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Strategic Stability in the Context of U.S.–Russia and U.S.–China Rivalries: Policy Implications |
| May 26, 2025 |
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Seong-Whun CheonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | dr.cheon@sejong.org
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On May 8, during his visit to Moscow for the 80th anniversary of Russia’s Victory Day, Chinese President Xi Jinping held a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin and issued a joint statement on “Strengthening the China–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the New Era.” The two leaders characterized the United States’ alliance-building efforts and adversarial policies as a form of "double containment" aimed at dividing Sino-Russian relations and pledged to respond closely in coordination.1)
The joint statement specifically condemned NATO’s eastward expansion into the Asia-Pacific region and its alignment with regional states’ Indo-Pacific strategies, arguing that such actions undermine peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. It also strongly opposed the deployment of nuclear sharing arrangements, ground-based intermediate-range missiles, and the establishment of a global missile defense system, all of which were said to undermine strategic stability by targeting China and Russia under the pretext of extended deterrence.
Strategic stability refers to a military-strategic concept that served as the foundation for managing nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The term “strategic weapons” typically denotes systems with the capability to strike the opponent’s homeland and inflict massive destruction. To be classified as strategic, a weapon must generally be capable of delivering a nuclear warhead—ranging from several hundred kilotons to megaton-class—in a long-range delivery system capable of reaching the adversary’s territory. Strategic stability is considered to be achieved when both parties possess credible second-strike capabilities—that is, the ability to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage even after absorbing a first nuclear strike—thereby deterring any side from initiating a nuclear conflict.
In the case of the United States, strategic stability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Russia has traditionally been maintained through the so-called nuclear “triad,” comprising three major weapons systems: (1) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with ranges over 5,500 kilometers, (2) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and (3) long-range strategic bombers. Both Russia and China currently maintain triad capabilities of their own. The United Kingdom and France lack ICBMs and rely primarily on submarine-based deterrence. North Korea, with relatively limited naval and air power, possesses only ICBM capabilities—specifically the Hwasong-18 and Hwasong-19. 2) India and Israel also maintain strategic weapons capable of striking targets thousands of kilometers away.3)
As part of the military-security annex to the earlier joint statement, the two leaders adopted a separate document titled 4) In this statement, they expressed concern that global strategic stability, historically sustained by a balance of nuclear forces, is now being undermined. This article examines the major issues raised in the statement, in which Russia and China identify the United States and its allies as primary disruptors of strategic stability, and analyzes the implications of these developments for South Korea’s national security policy. -
The statement on strategic stability identifies the United States’ pursuit of strategic absolute security as the most fundamental concern. It raises the alarm that Washington, by aligning with both nuclear and non-nuclear allies and mobilizing a range of technological and military capabilities, seeks to weaken the credibility and effectiveness of Chinese and Russian deterrence. Through this, the United States aims to achieve overwhelming military superiority and escape the threat posed by the strategic weapons of China and Russia—ultimately attaining absolute security for itself. The statement argues that this approach by the United States undermines the foundations of strategic stability and violates the principle of equal and indivisible security. 5)
It further asserts that such actions damage global strategic stability, incite arms races, heighten the risk of conflict among nuclear-armed states, erode predictability in the military domain, and obstruct efforts toward arms control.
The Chinese and Russian leaders contend that the specific concerns enumerated in the statement all fundamentally stem from the United States’ pursuit of absolute security and the pressure it thereby imposes on both countries. -
The statement on strategic stability identifies one of the most pressing strategic risks as the expansion of power projection capabilities by certain nuclear-armed states, specifically the United States, through alliances and partnerships that extend military presence near the borders of other nuclear powers, namely China and Russia. It warns that such actions involve the establishment of forward military footholds used for force projection, coercion, and hostile activities, which threaten the core security interests of both China and Russia. In this context, the statement expresses serious concern over the forward deployment of advanced offensive and defensive weapons systems and military installations capable of conducting strategic missions, particularly decapitation strikes against leadership and preemptive disarmament attacks.
