North Korea and the U.S. in 2019

 

Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-16

December 12, 2018

Dr. Woo Jung-Yeop

Director, Department of Security Strategy Studies, the Sejong Institute

woo@sejong.org

 

 

Introduction

It seems ironic for the author, writing the outlook for next year, cannot even predict whether Chairman Kim Jong-un will visit Seoul within a week or two at this moment. Perhaps Chairman Kim did not clearly indicate his plan to visit Seoul to the South Korean government (and even the plan not to visit Seoul, for that matter). Hence, it seems the South Korean government has not ruled out his visit to Seoul yet. As it is impossible to even foresee what will follow in the following few weeks, I can bear the criticisms on those that question the credibility of forecasts regarding how the political landscape will unfold next year. Still, I am able to adequately discuss how the U.S. views the discourse on Kim Jong-un’s visit within South Korea and more widely, its relations with North Korea at this moment. For the record, I would like to clarify that it is never easy to prophesize how the strategic state of play unfolds, whether it is short term or long term, as situations unravel by the complex interplay between actions and reactions, not by the intention from one side. As a matter of fact, this state of unpredictability has lingered on throughout the year 2018. The short-term predictions and forecasts were often proven incorrect every time when an event occurs between the two Koreas or between the U.S. and North Korea. This has been the case because we are dealing with a country with a very abnormal and unconventional political system, North Korea, and hence, the internal decision-making process in Seoul and Washington also have been opaque to outside observers. For this reason, attempts to complete the whole picture by gathering various bits of information have continued. In this process, various pieces of information based on subjective speculations and wishful thinking have circulated. In this paper, the author aims to aid the outlook for the next year by providing information as objective as possible on the U.S. perception of the current situation.

 

Framework for DPRK-U.S. Relations Outlook in 2019

The DPRK-U.S. relations took a completely different course in 2018, compared to 2017. The relationship ranged from a formidable concern that the armed conflict is at the doorstep to optimistic expectations that all situations will conclude with dialogue and negotiations. The first half of 2018 allowed predictions that North Korea’s denuclearization will proceed and the ensuing DPRK-U.S. relations will improve at a fast pace through the inter-Korean summits and the first-ever  DPRK-U.S. summit. Meanwhile, the second half of this year introduced dim prospects in the future DPRK-U.S. relations as the denuclearization talks between the two countries failed to accelerate. The bilateral relations in 2019 hinge on how the stalled denuclearization talks unravel - which may possibly proceed in four different directions. On the extreme, the two sides could either reach a peaceful resolution or advance bilateral relations or return to the situations in 2017. First, the scenario that leads to a peaceful resolution, could occur in two different directions: Chairman Kim concedes to the means of denuclearization that the international community desires; President Trump and Chairman Kim agree in principle, but falling short to be deemed as North Korea’s complete denuclearization. Between the peaceful resolution and heightened military crisis lies the current status quo - continuance of negotiations.

While these directions could be divided in further details, considering that the situation could take either of the four trajectories, Chairman Kim’s strategic decision and acceptance of means of denuclearization desired by the international community appears inconceivable viewing the fact that North Korea does not engage in working-level talks. And on the possibility of the U.S. piling military pressure akin to the situation in 2017, Washington will not have the rationale to do so unless North Korea carries out high-level provocations such as the nuclear or missile test in 2017 or issues an official statement to withdraw from the negotiations. Some analysts view that President Trump will opt for the military option to find a breakthrough – divert public attention - in the problems in domestic politics. Nevertheless, as this requires enough justification, President Trump is unlikely to decide such action unless North Korea provides the grounds to do so with provocations. Accordingly, putting these extreme scenarios of optimism and pessimism aside, the two sides may exchange incomplete denuclearization with partial sanctions relief through the second DPRK-U.S. summit or the situation in the latter half of 2018 may extend to the year 2019. Between the two scenarios, their possibility depends on how the following two factors influence events. First is the patience on the current situation - simply put, who could wait longer in the current situation. This will shape the negotiation leverage and strategy. Second is the changes in domestic political environment. The changes in the domestic politics affect the judgment of the situation for the negotiations with a foreign power. The following explores the variables that influence the two factors.

