Current Issues and Policies No. 2018-24
December 19, 2018
Dr. Lee Seong-hyon
Director, Center for Chinese Studies, the Sejong Institute
sunnybbsfs@gmail.com
While the U.S.-China trade war
entered a ‘90-day truce’ period, there are signs within the Chinese government
that it is preparing for a long-term war. It might be preparing for the
worst-case scenario, but in turn, it could be also construed as Beijing’s sense
of seriousness in its relations with Washington. As a matter of fact, Chinese
government officials, state-run research institutes, and journalists
consecutively visited the U.S. in the last several months, met U.S. politicians,
lawmakers, scholars in think tanks, and journalists, and perceived the gravity
of the current state of play.
China began to realize the U.S. is ‘enraged’
rather than ‘dissatisfied’ with China, a sense of ‘anxiety’ that the U.S. is
feeling chased by China in terms of national comprehensive power, and even
entails the ideological confrontation between liberal democracy and socialism.
Particularly, the Chinese authorities realized that some people in the U.S.
observe China entered the ‘path of dictatorship’ as the constitutional
amendment paved the way for President Xi Jinping’s lifelong reign. One American
podcast mocked, ‘now the U.S. views China like North Korea.’
Beijing regarded the trade war with the U.S.
as a ‘usual’ case that had been frequent in bilateral relations. That is, it
viewed the temporary bilateral trade war for U.S. domestic political purposes
and President Trump’s political spin for the midterm elections. Accordingly,
Beijing believed that special envoy to the U.S. will relieve the discontent;
but now comprehended that this method is no longer valid.[1]
What’s more is that China canceled the special
envoy’s visit to Washington a few days before the actual visit – Vice Premier
Liu He of the State Council, a close affiliate of President Xi was expected to
visit the U.S. This owes to the fact that even though it was clearly cognizant
of his visit, the U.S. administration imposed new tariffs on Chinese goods
worth $200 billion on September 24. Due to the imposition of tariffs,
approximately half of Chinese export volume - $250 billion out of $505.5
billion – became subject to tariffs.[2]
Overall, Beijing seemingly did not foresee
the U.S. playing ‘hardball.’ On December 14, the Global Times/Huanqiu Shibao,
the sister paper of Chinese Communist Party’s (CPC) mouthpiece People’s Daily/Renmin Ribao, published a confessionary editorial with the ‘Made in
China 2025’ plan, ambitiously pursued by the Chinese government, as an example.
“The objections to the "Made in China 2025" plan made by the US have
been beyond China's expectations.”[3]
Within China, the meetings to
prepare for a long-term standoff with the U.S. have become more frequently
observed. It is
worthy to point out the explanation of one Chinese figure who recently visited
the U.S. as part of a delegation. According to him/her, three different views
exist within the U.S. with regards to the perception of China.
The first group is the ‘hardliners’
consisting of conservatives and military people. The Chinese delegation sensed
that these people have an adamant hardline view on China. They perceive China
as a threat to the U.S. only for being the ‘world’s second power’ after the
U.S. Thus, Beijing found no space to persuade or convince them and concluded
that the efforts will be meaningless. It grasped how deep the wrath against
China runs. And it also opines that these ‘hawkish’ figures encircle President
Trump.
The second group is ‘liberals’
that reflects the U.S. Democratic Party’s conventional sentiment of China. As
the name suggests, they value China’s attitude to ‘democracy’ and ‘human
rights’ – the traditional values that the Democratic Party upholds. The
‘liberals’ are able to brook the fact that China is second to the U.S. in terms
of military and economy. However, they can never tolerate one thing concerning
China. That is, although China has emerged as a global power elevated by
economic growth and endowed with responsibility, it still remains as a
non-democratic country. Particularly, this fact - that even though the Clinton
administration hugely contributed to China’s economic rise, such as applying
most favored nation treatment to China and assisting China’s accession to the
WTO, China is not a democratic country – tests the limits of liberals’
patience. In other words, the ‘liberal’ group’s sentiment of China could be
summarized as disappointment and anger.
The third group could be dubbed
as ‘capital-oriented’ group represented as Wall Street and Silicon Valley. From
China’s point of view, this group is categorized as the most ‘practical’
people. They are aware that China plays an unfair trade game. However, despite
such fact, they concluded that it is still profitable to do business with China
(rather than not doing business with China) overall based on coldhearted
calculations of cost and benefit. Consequently, the ‘capital-oriented’ group
strives to maximize profits through economic interdependence with China.
