The Recent Taiwan Crisis and the Responding Strategies of the US, China and Taiwan

Chung Jae-hung

(jameschung@sejong.org)

Research Fellow,

The Sejong Institute

English Abstract

The United States: Possible Change in its ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ toward Taiwan

After Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit on August 2 and the consequent increase in China’s military pressure in the Taiwan Strait, President Biden exerted direct influence in the region by indicating the US’ commitment to defend Taiwan.

The Taiwan Policy Act regards Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally, authorizes $4.5 billion of military support over four years and affirms the president’s power to impose sanctions on Chinese officials and financial institutions involved in hostile actions against Taiwan.

The passing of the Taiwan Policy Act will undoubtedly bring changes to US-China relations as it scraps the ‘One China’ Policy held by the US since the normalization of relations in 1979.

Taiwan: New Military Strategy of ‘Resolute Defense and Effective Deterrence’ and Buildup of Asymmetric Defensive Capabilities

Following China’s aggressive military response in the Taiwan strait, Taiwan’s defense ministry assessed China to be strengthening its landing operation capabilities by diversifying its means of force projection in air and sea. The ministry anticipated that China will gain actual invasion capabilities by commissioning into service Y-20 and Type 075 LHD in 2025.

The Taiwan military is strengthening its asymmetric forces by focusing on high-mobility, high-efficiency and precision strike capabilities. Its military power is totally devoted to achieving the strategic target of ‘effective deterrence’ by effectively defending against threats of cyber, cognitive and unrestricted warfare.

China: Emphasis on ‘One China’ Policy and the Beginning of Full-scale Military, Political, Diplomatic and Economic Pressure

The Xi Jinping leadership believes that a new international order is inevitable given the war in Ukraine and the geopolitical and strategic gap created by US’ withdrawal from Afghanistan. As such, it cannot afford to lose its military and diplomatic competition with the US with whom it shares core interests of Taiwan and the South China Sea within the First Island Chain.

It is highly likely that the Xi Jinping leadership will take a hard-line approach against Taiwan to prevent President Tsai and Democratic Progressive Party from staying in power through regular military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, full-scale political and diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.

The Xi Jinping leadership has made it clear that it will not make concessions to the US on issues within the First Island Chain which includes Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula. It aims to actively pursue its core interests by seeking allies such as Russia, Iran, North Korea, Syria and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Preparing for a Taiwan Strait Crisis and Activating Communication Channels

The Taiwan Strait is a difficult challenge for Korea given its geographical proximity and the possibility of a military confrontation between the US and China.

The division of the international order into liberal and socialist blocs is accelerating following the deterioration of US-Russia relations and the intensification of the US-China strategic competition. North Korea-Russia-China relations are also growing stronger around the issues of Taiwan and Korean Peninsula.

Active communication with the governments and experts in the US, China and Taiwan is crucial as confidence-building measures and to construct a response strategy for crisis management in the Taiwan Strait.