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China and ROK-China Relations in 2018 and Outlook in 2019

Date 2018-12-13 View 2,131

China and ROK-China Relations in 2018 and Outlook in 2019

 

Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-18

December 13, 2018

Dr. Chung Jae Hung

Research Fellow, the Sejong Institute

jameschung@sejong.org

 

 

1. Chinese Politics in 2018

The most notable characteristic in Chinese politics in 2018 is the constitutional amendment and the establishment of President Xi Jinping’s one-man rule.  Along with the emphasis on 'the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' proclaimed at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) October last year, the lianghui (National People's Congress, NPC and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, CPPCC) held last March proceeded with constitutional amendment. Moreover, the amended constitution and ensuing restructuring of state apparatus confirmed the establishment of Xi’s one-man rule. After the constitutional amendment, most of the Chinese state media especially highlighted the significance of this constitutional amendment - that a strong leader is essential to achieve the ‘Chinese dream,’ ensure continuity in key national policies, and expand China’s influence in the international stage. President Xi himself illustrated the necessity and legitimacy of the constitutional amendment, “We should not be concerned about personal gains or fames. What we want is a good reputation not only among the people today, but also a good reputation that will go down in history.”

The core of the amendment was Article 45 Paragraph 3 of Article 79 of the Constitution, "The terms of office for the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China are the same as those of deputies to the National People's Congress; presidents and vice-presidents shall serve no more than two consecutive terms." This was amended to read as “The terms of office for the President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China are the same as those of deputies to the National People's Congress." Therefore, this enables President Xi to rule for another term and even for life in legal terms. It has elevated President Xi to the strongest leader in China since Chairman Mao. Furthermore, the preamble of the constitution listed “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” along with  “Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development” - inscribing President Xi’s name for the first time in the constitution since Deng Xiaoping. It de facto completed Xi Jinping’s one-man rule.1)

The establishment of President Xi’s one-man rule does not end at the expansion of CPC General Secretary Xi’s power base and consolidation, but also encompasses the historic shift from the existing 1978 constitution system.2) This does not only simply denote the transformation from Deng Xiaoping-led orientation that held on for more than 40 years to Xi Jinping-led orientation but includes the ‘Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’ - fight against corruption - in all domains such as politics, economy, and society. President Xi especially reckons corruption as the largest threat against the CPC and appointed Deputy Secretary Yang Xiaodu of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as the first director of the National Supervisory Commission. Establishing the National Supervisory Commission, the Chinese government has launched a wide range of anti-corruption campaign against high-level officials within the CPC, government, PLA, and state-owned enterprises as well as investigations into illegal economic activities and tax evasion of major leaders of corporations and celebrities. While the anti-corruption campaign during Xi’s first term mainly focused on senior officials within the party, government, and the military, Beijing has ratcheted up its social control and surveillance in Xi’s second term. The social rigidity in China has increased as the government imposes tighter control on the public’s expression of views on the internet and social media.

 

Meanwhile, the Xi Jinping leadership set forth several key policies to prepare for the hegemonic competition with the U.S.: reinforcing the officials in foreign affairs and security, fostering a powerful military, and expanding the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As he reiterated several times earlier, “In front of the great national interests and the tide of history, any actions and tricks to split China are doomed to fail. ... The Chinese people and the Chinese nation share a common belief that it is never allowed and it is absolutely impossible to separate any inch of territory of our great country from China!” President Xi clarified ‘the determination to safeguard China’s core interests.’ Xi’s second term foreign policy will take the same orientation. Specifically, President Xi Jinping - Vice President Wang Qishan - Director Yang Jiechi of CPC Office of the Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs - State Councillor for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi hierarchy appears to spearhead China’s foreign policy during Xi’s second term. It has begun to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy with the slogans such as ‘modern socialist country,’ ‘belt and road initiative (BRI),’ and ‘a new type of international relations.’ That is, the foreign policy in Xi’s second term transcends the narrow goal of fostering an international climate favorable to domestic regime stability and development and pursues an alteration in regional order that contains China’s vision, emphasizing Chinese values.

