Outlining North Korea’s Abandonment of The Byungjin Line and Assessing Its Stance on Denuclearization

No. 2018-22 (April 23, 2018)

Cheong Seong-Chang (Director, Unification Strategy Department)

softpower@sejong.org

On April 19, North Korea, via the state-owned Korean Central National Agency (KCNA), announced that it would convene the third plenary meeting of the seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPKCC) “to discuss and decide the policy issues of new stage in line with the demand of the important historic period of the developing Korean revolution.” And at this plenum held on 20th, Chairman Kim Jong-un set forth “the new strategic line on channeling all efforts on the economic construction.” As he “declared the great victory of the byungjin line of simultaneously pushing forward the economic construction and the building of nuclear force,” the new strategic line will replace the existing byungjin line—the phrase used to describe the victory was ‘came to successful conclusion (결속되다, gyeolsogdoeda)’ which means ‘to terminate’ according to the most authoritative North Korean dictionary.

The WPKCC plenary meeting takes a significant place in North Korea as it assembles more than 200 members and alternate members of the WPKCC, the key elites that lead North Korea in all domains, including politics, economy, military, foreign affairs, society, and culture. In March 2013, North Korea announced the byungjin line that championed the rapid advancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities at the WPKCC plenary meeting and the second plenary meeting of the seventh WPKCC in October 2017 was held to replace more than a quarter of core elites in the key agencies of the party.  This third plenary meeting demonstrated North Korea’s pivotal transformation of advancing a new strategic line to abandon one side of the pre-existing byungjin line—building the nuclear force—and to concentrate all its effort on economic development.  

The announcement of the new strategic line at the WPKCC plenary meeting came a week before the inter-Korean summit presumably as a justification for the policy shift to the cadres and people prior to the proclamation of denuclearization at the upcoming summits with South Korea and the U.S. and as a sense of expectations of economic development after North Korea’s determination to denuclearize at the two summits and ensuing steps: removal of international sanctions; normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S. and Japan; and inter-Korean rapprochement.

Party cadres and people will have questions on why their leader suddenly engages with the South and why the party mouthpiece Rodong Sinmun no longer mentions the byungjin line and demands for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces in Korea and markedly reduced the level of diatribe against the U.S. Against this backdrop, Chairman Kim seems to have announced this new strategic line to assuage the probable surprise that the North Korean cadres and people will have before the inter-Korean summit which will include a joint declaration as a culmination of intensive discussions on the issues of denuclearization and the peace treaty.

At this plenary meeting, the North Korean leader declared that “no nuclear test and intermediate-range and inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire are necessary for the DPRK now … the mission of the northern nuclear test ground has thus come to an end.” Such statement from Kim Jong-un is particularly a great news for the U.S. administration.

South Korean and U.S. experts generally agree that North Korea did not complete its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities and this requires additional tests. Hence, North Korea’s statement to suspend further ICBM test-fires could be construed as a renunciation of finalizing its ICBM capabilities that Washington considers as a great threat.

In the resolution adopted by the plenary meeting, it states “the DPRK will never use nuclear weapons nor transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear technology under any circumstances unless there are nuclear threat[s] and nuclear provocation against the DPRK.” Some regard such statement as a ‘declaration of a nuclear weapons state’ remote from the ‘declaration of denuclearization.’ For example, regarding North Korea’s suspension of nuclear and missile tests and the closure of Punggye-ri test site,’ Korea Chair Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said “[t]his is not a denuclearization statement” and added that “[i]t is a statement that DPRK can be a responsible nuclear weapons state” concerning the pledge neither to test nuclear weapons, nor to utilize nuclear weapons preemptively, and nor to transfer the nuclear weapons and its technology.

Victor Cha’s assertion seems inappropriate as North Korea’s ‘denuclearization statement’ could be issued after the two summits conclude with a comprehensive accord that incorporates plans with regards to the normalization of DPRK-U.S. relations in exchange for North Korea’s abandonment of nuclear weapons, the establishment of a peace treaty among the relevant parties to replace the armistice agreement, and the removal of international sanctions. At this juncture where the negotiations on denuclearization did not even begin in earnest, North Korea’s ‘denuclearization statement’ is like “looking for scorched-rice water at a well” – meaning looking for results hastily when it has procedures to undergo.

And North Korea’s self-recognition as a ‘nuclear power’ does not conflict with the negotiations for denuclearization. There is no reason for South Korea and the U.S. to negotiate with North Korea regarding the denuclearization issue when North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the resolution hints at ‘nuclear disarmament’ as it states “the discontinuance of the nuclear test is an important process for the worldwide disarmament, and the DPRK will join the international desire and efforts for the total halt to the nuclear test.” Here, North Korea used the phrase ‘worldwide disarmament’ and did not express that it will have a ‘negotiation on nuclear disarmament’ with the U.S. Therefore, deciphering the resolution as Pyongyang’s intention to ‘negotiate nuclear disarmament’ with Washington is a far-fetched idea.

The KCNA report quoted Kim Jong-un’s saying “the WPK's peace-loving stand to make positive contributions to the building of the world free from nuclear weapons in conformity with the aspiration and desire common to mankind.” This ‘peace-loving stand’ will enable the North Korean regime to legitimize Kim Jong-un’s decision for denuclearization in the future.

If Pyongyang is not ready to accept the terms of ‘complete denuclearization,’ Kim Jong-un has no reason to hold summit talks with Presidents Moon and Trump who demand the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear program. And as North Korea laid out in other parts of the resolution, it has to renounce its nuclear ambitions to “create [an] international environment favorable for the socialist economic construction and facilitate close contact and active dialogue with neighboring countries and the international community.” Thus, concluding that Kim Jong-un will continue its efforts to maintain North Korea’s status as a ‘nuclear weapons state’ regardless of the statements indicating his intention to denuclearize North Korea to the South Korean, U.S., and Chinese governments and the upcoming summits with his South Korean and American counterpart is very unrealistic.

Chairman Kim evidently manifested his intention to negotiate denuclearization with the international community and focus on economic development through his remarks at this meeting and the ensuing resolution. As Kim set forth the new strategic line to concentrate all efforts on economic construction, the North Korean people will have higher hopes for economic development. Whether Kim Jong-un becomes ‘the North Korean Deng Xiaoping’ hinges on how the international community designs the plan to induce North Korea’s denuclearization while firmly assuring North Korea’s safety and offer it the opportunities of economic development.