Additionally, the statement highlights as a particular concern the deployment by the United States of ground-launched intermediate-range and short-range missiles in the territory of third countries, which are capable of striking various regions in China and Russia. On April 11, 2024, as part of the “Salaknib 24” joint exercise with the Philippines, the U.S. Army's 1st Multi-Domain Task Force deployed a Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system to Northern Luzon in the Philippines. The MRC system includes the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM).6) China has demanded the removal of these missiles from Philippine territory and, in its recently released national security white paper, China’s National Security in the New Era, criticized the deployment as a serious provocation that exacerbates geopolitical tensions.7)
Furthermore, the statement criticizes not only the United States but also its non-nuclear allies for enhancing their offensive capabilities under the banners of “deep precision strikes,” “kill chains,” and “counterstrike capabilities,” arguing that these developments undermine regional stability and global security. -
The statement on strategic stability characterizes the “Golden Iron Dome,” a missile defense initiative of the Trump administration, as an unconstrained, global, deeply layered, and multi-domain missile defense system designed to shield the United States from all missile threats posed by China and Russia. It argues that this system poses a serious threat to strategic stability. The core concern is that the Golden Iron Dome effectively rejects what the statement describes as the fundamental and essential principle for maintaining strategic stability: the inseparable interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and strategic defensive systems.
The two leaders further criticize the Golden Iron Dome for enabling military operations in space by deploying missile interception capabilities beyond the atmosphere, thereby accelerating the militarization of outer space. They reaffirm their opposition to the weaponization of space and efforts to turn outer space into a domain of armed conflict. The statement reiterates both countries’ commitment to advancing the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, jointly drafted by Russia and China, into a formal international agreement as soon as possible. Both sides also pledged that they would not become the first to deploy weapon systems in space. - The statement on strategic stability identifies the United States’ nuclear sharing and extended nuclear deterrence arrangements as a particularly provocative action that poses a direct threat to the security of China and Russia. It argues that the forward deployment and potential operation of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear allied states, especially through integrated operations that involve the use of allied military bases and the transfer of dual-use platforms, have contributed to heightened tensions and arms buildups at both regional and global levels.
- The two leaders reaffirmed their opposition to the aforementioned actions that undermine strategic stability and reiterated their commitment to the January 3, 2022 joint statement issued by the five nuclear-weapon states, which called for the prohibition of nuclear war and the prevention of arms races. They also urged the United States and the other nuclear-armed states to faithfully abide by the pledges made in that declaration. In the statement, Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States On Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races, January 3, 2022, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/ the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France pledged: ① a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; ② nuclear weapons should serve solely defensive purposes by deterring aggression and preventing war; ③ the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be prevented; ④ all existing bilateral and multilateral treaties and commitments on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and arms control must be upheld; ⑤ internal safeguards must be strengthened to prevent the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.
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Security Implications of the Undermining of Strategic Stability in the Nuclear Era
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a series of nuclear arms control treaties aimed at preventing nuclear war, avoiding excessive arms races, and maintaining peace. The first of these was the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (SALT I), which was signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, and entered into force on October 3 of the same year. SALT I was the first treaty to formally acknowledge that the United States and the Soviet Union had reached strategic parity in terms of nuclear capabilities.
SALT I recognized the impossibility of complete nuclear disarmament and introduced a key strategic concept that would shape arms control throughout the nuclear era: that peace could be maintained by limiting each side’s defensive capabilities in order to reduce incentives for offensive arms buildups. The logic was that by accepting higher levels of strategic vulnerability through self-imposed constraints on missile defenses, each side would discourage the other from enhancing its own offensive strike capabilities. In other words, by weakening one's shield, it would become possible to restrain the opponent’s sword, thereby achieving stability and peace through mutual restraint. Reflecting this philosophy, SALT I was composed of two core documents: (1) the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which limited each side’s territorial missile defense capabilities, and (2) the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms, which capped the number of strategic offensive weapons each side could deploy.
