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The Dawn of a ROK-France "Global Strategic Partnership" Era and Remaining Challenges ―Institutionalization and Project Development Tasks as Seen Through a Comparison with the Japan-France Summit― |
| April 13, 2026 |
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Seong-Chang CHEONGVice President, Sejong Institute | softpower@sejong.org
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French President Emmanuel Macron paid a state visit to South Korea on April 2 and 3, 2026. This visit carried considerable symbolic weight and diplomatic significance, as it marked the first visit to South Korea by a French president in eleven years since former President François Hollande's visit in 2015, as well as the first state visit by a European head of state since the inauguration of the Lee Jae Myung administration.1)
The visit gave concrete form to a schedule agreed upon during contact between the two leaders on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in South Africa in November 2025, and served as an occasion to elevate the bilateral relationship from the existing "Comprehensive Partnership for the 21st Century" to a "Global Strategic Partnership" (Partenariat stratégique global) on the occasion of the 140th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.2)
This represented a public declaration of intent, both domestically and internationally, to transition toward a long-term cooperative relationship that transcends the existing framework centered on economic and cultural cooperation and encompasses strategic domains including energy, critical minerals, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, space, defense industry, and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Given that France is a core European power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, this elevation in the relationship carries the significance of South Korea having secured a diplomatic foundation from which to expand its strategic linkages with Europe in a more proactive manner. The fact that President Macron, in his capacity as chair of the G7 this year, formally invited President Lee Jae Myung to the G7 Évian Summit and left open the possibility of additional leader-level contact within the year further demonstrates that this elevation in the relationship will not remain a one-time event. In this regard, President Lee declared that he had "reaffirmed once again the deep friendship between the two countries, solidly built over 140 years, and pledged a firm determination to create new opportunities for the next 140 years."3)
In order to accurately assess the significance of this summit, both its achievements and its limitations must be examined concurrently. In particular, the fact that President Macron held a summit with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae(高市早苗) 일in Tokyo immediately before visiting Seoul, reaching more institutionalized agreements in the areas of diplomacy, security, nuclear energy, and economic security,4) serves as the most useful comparative benchmark against which to view this ROK-France summit. What is significant is not the sequence of the itinerary itself, namely that President Macron visited Japan before South Korea, but rather that his consecutive visits to Tokyo and Seoul demonstrated that France France regards both Japan and South Korea as core strategic pillars of its Indo-Pacific strategy. However, looking solely at the tangible outcomes, a clear distinction also emerged: whereas Japan and France have already entered the stage of institutionalization, South Korea and France have only just opened that door.
This paper seeks to evaluate the ROK-France summit against four criteria: ① the significance of the elevation of the relationship; ② the level of security institutionalization; ③ the specificity of agreements on nuclear energy and economic security; and ④ the sustainability of follow-on summit diplomacy.Ⅱ. Major Outcomes of the ROK-France Summit -
1. Convergence of ROK and France Interests and Elevation of the Relationship
President Lee Jae Myung and President Macron agreed to elevate the "Comprehensive Partnership for the 21st Century" established by President Roh Moo-hyun and President Chirac in 2004 to a "Global Strategic Partnership" after 22 years, and adopted a joint statement to this effect.5) The concept of a "Global Strategic Partnership" ranks one level below a treaty alliance (a legal alliance entailing collective defense obligations), but is a term used to describe a comprehensive, long-term, high-level cooperative relationship encompassing economic, security, technological, and global agenda dimensions.
The first instance in which South Korea formally established such a relationship was the 2023 ROK-UK Downing Street Accord (officially titled "The Downing Street Accord: A United Kingdom-Republic of Korea Global Strategic Partnership"), with the present ROK-France agreement constituting the second. The Downing Street Accord explicitly stated the objective of elevating cooperation across all domains, including security and defense, science and technology, and energy security, to the level of "the highest level of strategic ambition."
The strategic background to this ROK-France summit is multifaceted. As the risk of alliance relationships becoming transactional under the second Trump administration, the deepening of Russia-North Korea military cooperation, China's military rise, and Strait of Hormuz risks stemming from Middle Eastern instability have simultaneously come to the fore, both South Korea and France find themselves in an environment where they must pursue the strengthening of strategic autonomy, supply chain stability, and the diversification of security cooperation. Marc Julienne, Director of the Center for Asian Studies at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), analyzed that it is precisely under these structural conditions that the interests of France, Japan, and South Korea are converging to a greater degree than at any previous time.6) In this respect, the summit should be understood not merely as a reaffirmation of friendship, but as an event that formalized the necessity for the two countries to move toward a higher level of strategic cooperation amid deepening uncertainty in the international order.
