Russia and Relations with South Korea in 2018 and Outlook

 

 

Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-21

December 18, 2018

Dr. Yoon Ik Joong

Professor, Hallym University of Graduate Studies,

youn@hallym.ac.kr

 

 

Summary

 

In Russian politics in 2018, President Putin was sworn in for the fourth time and new policies such as pension reforms were introduced but faced a public backlash. In foreign policy, Russia continued to wrestle with the confrontation with the West such as the crisis in Ukraine, Syrian civil war, and the spy incidents in the UK and the West maintained economic sanctions against Russia. Nevertheless, it has countered the U.S. unilateralism with China, developing bilateral relations to a historic high in 2018. Meanwhile, although the ROK-Russia relations have made considerable progress including the summit and vibrant exchanges across various domains in 2018, the dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, DPRK-U.S. summit, and the Northeast Asia defined by continuing U.S.-China standoff stole the headlines. The two countries laid the foundations for ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation among others, but these details failed to come into fruition. Should the Moon Jae-in administration’s New Northern Policy is unable to make substantial and tangible progress in so-called ‘nine bridges’ issue of the Russian Far East development in 2019, the policy drive will deteriorate. The year 2019 will be the testing ground for the Moon administration’s New Northern Policy and the development of ROK-Russia relations.

 

1. Russian Domestic Politics in 2018

 

Presidential Elections, Pension Reform, and Anti-Government Protests

 

On March 18, 2018, Vladimir Putin won the presidential elections and inaugurated as the 7th president of the Russian Federation on May 7 - commencing his fourth term in power (2018-2024). He became the longest-serving leader of Russia since General Secretary Josef Stalin during the Soviet Union era. The elections in March grasped the attention from the domestic and international media as several issues intermingled: allegations of Russia’s interference at the U.S. elections (so-called Russia-gate); conflict in Ukraine; economic instability caused by western sanctions and fall in oil prices; and the candidates from the opposition like Pavel Grudinin who put up a good fight. Winning with the largest proportion of votes (77 percent), President Putin re-appointed Dmitri Medvedev as the prime minister and set education and public health among others as the primary tasks for the new government. At the same time, Putin ordered the administration to surge as the world’s fifth largest economy and to reduce the level of poverty by half within the six years - during Putin’s fourth term. However, before Putin’s inauguration, the Russian society was unstable due to nationwide anti-government protests that condemned the Putin regime’s authoritarian policies and suppression of democracy. Around 1,300 people who attended the anti-government protests against Putin’s policies were detained by the Russian government. Besides, the Putin government introduced pension reforms which instigated public outrage and decline in approval ratings. The essence of the pension reforms was to raise the pension age by 5 years - from 60 to 65 for men and 55 to 60 for women. It is assessed as the most shocking pension reform in modern Russian history. The plan passed the State Duma in September.

 

Continuance of the Conflict with Ukraine

 

The Russo-Ukrainian relations, which deteriorated since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, have continued the confrontational state by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s independence from the Russian Orthodox Church, the Russian seizure of three Ukrainian vessels, and others. At the synod in October, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople approved the decree, recognizing the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church despite the fierce opposition from the Russian Orthodox Church. The Constantinople patriarchy’s decision enabled the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to enjoy autonomy vis-a-vis the Russian Orthodox Church. Accordingly, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate severed its relations with the Constantinople patriarchy. Meanwhile, the Russian Orthodox Church declared the schism with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople for the reason that the latter violated the former’s autocephaly. And the naval clash in November heightened tensions between Moscow and Kyiv, worsening the already-strained relations. The Russian coast guard violently captured three Ukrainian naval vessels (two gunboats and a tugboat) which were passing through the Kerch Strait toward Azov Sea late November. Although the bilateral treaty signed in 2003 stipulates the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea as a shared territory with free access, Russia has claimed the dominance over the passage of Kerch Strait since 2015 after the annexation of Crimea.

 

Continuance of War in Syria and U.S.-Russia Confrontation

 

As it is well known, the U.S.-led international forces have named Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a dictator and confronted the Russians in Syria by supporting the rebel forces. Syria is the sole Arab state that has maintained friendly relations with Soviet Union/Russia since the late 1950s. When pro-Soviet Nasser of Egypt died and his successor Anwar Sadat shifted to pro-American orientation in 1970, Syria’s importance for the Soviet Union in the Middle East has elevated. The cordial relations have continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era, Syria is a geopolitical foothold for Russia to exert its influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Putin’s Russia obstructed the opposition forces or Sunni forces winning the war in Syria to boast to the West that cooperation with Russia is essential in issues such as the Syrian civil war, the spread of armed factions in the Middle East, and the refugee influx to Europe. Besides, Russia has aggressively involved in the resolution to the civil war in Syria and piled up pressure against the West to acquiesce its annexation of Crimea and lift economic sanctions against Russia. Russia’s foreign policy and security strategy since 2000, when President Putin was sworn in, highlights that the improvement of relationship and cooperation with the countries that were under Soviet sphere of influence along with those constituted the Soviet Union (referred as the Near Abroad) are key countries to achieve Russia’s core interests. Consequently, because losing influence in Syria will engender decline in Russia’s position in the Middle East, Russia carried on its confrontation and struggle against the U.S. throughout 2018. For example, the alleged chemical attack in the Syrian opposition area last April staged acute tensions between Russia and the West again. Both sides exchanged diatribes against each other and expanded the battlefront; thus, the tendencies of a new Cold War incessantly deteriorated the U.S.-Russia relations.

