File
No. 2019-6 (March 1, 2019)
Dr. Cheong Seong-Chang
Vice President for Research Planning, the Sejong
Institute
softpower@sejong.org
The summit between North Korea and the U.S. in
Hanoi concluded on February 28, with both sides leaving empty-handed, against
the expectations that this summit will bring significant progress in several
aspects – North Korea’s denuclearization, the establishment of a peace regime
on the Korean Peninsula, and the improvement of DPRK-U.S. relations. At the
summit, President Trump demanded a denuclearization measure beyond the
permanent shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear complex while Chairman Kim Jong-un also
demanded UN sanctions relief beyond the level of exempting the inter-Korean
cooperation projects. The two failed to bridge this gap.
At the post-summit press conference, Secretary
Pompeo, who sat beside President Trump, said, “We asked him to do more. He
was unprepared to do that.” In relation to the abrupt cessation of the
summit, President Trump said, “it was about sanctions. I mean, they wanted
sanctions lifted but they weren’t willing to do an area that we wanted.” [emphasis
added by the author]
U.S. State Secretary Mike Pompeo, who
accompanied President Trump at the joint conference, said specifically, “even
that facility [second uranium enrichment plant], even the Yongbyon facility and
all of its scope -- which is important, for sure -- still leaves missiles,
still leaves warheads and weapons systems. So there's a lot of other elements
that we just couldn’t get to.” Judging from his comments, it seems that the
U.S. wanted to agree on ‘denuclearization measures more than the complete
decommissioning of the Yongbyon nuclear complex’. This is corroborated by North
Korea’s Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho’s news conference held around midnight,
stating, “during the meeting, the United States insisted that we should take
one more step beside the dismantlement of nuclear facilities in the Yongbyon
area.”
However, it appears that Pyongyang was not
prepared to agree on additional denuclearization measures other than the
closure of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities at the Hanoi summit. Foreign
Minister Ri, through an interpreter, expressed North Korea’s stance related to
the denuclearization, “If the United States removes partial sanctions, namely,
removes the article of sanctions that hamper the civilian economy and
livelihood of our people in particular, we will permanently and completely
dismantle all the nuclear material production facilities in the Yongbyon area,
including plutonium and uranium, in the presence of U.S. experts and by the
joint work of technicians from both countries. [emphasis added by the
author]” And he added, “What we proposed was not the removal of all sanctions,
but the partial removal. In detail, there are 11 UN sanctions resolutions
imposed upon the DPRK and we proposed to the United States to lift the article
of sanctions that impede the civilian economy and the livelihood of our people
from five UN sanctions resolutions adopted in 2016 and 2017.” [emphasis
added by the author]
Such remarks from the North Korean foreign
minister refutes President Trump’s words that the North wanted ‘complete
removal of sanctions’. Nevertheless, Washington seemed to fear that the drive
for denuclearization talks could wane as the partial removal of sanctions
markedly nullify the effects of sanctions even if the UN Security Council
excludes the articles of resolutions related to people’s livelihood and the
civilian economy, beyond the exemption of inter-Korean cooperation projects for
sanctions. Therefore, President Trump possibly regarded North Korea’s demand
for partial removal of sanctions synonymous with ‘the complete removal of
sanctions’.
During the Hanoi summit, in the U.S., President
Trump’s former personal lawyer Michael Cohen, once his ‘wingman’, testified at
the public hearing; thus President Trump plunged into serious crisis in
domestic politics. Consequently, President Trump desperately needed to obtain
‘an outcome beyond expectations’ related to North Korea’s denuclearization at
the Hanoi summit. Nonetheless, he failed to do so because North Korea refused
to agree on ‘a step further than the decommissioning of Yongbyon nuclear site’.
If President Trump agreed on a deal with North Korea involving the partial
relief of UN sanctions as a corresponding measure of the shutdown of Yongbyon
nuclear sites, he would have inexorably confronted severe criticisms at home
for the ‘bad deal’.
Despite failing to clinch an agreement in the
Vietnamese capital, the two leaders maintained amicable relations and alluded
to the continuation of the negotiations after the summit. At the post-summit
press conference, President Trump said, “We had a really, I think, a very
productive time.” and “I think we’ll end up being very good friends with Chairman
Kim and with North Korea.” Secretary Pompeo also added, “the President and
Chairman Kim both felt good that they had made that progress but couldn’t quite
get along the line any further to make a deal that would have been bigger at
this point. I hope we’ll do so in the weeks ahead.”
North Korea also explicated the reasons of the
summit collapse through a new conference by Foreign Minister Ri and Vice
Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui around midnight nearing March 1; but they showed
a restrained attitude, refraining from lambasting President Trump and the U.S.
acutely. And the mouthpiece of North Korea’s ruling Workers’ Party of Korea,
Rodong Sinmun, issued an article with a picture of President Trump and Chairman
together harmoniously and reported, “They agreed to … continue productive dialogues
for settling the issues discussed at the Hanoi Summit.” It added, “Kim Jong Un
expressed his thanks to Trump for making positive efforts for the successful
meeting and talks while making a long journey and said goodbye, promising the
next meeting.”
After the summit, “President Trump asked
President Moon to play an active role as a mediator by conversing with Chairman
Kim Jong Un and later informing him about the results of those conversations.”
Accordingly, should the South Korean government help the two countries narrow
the gap through the summits with the U.S. and North Korea, President Trump and
Chairman Kim will be able to reach a ‘bigger deal’ in the third summit than
what the Hanoi summit aimed to achieve.
While the ‘permanent shutdown of the Yongbyon
nuclear complex’ is a first crucial measure regarding North Korea’s
denuclearization, this cannot solely persuade the U.S. public view which is
generally skeptical to North Korea’s denuclearization. Pyongyang should bring
up additional daring measures of denuclearization - such as the shutdown of
nuclear facilities in other areas or abolition of ICBMs partially or fully – in
its negotiations with the U.S. delegation. And once North Korea agrees on
‘denuclearization measures in addition to the closure of Yongbyon nuclear
facilities’, the U.S. needs to consider keenly the partial removal of UN
sanctions related to people’s livelihoods such as textile exports and petroleum
imports as well as the exemptions for inter-Korean cooperation projects.
For such an agreement to be realized between the
two sides, the South Korean government should arrange a trilateral
working-group meeting that brings together U.S. Special Representative for
North Korea Stephen Biegun, North Korea's Special Representative for U.S.
Affairs Kim Hyok-chol, and Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace
and Security Affairs Lee Do-hoon in the nearest future. And Seoul should assume
the mediating role more actively in assisting North Korea and the U.S. to find
a common ground related to denuclearization and sanctions relief by pursuing a
ROK-DPRK-U.S. trilateral summit in Panmunjom or a third country.
※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the
original article that was written in Korean. All references should be made to
the original paper.
※ The
views expressed here are the author's own, and do not necessarily represent
those of the Sejong Institute.