The objectives of the visit to South Korea as articulated by the Élysée Palace may be summarized under three headings: first, the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in strategic domains; second, the coordination of joint positions on major international issues; and third, the advance coordination of the agenda for the G7 Évian Summit. Given that France is not directly subject to U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, the federal regulations governing the export of U.S.-origin military technology) constraints, the potential for sensitive military technology cooperation is relatively greater, and France may be assessed as an important strategic cooperation partner for South Korea.7)
The significance of this elevation of the ROK-France relationship may be assessed along three dimensions. ① As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a core EU state, France can contribute to South Korea's efforts to broaden its strategic support base on the global multilateral diplomatic stage. ② In conjunction with President Macron's formal invitation to President Lee to attend the G7 Évian Summit, the foundation for South Korea's participation in G7 diplomacy has been strengthened. ③ The "Global Strategic Partnership" framework has the potential to serve as overarching framework through which specific cooperation agenda items are addressed on a sustained basis. However, given that an elevation in nomenclature in diplomacy does not automatically guarantee a substantive elevation, the true value of this declaration will be determined by the success or failure of subsequent institutionalization and project development.
2. Conclusion of 14 Agreements, MOUs, and Letters of Intent for Cooperation and Expansion of the Foundation for Cooperation
On the occasion of the summit, three existing agreements were amended and eleven MOUs and letters of intent for cooperation were concluded.8) The amendments to the Agreement on Cultural and Technological Cooperation (expanding into emerging content domains such as e-sports), the Working Holiday Agreement (raising the upper age limit from 30 to 35), and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (a GSOMIA-type agreement) simultaneously broaden both the scope and depth of the bilateral relationship. In particular, the amendment to the General Security of Military Information Agreement is of considerable significance not merely as a symbolic measure, but insofar as it reinforces the minimum institutional infrastructure that will underpin future defense industry cooperation, participation in combined exercises, exchange of sensitive information, and expansion of interoperability.9)
n the economic domain as well, the two countries presented a vision of expanding bilateral trade volume, which stood at approximately 15 billion dollars as of 2025, to 20 billion dollars by 2030, and of doubling the current employment scale of approximately 40,000 persons at bilateral investment companies to 80,000 persons over the next ten years, thereby seeking to link the elevation of the relationship to concrete economic objectives.10) The letters of intent(LOI) for cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum technology, as well as the letter of intent for cooperation on critical mineral supply chains, are assessed as measures that have elevated economic cooperation beyond traditional trade into the domain of economic security.
The cooperative foundation across such fields as veterans affairs, cultural heritage, ODA(Official Development Assistance), and forestry was also simultaneously expanded on the occasion of this summit. This demonstrates that the external reach of the bilateral relationship is extending beyond strategic domains to encompass social, cultural, and development cooperation as well.
3. Progress in Nuclear Energy Cooperation
The most substantive outcome of the summit emerged in the area of nuclear energy cooperation. The MOU concluded between Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Orano established a framework for cooperation across the entire nuclear fuel cycle process, from uranium feed material procurement through conversion and enrichment.11) Orano is a French state-owned enterprise possessing world-class nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, including the La Hague reprocessing facility with an annual processing capacity of 1,700 tU. Against the backdrop of growing uncertainty in Russian uranium supply chains following the war in Ukraine, this MOU will make a tangible contribution to stabilizing South Korea's nuclear fuel supply chain.
In addition to Orano, KHNP concluded a nuclear fuel technology cooperation MOU with Framatome, a company specializing in reactor design and key component manufacturing, and a joint development MOU with EDF (Électricité de France), France's largest state-owned power utility, for the Haema offshore wind power generation project in Yeonggwang, South Jeolla Province.12) The joint statement also encompasses a medium to long-term vision extending to cooperation on spent nuclear fuel management, fourth-generation reactors, and nuclear fusion.13) This signifies that a structure has been opened that goes beyond mere resource procurement and can lead to cooperation in the global nuclear power market and energy technology going forward. However, the agreements reached at the current stage have yet to reach the level of project implementation such as long-term supply contracts, joint investment, or joint entry into third-country markets. Accordingly, nuclear energy cooperation represents simultaneously the most significant achievement of this summit and the area in which the ultimate determination of success or failure will be most clearly manifested going forward.