Obviously, for the time being, Beijing is unlikely to challenge the U.S. hegemonic status in the region; but it will broaden its foreign influence through stronger diplomatic ties with its neighbors and BRI. President Xi urged the stronger ‘implementation of the military-civilian integration, strengthened role of rule of law, deeper reform of system, and further coordinated innovation in science and technology’ and increased China’s defense budget to 1.11 trillion yuan ($175 billion) - an 8.1-percent increase. In 2017, China’s defense expenditure passed the 1 trillion yuan threshold, placing China as the second in terms of military spending globally - 1.04 trillion yuan in total. The Chinese military already has a mid-to-long term plan to become the world-class army that stands victorious in any war beyond a defensive army by 2050, realizing military reform and modernize the equipment by 2035 and develop capabilities for the all branches and services in the military and civilian-military integration. China has specified its plan to advance as an economically prosperous and militarily powerful global power by 2050.

As such, the Chinese leadership under Xi’s second term explicitly illustrated its will to achieve the interests proactively and boldly - unlike the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era - and to pursue shift in regional order based on China’s vision and objectives to fulfill the ‘Chinese dream.’ Beijing has already emphasized China’s widened position and role as a big power - replacing the old phrase ‘a new type of major power relations' to ‘a new type of international relations’ and claiming to build a ‘community with a shared future for humanity.’ China’s great power politics driven by President Xi’s one-man rule have been well visible in domestic and foreign policy in 2018.

 

2. ROK-China Relations in 2018

The Moon Jae-in administration, inaugurated in May 2017, have made efforts to restore the ROK-China relations for the last year. In October last year, the foreign ministers of the two countries issued a joint statement on normalization of bilateral relations and advancement of strategic cooperative partnership. In December last year, at the ROK-China summit, the two leaders shared the view to open a better future for the bilateral ties. The two leaders agreed on four principles regarding the Korean Peninsula issue: war on the Korean Peninsula can never be tolerated; the principle of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will be firmly maintained; all issues, including the denuclearization of North Korea, will be peacefully resolved through dialogue and negotiations; and improvement in inter-Korean relations will be ultimately helpful in resolving issues involving the Korean Peninsula. This implied that the Moon administration garnered Chinese support on the principles of peace, stability, and non-tolerance of war – the tenets that the administration emphasized. This was a significant achievement to reduce anti-Korean sentiments within China and obtain national consensus through the ‘ice-breaking steps’ despite the confrontation surrounding the THAAD deployment. Hence, should South Korea breach the ‘three-no consultation’ regarding the THAAD agreed with China, the bilateral relations will likely to aggravate again. Furthermore, amid its intensifying hegemonic competition with the U.S. recently, China strongly perceives the ROK-U.S. alliance and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets on South Korean soil as factors directly threatening China’s core interests. Therefore, the South Korean government should take a judicious approach and contemplation regarding the deployment of U.S. strategic assets such as THAAD.

Despite the dilemma and fluctuations in ROK-China relations, the Korean Peninsula in 2018 has undergone a great transformation. President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un had a successful inter-Korean summit on April 27, a summit that opened a new chapter in Korean history. The two leaders agreed on invigoration of inter-Korean cooperation and exchanges in various domains including the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to end the hostile relations and usher in an era of national reconciliation, peace, and prosperity at Panmunjom, the symbolic venue of division and confrontation for more than the last half-century. Based on the improved relations affirmed at the inter-Korean summit, the historic DPRK-U.S. summit was held in Singapore on June 12. It left a very meaningful outcome of laying the groundwork to build trust and normalize relations between the two countries which have lingered on mutual animosity for 70 years. Chairman Kim and President Trump had three key interests in mind - complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the guarantee of regime security for North Korea, and normalization of bilateral relations - and reached a comprehensive agreement on these matters. The phrase, “Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” implied such outcome. While the comprehensive agreement on establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and achieving complete denuclearization matters, the most crucial achievement in the summit was the two leaders found a common ground on confidence to resolve the complex and difficult resolution to the denuclearization issue through the mutual understanding on the need to build trust and improve relations between the two countries.