The maintenance of mutual strategic vulnerability has served as a core principle guiding U.S.-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. In the late 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), aiming to construct a perfect missile defense shield. This initiative was met with strong opposition from Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev insisted that SDI development be confined to research activities, but Reagan’s refusal ultimately prevented the two leaders from reaching a broader agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
On May 20, 2025, President Donald Trump announced his intention to operationalize the "Golden Dome" missile defense system during his term. 9) This system is designed to protect the U.S. homeland using space-based and advanced technologies. The backdrop to China and Russia’s concerns, explicitly stated in their Joint Statement on Global Strategic Stability, regarding the U.S. pursuit of absolute security and the development of the Golden Iron Dome lies in the belief that the expansion of American homeland defense capabilities fundamentally undermines the framework of strategic stability that has enabled the management of nuclear risks. Trump’s Golden Dome initiative appears to be driven by a combination of motivations: (1) demonstrating a firm commitment to homeland defense; (2) prompting military buildups in China and Russia to impose economic costs; (3) pre-positioning the U.S. for future multilateral arms control negotiations; and (4) fulfilling Reagan’s vision, who remains Trump’s strategic role model. The deterioration of strategic stability, an essential foundation and shared understanding among major powers, signals a more challenging external security environment for South Korea. As U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China rivalries intensify, the risk of tensions spilling over into the Korean Peninsula also increases. The next South Korean administration must closely monitor the evolving tensions surrounding strategic stability among the United States, Russia, and China, and formulate comprehensive contingency plans in response.
China and Russia’s Response to Strategic Asset Deployments and the Risk of Escalation
The joint statement expressed deep concern over the fixed deployment of intermediate-range missiles and the forward deployment of strategic assets near the borders of China and Russia. Since the intermediate-range missiles deployed in the Philippines are conventional rather than nuclear, China and Russia’s response has so far remained relatively muted. However, as U.S. strategic assets are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, Beijing and Moscow are expected to express stronger opposition to their future deployment near the Korean Peninsula under the pretext of deterring North Korea’s nuclear threat.
The Cuban Missile Crisis, which nearly escalated into nuclear war during the early Cold War, was triggered by the Soviet Union’s deployment of dozens of intermediate-range nuclear missiles (SS-4 and SS-5) in Cuba, capable of striking the U.S. mainland. The crisis serves as a vivid illustration of how nuclear powers regard the close deployment of an adversary’s nuclear forces as a severe threat. Should the United States deploy nuclear-capable intermediate-range missiles in Asia, or continue with excessive and overt deployments of strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula, there is growing concern that an “Asian Cuban Missile Crisis” may unfold. It is time to carefully reassess the costs and benefits of strategic asset deployments justified in the name of countering North Korea’s nuclear program.
China and Russia’s firm position on the demilitarization of outer space
The joint statement reflected the two countries’ firm stance on the demilitarization of outer space. The draft treaty, prepared by China and Russia, is based on the principle that no form of weapon should be deployed in space and that no attack should be made on space-based objects such as satellites. It remains uncertain whether the draft treaty will garner broad support from the international community, as existing treaties that prohibit the militarization of space have lost much of their normative power due to advances in science and technology.
The Outer Space Treaty, signed on January 27, 1967, stipulates the following: (1) the prohibition of placing weapons of mass destruction in space; (2) the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes; (3) the prohibition of establishing military bases, installations, or fortifications; and (4) the prohibition of weapon testing and military exercises in space. Like the Antarctic Treaty, it aimed to prevent arms races and promote demilitarization in specific domains. However, the development of technology has rendered many of its provisions ineffective. Military utilization of space has progressed through initiatives such as Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, space-based laser interceptors against ballistic missiles, and terrestrial systems targeting satellites. Notably, the United States established its Space Force on December 20, 2019.
South Korea, as a member of the Outer Space Treaty, has taken the lead in promoting the peaceful use of outer space. At the same time, its Air Force Space Operations Squadron under the Air Force Operations Command conducts defensive space missions. Looking ahead, South Korea may face calls to participate in the U.S.-led Golden Dome initiative. As seen in the controversy surrounding the THAAD deployment, this issue may become politically contentious. The South Korean government must respond based on a balanced approach that upholds national security, avoids heightened tensions with China and Russia, and reaffirms the principle of peaceful use of outer space.
Possibility of Chinese and Russian Opposition to Tactical Nuclear Redeployment and Nuclear Sharing
Given that China and Russia expressed critical positions in the joint statement regarding the deployment of U.S. nuclear assets to allied countries and the conclusion of nuclear sharing agreements, it is highly likely that both countries will raise objections if tactical nuclear weapons are redeployed to the Korean Peninsula in the future. Therefore, South Korea and the United States must present justification and persuasive arguments capable of overcoming opposition from China and Russia.
