North Korea’s Future Inferred by the Three DPRK-China Summits
No. 2018-35 (July 2, 2018)
Dr. Lee Seong-hyon
Research Fellow, Department of Unification Strategy
Studies
The Sejong Institute
And Mr. Min Hyunjong
Student, Seoul National University Graduate School of
International Studies
PRC President Xi Jinping met DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un
three times in three months from March to June—one meeting per month. This naturally contrasts with the
fact that Kim Jong-un met President Moon Jae-in twice and President Trump once.
Russia and Japan are yet to hold summit talks with North Korea.
Russia has officially invited Kim Jong-un and Japan also
pursues to hold summit talks with North Korea. One can view Beijing feeling
triumphant by being ‘ahead’ of other key geopolitical stakeholders with regards
to the North Korea affairs. Furthermore, this effectively eradicated the
controversy over the so-called ‘China passing’ which meant that China is
neglected in the Korean Peninsula affairs. One Chinese scholar’s question hints at China’s method of
calculation on the influence over North Korea—the number of summits with the North Korean leader: ‘the
Chinese president met Kim Jong-un three times. How many times did the South
Korean and American presidents meet Kim Jong-un?’
Then, how close have the two countries been? On the
surface, the two countries seem really intimate. During Kim Jong-un’s last
visit to China on June 19, President Xi made ‘three unchanging promises’ to
Chairman Kim: the support for the development of bilateral relations from the
Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government; Chinese people’s friendship
toward the North Korean people; and China’s support for ‘socialist North Korea.’
The first two could be deemed as diplomatic rhetoric. The
thing to note is that President Xi referred North Korea as ‘socialist North
Korea.’ This is no accident. Similar phrases have appeared before when Xi
mentioned North Korea. For example, President Xi said, “both China and the DPRK
are socialist countries, and their bilateral relations are of major strategic
significance” at the second summit with Kim Jong-un in Dalian. (Xinhua News Agency,
May 8, 2018)
Going further back, even in the first summit between
President Xi and Chairman Kim last March, whereas the North Korean leader used the
term ‘socialism’ once, President Xi notably pronounced the same term seven
times (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 28,
2018). Meeting with the special envoys of North Korea’s Workers’ Party of Korea,
President Xi said that he hopes for the better development of the two
countries' socialist causes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s
Republic of China, May 16, 2018). Xi Jinping has consistently espoused North
Korea as a ‘socialist country.’
President Xi is known as an ardent proponent of socialism
and Marxism. At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China
(CPC) in October 2017, President Xi proclaimed the ‘Xi Jinping thought on
Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era.’ Particularly, the
Chinese leadership, which has keenly resisted the development model of the West,
has reaffirmed the confidence on the Chinese path of development through the decline
of the West epitomized by President Trump’s election victory. President Xi said
that the CPC’s decision to adhere to political theories of Karl Marx this March
was ‘totally correct’ (Xinhua News Agency, May 4, 2018).
On the contrary, President Trump urged Kim Jong-un to
accept his idea of denuclearization that will allow North Korea to enjoy
prosperity on par with South Korea as the U.S. helped South Korea to a
prosperous democratic state. In the U.S. history of foreign intervention, South
Korea is the most successful case of ‘democratic transition.’ Since South Korea
achieved both democratic transition and economic prosperity, it has been
frequently referred to as the ‘poster child’ of a successful U.S. foreign
policy.
Naturally, this poses the question of whether President
Xi’s outlook on North Korea is compatible with that of President Trump. Especially,
even though both the U.S. and China desire North Korea’s denuclearization, this
question needs attention as the two have different views on North Korea’s
future and its political system.
Xi Jinping is steadfast. He wants North Korea to remain
as a socialist state like China. This will have influenced Xi Jinping’s advice
to Kim Jong-un in the negotiations with President Trump. Moreover, this hints
at China’s position on Korean unification. That is, it implies that China will
be more likely to side with socialist North Korea than capitalist South Korea
when the two Koreas have diverging opinions on Korean unification.
Meanwhile, Chairman Kim Jong-un
said that North Korea and China, having sincerely helped and cooperated with
each other ‘like family members,’ would ‘closely cooperate’ with the Chinese
comrades ‘at the same staff.’ This is as if they safeguard socialism and picture a different future for
the Korean Peninsula. Such expressions appear very intriguing.
During the Korean War when the U.S. and China fought
fiercely, the Chinese army and the North Korean army established ‘North
Korea-China Combined Forces Command.’ This is the reason why the phrase ‘at the
same staff’ appears serious to the author.
It might be too early to conjecture what significance these
series of events have on the ‘evolutionary process’ of the DPRK-PRC relations.
However, in the recent few months, we witnessed a sudden ‘transformation
process’ in bilateral relations—North Korea and China sharply shifted their strategy and bolstered
mutual friendship and closeness from one of neglect. This reminds of the times when China and North Korea
referred to the bilateral alliance as ‘bloodshed relations.’ In fact, Xi and
Kim called each other as ‘the one and only relationship in the world.’
Some analysts view that Chairman Kim wants to reinforce
ties with China on par with the ROK-U.S. alliance to use the relations as a
‘protective shield’ against the foreign inflow of capitalism that will be
introduced with the opening and reform policy. In their view, North Korea’s
future model is a prosperous socialist state like China, and not a prosperous
capitalist state like South Korea as Trump hopes.
Kim Jong-un’s three visits to China cast one potential
question to not only the Trump administration but also the Moon Jae-in
administration and even the South Korean people. In other words, are the South
Koreans prepared to accept that North Korea will be closer to ‘China of the
same system’ rather than ‘South Korea of the same ethnic group’ through
openings and reform? Even if the military tensions are defused, the South
Korean government has the issue of persuading the public when the human rights
issue in North Korea such as political freedom and political prisoners become a
hot potato.
Due to the conciliatory ambiance for the last several
months, Korea hopes that this current situation leads to unification. Unification,
as the word suggests, signifies the unity of the political system. However, even putting aside the point that North Korea does
not desire a South Korea-led unification, China’s preference of ‘socialist
system’ on the northern part of the Korean Peninsula alludes at the necessity
of preemptive rumination on the issues to come when the hopes actually are
realized.