             On the DPRK-U.S. joint statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi officially hailed the summit, “the two countries’ highest leaders can sit together and have equal talks has an important and positive meaning and is creating a new history.” After the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits, the Chinese government argued that the only solution to the North Korean nuclear and missile issue is to relieve North Korea’s security concerns through continuous dialogue and communication. With this as the basis, Beijing stressed the importance of the denuclearization of the peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime. After the series of summits, it has proposed Chinese-style common security approach, as a counter to a zero-sum approach overlooking others’ security concerns, to alleviate North Korea’s security fear as the resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue.

Currently, China has not spared diplomatic efforts to pursue its version of the resolution to the Korean Peninsula issue, the ‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ approach since the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summit. Urging the relevant parties to improve bilateral relations to speed up the solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, Beijing has begun to prepare coordinated measures with its neighbors. Chinese experts on Korea already assert that South Koreans should extricate from the old Cold-War mindset and North Koreans should prioritize economic development and improvement of people’s living conditions above all else. To this end, it demands closer coordination and cooperation with South Korea, stressing the need to ease sanctions against and engage in economic cooperation with North Korea. Therefore, when the Panmunjom declaration turns into implementation phase earnestly along with the progress in the North Korean nuclear issue, the inter-Korean economic cooperation and exchanges set in motion will drive ROK-DPRK-China-Russia quadrilateral economic cooperation forward. The inter-Korean railroad connection project will have synergic effects on economic cooperation and co-prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula but also Northeast Asia when it extends to the trans-China railroad (TCR) and trans-Siberian railroad (TSR) and is associated with the BRI.

Meanwhile, China, through close consultation with South Korea, hopes to resume the suspended six-party talks to foster favorable and smooth conditions for follow-up negotiations depending on the denuclearization process after the inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. summits. For a smooth resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, China believes that the six-party talks should resume with the help of ROK-China close coordination because of the intricate issues such as relieving North Korea’s security concerns, removing sanctions against North Korea, assisting North Korean economy, and establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Hence, South Korea needs to take an audacious policy shift of pursuing multilateral dialogue channels such as ROK-DPRK-U.S.-China quadrilateral talks or the conventional six-party talks for substantial cooperation with China on North Korea including the North Korean nuclear issue. Particularly, Seoul should approach China’s ‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ solution seriously and endeavor bold policy attempts to prepare an inflective point in inter-Korean and DPRK-U.S. relations and to promote inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S., and DPRK-China relations all for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Until now, South Korea has engaged in dichotomous diplomacy, inclined toward China in the economic affairs and inclined toward the U.S. in the security affairs. However, the THAAD deployment issue brought Seoul to understand the Chinese influence and that this diplomacy mechanism of shuttling between the U.S. and China is no longer viable. The 25 years of bilateral economic cooperation since the establishment of diplomatic ties between South Korea and China have deepened in an unprecedented pace and China’s international influence has rapidly grown; still, it is worthy to contemplate that South Korea’s strategy regarding China has largely remained unaltered. Particularly, the previous government’s China policy overlooked the national interest-based realities underpinning international politics and exposed diplomatic incompetence, only focused on others’ goodwill and understanding. This should be the lesson learned for the current government. Moreover, the intensifying and emerging U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry will coerce South Korea to face strategic dilemmas - requiring Seoul to renew its China policy completely.

