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Gyeongju APEC Summit and Tasks for South Korea |
| November 17, 2025 |
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Sang Hyun LeePrincipal Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | shlee@sejong.org
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From October 31 to November 1, the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) Summit was held in Gyeongju, Gyeongsangbuk-do. It marked the first time in 20 years that South Korea hosted an APEC Summit as chair, since the 2005 Busan Summit. The meeting agenda is organized under the theme “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow,” with “Connect,” “Innovate,” and “Prosper” as its core values. Among the sub themes, “Connect” seeks to promote trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen connectivity through physical, institutional, and people to people exchanges. “Innovate” aims to promote digital innovation by narrowing the digital gap and strengthening cooperation in artificial intelligence, reflecting South Korea’s position as a digital leader. “Prosper” seeks sustainable and inclusive growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region through joint responses to global issues such as energy, food security, and demographic change.
As the host country, the South Korean government has considered deliverables that could be conveyed to the Asia-Pacific region and to the world through this meeting. As chair, South Korea presented “AI cooperation” and “responding to demographic change” as key APEC outcomes for the year, proposing a shared vision on AI transformation and demographic change and concrete cooperation measures among members. AI cooperation focuses on strengthening AI capacity and presenting APEC level directions for the use of AI centered on the development of a sustainable AI investment ecosystem. Responding to demographic change aims to present APEC policy cooperation measures such as systems to address aging societies, strengthening human resource circulation, and promoting medical and technological innovation, in order to transform demographic crisis into opportunities for future growth and innovation. Although these two themes have broad impacts across the economic and social spheres of the Asia-Pacific region, this marks the first time they have been discussed at the APEC leaders’ level.
Through this, the Lee Jae Myung government successfully navigated what it described as a “super week” of South Korean diplomacy. The 2025 APEC Summit was held at a transitional moment marked by growing geopolitical and geoeconomic uncertainty, and is significant in that 21 member economies that account for a large share of the global economy gathered in one place to discuss shared prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, attention is focused on whether this leaders meeting can serve as an opportunity to revive free trade and multilateral cooperation, which have been increasingly constrained amid the disruption caused by the tariff war initiated by the Trump administration of the United States against the world.
The Gyeongju APEC Summit raises the question of whether, in the current unsettled international environment, it can serve as an opportunity to revive multilateral cooperation and the rules-based international order. At present, the actor most fundamentally shaking the foundations of the international order is not China, Russia, or North Korea, but the United States. Under the second Trump administration, America First has returned with greater intensity, driving the world toward unprecedented uncertainty and confrontational dynamics. The United States had previously designed and led the rules-based international order after World War II and provided public goods for the maintenance of global order as the leader of the free world. While the United States had led in maintaining global order through security commitments and in sustaining a free trade order, it is now moving away from that role and evolving into a self interested superpower that places its national interests first. As a result, global governance that operated through international organizations and regimes is expected to recede, to be replaced more openly by measures based on power and interests. -
The 2025 Gyeongju APEC Summit concluded with the unanimous adoption of the Gyeongju Declaration by all 21 member economies. The next leaders meeting is scheduled to be held in Shenzhen, China, in November of next year. Under the overall theme of this year’s APEC, “Building a Sustainable Tomorrow,” the declaration presents three priority pillars: Connect, Innovate, and Prosper. In particular, as two key implementation tasks, cooperation frameworks to address artificial intelligence and demographic change, including aging and low birth rates, were explicitly included at the initiative of the Republic of Korea. These are expected to contribute to strengthening regional trends aimed at responding to changes in future labor markets and industrial structures through digital transformation and economic and social innovation driven by AI technologies.
With regard to efforts to restore the trade and investment environment and to stabilize supply chains, the declaration reaffirms that trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region are essential for growth and prosperity and emphasizes the need to build a “resilient” trade and investment environment in a changing global context. In particular, amid intensifying strategic competition, including between the United States and China, discussions on supply chain stabilization and economic diversification within the Asia Pacific region were prominent. The Gyeongju Declaration reflects the reality that the multilateral trading order has been unsettled since the launch of the Trump administration in the United States. However, direct language supporting free and multilateral trade and the WTO, which is typically included in past leaders declarations, was omitted and replaced with more ambiguous language recognizing the importance of the trade and investment environment, representing a retreat in the level of wording compared with previous statements. This contrasts with the APEC Declaration in Peru last year, which referred to the importance of a trade and investment environment based on values such as free, open, fair, non-discriminatory, transparent, inclusive, and predictable, and reaffirmed support for the WTO based multilateral trading system. Another notable feature of the Gyeongju Declaration is that it recognizes cultural and creative industries as a new growth engine for the Asia-Pacific region and specifies the need for cooperation in this area. This marks the first time that cultural and creative industries have been explicitly mentioned in a leaders declaration. The South Korean government assesses that this provides an opportunity for its “K-culture” to take root as a growth engine in the Asia-Pacific region. These APEC outcomes can be viewed as a compromise between the positions of the United States and China. Because APEC decision making operates by consensus, without voting, any single member’s continued opposition can prevent agreement. Since APEC’s establishment in 1989, the only time a leaders declaration was not issued was at the 2018 APEC Summit in Papua New Guinea during the first Trump administration.
