The North Korean Nuclear Issue: Seoul’s, Pyongyang’s, and Washington’s Position and Prospects for 2019

 

Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-15

December 11, 2018

Dr. Hong Hyun-ik

Director, Department of Diplomatic Strategy Studies, the Sejong Institute

hyunik@sejong.org

 

 

The Current State of Play

 

In 2018, the inter-Korean relations have embraced an era of peace based on the confidence built between the two leaders who met three times and the two Koreas are preparing a mutually beneficial economic cooperation. North Korea and the U.S. also have agreed on principles of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, normalizing bilateral relations, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at the June 12 summit. South Korea and the U.S. suspended large-scale joint military drills and North Korea replied with several measures: repatriated American detainees, returned remains of U.S. soldiers, and manifested its intention to cease future nuclear development – demolished the nuclear test site, dismantled Sohae missile launch site, and suspended nuclear and missile tests since last December.

However, as Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol canceled his visit to the U.S. early November - which was to prepare the second DPRK-U.S. summit - it enfeebled the momentum for denuclearization and the summit. The November U.S. midterm election resulted in the Democrats’ control of the House and weakened President Trump’s power base. When the Congress opens next January, it will likely to hold back the administration’s negotiations with North Korea. In such context, President Trump showed his determination to negotiate with North Korea, mentioning that he will have the second summit with Kim Jong-un next January or February and narrowed down the list of potential venues to three when he met with President Moon at the G20 summit late November. Moreover, he asked President Moon to deliver his message that Chairman Kim’s visit to South Korea will serve a positive momentum to settle peace on the Korean Peninsula and that he will provide what he wants when he implements the agreement between the two leaders. U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton, who maintains a hardline stance against North Korea, made an extraordinary remark - Washington will review the option of lifting sanctions when North Korea shows progress in the denuclearization process.

Against this backdrop, the possibility of Kim’s visit to South Korea prior to the DPRK-U.S. summit has grasped the attention from the media. While it seems that the second Trump-Kim meeting will be held within the next two and a half months, the talks between Pyongyang and Washington to prepare the summit have only taken place as a working-level dialogue at Panmunjom early December and the high-level talks are yet to be scheduled. The inter-Korean relations are likely to be a breakthrough or a mediator for the DPRK-U.S. talks.

This paper examines the positions of three countries on the North Korean nuclear issue at the current situation, lays out the outlook on the issue for 2019, and elaborates South Korea’s strategy for Kim Jong-un’s visit to South Korea and the resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue.

 

How South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. View the North Korean Nuclear Issue

 

Moon Jae-in Administration’s Position

The Moon administration chiefly values the principle of ‘defending the peace on the Korean Peninsula.’ In this context, it has achieved the inter-Korean rapprochement with Chairman Kim and ushered in the era of peace on the Korean Peninsula, adopting measures for lessening military tension, preventing accidental clashes, and building confidence. Building military confidence between the two Koreas possibly sets a favorable condition for North Korea’s denuclearization. It also entailed the recommendation to the U.S. to participate in the declaration to end the Korean War that de facto ended 65 years ago in a political and symbolic manner as a gesture to encourage North Korea to adopt measures for denuclearization free from security concerns as the two Koreas already agreed on terms resembling a peace treaty - preventing accidental military clashes and building confidence beyond an ‘end-of-war’ declaration.

The South Korean government’s policy orientation on the North Korean nuclear program follows the idea of ‘being the driver of Korean Peninsula affairs.’ This is Seoul’s concept of playing a facilitator and mediator role between Pyongyang and Washington to reach an agreement on the nuclear issue, assuming responsibility as a key stakeholder and preparing a creative proposition to resolve the issue - a more active approach to the issue compared to the previous administrations. It advises Pyongyang to build trust with Washington by adopting measures for denuclearization and receive corresponding measures in return. On the other side, Seoul persuades Washington to declare the end to the Korean War and ease sanctions flexibly as Kim Jong-un’s commitment to denuclearization is more trustworthy than his predecessors so as to induce North Korea’s swift denuclearization process in an irreversible manner.

