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China’s Strategic Perception of Europe amid U.S.-China Strategic Competition |
| May 22, 2025 |
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Gyubeom KimVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | daitou826@gmail.com
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| IntroductionThe new trade policy direction of the second Trump administration is affecting China’s relations with Europe. On April 2, following President Trump’s announcement of sweeping high tariffs, Chinese Premier Li Qiang and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen held a phone call to discuss a joint response. The two sides expressed concern over market disruptions caused by the U.S. tariff measures and agreed to defend a “fair and free multilateral trading system.” They also agreed to hold a summit in Beijing this July to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations. China broke precedent by announcing that President Xi Jinping himself, not the premier, would attend the meeting—a move widely seen as a positive signal for China–EU cooperation.
In recent years, China–EU relations have exhibited a complex and delicate dynamic. While maintaining close economic interdependence as key trading partners, the two sides have consistently clashed over issues such as unfair trade practices, technological competition, and human rights. These tensions have become even more pronounced amid the intensifying U.S.–China strategic rivalry and the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.
Amid this backdrop, attention is turning to whether the ‘Trump factor’ could serve as a catalyst for strategic cooperation between China and Europe. Some argue that the United States’ intensified trade protectionism will strengthen comprehensive cooperation between the two sides, thereby presenting China with a strategic opportunity. Others offer a more cautious assessment, suggesting that systemic distrust and growing structural competition in trade will limit the impact. Recent reports highlighting both cooperation and conflict between China and Europe further complicate the outlook.
This article analyzes the historical context and strategic direction of China–EU relations from the Chinese perspective, in light of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties. In doing so, it aims to provide a preliminary framework for understanding how the two actors may reshape their relationship amid growing U.S.–China strategic rivalry and the uncertainties posed by the second Trump administration’s evolving trade policy. -
In the early Cold War period, China primarily engaged with socialist countries in Eastern Europe. However, starting in the 1960s, driven by new strategic needs, China began reaching out to Western European nations. When the United States and the Soviet Union began discussions on nuclear non-proliferation, China opposed the initiative and pursued its own nuclear armament. In January 1964, it established diplomatic ties with France, a country that shared similar views. Following the Zhenbao Island Incident in 1969, countering the Soviet Union emerged as a central objective in Chinese diplomacy, thereby creating a strategic common ground between China and Western Europe. As the Sino-American rapprochement unfolded in the 1970s, China successively established diplomatic relations with major Western European countries and, in May 1975, officially launched diplomatic ties with the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU.
While strategic needs marked the starting point of China–Europe relations, economic cooperation and trade became the driving force behind their rapid development. With China’s reform and opening-up policies gaining momentum in the 1980s, a vast domestic market emerged. This development led to an influx of European capital, technology, and goods. The Chinese market offered high profits and growth potential for the European economy, while European firms found opportunities for job creation and technology transfer in China. Although the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident temporarily constrained trade, the overall trajectory of China–EU relations remained on an upward path within the framework of strategic and economic win-win cooperation.
Since the 2000s, China's accession to the WTO and the EU's introduction of the euro and the formation of a single market served as key turning points that dramatically expanded China–Europe economic relations. Europe emerged as China’s largest source of advanced technology and a primary origin of foreign direct investment (FDI), with China importing more than 19,000 technologies from Europe by 2004. During the same period, European companies established around 20,000 local entities in China, maintaining an active investment presence. This deep economic interconnection enabled European multinational firms to play a significant role in China’s industrial modernization, producing substantial mutual benefits. As a result, by 2004, the EU had become China’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $177.3 billion—74 times greater than at the time of diplomatic normalization. At the same time, China had become the EU’s second-largest trading partner. On the basis of these developments, the EU described its ties with China as “the cornerstone of Europe’s Asia and global strategy,” while China, declaring that bilateral relations had entered “the most amicable phase in history,” formalized a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.”