4. Diplomatic and Security Cooperation , Including Hormuz
The central agenda item in the diplomatic and security domain was the question of the Strait of Hormuz. With the safety of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Strait of Hormuz having been significantly destabilized by U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran, the two countries stated that they "will work closely with regional countries to pursue de-escalation and seek a political solution that ensures peace and security for all in the region within the framework of United Nations Security Council resolutions and international law."14) Their shared dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil supplies provides the substantive basis for this cooperative commitment. Concrete security outcomes include South Korea's agreement to participate in the PEGASE mission,15) the French Air and Space Force's long-range air deployment mission, during its planned stop in South Korea in the fall of 2026, and the strengthening of defense information sharing through the amendment of the General Security of Military Information Agreement.
5. Securing Momentum for Follow-on Summit Diplomacy
President Macron formally invited President Lee to the G7 Évian Summit scheduled for June 15 to 17 of this year,16) and also invited South Korea to serve as co-chair of the Moving Image Summit, an international film and audiovisual industry summit to be held in France on September 7, extending a state visit invitation in conjunction therewith.17) The prospect of three or more leader-level contacts within the year—Seoul in April, Évian in June, and Paris in September—is unprecedented in its intensity and also aligns with the Lee Jae Myung administration’s national agenda of realizing a “G7+ diplomatic power.”
However, it should be noted that these contacts are contingent upon G7 presidency invitations and cultural event occasions. A warm personal rapport between the leaders and additional meetings within the year alone cannot guarantee the continuity of the strategic relationship, and the challenge of establishing institutionalized regular channels must follow. This will be addressed in concrete terms in Chapter IV. -
In order to avoid overestimating the achievements of this ROK-France summit, a comparison with the outcomes of the Japan-France summit that President Macron held in Tokyo immediately prior to his visit to South Korea is essential. On April 1, Japan and France separately convened the 8th Foreign and Defense Ministers' 2+2 meeting (the first in-person meeting in seven years)18)
and adopted a defense roadmap. In the nuclear energy domain, a joint declaration was adopted encompassing cooperation on fast reactor development (next-generation reactors with higher nuclear fuel efficiency than conventional light water reactors), the advancement of the nuclear fuel cycle, and fusion energy cooperation, and a critical minerals cooperation roadmap was also established,19)
including support for the construction of the Caremag rare earth recycling and refining facility.20)
There are structural reasons why the Japan-France relationship has already entered a stage of deepened institutionalization. Since elevating the bilateral relationship to an "exceptional partnership" (partenariat d'exception, a relationship entailing a higher level of political trust and institutionalization than a general strategic partnership) in 2013, Japan has steadily built a dense cooperative network comprising regular 2+2 meetings, a defense roadmap, and a joint declaration on the nuclear fuel cycle. In particular, following Prime Minister Abe's announcement of the Indo-Pacific strategy in 2016, Japan systematized its diplomacy with France at the level of "strategic diplomacy," resulting in the continuation of strategic cooperation regardless of changes in administration. In other words, the institutionalization of the Japan-France relationship is the product of more than a decade of deliberate and sustained investment.
By contrast, while South Korea and France on this occasion elevated the nomenclature of the relationship and broadened the scope of cooperation, the regular consultative bodies, joint roadmaps, and long-term implementation frameworks needed to underpin these developments have not yet been sufficiently established. This difference constitutes the core criterion distinguishing the character of the two relationships.
Accordingly, a more precise assessment is as follows. The ROK-France summit was successful in terms of its symbolic significance, potential, and the breadth of its cooperation agenda; however, in terms of the depth of security institutionalization and technological cooperation and the specificity of implementation mechanisms, it remains one step behind the Japan-France relationship. For South Korea to narrow this gap, it must move beyond episodic event diplomacy and establish a medium to long-term strategic roadmap. -
① Institutionalization of Summit Diplomacy and Diplomatic Security Cooperation
The ROK-France joint statement did not specify the establishment of an annual 2+2 foreign and defense ministers' meeting, a defense industry cooperation roadmap, or the frequency and format of a regular strategic dialogue. This represents the most conspicuous limitation of the summit. While the elevation of the relationship was achieved, the operational mechanisms commensurate with that elevation are absent.