Beijing views that this group will not abandon China even when the U.S.-China
relations are further strained.
The typical step that the
‘capital-oriented’ group made was U.S. electric car manufacturer Tesla’s
announcement in June 2018 to construct a plant capable of producing 500,000
electric cars annually in Shanghai, and not the U.S. The predominant analysis
is that Tesla made such move because of the trade war evoked by President
Trump. In other words, Tesla decided to build the production plant in Shanghai
to access the Chinese market, factoring in the fact that China introduced
40-percent retaliatory tariff on U.S. cars after the U.S. imposed high tariffs
on Chinese goods. The market’s reaction to Tesla’s ‘unpatriotic’ behavior was
intriguing. This day, Tesla’s stock prices rose by 2.9 percent when the market
was open.[4]
Ironically, Tesla CEO Elon Musk,
along with President Trump, criticized China for the barriers to the market
such as tariffs. As the U.S.-China trade war looms large, he reversed his views
completely. China is the largest electric car market for three consecutive
years and accounts for 15-percent of Tesla’s total sales of electric cars –
Tesla sold 17,000 electric vehicles in China. For Tesla, the Chinese market
would have been indispensable – unable to abandon it because of the U.S.-China
trade war. Although the specific amount of investment is undisclosed, the
Chinese media reported as the largest foreign investment in Shanghai’s
manufacturing sector. This is the nature of capital. Capital moves for profits
beyond national boundaries and ideology.
China prospects that the ‘Silicon
Valley’ will not be able to give up the Chinese market. Recently, the Chinese
telecommunication equipment manufacturer Huawei’s CFO Meng Wanzhou was arrested
for violating sanctions against Iran. There were interpretations that the U.S.
government attempts to thwart Chinese followers in the 5G-telecommunication
competition, vying for the so-called ‘neural network of the fourth industrial
revolution’ such as artificial intelligence. One of the key factors in the
‘fourth industrial revolution’ is ‘big data’ which is directly proportionate to
population – allowing collection of more big data with larger population size.
China stores the largest data in the world. Moreover, China attracts
multinational corporations as it has less strict regulations big data and privacy
compared to the U.S.
The Chinese authorities will
judiciously discern the groups that they could work with and groups that they
cannot engage with. In other words, they will classify the three groups in
terms of the possibility of persuasion. First, the ‘hardliners’ and ‘liberals’
are excluded as they are prone to have anti-China sentiments. Hence, China will
strengthen ties with ‘capital-oriented’ group – the most ‘pro-China’ group
among the three groups. At the same time, the Chinese authorities have had
brainstorming sessions to prepare for the elongation of U.S.-China standoff
surfaced as a trade war.
One of the ideas is the so-called
‘globalization without America (Fēi měi
quánqiúhuà)’ strategy. It literally means that China will carry on with globalization
without the U.S. This should not be misinterpreted as China’s isolationist
strategy. The Global Times claimed that China should continue the globalization
industrial policy in the editorial titled, “How should China adjust its
industrial policy?” on December 14, 2018. It reads that the continuation suits
Chinese interests. “Reform and opening-up is the only path China should follow.
We have achieved successful results over the past 40 years, as will we do in
the future.”[5]
As the U.S. tries to exclude
China in the global value chain, China apparently responded that it will do
business with ‘others except the U.S.’ Furthermore, it intends to further
strengthen the network with ‘others except the U.S.’
Secondly, this strategy is to
make ‘others except the U.S.’ on China’s ‘side.’ China divides the rest into
three different regions, ‘three Northeast Asian countries (Korea, China, and
Japan),’ Southeast Asia, and Europe. That is, it will enhance cooperation with
countries in the three regions, dividing the world into three ‘battlefronts.’
In fact, China’s ‘new type of
major power diplomacy,’ set forth at the 19th National People’s Congress, has
made a number of achievements in 2018, except for the relations with the U.S.
The ROK-China relations hopped on the path of recovery after the ‘THAAD issue’
and Japanese Prime Minister Abe met President Xi in Beijing. In May 2018, South
Korea, China, and Japan held the trilateral summit in Japan. China also held a bilateral
summit with India, which had encountered standoff at the border with China, in
April in Wuhan and Prime Minister Modi visited China to participate in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting held in Qingdao in June.