South Korea has been assessed as demonstrating “pragmatic middle power leadership” through this meeting. The summit provided an opportunity to highlight Gyeongju on the international stage, and positive assessments suggest that South Korea has secured its status as a platform for regional and global cooperation going forward. The adoption of the declaration, which confirms that member economies share at least a common understanding of issues (digital innovation, demographic change, and trade and investment resilience) is significant. The fact that the South Korea-led efforts to firmly place forward looking issues such as AI and responses to demographic change on the APEC agenda can be regarded as a major diplomatic achievement.
At the same time, because the Gyeongju Declaration remains at the level of a declaration, practical implementation capacity and concrete follow up measures will be key going forward. Attention is also focused on whether APEC can continue to exercise a strong normative function as in the past, at a time when the existing free trade and multilateral order is under strain. The Gyeongju Declaration largely avoided the traditional APEC vocabulary of “trade liberalization” and “investment openness.” The United States sought to dilute expressions such as “free, open, and rules-based trade” in the declaration, and it is reported that the wording was adjusted in that direction. The Guardian highlighted remarks by Canadian Prime Minister Carney that “the era of free trade is over,” assessing that the meeting served as an institutional confirmation of this trend. In addition, because U.S. President Trump did not attend the full plenary session, the U.S. presence was relatively weak in the concluding messages, and China filled that space. As a result, some foreign media characterized the meeting as one in which China quietly benefited. -
At this year’s APEC Summit, the U.S.–China leaders meeting drew the greatest international attention. Prior to the meeting, on October 20, U.S. President Trump, referring to the summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping scheduled on the margins of APEC, stated that “we will make a great trade deal, and it will be fantastic not only for our two countries but for the whole world,” adding that “we will create something good for both sides.” At the same time, he noted that if an agreement were not reached, tariffs on imports from China could be raised to as high as 155 percent starting November 1, and emphasized that the United States possesses “leverage,” such as tariffs and aircraft parts, in response to China’s export controls on rare earths.
The core agreements of the U.S.–China Summit first concerned the easing of tariffs and trade tensions. The United States agreed to lower the tariff rate related to fentanyl on China from 20 percent to 10 percent and to continue for one year the suspension of the 24 percent reciprocal tariff on China. The additional 100 percent tariffs on China that President Trump had previously indicated would not be imposed. Both sides also agreed to postpone for one year the implementation of measures introduced after September, including the U.S. expansion of its “trade blacklist” and China’s strengthened export controls on rare earths, and to suspend port entry fees on each other’s vessels. China also agreed to purchase U.S. soybeans, which is regarded as a positive factor for voters in the U.S. Midwest, where support for the Republican Party is strong.
Through these agreements, the United States and China appear to have averted a breakdown in relations for the time being. However, major media outlets have interpreted this U.S.–China leaders meeting not as a “major reset” of relations but rather at the level of a “tactical truce.” The two sides plan for President Trump to visit China in April of next year, after which President Xi is expected to make a reciprocal visit to Palm Beach, Florida, or Washington, D.C., to continue further negotiations.
Some note that the Gyeongju Summit recalls the first informal summit held in June 2013 between then–U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping at the Sunnylands retreat in Rancho Mirage, California. At that time, as the Obama Administration advanced its “Pivot to Asia” policy, China viewed the initiative as a threat to its national security, leading to heightened tensions between the two countries. Following the Sunnylands summit, however, the two sides reset their relationship toward what was described as “cooperative competition and mutual benefit.” Two years ago, in November 2023, on the margins of the APEC Summit in San Francisco, a summit was also held between President Joe Biden and President Xi. During that meeting, the two leaders pledged cooperation on certain issues, including countering fentanyl trafficking and addressing risks associated with artificial intelligence, but revealed clear differences in perspective on core issues such as advanced technology export controls and the Taiwan issue. The Biden Administration largely carried forward the Trump Administration’s first term approach toward China, and measures to counter China were further strengthened following the inauguration of the second Trump Administration. Although the terminology shifted from “decoupling” to “de-risking,” the underlying objective of excluding China from global technology and resource supply chains remained unchanged.
