
U.S. also could lift the travel ban on North Korea as North Korea returned a
U.S. national who illegally entered North Korea. As the U.S. administration’s
pre-existing principle is not to link humanitarian assistance with political affairs
such as denuclearization, Washington could convey the intention to resume
humanitarian aid without stipulating it in the agreement.
Other
issues require agreement through negotiations. Foremost, the U.S. removed the
submission of the list of nuclear and missile facilities as a prerequisite for
the summit. Hence, it will not ask North Korea of such list. However, it is
likely that the U.S. will demand North Korea to enumerate the details of
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and long-range missiles – the items and
installments it expressed to dismantle.
Moreover,
North Korea should vow to suspend and freeze the operation of its nuclear and
missile program – something that needed to be agreed at the first summit last
year. While it may be difficult to agree on declaration and inspection of this
matter, the two sides could find a midpoint by North Korea accepting a group of
experts to inspect and verify the permanent shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear
facilities after the dismantlement, without the declaration.
On
missiles, the U.S. will hope to bring some of North Korea’s long-range missiles
to the U.S. as National Security Advisor Bolton said last May. However, North
Korea will repel the claim since it exposes Chinese and Russian technology
employed to the missiles. As a second thought, Washington may request the transfer
of missiles to China or Russia; Pyongyang will refuse on the grounds of
sovereignty. Therefore, the two could reach a middle ground in placing the
missiles in parts under experts’ observation after North Korea disassembles
them before American observers. The short- and medium-range missiles will be an
agenda for the inter-Korean talks or talks between North Korea and Japan rather
than the North Korea-U.S. negotiations.
The
success of the summit will hinge on what the U.S. will put forth as measures corresponding
to North Korea’s such steps toward denuclearization. Pyongyang primarily
desires either ease or relief or even removal of sanctions, but the issue is
intricate as the U.S. unilateral sanctions are entangled with the UN Security
Council sanctions. Hence, the U.S. could make efforts to partially ease UN
Security Council sanctions in a phased manner in accordance with the progress
in North Korea’s denuclearization and at the same time, agree on the exemption
of sanctions for inter-Korean economic cooperation – something that the
administration could do without the approval from the Congress. In such case,
the two Koreas could initiate several projects: resuming tourism of Mount
Kumgang, reoperating the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and beginning the
connection of railways between the two Koreas. Noting that Secretary Pompeo
said, “if we can make a substantial step towards achieving the denuclearization
and create the right conditions, it’ll be the private sector that sits there”
at the Davos Forum on January 22, it is necessary to have pre-calculated review
and preparations sufficient to invest in North Korea swiftly.
Other
demands from North Korea will include the commencement of talks or the opening
of liaison offices in two countries to establish new bilateral relations
between the two countries – as agreed at the first summit –, initiation of
international dialogue such as quadrilateral talks to establish a lasting peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula, and adoption of an ‘end-of-war’ declaration,
among others.
Even if the two countries come up with significant progress,
it will be nearly impossible to agree on North Korea’s full submission of
nuclear sites or a complete schedule for denuclearization. This will likely
spark criticisms and voices of dissatisfaction in South Korea and the U.S. - that
the agreement de facto acknowledged North Korea’s possession of nuclear
weapons. For that reason, the agreement of the second DPRK-U.S. summit must lay
down the clause that the guarantee of North Korean regime security and North
Korea’s complete denuclearization are the ultimate goals that the two countries
pursue.
South Korea’s Role
While
the leaders of North Korea and the U.S. expressed mutual trust and expectations
for the summit, the holding of summit per se may actually be in jeopardy as
working-level talks have reportedly yet to tangible and substantial outcomes
and the experts, media, and the Congress in the U.S. all still look askance at North
Korea and the summit. Therefore, the South Korean government should expound
South Korea’s position and support the bilateral negotiations by intervening
from the initial stages if possible as Lee Do-hoon, South Korea’s special
representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, served the mediating
role and bridged the gap between North Korea and the U.S. at the trilateral
talks in the Swedish capital.
Should
the summit itself be at stake as the two countries re-encounter the situation
last May - cleavage between the two countries widen -, Seoul could consider the
inter-Korean summit to discuss solely the DPRK-U.S. summit and provide a
breakthrough and prepare for it, if necessary.
South
Korea should make use of all official and non-official communication channels with
North Korea and the U.S. First, it should persuade North Korea that the whole
nation could reap large benefits with large-scale mutually beneficial economic
cooperation such as resumption of tourism of Mount Kumgang and of Kaesong
Industrial Complex, connection and modernization of railways and roads, and gas
pipeline projects even if the negotiations with the U.S. proceed unfairly and
North Korea needs to take a half step back. And toward the U.S., it could
persuade that the U.S. could show flexibility in its corresponding measures to
take a great leap in denuclearization as the international sanctions, despite
pressuring North Korea considerably, does not seem to succumb North Korea soon
and the U.S. politics will be immersed in presidential elections – thus, the
North Korean nuclear issue may be harder to be resolved. The government in
Seoul should convince that it is wise to implement an elastic mechanism such as
snap-back – easing sanctions in gradual stages first and imposing harsher
sanctions in the event of North Korea’s deviation from the path of
denuclearization. Provided that the U.S. administration cannot vigorously adopt
a policy of enticement, the South Korean government and the private sector
should appeal that it could induce North Korea to denuclearization through
economic cooperation.
Simultaneously,
the South Korean government should make sure to prevent Kim Jong-un’s visit to
South Korea that will come after the DPRK-U.S. summit from instigating a social
discord within South Korea. Furthermore, it should prepare the summit painstakingly
to translate the summit into an occasion to eradicate distrust between North
and South Koreans, to heal the wounds that caused South Korea’s unilateral
sanctions against North Korea, and to establish a foundation advancing
inter-Korean economic cooperation.
*Note: This
article is based on the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the
views of the Sejong Institute. This is an unofficial translation of
the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made
to the original paper.