The Moon administration is poised to welcome Kim Jong-un’s visit to Seoul and encourages Kim to pay a visit this year - but it will accept the visit even if it takes place next year. The administration attempts to seize the opportunity to be exempt from sanctions by inducing North Korea’s additional measures of denuclearization and seek South Korea’s economic development through mutually-beneficial inter-Korean economic cooperation such as the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

 

Chairman Kim’s position

Chairman Kim Jong-un thinks and acts based on the principle of ‘safeguarding the regime at all costs.’ In this context, North Korea bolstered its nuclear and missile development during the Obama administration which was reluctant in negotiations with North Korea. When the Trump administration posed a hardline posture against North Korea, it strived to enhance nuclear and missile capabilities as a brinkmanship tactic and declared the completion of state nuclear force late November 2017 when it perceived that it had acquired minimal deterrence against the U.S. with the successful test-launch of Hwasong-15 missile which made the U.S. east coast within range.

Afterward, Kim Jong-un engaged in proactive diplomacy with confidence. First, North Korea sought reciprocal inter-Korean economic cooperation and participated in the Winter Olympics under the concept of national cooperation between South and North Korea. Together with South Korea, it opened in an era of peace on the Korean Peninsula through three inter-Korean summits. Moreover, having set forth the proposition that North Korea could abandon its nuclear arsenal once the U.S. military threat is removed and the regime security is guaranteed, Chairman Kim received assurances of normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S. and the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in exchange for the commitment to complete denuclearization at the summit talks with President Trump. Thereafter, Kim Jong-un pressured the U.S. to take corresponding measures while North Korea divided up the denuclearization procedures into several stages, asserting that he will accept denuclearization when the U.S. complies with the principle of mutual respect and security. However, as the U.S. did not take additional steps other than the suspension of large-scale war games with South Korea, North Korea has urged the U.S. to adopt additional corresponding measures while it halted additional denuclearization measures since last July.

In a long-term vision, Kim Jong-un aims to establish the foundation for a long-term rule by having the international sanctions lifted as it takes denuclearization measures at a step-by-step and case-by-case basis depending on the U.S. corresponding measures and achieving economic growth through inter-Korean economic cooperation and reception of international investment.

President Trump’s Position

With the slogan of ‘America First,’ President Trump seems to have a policy goal of winning the presidential elections in November 2020. It is rational to explicate that President Trump pursues his North Korea policy in such a context. Unlike the negotiators in the previous administrations who had the expertise and experience but took a restrained attitude with the disbelief in North Korea, President Trump has opted for a top-down resolution - believing his intuition and judgment - and Chairman Kim also wants negotiations with President Trump and reach a deal with him directly.

Nevertheless, faced with the anti-Trump sentiment and distrust against North Korea deeply entrenched among many media outlets, intellectuals, and the establishment, President Trump hopes to receive public praise for diplomatic achievements by inducing North Korea’s denuclearization with minimal cost. Hence, whereas the U.S. journalists and scholars, armed with distrust against North Korea, criticize the top-down approach to negotiations with North Korea, President Trump lauded himself for diplomatic and security accomplishments - rapid reduction of North Korea’s security threat against the U.S. and return of American detainees - and has fended off North Korea’s discontent of U.S. unilateral policy toward North Korea by expressing trust in Kim Jong-un.

 

Outlook in 2019

Compared with the era of peace and reconciliation during the previous Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, the peace process unfolded on the Korean Peninsula this year appears more likely to end with success.

First, currently, the peace process based on trust among the leaders of the two Koreas and the U.S. seems to proceed in a virtuous cycle. Although the two Koreas had moments of reconciliation during the Bush administration in the past, the U.S. hardline stance exposed clear limitations with the cacophony between Seoul and Washington on the confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. and policy coordination toward North Korea. Additionally, when the Obama administration endeavored to engage in talks with the North Korean regime, the momentum was weakened by the passive attitude of the previous Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations. Now, the two Korean leaders have built rapport; Kim Jong-un and Trump have maintained trust toward one another; South Korea and the U.S. have minimized the differences on their North Korea policy and upheld coordination. Even though cleavages exist lies between the officials of North Korea and the U.S., these hindrances could vanish by the trust between the leaders.

 

Second, the three leaders commonly perceive that the peace process on the Korean Peninsula suits their political interests. President Moon, having values of progressiveness and peace, obviously leads the drive. Chairman Kim strives to lay the groundwork for his long-term reign by having the regime’s safety guaranteed and achieving economic growth with gradual denuclearization. President Trump endeavors to have the resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue as his diplomatic accomplishment, sustaining trust with Chairman Kim, even when he sparked disputes with competitive powers and even allies by addressing solely U.S. interests. If possible, he aims to win the Nobel Peace Prize based on this diplomatic feat and retain his presidency onwards.