A warm personal rapport between the leaders and additional meetings within the year, namely the Évian G7 in June and the Paris Moving Image Summit in September, alone cannot guarantee the continuity of the strategic relationship. Given that these three leader-level contacts are contingent upon G7 presidency invitations and cultural occasions, the central challenge is to convert them into substantive institutionalization.
At a minimum, the establishment of a new foreign and defense 2+2 meeting, the formulation of three- to five-year cooperation roadmaps in the areas of defense industry, space, and cybersecurity, and the formal codification of a principle of annual or biennial summits must follow. Only then can the ROK-France relationship advance beyond the level of declaration to the level of substantive strategic engagement. It would be desirable to enshrine this principle through the next joint statement, on the occasion of either the G7 Évian Summit in June or President Lee's state visit to France in September, modeled on the "shuttle diplomacy" of the ROK-Japan relationship.
② Commercialization of Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Nuclear energy cooperation was the most significant substantive achievement of this summit; but for precisely that reason, it is also the first area that will be put to the test of commercialization. For the KHNP-Orano MOU to translate into tangible outcomes, follow-on measures such as long-term supply contracts, joint investment, joint entry into third-country nuclear power markets, and cooperation on spent nuclear fuel management must ensue. In addition, a working-level consultative body for nuclear fuel supply chain stabilization must be launched at an early stage. Without this, the present agreement is likely to remain a cooperation declaration containing favorable language. The essence of ROK-France nuclear energy cooperation lies in combining France's fuel cycle and design capabilities with South Korea's construction, operation, and project execution capabilities to generate mutual benefit. The time has come to move beyond documents to contracts, investment, and joint projects.
③ Formalization of the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation Agenda
The most notable shortcoming of this summit was that the possibility of cooperation related to South Korea's acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs, submarines propelled by nuclear power) was not addressed as a formal agenda item. France is the only Western country that operates LEU-fueled nuclear-powered submarines (low-enriched uranium, enriched below weapons-grade concentration). Unlike U.S. and British submarines that use HEU (highly enriched uranium), this provides a cooperation model compatible with the nuclear nonproliferation regime (including the NPT), and France is assessed to be South Korea's optimal cooperation partner given that it is not subject to U.S. ITAR regulations, affording greater autonomy in technology transfer.21)
France's Suffren-class nuclear-powered submarines represent a demonstrated case of LEU-fueled operation and could serve as a technical model for South Korea's SSN development. Furthermore, France's School of Military Applications of Atomic Energy (EAMEA, École des Applications Militaires de l'Énergie Atomique) possesses educational and research capabilities in the field of submarine nuclear propulsion and could serve as a viable channel for cooperation on training programs for South Korean officers.
Nevertheless, while civilian nuclear energy cooperation advanced at this summit, the question of nuclear-powered submarines, which may be characterized as the symbolic agenda item of strategic nuclear cooperation, was absent from the formal agenda. At the next summit, it will be necessary to place SSN cooperation on the formal agenda and to begin with indirect and incremental approaches such as EAMEA training programs, the deepening of nuclear fuel cycle technology cooperation, and policy dialogue on LEU-based propulsion systems. Even as South Korea pursues cooperation with the United States, it is strategically worth keeping open the possibility of cooperation with France.
④ Establishment of Implementation Bodies for Economic Security Cooperation
While the conclusion of letters of intent for cooperation in the areas of critical minerals, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum technology is meaningful, the absence of intergovernmental implementation bodies or joint working groups to translate these into actual outcomes represents a clear weakness. Unlike Japan and France, which presented more measurable deliverables such as a critical minerals supply chain roadmap and Caremag-related cooperation, ROK-France economic security cooperation remains at the level of declaration. Going forward, the critical minerals supply chain cooperation roadmap must be made more concrete, and joint research working groups or intergovernmental implementation bodies in the areas of artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum technology must be established. In addition, sector-specific implementation schedules and regular review mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that the 2030 trade target of 20 billion dollars does not remain a mere aspiration. -
Since taking office in 2017, President Macron has visited South Korea only once—this year—whereas he has visited Japan four times. This disparity is the cumulative result of Japan having steadily built up strategic dialogue and cooperation with capable middle powers (junggangguk, 中强國)22)
in Europe over the years, while South Korea has remained unable to break free from a diplomacy centered on the four major neighboring powers of the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. The reality that South Korea lags behind Japan in its diplomacy toward Europe and in its engagement with capable middle powers is encapsulated in these figures.