For instance, Seoul could have potential scenarios on U.S.-China and ROK-China confrontation drawn out and thoroughly prepare response plans (even plans B and C) and measures for each scenario. To this end, South Korea should have a principled understanding on what South Korea can cooperate with China and what it cannot concede to China for the sustainable development of bilateral relations so as to prepare for the strategy regarding China. As such, despite the expansive development of bilateral relations, the ROK-China relations relied heavily on the rapport built between the leaders and have now encountered a predicament due to the perception gap in vision and Korean Peninsula affairs. Thus, Seoul and Beijing should build confidence in diplomacy and security to find common ground on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, ‘end-of-war’ declaration, and the peace treaty; and strive to expand cooperation in economy, society, and culture based on mutual interests.

 

3. Outlook on the Korean Peninsula and China in 2019

The Xi Jinping’s second-term leadership actively endeavors to transmute China from a ‘big power (daiguo)’ to a ‘strong power (qiangguo)’. It is Beijing’s expression of confidence in astonishing economic growth through the four decades of successful Chinese-style opening and reforms and in its influence and voice that rivals with the U.S. at the international stage. Particularly, President Xi proclaimed the ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’ at the 19th National Party Congress with firm confidence and mid-to-long term goal to become a regional hegemon dominant in all realms, not only economy, by 2050 - inevitably signaling a shift in regional order.

Furthermore, China, with President Xi taking office for the second term, vowed that it will extricate from adapting to the existing U.S-created liberal international order and establish a Sinocentric regional order, establishing new norms and institutions. Therefore, China maps out an initiative to change the global governance and neutralize the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and U.S.-Japan (South Korea) alliance by mobilizing all its means (political, economic, military) and pursuing the BRI and great power strategy to achieve the goal of building a modern socialist power with Chinese characteristics by 2050. Foreign policy and security experts in China already opine that if the U.S. does not take Chinese concepts - a new type of major power relations, a new type of international relations, community with a shared future for humanity - sincerely and attempts to hasten the Indo-Pacific strategy and formulate the NATO-type alliance in the Asia-Pacific as a containment against China, the U.S.-China strategic confrontation and collision will be more likely to be intensified.

Meanwhile, domestically, the Xi leadership proposes a vision of strong power of Chinese nationalism based on the Chinese socialist ideology and actively pursues a state-led and market-oriented economic reform (state capitalism) through strong control of the society (neo-authoritarianism). That is, it presented a blueprint on ‘neo-authoritarian socialist model with Chinese characteristics’ that responds to the U.S. neoliberalist model. The Xi leadership’s blueprint is epitomized as a ‘Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.' According to Xi’s remarks, China endeavors to: enhance material foundation through the BRI, an impetus for capital accumulation; beef up its military strength to pursue the ‘dream of a powerful military’ that guarantees national territorial integrity and sovereignty; and to disseminate Chinese values and institutions globally through the community with a shared future for humanity, all based on the Xi Jinping Thought. Also, based on Xi Jinping Thought, the Chinese government strives to achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, rectifying the social contradictions such as corruption, the wealth-poor gap, and environmental degradation that unraveled after the reform and openings and strengthen its global standing in accordance with its growing national power.3)

As it already illustrated the firm determination to establish a new Sinocentric international order, the second Xi leadership will maintain the Chinese solution to the North Korean nuclear issue - ‘suspension-for-suspension’ and ‘dual track’ approach. Mindful of this fact, the U.S. pressure on North Korea and China’s ‘dual track’ approach may cast a dilemma for South Korea despite the great transformation of the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese leadership in Xi’s second term has growing concerns of U.S. forces in Korea, ROK-U.S. alliance, and U.S. deployment of strategic assets surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the U.S. forces in Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance transition to a regional alliance as strategic flexibility after the ‘end-of-war’ declaration and the peace treaty regarding the Korean Peninsula will incite challenges and confrontation between South Korea and China.