Third, the three leaders have some time to pursue the process as they have more than a year and 10 months until the end of their terms - different from the past. It contrasts with the past where only five months remained at the decisive moments to pursue the peace process - for either President Clinton or President Roh Moo-hyun.

Fourth, Chairman Kim Jong-un’s peace diplomacy initiative with an active attitude full of confidence - differing from his father Kim Jong-il who passively approached the peace process through Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s persuasion - also increases the possibility of success. Chairman Kim also manifests a leadership with efforts to fulfill the promises - adding to the positive factors.

As such, while Chairman Kim’s Seoul visit in December will raise the likelihood of success in denuclearization and the peace process on the Korean Peninsula, his visit postponed early 2019 will still ensure a high rate of success.

Yet, it is worrisome that there still is room for the political environment to retreat to a confrontational state, as the conservative factions within the three countries may excessively oppose and resist the advancement of negotiations - bringing the peace process to a standstill. For example, the anti-Trump bloc within the U.S. and North Korea-skeptics could pressure President Trump to categorically refuse any corresponding measures without North Korea’s preceding ‘complete’ denuclearization, despite North Korea’s expression of intent to denuclearization. Then Kim Jong-un may a return to hardline stance against the international community, reneging the denuclearization process.

Nonetheless, from a bird-eye view, the process of denuclearization and establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is likely to advance forward albeit twists and turns and a slow pace.

 

 

 

South Korea’s Policy Direction

Because the inter-Korean summit in South Korea seems more likely to be held earlier than the DPRK-U.S. summit whether it takes place in December or January, the paper presents the South Korean government’s strategy when Kim visits Seoul.

In the context of time, the South Korean government should encourage North Korea to take additional denuclearization measures, explaining the realist logic in international politics as a relatively weak power - which may stir sentiments of undeservedness - and emphasizing that President Trump will have a leeway to take corresponding measures when North Korea makes a step toward denuclearization.

The problem is that the South Korean government cannot provide any material concessions to Chairman Kim due to the sanctions imposed by the UN and the U.S. Against this backdrop, it should focus on the resolution based on the historic meaning that the North Korean leader visits South Korea for the first time. President Moon could review the idea of persuading Chairman Kim to pay a tribute to the National Cemetery, express firm determination that ‘I deeply contemplated several unfortunate incidents that occurred around the inter-Korean demarcation line and will make efforts to prevent these events from recurring,’ and revoke the freeze of South Korean assets in Mount Kumgang and Kaesong Industrial Complex - in exchange South Korea could lift the May 24 measures and pave the way to resume operation of Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism of Mount Kumgang.

Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, Seoul should organize affairs for North Korea to swiftly accept the international inspection team to observe the demolished Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the dismantlement of the missile engine test site in Tongchang-ri. Furthermore, as Chairman Kim pledged to permanently shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facilities when the U.S. takes corresponding measures to President Moon in Pyongyang in September, the South Korean government should persuade that it is wise to take dramatic measures - deconstructing the Yongbyon facilities under the supervision of the inspection team and receiving monitoring team afterward - and induce U.S. corresponding measures in return - open a U.S. liaison office in North Korea, declare end to the Korean War, ease sanctions, and make inter-Korean economic cooperation exempt from sanctions such as the resumption of Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism of Mount Kumgang. Also, it could convince that it will be easier to urge the U.S. to take corresponding measures when North Korea could declare the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, of which Chairman Kim already pledged to dismantle. In sum, the South Korean government could request North Korea to take a substantial step toward denuclearization on one side, and persuade the U.S. to induce North Korea’s denuclearization adopting an original corresponding measure and ease sanctions.

 

Even if Chairman Kim visits Seoul after meeting with President Trump, the South Korean government should have a draft resolution including the schedule that links North Korea’s denuclearization with sanctions relief, establishment of DPRK-U.S. liaison office, ‘end-of-war’ declaration, establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, etc. to offer both sides and strive to achieve the denuclearization and establishment of a peace regime according to Seoul’s timeline, reflecting and revising the draft by continuous consultation with both sides.

 

 

 

This article is based on the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

 

*Translator’s note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.