The ROK-France summit achieved clear results in elevating the bilateral relationship to a new framework designated as a "Global Strategic Partnership." The external reach of cooperation in the areas of nuclear energy, economic security, culture, and people-to-people exchanges was also meaningfully broadened. However, when compared with the Japan-France relationship, the ROK-France relationship still stands before the challenges of security institutionalization, the commercialization of nuclear energy cooperation, and the establishment of implementation frameworks for economic security cooperation. What is now needed is not additional rhetoric or the repetition of relationship nomenclature, but the gradual institutionalization of regular summits, the 2+2 framework, joint nuclear energy projects, a critical minerals cooperation implementation body, and the sensitive yet unavoidable strategic agenda of nuclear-powered submarine cooperation.
South Korea and France are strategically capable powers that play pivotal roles in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, respectively. In the current international security environment, where the weakening of U.S. extended deterrence and multilayered security crises intersect, strategic solidarity among capable middle powers is more essential than ever. In this era of uncertainty over extended deterrence, if South Korea were to take the initiative, with strategic foresight, in building a Middle Power Five (MP5) security cooperation network among South Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany—with possible expansion to Canada, Australia, and Italy—it could gradually narrow the gap with Japan in diplomacy with capable middle powers.23)
This summit was sufficiently meaningful. However, the true measure of success or failure of the ROK-France "Global Strategic Partnership" era will henceforth depend on what is institutionalized, what is commercialized, and how far the relationship is strategically deepened
Ⅰ. A Starting Point Where Achievements and Limitations Coexist
Ⅲ. Comparison with the Japan-France Summit: Why the ROK-France Relationship Remains at the "Opening" Stage
Ⅳ. Remaining Challenges
Ⅴ. Conclusion
1) Cheong Wa Dae, "Written Briefing by Chief Spokesperson Kang Yu-jeong on the Outcomes of the ROK-France Summit," Republic of Korea Policy Briefing, April 3, 2026. The visit by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to South Korea on January 17–19 of this year is classified not as a "state visit" but as an "official visit."
2) Seong-Chang Cheong, "The 140th Anniversary of Korea-France Diplomatic Relations and a New Design for Middle Strong Power Cooperation," Sejong Focus, March 26, 2026.
3) "ROK-France Joint Press Statement (Friday, April 3)," April 3, 2026, https://www.president.go.kr/cms/board/boardView.do?MENU_CD=puvIc0NF&CONTENTS_CD=vqNUjDNc&BBS_CD=4ctKz7GJ&pageNo=1(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
4) Kyung Su-hyeon, "Japan-France Summit: Supply Chain and Nuclear Energy Cooperation Confirmed," Yonhap News Agency, April 1, 2026.
5) "Joint Statement between the President of the Republic of Korea and the President of the French Republic," April 3, 2026, https://www.president.go.kr/cms/board/boardView.do?MENU_CD=NQo0Qlts&CONTENTS_CD=vqNUjDNc&BBS_CD=DU6LJ2gY&pageNo=1(Accessed: April 5, 2026); Élysée, "Déclaration conjointe du Président de la République française et du Président de la République de Corée," April 3, 2026, https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2026/04/03/declaration-conjointe(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
6) Marc Julienne, "Emmanuel Macron in Japan and South Korea: A Historic Opportunity for Euro-Asian Rapprochement," IFRI Editorials, April 2, 2026, https://www.ifri.org/en/editorials/emmanuel-macron-japan-and-south-korea-historic-opportunity-euro-asian-rapprochement(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
7) Seong-Chang Cheong, "A 'Grand Bargain' Strategy for Building a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Korea and France: The Exchange Structure and Implementation Roadmap for Nuclear-Powered Submarine, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and Defense Industry Cooperation," Sejong Focus, January 21, 2026.