 

Continuance of Enhanced Cooperation with China

 

In 2018, Russia and China affirmed that they have been the best strategic partner in history, voicing their stances in unison regarding major international issues such as the sanctions against North Korea, the war in Syria, and the crisis in Ukraine. The highlight of this developed partnership was when the two countries started the largest joint military exercises during President Xi Jinping’s visit last September to participate in the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. With Chinese participation, Russia’s ‘Vostok-2018’ drills conducted the joint operation plans beginning in Russia’s eastern region including Siberia. This drill, the largest one in scale since 1981, involved some 300,000 Russian soldiers, more than 1,000 aerial vehicles (drones, helicopters included), 80 warships, and 36,000 military vehicles. The drill took the form of strategic joint exercise with China’s participation - 3,200 soldiers, 1,000 armaments and equipment, and 30 fighter jets and helicopters. The two countries manifested the stronger-than-ever bilateral relations in the military domain such as arms purchases and joint exercises, not to mention the economy.

 

2. South Korea-Russia Relations in 2018

 

Even though the two countries made meaningful progress in bilateral relations including the summit and exchanges in various fields, these accomplishments failed to steal the show under the U.S.-China confrontational structure in Northeast Asia, the dramatic inter-Korean rapprochement, and the DPRK-U.S. summit. Furthermore, the two countries failed to cement a tangible result in the “nine bridges” of cooperation in Russian Far East development. Instead, the two countries gathered international attention in terms of culture and sports as they commonly hosted major sporting events  - the 23rd Winter Olympics in PyeongChang and the 21st World Cup in Russia.

 

Russian View of the Korean Peninsula Affairs

 

The Putin administration, beginning its fourth term, actively espoused Moon Jae-in administration’s policies and principles which aims at denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace mechanism in Northeast Asia for substantial and tangible achievements in New East Policy for the development of the Russian Far East. For example, the Russian government and the Duma welcomed the inter-Korean summit in April itself and the resultant Panmunjom Declaration and expressed that Russia will jointly strive for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the settlement of a peace regime. Also, the Russian political community embraced the Pyongyang Joint Declaration in September as a significant achievement and urged the international community to support the implementation of the declaration. In addition, the Kremlin continually stressed the previous stance that the six-party talks’ should resume in the future process of establishing a multilateral peace and security regime in Northeast Asia based on the peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula. In more specific terms, the Russian government re-proclaimed that it has a phased initiative to discuss the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and regional security architecture in Northeast Asia through multilateral framework - insisting the resumption of the six-party talks. In fact, Russia, along with China, has proposed a ‘roadmap’ that specified the peaceful, phased resolution to the Korean Peninsula issue and consistently urged the implementation of this roadmap since July 2017. The Russo-Chinese roadmap lays out the resolution in three phases: first, North Korea announces that it suspends additional nuclear and ballistic missile tests and complies with non-proliferation principles regarding nuclear weapons and missiles and South Korea and the U.S. replies with downsizing its joint military exercises; second, the two Koreas normalize bilateral relations by direct talks; third, the multilateral framework resumes to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. Additionally, Russia continued to raise the necessity to ease and lift international sanctions against North Korea.

 

President Moon Jae-in’s State Visit to Russia and ROK-Russia Summit

 

From June 21 to 23, President Moon Jae-in sought to develop cooperation with Russia through his second visit to Russia and the summit. His state visit to Russia - first official visit to Russia by a South Korean president since President Kim Dae-jung visited in 1999 - overlapped with the World Cup period and proceeded after the two inter-Korean summits and the DPRK-U.S. summit. Hence, this visit connoted a special meaning as it was the first summit diplomacy after the two inter-Korean summits and the June 12 DPRK-U.S. summit. While congratulating Russia for hosting a global event and directly explaining the results of the inter-Korean summits and North Korea-U.S. summit to President Putin, President Moon attempted to draw Russian support for South Korea’s position on North Korea’s denuclearization and the establishment of a Korean peace regime, directly appealing to President Putin. Furthermore, President Moon addressed at the Russian State Duma - for the first time as South Korean president. This is viewed as his emphasis on the role of the legislative branches for bilateral cooperation. At the ROK-Russia summit, Presidents Moon and Putin adopted the joint declaration containing 32 clauses while agreeing to continue joint efforts to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and secure perennial peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia as a whole. The joint declaration reflected the thawing ambiance surrounding the Korean Peninsula following the successes of inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits. Ultimately, President Moon endeavored to entice Russia’s active will for cooperation, necessary in the denuclearization process, as he affirmed the common goal of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia with President Putin. In addition, President Moon highlighted the ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation projects to turn the summit as an opportunity to kickstart the ‘New Northern Policy.’ Therefore, the summit laid the foundation for trilateral cooperation. The two countries discussed substantial measures in three key agendas, expanding future growth engine, developing the Eurasian region and the Russian Far East, and enhancing public welfare, to have synergic effects on bilateral relations at the expanded meeting.