The current circumstances differ in important respects from those of that earlier period. China’s international standing has risen markedly, and President Xi, who emphasizes the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” is unlikely to yield to pressure from President Trump. In light of the complexities of U.S.–China relations to date, it is difficult to expect that a single meeting in Gyeongju would soon ease the confrontational structure between the two countries. As long as both sides define the current strategic competition as a “game that cannot be lost,” the confrontational dynamic is likely to persist. Nevertheless, whether Gyeongju becomes, like the Sunnylands summit, a turning point toward a manageable thaw in U.S.–China relations, or instead leads toward the long term structural consolidation of a “new Cold War,” will depend on the decisions of the two leaders. -
ROK–U.S. relations had been at an impasse prior to the summit due to differences over the specific implementation of a proposed $350 billion investment package in the United States, which Korea had put forward in an effort to avoid the high tariffs imposed by Washington. At the Gyeongju summit, however, the two sides broke this deadlock and reached a comprehensive agreement. Korea confirmed the $350 billion investment plan but agreed to implement it in stages by capping annual cash investment at $20 billion in order to minimize the impact on its domestic economy. The package includes $200 billion in cash investment and $150 billion in cooperation in the shipbuilding sector. In addition, Korea agreed to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035. In return, the United States agreed to reduce reciprocal tariffs on Korean imports from 25 percent to 15 percent, a move assessed as particularly beneficial to Korea’s automobile industry.
The most notable development in the summit was the U.S. approval of Korea’s long-standing objective to build nuclear-powered submarines. In his opening remarks at the summit, President Lee formally requested U.S. provision of nuclear fuel for nuclear-powered submarines equipped with conventional weapons, citing the need to ease the U.S. military’s regional defense burden. President Trump announced the following day on social media that he had “approved” the request, surprising Korean officials. Under the reported agreement, the submarines would be built at a U.S. shipyard in Philadelphia. However, that shipyard currently lacks the facilities required for constructing nuclear-powered submarines, and significant additional investment and technical challenges are anticipated. Questions also remain as to whether nuclear fuel procurement would be possible under the existing ROK–U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement or whether a new legal framework, such as a separate treaty or protocol, would be required. Nuclear fuel materials and related technologies would likely be subject not only to review within the executive branch but also to congressional oversight and approval. If the submarines are built in the United States and transferred to Korea with nuclear fuel already installed, the degree of operational discretion available to Korea will also be an important issue.
Through the ROK–China summit, the two sides reaffirmed their “strategic cooperative partnership” and signed seven MOUs related to economic cooperation and public welfare. These outcomes helped generate expectations, domestically and externally, for expanded economic cooperation and exchanges and contributed to a more favorable environment for the recovery and development of bilateral relations. However, no specific agreements or tangible results were reached on key issues between the two countries, including denuclearization of North Korea, structures in the West Sea, the so called restrictions on Hanhanryeong(限韓令), and China’s export controls. This highlighted continuing differences in positions on diplomatic and security matters. China also emphasized cooperation at the broader multilateral level, including multilateralism and an Asia-Pacific community, suggesting that it views relations with Korea through the broader lens of U.S.–China relations. Meanwhile, recent indications of diver activity around structures unilaterally installed by China in the provisional maritime zone in the West Sea point to the potential for future friction. Although the Chinese government has maintained that these facilities are purely for salmon farming, many experts suggest they could serve as de facto installations intended to bolster China’s territorial claims. If such structures are consolidated in a manner similar to China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea, this would constitute a serious infringement on Korea’s maritime sovereignty.
There was also no progress regarding the role Korea had hoped China might play in inter-Korean relations. The Lee administration had sought strategic communication with China to help facilitate the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. However, the more Korea emphasizes China’s role, the more likely Beijing is to showcase its ties with Pyongyang and use its relationship with North Korea as leverage to conciliate and put pressure on Korea. Accordingly, expectations regarding China’s role in inter Korean affairs should be moderated. Instead, Korea may need to underscore that North Korea’s security threats could undermine the multilateralism, economic cooperation, and shared prosperity that China seeks to promote, and call for responsible Chinese behavior.