In terms of both capability and operational doctrine, tactical nuclear weapons can be examined separately. From the standpoint of capability, objections from China and Russia could be mitigated. Currently, the only tactical nuclear asset operated by the United States is the B61-12 tactical nuclear warhead, mounted on F-35 fighter jets. In terms of range and destructive power, these tactical nuclear weapons are confined to limited regional missions for deterrence against North Korea, rather than strategic missions targeting Chinese or Russian territory. However, in the domain of nuclear doctrine, more refined countermeasures and persuasive logic will be required. In particular, in South Korea’s case, even if it shares tactical nuclear assets with the United States, it will be necessary to clearly declare its own nuclear doctrine regarding how those assets will be operated within the Korean theater. Only by doing so can South Korea truly establish itself as a state equipped with credible nuclear deterrence against North Korea in the nuclear era.
Prospects for Arms Control and Implications for U.S.–North Korea Negotiations
Although the joint statement did not explicitly mention specific agreements, the emphasis placed by the Chinese and Russian leaders on the necessity of arms control appears to reflect their awareness of the U.S. withdrawal from major arms control treaties during the first Trump administration. Citing Russian violations, the United States formally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on August 2, 2019, and subsequently exited the Open Skies Treaty on November 22, 2020. It also showed little interest in extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a key nuclear arms reduction agreement set to expire in 2021. The treaty’s extension was eventually initiated by the Biden administration and accepted by Russia, keeping it in effect until 2026.
The Chinese and Russian emphasis on the need for nuclear arms control could serve as a catalyst for future U.S.–North Korea nuclear negotiations. At a minimum, it is clear that the two countries are unlikely to oppose Trump’s diplomatic approach toward North Korea and may even support negotiations that seek to address Pyongyang’s security concerns. Trump is expected to frame the Biden administration’s denuclearization efforts as a failure and pursue a limited nuclear arms control deal or a so-called “small deal” with North Korea. He may attempt to promote this as a success that safeguarded the American people from nuclear threats.
North Korea, for its part, is likely to exploit Trump’s desire to differentiate himself from Biden and may accept partial constraints on its nuclear arsenal, particularly long-range capabilities, in exchange for maximum political, economic, military, and diplomatic concessions. Over the longer term, Pyongyang may attempt to elevate bilateral nuclear negotiations with the United States into trilateral or quadrilateral arms control talks involving China and Russia, the other two nuclear powers in Northeast Asia. If realized, such a development would likely bring about fundamental and structural changes to the regional security order.
1) “China, Russia issue joint statement on further deepening comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for a new era,” CGTN, May 8, 2025, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-05-08/Xi-Putin-sign-joint-statement-on-further-deepening-China-Russia-ties-1Dd9CjSlppS/p.html
2) According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s (DIA) missile threat assessment report, North Korea has successfully tested ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach the entire continental United States. While it is currently estimated to possess fewer than 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the report projects that this number could increase to around 50 by 2035. 美 "북한, 현재 ICBM 10기 보유…2035년까지 50기로 늘 수 있어," 연합뉴스, 2025년 5월 14일.
3) India possesses the Agni-V missile, with a range exceeding 5,200 kilometers, and is developing the Agni-VI, which is expected to have a range between 8,000 and 10,000 kilometers. Israel, meanwhile, is believed to possess the Jericho-3 missile, with an estimated range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometers.Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories, Arms Control Association, August 2023.
4) "Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability" (hereafter, the statement on strategic stability). Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Global Strategic Stability, May 8, 2025, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/6310
| The Pursuit of Strategic Absolute Security
5) It is a concept that emphasizes the indivisibility of security in relations between adversarial parties, based on the principle that the security of both sides is equally important and cannot be considered separately.
| The Expansion of U.S.-Led Military Alliances
6) "US Army’s Mid-Range Capability makes its first deployment in the Philippines for Salaknib 24," U.S. Army Pacific, April 15, 2024.
7) Leilani Chavez, "US Typhon missile system in Philippines is a subtle headache for China," Defense News, May 14, 2025.
| The “Golden Iron Dome” and the Militarization of Outer Space
| The Issue of Nuclear Sharing Between Nuclear and Non-Nuclear States
| Emphasizing the Need for Arms Control
| Policy Implications and Considerations
9) “트럼프, ‘우주기반 MD 골든 돔 재임 중에 가동... 레이건 과업 완수,” 연합뉴스, 2025년 5월 21일.
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