Along with these diplomatic accomplishments,
China agreed to develop the resources in the South China Sea jointly with the
Philippines, the country that had a territorial dispute with China, took a
coordinated posture with Russia in September as it participated in a
large-scale joint military exercise, and signed a $28.8 billion-worth currency
swap deal with Indonesia. Internally, China evaluates that its diplomacy had a
successful year in 2018 except for the U.S.-China relations.
Eventually, China manifested the
strategy against the U.S. – joint coalition with other countries – as it
entered the mid-to-long-term competition framework with the U.S. While the daughter
of Huawei’s founder Meng Wanzhou’s arrest in Canada at the U.S. government’s
behest led to distress, President Xi convened the CPC Central Committee
Political Bureau on December 13. He said that ‘having a stronger sense of
crisis in mind, the country should continue to seize the important period of
strategic opportunity for development and manage its own affairs with firm
confidence and initiative.’[6] President Xi’s comments
imply that the current trade war, in the wider picture of power competition between
the U.S. and China, will have long and deep ramifications. Will this
strategy succeed?
Beijing seems to shift carefully
toward optimism. First, in relations with Japan, the archrival in East Asia,
Japan was the largest participant in China’s first import exposition held in
Shanghai in November 2018. The Japanese corporations filled the void left by
the U.S. companies which did not participate in the expo due to the trade war.
Japan, home to global home appliances producers such as Sony and Panasonic, had
their eyes in the Chinese market for a long time. Chinese people’s preference
for Japanese home appliances has been consistent, regardless of the political
situation, ranging from electronic rice cookers to a lid of a toilet seat.
Accordingly, there are speculations that the Chinese government will open the
market to Japanese household appliances once the trade war with the U.S.
intensifies.
China sees South Korea and Japan
as countries not easily influenced by ideology in the process of policy formulation
and execution unlike the U.S. As such Beijing believes that it could entice
South Korea and Japan to its side with economic incentives or even refuse to
coordinate with the U.S. on encirclement of China. (This could be apparently
Chinese thought on the state of play.)
Can China’s ‘globalization
without America’ strategy succeed? Although it will engender difficulties for
China in the short term, China forecasts that this strategy will succeed in the
medium to long run. China exudes its confidence based on the idea that ‘time is
on Chinese side’. While hard times may come to China for about five years, China
understands that it will not only survive, but also thrive with greater
strength. It rather sees that it is only a matter of time for China to have
strength on par with the U.S. – as it ‘survived’ without trading with the
world’s largest economy. That is, China intends to compete with the U.S.
without dodging the situation and regard it as ‘growing pains’ necessary for
China’s rise.
Obviously, China also has its Achilles’s
heels, military strength, lagging far behind the U.S. Therefore, it will want
to evade full-scale military clash with the U.S. While the fault lines between
the U.S. and China – Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the South China Sea, and Taiwan –
may heighten military tensions, China will downplay the situation to prevent
tensions taking the collision course. Unless the U.S. and China engage in a
military clash, the U.S. and China will take a long time to strike a balance in
bilateral relations. That is, the issue should not be considered as a temporary
disturbance.
At the conference marking the 40
years of reform and opening-up on December 18, President Xi stated that he will
boost ‘communist rule’ and ‘economic reforms’ against the ‘unimaginable
threats.’ In other words, China vows to expand its influence on ‘its neighbors’
through economic reforms, while strengthening CPC rule ideologically. This also
is aimed at preparing for a long-term struggle with the U.S.
This article is based on the
author’s personal opinion and does not reflect the views of the Sejong
Institute.
*Translator’s
note: This is an unofficial translation of the original paper which was written
in Korean. All references should be made to the original paper.
[1] In
this context, some speculated in early 2018 that Wang Qishan, President Xi’s
close aide and vice president of China, will take over the diplomacy with the
U.S. – he played a reliever role in the SARS epidemic, financial crisis, and
the recent anti-corruption campaign.
[2] Against
the U.S. measures, China imposed retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods worth $60
billion on the same day.
[3] 环球时报. “社评:怎么做有利,中国产业政策就该怎样.” December 14, 2018. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2018-12/13800101.html
[4] The Hankyoreh. "Tesla to build production plant in Shanghai, manufacturing 500,000
cars annually" July 11, 2018. http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/international_general/852789.html#csidx56a0e70683deb67a7b893ffc7b6bd5e.
[5] 环球时报. “社评:怎么做有利,中国产业政策就该怎样.” December 14, 2018. http://opinion.huanqiu.com/editorial/2018-12/13800101.html;
The Global Times, “How should China adjust its industrial
policy?” December 14, 2018. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1131925.shtml