Already, Beijing has proclaimed the strategic initiative and firm resolve to establish a new Sinocentric regional order by 2050. The recalibration of ROK-U.S. alliance and U.S. forces in Korea will likely serve as seeds of confrontation between South Korea and China. China will actively involve in the Korean Peninsula affairs and exert its influence, linking the ‘end-of-war’ declaration and the peace treaty to its mid-to-long term foreign strategy and U.S.-China dynamics. The Xi leadership in the second term’s perception on the Korean Peninsula, intermingled among past, present, and future, has maintained that it cannot abandon the strategic and geopolitical value of the peninsula in this unstable transitional phase in the region caused by the deepening U.S.-China hegemonic rivalry. In other words, China will readjust its alliance with North Korea, its geopolitical asset, and calibrate its relations with South Korea with the consideration of its policy orientation and strategy to maximize its interests.

Meanwhile, China, to avoid the possibility of itself being marginalized in the resolution process for the denuclearization, will resolutely accentuate the resumption of six-party talks and the institutionalization of a multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia so that it could exert its influence in Korean Peninsula affairs. This directly links with the issue of whether China could maintain or even expand its influence the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula - Beijing already reiterated that it is a direct stakeholder in the ‘end-of-war’ declaration and the peace treaty after the inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S., and DPRK-China summits. Beijing insistently understands that the discourse on ‘end-of-war’ declaration and peace treaty will lead to a structural shift in the regional geopolitics. Hence, it argues that the four parties, the two Koreas, the U.S., and China, or six parties, four plus Japan and Russia, should discuss and reach a compromise together the security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the sanctions against North Korea, the status of United Nations Command, and U.S. forces in Korea, etc. Obviously, the South Korean government asserts that the status of U.S. forces in Korea is of South Korea’s sovereign matter, China considers U.S. forces in Korea and its strategic assets as its security threat. It requires frank bilateral communication and discussion to attenuate the concerns.

Due to intensifying U.S.-China hegemonic competition, the Xi Jinping leadership will react more sensitively to the core interests, and accordingly, South Korea will probably face a security dilemma. Hence, it is necessary to formulate an autonomous foreign strategy based on objective analysis of the political environment. For instance, if the inter-Korean relations and DPRK-U.S. relations drastically improve by the sustenance of momentum created by the third inter-Korean summit and the ensuing Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the ROK-DPRK-China trilateral economic cooperation begins in earnest as the Moon administration’s New Northern Policy collaborates with China’s BRI, this will possibly lead to the emergence of new economic prosperity and an amicable climate for the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, the focus of South Korea-China cooperation should lie on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the establishment of a peace regime; and it is quintessential for South Korea to lead the efforts to build a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, encouraging the relations with China to have a positive effect on inter-Korean, DPRK-U.S., ROK-U.S., and U.S.-China relations. Subsequently, it is vital to seek sustainable peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and ultimately establish a multilateral peace and security regime in Northeast Asia, thus opening a new prosperous age on the Korean Peninsula driven by geoeconomics, not geopolitics.

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1) On March 17 after the constitutional amendment, the lianghui reelected Xi Jinping unanimously as the president and the chairman of Central Military Commission, and his affiliates Wang Qishan and Li Zhanshu were elected as vice president and chairman of the National People’s Congress respectively. This will strengthen Xi Jinping’s one-man rule in the Chinese government.

2) The Chinese leadership gave birth to the ‘78’ system’ linking with the capitalist world, once its archenemy to destroy and seeking a bold transition to a revival of China based on ‘keeping a low profile. The previous ‘56’ system’ aimed at completion of total orientation toward socialism to construct a new China. In turn, the 78’ system initiated a neomercantilist national development pursuing a prosperous state combining socialism with the market economy. This gave birth to the socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.

3) The previous Deng Xiaoping’s thought on early stages of capitalism recognized ‘contradiction between material demand and underdeveloped production’ as a major social contradiction; the ‘Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ views ‘the contradiction between people’s demand and imbalance for a better life and insufficient development’ as the main social ill to resolve to achieve the Chinese dream.

 

 

 

 


This article is based on the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

 

*Translator’s note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.