The ROK–Japan summit is regarded as significant for reaffirming a future-oriented framework for bilateral cooperation. Prime Minister Takaichi has in the past made right leaning remarks related to historical issues, including visits to Yasukuni Shrine, sovereignty claims over Dokdo, and matters concerning apologies to former comfort women. She criticized the 1995 statement by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, which expressed reflection and apology for Japan’s colonial rule and aggression, and she has also denied the forced mobilization of comfort women. In addition, she has maintained that the stationing of armed guards by Korea on Takeshima (竹島), the Japanese name for Dokdo, as well as the construction of a heliport and barracks there, is tantamount to “illegal occupation.” In 2023, while serving as minister in charge of economic security, she visited Yasukuni Shrine, where Class A Pacific War war criminals are enshrined, three times. She has also consistently argued that Japan should send minister level, rather than vice minister level, officials to the annual “Takeshima Day” event hosted by Shimane Prefecture. For these reasons, there had been concern in Korea that ROK–Japan relations might become strained during Prime Minister Takaichi’s tenure.
However, at the summit with President Lee, Prime Minister Takaichi stated that “Japan and Korea are important neighbors to each other” and that the bilateral relationship built thus far should be developed in a “future-oriented and stable manner.” The two leaders shared the view that, as neighboring countries with many commonalities, they should strengthen future-oriented cooperation amid rapidly changing international and trade environments. The meeting, held just nine days after Takaichi’s inauguration, is seen as a new starting point for bilateral relations. Both sides agreed to maintain and strengthen shuttle diplomacy, including regular exchanges between leaders and foreign ministers. Nevertheless, the value of the meeting will depend on whether these signals are translated into practical and implementable cooperative projects. Although both governments emphasized future oriented cooperation, most outcomes remain at the level of general statements or framework agreements, rather than immediately actionable plans. Follow up mechanisms for implementation, monitoring, and results generation on the most complex and sensitive issues, including history, security, and trade, therefore remain an outstanding task. -
Although the Gyeongju APEC Summit attracted attention because of several high profile bilateral summits, a more consequential question is whether the meeting can help rekindle the weakening rules-based international order and the broader system of multilateral cooperation. The resurgence of an intensified America First orientation under a second Trump administration is pushing the international system toward an unprecedented level of uncertainty and confrontation. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has designed and led a rules-based international order and has provided public goods for the maintenance of global order as the leader of the free world. In the past, the United States sustained global order through security commitments and by leading an open trade and economic system. It is now moving away from that role and evolving toward a more narrowly self interested superpower that places primary emphasis on its own national interests. As a result, global governance mechanisms that have operated through international organizations and institutional regimes are receding, while more explicit calculations of power and material interest are becoming more prominent.
Recent changes in the international order have been driven largely by the United States, more specifically by President Trump and his close associates, often identified with the political current commonly referred to as MAGA. During the twentieth century, the United States developed a role identity as a “benign hegemon” pursuing a doctrine of “liberal internationalism,” a posture that shaped the international system familiar today. In the emerging post unipolar environment, however, the American self conception appears to be shifting toward a fundamentally illiberal and more coercive hegemonic posture, and more broadly toward that of a conventional self interested great power.
Policies that may appear erratic at the surface level reflect a more coherent effort to transform both the U.S. domestic order and the international system. Domestically, President Trump and his associates seek to reform the core values, norms, and objectives that have underpinned American national identity, with the aim of reshaping the United States into a more conservative and inward oriented state. Externally, they aim to redefine the U.S. role in world affairs by reducing the traditional function of the United States as a global policeman engaged in a wide range of international issues. The basic premise of America First is that the United States has prioritized the interests of other countries and, in return, has faced free riding and inadequate reciprocity. On this view, the United States should withdraw from its role as guarantor of a rules based security and economic order and instead adopt a more transactional approach focused on direct national benefit. This approach places greater emphasis on coercive leverage rather than economic cooperation and prioritizes concrete U.S. interests over broad international values. In security terms, this implies a reduction in U.S. security commitments and guarantees, accompanied by increased demands for burden-sharing from allies and partners. At the same time, U.S. participation in international organizations and institutions that have underpinned the rules based order is likely to become more limited and selective.
