The Huawei Case: Is Korea Still Receiving “Love Calls”
from Both the United States and China?
 

No. 2019-19 (June 5, 2019)
Lee Seong-hyon (The Sejong Institute)

and Min Hyeon Jong (SNU GSIS)

sunnybbsfs@gmail.com

Ever since the United States added Huawei onto its “blacklist” of export-restricted companies, it has come to attention that the U.S. government also requested Seoul to join the ban against Huawei. On the other hand, Beijing has been sending out threatening messages through state-run media, stating that Korean firms will suffer billions of dollars in losses, if Korea suspends its import of Huawei equipment. Korea seems to be pushed into a corner, forced to make a decision between the US and China, much like the situation concerning the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) deployment a few years ago.

When the drama concerning the deployment of US THAAD systems raised tensions between Beijing and Seoul, Seoul showed a posture of remarkable indecisiveness, dragging the decision for over a year. This came at a huge expense. Korea’s ambiguous position caused the U.S., its major ally, to question its commitment. Interestingly, it also deteriorated China’s perception of Korea, making it believe that Seoul is behaving like an ‘opportunist’ between Beijing and Washington.

Opportunism is a part of human nature. Being an opportunist pays off in the world of international relations and realpolitik. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Yun Byung-se had stated that Korea is being “wooed” by both the U.S. and China (May 30, 2015). Yun was referring to the importance of the Korean peninsula in East Asian geopolitics.

If so, one could raise the question why Beijing launched a “THAAD retaliation” against Seoul, when it should have tried to impress Korea. Would a “wooing strategy,” involving economic inducements and political concessions to tip the scales on its favor, be a more likely approach towards Korea on the THAAD issue?

Instead, Beijing launched a variety of retaliatory measures against Seoul. It utilized the media and psychologic strategies to divide the opinion of the Korean public, launched boycotts on Korean firms, delayed customs and conducted sanitary inspections, banned tourists, cancelled conferences and exchange programs, and shut down official communication channels. These are clearly not measures intended to “woo” someone.

Amidst heightening rivalry with the US, China classified its neighbors into three categories: first, clear allies to the U.S., such as Japan. China approaches these nations with a cold and “business-driven” attitude with minimal contact. However, it opens windows to improving relations, if it meets Chinese national interests. This is precisely why China had a summit meeting with Japan, after seven years of treating Japan like an “invisible man.”

The second group is the “‘pro-China” group, such as the Philippines. China provides

economic benefits to these nations to keep them on its side.

The third category is where Korea falls into: the group of “tightrope walkers,” trying to balance between the U.S. and China. Instead of luring them with economic benefits, Beijing punishes them – the THAAD retaliation being a “prime example.” South Korea became a scapegoat to show the rest of its neighbors what happens when they act against Chinese will. If Korea goes unpunished, other nations would also ignore China’s warnings in a similar situation. It is a classic art-of-war strategy of “Killing the chicken to scare the monkey.”

It seems that Seoul could not see through Beijing’s strategy during the THAAD crisis. In a visit to Shanghai, a senior Korean government official had publically voiced the opinion that China would dare not impose economic retaliations on Korea. He used the “Economic Rationale” to explain his reasoning, saying that trade is intrinsically mutually beneficial, which means Chinese retaliations would backfire into Chinese losses. Reportedly, his words have poured fuel onto Chinese will to retaliate.

From the beginning, the Moon Jae-in Administration inherited the THAAD situation from the previous government. With the current situation surrounding Huawei, Korea is again faced with an existential challenge of trying to find strategic room between the U.S. and China. Both superpowers are demanding Korea to take its side on this sensitive issue.

According to Korean media, Seoul’s most likely course of action is to stay impartial and maintain a “low-key” mode. The question is: “Is this an effective strategy?”

Washington would find Seoul’s behavior of “not acting like a U.S. ally” displeasing. Beijing, on the other hand, reflecting upon the THAAD experience, would launch retaliations should Seoul ban Huawei. Korea is clearly not being “wooed” from both the US and China. The “strategic ambiguity” aimed at finding balance between two superpowers is gradually reaching a breaking point.

The most prevalent reaction to the Huawei situation in Korea is that “Korea should not make a choice between the U.S. and China.” Does running away from a decision and buying time in the name of “strategic ambiguity” solve the problem? We can take some lessons learned from the outcome of the THAAD crisis.

Korean diplomacy has already entered a new framework. The “Security with the U.S., economy with China” strategic framework is not effective anymore. The era of “wooing” from the U.S. and China has ended. With intensifying competition, both powers will increasingly view issues on the Korean Peninsula with a strategic perspective, trying to check the other’s power in the Asia-Pacific region. In turn, this will act as a critical restriction as Korea plans to lead the policy towards North Korea.

The best outcome for Korea is not having to make a choice between the US and China. However, it is now time for Korea to critically assess whether maintaining “mechanical neutrality” is the best, if it has the diplomatic assets and capacity to do so. And how to employ “signal diplomacy” to protect South Korea’s national interests, when the U.S. and China are likely to contest each other on every possible issue in the future.

※ Translator’s note: This is a summarized unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
※ This article is written based on the author’s personal opinions and does not reflect  the views of the Sejong Institute.