However, since the 2010s, China’s rapid rise in national power and mounting wariness from the West have begun to generate tensions in China–Europe relations. China’s increasing competitiveness in manufacturing and high-tech sectors weakened the previously complementary trade structure in which Europe supplied high-value-added technologies and China served as a production base and consumer market. Moreover, Europe’s persistent trade deficits with China intensified dissatisfaction, with European nations criticizing China for limited market access, the dominance of state-owned enterprises, and its industrial subsidy policies—accusing China of undermining fair competition. As a result, previously less emphasized issues such as differences in political systems and human rights have increasingly emerged as major points of contention in the bilateral relationship.
Amid these accumulating grievances, the intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition and the proliferation of new Cold War rhetoric have further deteriorated European perceptions of China. Europe has come to perceive the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) not merely as an economic cooperation framework but as a strategy for expanding China's geopolitical influence. Deep skepticism also emerged regarding the growing strategic alignment between China and Russia. In March 2019, the EU published the report EU–China: A Strategic Outlook, officially describing China as an “economic competitor,” “systemic rival,” and “cooperation partner” on global agendas—marking the EU’s formal articulation of its concerns about China. This provoked a strong backlash from Beijing, and tensions have since intensified over a range of issues including human rights in Xinjiang, the ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), and tariffs on electric vehicles.
At present, China–EU relations are at a new crossroads. While the foundational commonalities for cooperation remain, they are weakening. New sources of conflict and competition are emerging, but they do not fully define the relationship. The China–EU relationship, anchored in high levels of economic interdependence and certain shared strategic interests, has now reached a stage where these tensions must be recalibrated. -
To understand Europe’s strategic value from China’s perspective amid U.S.–China strategic competition, it is first necessary to examine the fundamental goals of China’s foreign policy. Although China’s external strategy under Xi Jinping’s leadership is often perceived as assertive and expansionist, in reality, Beijing remains acutely aware of the power gap with the United States. Rather than escalating conflict, China’s pragmatic objective is to manage tensions at a controllable level while continuing to build national strength.
According to analyses by China’s key policy advisors, Beijing perceives the U.S. strategy to contain China along three primary dimensions. First, in terms of security, the United States is seen as seeking to isolate China internationally and induce an arms race in order to deplete China’s resources and capabilities over the long term. Second, on the economic front, the U.S. is perceived as persistently attempting to exclude China from the global industrial ecosystem by restructuring global supply chains and blocking its technological advancement. Third, at the ideological and systemic level, Washington is understood to be deploying narratives of democracy and human rights to delegitimize China’s political system and undermine its prestige and influence in the international community.1)
Perceiving the U.S. strategy toward China as involving technological blockades, supply chain exclusion, and military pressure through an alliance-based network, China has grown increasingly concerned about the risks of ‘exclusion’ and ‘isolation’ in both security and economic domains. In response, Beijing has sought to strengthen cooperation frameworks centered on developing countries—such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)—and has prioritized building solidarity with Global South nations. However, this does not indicate a strategic choice to sever ties with the West. On the contrary, China regards isolation from the advanced Western economies that lead in technology, standards, and global governance as a critical threat to be avoided at all costs. In fact, many Chinese policy researchers identify the collapse of the Soviet Union as resulting primarily from its isolation from the advanced Western market economies, viewing this as a key historical lesson in shaping China’s foreign policy strategy.
This perspective has contributed to a recent shift in China’s diplomatic posture. Since the end of the pandemic in 2022, China has launched a broad campaign to restore and rebuild global supply chains, leveraging its vast domestic market and strong manufacturing capacity. At the same time, Beijing has actively pursued improvements in diplomatic relations with a wide range of countries. As part of this shift, the confrontational image associated with China’s former “wolf warrior diplomacy” is being increasingly moderated, giving way to what is now referred to as “smile diplomacy,” reflecting a renewed emphasis on improving China’s diplomatic image. Efforts to expand diplomatic outreach to ASEAN countries and to revive trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea are also part of this broader transformation.