 

Invigoration of South Korea-Russia Inter-Regional Cooperation

 

Last April, the Gyeonggi province expanded economic exchanges with Primorsky Krai of Russia, signing exchange and cooperation agreement with regional enterprises and organization. Gyeonggi province officials also signed a memorandum of understanding regarding investment and cooperation with organizations such as the Vladivostok Free Zone residents supporting the representative companies of the Russian Far East. And Gyeonggi province also signed a memorandum on cooperation with Rostec State Corporation in Khabarovsk. And in November, the regional government entities of Korea and Russia held ‘South Korea-Russia Inter-Regional Forum’ in Pohang. With the participation of representatives of 17 regional entities of Korea and 9 regions of Russia, businesspeople, and experts, the forum discussed bilateral cooperation in various domains including but not limited to the economy, trade, science, logistics, and energy. At the Pohang City Hall, the regional government meeting was held to discuss expanded cooperation between the representatives of the regional governments from the two countries. The co-chairs of the forum, governors of North Gyeongsang province and Primorsky Krai, announced the ‘Pohang declaration’ after the meeting. Invigoration of inter-regional cooperation is evaluated as a means to produce concrete outcomes of bilateral cooperation.

 

3. ROK-Russia Relations Outlook in 2019

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s South Korea Visit

 

Last June, President Moon, during his visit to Russia, invited President Putin to visit South Korea, and President Putin accepted the invitation. President Putin’s visit will be determined after considering various factors, the progress in inter-Korean relations, the result of the second DPRK-U.S. summit, Chairman Kim Jong-un’s visit to Russia, and President Putin’s visit to North Korea, among others. The development of the Russian Far East including the ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral cooperation will also affect President Putin’s schedule to visit South Korea. Thus, as President Putin will visit South Korea, Russia will play a larger role in the Korean Peninsula and regional affairs in 2019. As a matter of fact, noting the concerns of ‘Russia passing (Russia being neglected)’ in Korean Peninsula affairs in 2018, President Putin is likely to take a more active step when the larger picture on the Korean Peninsula (denuclearization and regime guarantee for North Korea) is set and the specific plans are drawn out - asserting the six-party framework in 2019. Meanwhile, Moscow is expected to strongly hope President Moon to attend the fifth Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok in September. For the Moon administration’s New Northern Policy and Putin government’s New East Policy, the South Korean President should seize the opportunity of the forum in Vladivostok.

 

Need for Tangible Results and Execution in Pending Issues between the Two Countries

 

To achieve the blueprint of ROK-Russia cooperation, the two countries should bear fruits in ‘nine bridges’ issues as soon as possible, while it is also vital to find strategic commonalities between South Korea’s New Northern Policy and Russia’s New East Policy. Should the two countries are unable to make concrete outcomes, the New Northern Policy will lose the impetus. For a forward-looking and constructive development of ROK-Russia partnership, it is imperative for the Moon administration to carry out detailed plans and achieve tangible outcomes regarding the bilateral cooperation projects in the Russian Far East, while the policy vision of New Northern Policy is also important. The two countries should not satisfy by discussing ‘potential’ and ‘possibility’ of cooperation. Both governments need concrete ‘achievements.’ The year 2019 will be a decisive year in Moon administration’s New Northern Policy and the development of bilateral relations.

ROK-Russia Economic Cooperation

 

The success of reaching the goal set at the ROK-Russia summit in June 2018 - bilateral trade volume of $30 billion and people-to-people exchange 1 million by the 30th year of bilateral relations (2020) - hinges on the interactions in 2019. Although the bilateral trade volume recovered to $19 billion, a 40-percent increase from 2016, the two countries did not harness the relation’s potential sufficiently. While the bilateral trade volume is expected to increase in 2019, the progress in ROK-Russia FTA (in services and investment) negotiations will be a crucial factor in the future development of bilateral economic relations. The two countries began the FTA discussions in 2007, but the negotiations suspended after two years in 2009 by Moscow’s request. Meanwhile, the role and competitiveness of head of the Presidential Committee on Northern Economic Cooperation and former Goldman Sachs economist Kwon Goo-hoon, newly appointed last November, will heavily affect the bilateral economic cooperation. Additionally, if the West eases economic sanctions against Russia and North Korea, the bilateral and ROK-DPRK-Russia trilateral economic cooperation will gain boost. If not, the bilateral and trilateral economic cooperation will not yield substantial results.

 

 

 

 

 

This article is based on the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

 

*Translator’s note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.