8) Kim Gyeong-rok, "14 Documents Produced on the Occasion of the ROK-France Summit: KHNP Signs MOUs with Orano and Framatome," Newsis, April 3, 2026. Both MOUs and LOIs are non-binding documents that share the common characteristic of "documenting cooperative intent at a stage prior to a definitive agreement," but in general, MOUs tend to be more comprehensive and specific in nature, while letters of intent are considered simpler and more preliminary in character.
9) The ROK-France Agreement on the Protection of Military Information (Classified Military Information) was concluded in March 2000 to establish a legal framework for the secure mutual exchange and protection of classified military information, in the context of deepening bilateral strategic cooperation encompassing expanded military and arms cooperation as well as major projects including defense industry and high-speed rail (TGV). "Signing of the ROK-France Agreement on the Protection of Military Secrets," Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release, March 6, 2000.
10) Park Gi-seok, "Korea-France Strengthen Cooperation on Nuclear Energy and Critical Minerals; Working Holiday Age Limit Raised," Seoul Shinmun, April 3, 2026.
11) Orano, "KHNP and Orano Sign a Memorandum of Understanding for Nuclear Fuel Cooperation," April 3, 2026, https://www.orano.group/en/news/news-group/2026/april/khnp-and-orano-sign-a-memorandum-of-understanding-for-nuclear-fuel-cooperation(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
12) "Korea-France Leaders Join Hands on Nuclear Cooperation; Joint Response to Strait of Hormuz Blockade Also Agreed," Hankook Ilbo, April 3, 2026.
13) "Joint Statement between the President of the Republic of Korea and the President of the French Republic," April 3, 2026.
14) "ROK-France Joint Press Statement (Friday, April 3)," April 3, 2026.
15) PEGASE, as referenced in the ROK-France summit joint statement, refers to "Mission PÉGASE," the long-range air deployment mission of the French Air and Space Force (Armée de l'Air et de l'Espace). The joint statement specified that, in conjunction with the amendment of the defense sector classified information protection agreement, a stop (escale) in South Korea as part of this mission is planned for the fall of 2026.
16) Cheong Wa Dae, "Written Briefing by Chief Spokesperson Kang Yu-jeong on the Outcomes of the ROK-France Summit."
17) "ROK-France Joint Press Statement (Friday, April 3)," April 3, 2026.
18) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Eighth Japan-France Foreign and Defense Ministers' Meeting ('2+2')," April 1, 2026, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/japan/2026/japan-260401-jp-mofa02.htm(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
19) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Japan-France Summit Meeting and Working Dinner," April 1, 2026, https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/erp_1/fr/pageite_000001_01563.html(Accessed: April 5, 2026).
20) Prime Minister's Office of Japan, “Japan-France Summit Meeting and Working Dinner (Summary),” 2026.4.1., https://japan.kantei.go.jp/105/diplomatic/202604/01france.html (Accessed: 2026.4.5.). The "Caremag refining facility" refers to Caremag's rare earth recycling and refining plant currently under construction at the Lacq industrial complex in southwestern France. This facility is a project designed to process 2,000 tonnes of spent magnets and 5,000 tonnes of mineral concentrates annually to produce high-purity rare earth oxides. It has attracted considerable attention as the first large-scale rare earth recycling facility in Europe and as a key Western hub for the refining of critical heavy rare earth elements.
21) See Seong-Chang Cheong, "Strategy and Roadmap for Korea-France Nuclear-Powered Submarine Cooperation: Vessel Integration Based on Low-Enriched Uranium and a Model for Mutually Beneficial Partnership," Sejong Focus, February 10, 2026.
22) This paper translates "Middle Power" as 'major middle power' (中强國) rather than the conventional rendering of 'middle power' (中堅國). The concept of 'major middle power' carries a strong connotation of "pillar" or "buttress," lending it a predominantly normative character with an emphasis on "role and responsibility." By contrast, the concept of 'middle strong power' more accurately reflects the substantive capabilities and strategic standing of a mid-sized state that, while falling short of superpower status, clearly occupies a position within the ranks of the great powers.
23) See Seong-Chang Cheong, "A New Security Architecture for the Post-Extended Deterrence Era: A Proposal for Establishing a 'Five Middle Strong Powers (MP5) Security Consultative Body' Comprising Korea, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany,"Sejong Focus, February 24, 2026.
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