In this context, Europe holds significant strategic value for China. Europe is viewed as a potential balancer or buffer that can mitigate the effects of the U.S.-led strategy to isolate China. Although the “Transatlantic Alliance” between the United States and Europe is strong, Europe does not always align with the United States on every issue. Major European countries have consistently advocated for “strategic autonomy,” and the 'de-risking' initiative proposed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in the first half of 2023 exemplifies this approach. While often interpreted as a symbol of coordinated efforts to counter China, the de-risking concept also reflected European dissatisfaction with the Biden administration’s pressure for excessive alignment, and demonstrated Europe’s intention to act as an autonomous diplomatic actor.
Europe also places high importance on multilateral values and respect for international norms, yet it tends to adopt a more moderate and pragmatic stance on ideological and systemic differences compared to the United States. In this regard, China sees Europe as a more flexible negotiating partner and aims to strategically leverage Europe’s normative and institutional influence within initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative and global governance strategies. Economically, Europe remains a vital market for China’s consumer and intermediate goods exports and a major partner in technology cooperation. Thus, China perceives Europe as a strategic partner where interests intersect across multiple dimensions, including technology, institutions, and norms.
However, this does not mean that China expects to draw Europe entirely into its camp as a friendly force. Rather, Chinese diplomacy strategically focuses on achieving a minimal yet crucial objective: maintaining relations to ensure that Europe does not transform into an overtly hostile actor toward China, even if it cannot be fully aligned with Beijing’s interests. -
China’s policy approach toward Europe prioritizes building strategic consensus and expanding areas of cooperation. First, in response to U.S.-led pressures such as decoupling and high tariffs, China seeks solidarity with Europe under the banner of “safeguarding the global trade order.” China characterizes the Trump administration’s trade policies as 'unilateralism' and 'protectionism,' criticizing them for weaponizing economic and trade issues to undermine the multilateral trading system. In contrast, Beijing portrays China and the EU as “two major economic blocs” and “forces supporting economic globalization and free trade.” In an April summit with the Spanish Prime Minister, President Xi Jinping emphasized that China and Europe should jointly respond to the United States’ unilateral bullying.
This approach is also evident in China’s stance on Europe’s discourse on “strategic autonomy.” China denounces U.S. 'hegemonism' and bloc-based politics, positioning a multipolar world order and the “democratization of international relations” as key diplomatic narratives. In this context, China has consistently supported Europe’s internal calls for autonomy, especially in areas of transatlantic divergence—such as defense burden-sharing, digital regulation, and Middle East policy. President Xi has repeatedly voiced support for a “strong Europe,” praising the continent as “a pillar of world civilization and a cornerstone of a multipolar world,” and has urged Europe to stand against bloc confrontation and power politics. This aligns with China’s strategic objective of sustaining a multipolar order by counterbalancing tendencies toward Western bloc consolidation.
China’s most practical and medium-to-long-term policy toward Europe lies in deepening mutual economic interdependence through trade and cooperation. China views its economic relationship with Europe as a 'safety pin' that helps ensure both supply chain connectivity and market access. In particular, the two sides have set joint goals for expanding markets and technological cooperation in emerging industries such as renewable energy, electric vehicles, and digital transformation. Moreover, China is attempting to expand the foundation for cooperation by focusing on global agendas that carry relatively low political sensitivities such as climate change and sustainable development. These global issues provide politically less burdensome avenues for collaboration, creating favorable conditions for a stable expansion of economic ties.
Despite existing divergences in political positions, economic interests, and normative values, China has maintained high-level diplomacy and working-level communication channels with Europe. It has made continuous efforts to coordinate mutual perceptions and ease tensions through summit meetings and other mechanisms. In fact, the China-EU dialogue mechanism has expanded and become more sophisticated in recent years, with multilayered consultation channels across different sectors. China stresses that “China and the EU are partners in mutual prosperity without fundamental conflicts of interest or geopolitical rivalry,” and that “in increasingly complex international circumstances, both sides should remain true to their original aspiration at the time of establishing diplomatic relations and enhance strategic communication.” Under the principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences (求同存異),” China aims to manage bilateral tensions and ensure the stable development of its relationship with Europe.