 

Washington’s Understanding of the Current Gridlock in Negotiations

Evaluating the current situation, the U.S. administration does not believe that North Korea refuses negotiations, but it may probe several hypotheses on why North Korea has not appeared in working-level negotiations. It will have questions on why the North Korean authorities shifted from a proactive attitude to a reserved one from last autumn onwards toward not only the U.S. and South Korea, but also China and Russia. Against the criticism that the high- and working-level negotiations failed to take one step forward because the U.S. put forth a firm negotiation draft leaving no room for concessions or compromise, the U.S. administration indicates that it is not even near to present such draft at the moment. It maintains that North Korea has not refused negotiations because the U.S. set the bars too high but rather it has not engaged in talks with scheduling as an excuse even though Chairman Kim made positive remarks on the resumption of working-level negotiations when Secretary Pompeo visited Pyongyang in October. Nonetheless, the U.S. perceives that the North Korean authorities act hesitantly because of the concern that the working-level negotiations on denuclearization will draw the country to an irreversible situation. The U.S. side comprehends that the high-level talks or working-level negotiations will not commence within December and rather looks onto Kim Jong-un’s New Year’s address.

 

Washington’s Understanding of the Second DPRK-U.S. Summit

The U.S. perceives that while it could give a positive score for the possibility of a political agreement between the leaders over a larger framework, it learned the lesson that they failed to reach a specific execution plan at the Singapore summit in June. The reason behind the failure of working-level negotiations on a concrete execution plan could be ascribed to the fact that they had working-level negotiations with the date of the summit already set. Because the summit date was fixed even though North Korea did not actively draw out a negotiation offer or find common ground with the U.S., Washington had weaker negotiation power vis-a-vis Pyongyang. Henceforth, the U.S. will proceed with discussions on the details of the second summit only when the high-level talks with working-level negotiations attached precede. There was news that the soon-leaving Andrew Kim, head of CIA Korea Mission Center, met with North Korean officials in Panmunjom and some speculated that the two sides resumed working-level talks. However, these talks are unlikely to take place in Panmunjom. The U.S. senses that the working-level talks in Panmunjom have been ineffective since the North Korean delegation will be constrained in its autonomous negotiation capacity because the delegation will be under the guidance and directives from Pyongyang constantly. The U.S. publicly wanted working-level negotiations in a third region such as Europe due to such considerations.

Washington’s Understanding of Sanctions against North Korea

Some opine that the U.S., being anxious, has made a move to restart negotiations with North Korea as the negotiations remain stagnant. They base their claims on the recent interview by National Security Advisor John Bolton and anonymous U.S. officials. However, at the moment, the U.S. administration has a negative view on easing sanctions as a corresponding measure. Naturally, it is willing to have all things on the table when the negotiations begin in earnest; but the sanctions relief could only be discussed when North Korea takes a very marked measure. Some media reported the possibility of expanding the range of items exempt from sanctions for humanitarian causes; the U.S. approaches this idea negatively despite the demands to expand humanitarian assistance to North Korea from South Korea and even some in the U.S. Except for issues such as contagious diseases, Washington asserts that North Korea has to resolve the issues autonomously. It holds that the humanitarian crisis occurring within North Korea is attributable to the North Korean regime and not the lack of international aid and intends to hold this position at least for the time being despite some condemnations that it utilizes even humanitarian aid as negotiation leverage. Because Washington has such a resolute position on humanitarian assistance, it will adhere to a more firm stance on inter-Korean economic cooperation.

 

 

Changes in U.S. Domestic Political Situation

The Democratic Party will take control of the House of Representatives by the turn of the year. The Blue party will presumably highlight three principles in the U.S. policy toward North Korea. First, the Trump administration should implement its North Korea policy more transparently. It will maximize the House authority to monitor the executive branch. If so, North Korea, having expectations on ‘top-down’ approach - between the leaders - will face circumstances different from 2018 in its negotiations with President Trump in the future. Second, the House will raise issues on the human rights situation in North Korea. The Democrats view the human rights issue as President Trump’s weakness in his foreign policy. Therefore, the party has a negative view of sanctions relief without improvement in human rights conditions along with the issue of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the same vein, the Democrats hold a negative standpoint on the resumption of the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Third, it accentuates the alliance. This will act as a restraint for President Trump to use the military posture of ROK-U.S. alliance as a card in negotiations with North Korea.

 

 

Closing Remarks

At the second DPRK-U.S. summit, which will likely to be held early next year, the two leaders will openly agree on leaving the working-level negotiations ongoing rather than a ‘big deal’ that drastically improves the bilateral relations. Obviously, the U.S. cannot unilaterally insist on these terms and North Korea should accede to it. It should be aware of the fact that the working-level talks since July, despite the historic Singapore summit, failed to take a step forward and the time is running out for the working-level talks to deduce a significant outcome in the future summit. These elements made the U.S. understand that the commencement of working-level negotiations on denuclearization with ‘a set deadline’ after the summit will be most practical and efficient. The U.S. will stress the point that the sooner the working-level negotiations conclude and the higher the achievements are, the faster the sanctions will be eased or lifted.

 

 

 

This article is based on the author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong Institute.

 

*Translator’s note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.