Changes in U.S. identity are not confined to the United States itself but have significant implications for the character and trajectory of the global order. It is not an exaggeration to say that the international order since the end of the Second World War has largely been an order shaped by the United States, led by the United States, and serving U.S. interests. However, as the United States steps back from the hegemonic position it has maintained since that period, the rules-based international order is increasingly viewed as entering a transitional phase toward a more multipolar configuration. The liberal international order long dominated by the United States and the broader West appears to be receding, while a new era is emerging in which power and material leverage carry greater weight than international norms, institutions, or formal rules. The space left by the retreat of a rules-based order is likely to be filled by a more multipolar system, sometimes described as Yalta 2.0, or by a revival of great power sphere of influence politics.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is widely regarded as a symbolic example of the erosion of the rules based international order. In response to Russia’s violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, Western countries have been unable to produce an effective response. Another indication of the weakening of the rules based order is the apparent decline of the free trade system that has contributed significantly to global economic growth. In a New York Times opinion piece, U.S. Trade Representative(USTR) Jamieson Greer presented the Trump administration’s tariff policy as the foundation of a new trade order, arguing that such measures could enable the revival of manufacturing. Greer contended that the Bretton Woods system, initiated by the United States after the Second World War to rebuild the global trade system and later institutionalized through the establishment of the World Trade Organization, led the United States to relinquish tariff protection for key manufacturing sectors and ultimately produced a trade order disadvantageous to the United States. -
The 2025 APEC Summit in Gyeongju is being held at a critical inflection point in the international order, where multilateral cooperation is under increasing strain. In his opening remarks on the first day of the meeting, President Lee Jae-myung described South Korea’s current foreign policy environment as a “grave” situation at a major “inflection point” in the international order. He emphasized that “cooperation and solidarity” constitute the only viable path forward in addressing these challenges. The Gyeongju APEC Summit is thus likely to serve as an important test case for the future trajectory of the international order. At a time when the rules-based international order is contracting and the free trade system is being shaken by the ripple effects of a broad tariff war initiated by the Trump administration, the APEC process will require substantial follow up measures if it is to help revive the embers of multilateralism grounded in openness and cooperation. The Lee Jae Myung administration is expected to demonstrate leadership in advancing such follow up efforts.
Whether the views of regional economies calling for the restoration of free trade could be reflected in the APEC Leaders’ Gyeongju Declaration was a matter of significant interest. Even before the meeting, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether consensus could be reached on language promoting free trade, given the United States’ refusal to accept the use of the terms free trade and multilateral system. A key question was whether alternative wording acceptable to the United States could be identified. Ultimately, the terms free trade, multilateral system, and World Trade Organization(WTO) did not appear at all in the Declaration. Instead, these concepts were replaced by more general language noting that “the global trading system is facing significant challenges” and that “a resilient trade and investment environment that promotes benefits is important.” That even APEC, an institution whose origins are closely linked to the free trade and multilateral trading order, could not explicitly use such terminology has prompted assessments that the era of free trade and multilateralism may be coming to an end. As the United States, long a leading champion of the free trade system and an open trading order, appears to be stepping back, China’s emphasis on supply chains, multilateralism, and global norms has emerged in a way that some observers still find unfamiliar.
Finally, South Korea and the United States will need to conclude outstanding tariff and trade issues in a timely and stable manner in order to address other key bilateral issues, including alliance modernization, in a smooth fashion. It will be important to document bilateral agreements with precision to minimize the risk of future misunderstandings. Given President Trump’s negotiating style, which is often described as unpredictable, disagreements over the implementation of agreements could generate new friction. For example, President Trump has indicated that South Korea would fully open its agricultural market, while the Korean government maintains that no such agreement was reached. In addition, President Trump has stated that NVIDIA’s latest artificial intelligence chip, Blackwell, would not be exported to China or other foreign countries, whereas NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang has reportedly indicated that 260,000 Blackwell graphics processing units would be supplied to the Korean government and companies. Questions also remain regarding whether the nuclear-powered submarines approved by President Trump for South Korea would be built in Korea or at the Philadelphia shipyard, and how enriched uranium fuel would be handled. It is expected that both sides will seek to reach reasonable and mutually acceptable compromises on these issues.
| 2025 Gyeongju APEC Summit
| Key Summaries and Assessment of the Gyeongju Declaration
| U.S.-China Summit Choosing a “Tactical Truce”
| Outcomes of the ROK–U.S., ROK–China, and ROK–Japan Summits
| Can the Gyeongju APEC Serve as a Catalyst for Reviving Multilateral Cooperation?
| South Korea’s Role and Future Tasks
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