China does not always adopt a uniform approach toward the EU but rather pursues a strategy that leverages the multilayered structure of Europe. While the EU is a supranational entity, it is also a collection of states with diverse interests. Recognizing this, China implements tailored, country-specific strategies. For instance, it approaches leading EU countries such as Germany and France on a more strategic and comprehensive level, while strengthening trade and investment-focused cooperation with economically China-dependent countries like Italy and Spain. In contrast, for countries such as Lithuania that adopt an openly anti-China stance, China employs a differentiated strategy that includes informal retaliatory measures.
Moreover, in addition to cooperating with the supranational EU institutions, China has developed separate channels of engagement with Central and Eastern European countries. This approach is interpreted as an effort to secure at least a minimal base of friendly nations within Europe while projecting Chinese influence within the EU. Examples include the '16+1 Cooperation' platform (C+CEEC)—despite the withdrawal of the Baltic states—and bilateral relations with Hungary and Serbia. Although this strategy has drawn criticism within Europe as a form of 'divide and rule,' China maintains that it is simply a form of bilateral diplomacy that respects the sovereignty and policy autonomy of individual countries. Ultimately, the goal of China’s differentiated strategy is to preempt a scenario in which the EU as a whole adopts a uniformly hardline anti-China stance and, even if it cannot fully align Europe with its own bloc, to secure a minimum level of influence. -
From China’s perspective, Europe is both a ‘balancer’ and a ‘buffer zone’ in strategic terms, while serving as a crucial partner in economic and institutional dimensions. Amid intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, Europe’s strategic value in Chinese diplomacy is higher than ever. Consequently, China’s diplomatic efforts to strengthen cooperation with Europe, with the aim of drawing it into closer alignment, are expected to continue.
The future level of China–Europe cooperation will likely depend not only on bilateral issues but also on the state of U.S.–Europe relations. Former President Trump’s unilateral trade stance and deviation from traditional commitments to allies are potential sources of friction between the U.S. and Europe. China may seek to capitalize on these frictions, using them as opportunities to extend more proactive overtures toward Europe.
From China’s perspective, it is unrealistic to expect Europe to fully align with Beijing given the structural divergences between the two. In practice, China and Europe are expected to maintain a pragmatic and limited level of cooperation, thereby preserving strategic balance. What China anticipates from Europe is not alliance-level support but rather diplomatic leeway. Especially in the face of the Trump variable, what China needs most is not a full alliance, but strategic space—a buffer against U.S.-led exclusion and isolation. Accordingly, China is likely to focus on achieving its minimum objective of avoiding diplomatic isolation and maintaining the status quo, rather than pursuing unrealistic maximum goals.
The complex and multidimensional relationship between China and Europe holds important implications for South Korea as well. The South Korea–China relationship is also entering a structural transition marked by weakening economic complementarity and increasing competition in strategic sectors. In this context, closely observing and analyzing China’s approach to Europe can contribute to a better understanding of China’s future foreign and trade strategies. Additionally, South Korea should consider strengthening multilateral solidarity by enhancing cooperation with the EU. This would help secure a more favorable strategic position in economic and diplomatic negotiations with China. In this sense, the China–Europe relationship will serve as a meaningful reference for formulating South Korea’s future diplomatic strategy toward China.
| Developments in China–EU Relations Since the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
| China’s External Strategy and the Strategic Significance of Europe in the Context of U.S.–China Strategic Competition
1) This analysis draws on the arguments presented by Ni Feng, Director of the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. 倪峰：美国对华全面竞争战略与中美关系，《国际经济评论》。 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzIyNDEzNjU0NQ==&mid=2247486272&idx=1&sn=944aa34f790558bbe692e78c73ecfa16&chksm=e812d74edf655e585a28a70ab13622b352abda624650b88644b267c7b678d10fa40b385958a5&scene=27（Search date: May 14th, 2025）
| China’s Policy Approach Toward Europe
| Conclusion
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
