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“One Korea Policy”: A Response to North Korea’s “Two-State Declaration” |
| October 21, 2024
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Seongwhun CheonVisiting Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute | dr.cheon@sejong.org
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On October 17, Kim Jong Un, President of the State Affairs Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, visited the 2nd Corps of the Korean People’s Army. During his visit, he emphasized the need to keep in mind once again the stark fact that the Republic of Korea is a foreign country and an apparent hostile country, making the following remarks:
“We completely blocked the roads and railways to the territory of the ROK two days ago through blasting, meaning not only the physical closure but also the end of the evil relationship with Seoul, which persistently lasted century after century, and the complete removal of the useless awareness about fellow countrymen and unreasonable idea of reunification...”
The destruction of roads and railways is part of an ongoing effort to effectively erase the concept of reunification by redefining South Korea as an “unchangeable enemy” and inter-Korean relations as a “hostile two-state relationship.” Having witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union despite its nuclear capabilities, the North Korean regime is well aware that internal instability is its Achilles’ heel. The enforcement of several successive laws––including the Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act in 2020, the Youth Education Guarantee Act in 2021, and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act and State Secrets Protection Act in 2023––reflects the regime’s desperate measures to maintain internal control. The “Two-State Declaration” is the highest-level measure within this framework, grounded in a calculation to preserve the regime even if it means severing ties with South Korea, which it views as a threat to its stability. On October 10, at the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Kim Myung-soo assessed that these measures aim to prevent both the inflow of outsiders into North Korea and the outflow of its own people.
It is also important to note that by classifying South Koreans as a different ethnic group, North Korea has laid the groundwork to unify the North and South by nuclear force under communism in the event of a contingency. In 1992, at a meeting with the Korean delegation during high-level inter-Korean talks, Kim Il Sung remarked that he could never imagine developing nuclear weapons that could “annihilate” fellow Koreans, and during the Kim Jong Il era, North Korea even claimed that its nuclear weapons protect all Koreans. However, under Kim Jong Un, North Korea openly threatens South Korea with nuclear use, raising concerns that the North’s threshold for nuclear deployment against the South may be significantly lowered following the “Two-State Declaration.“
This brief examines the domestic reaction in South Korea following the “Two-State Declaration,” proposes the “One Korea Policy” as a response to North Korea’s “Two-State Declaration,” and suggests a new policy direction for unification diplomacy. -
Although there was significant interest in the potential impact of the “Two-State Declaration” within South Korea, as it was expected to lessen the so-called “South-South divide” (i.e., the division of public opinion over North Korea policy), 1) it appears to have had a minimal impact on South Korean society like a storm in a teacup. Most Koreans dismissed the “Two-State Declaration“ as simply revealing the vulnerability of the North Korean regime and showed little interest. However, as the issue continued to be brought up in political circles, it became a hot topic in Korean society.
The main catalyst was a speech by former Presidential Chief of Staff Im Jong-seok at an event commemorating the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Pyongyang Declaration. Notable remarks included: “Let’s not pursue unification; let’s let go of the obsession that unification must be achieved,” “Let’s embrace two nations,” and “Let’s reorganize everything to fit the objective reality of the Korean Peninsula.” He even proposed revising the territory clause in Article 3 of South Korea’s Constitution and abolishing the National Security Act and the Ministry of Unification. Im, who has advocated for unification his entire life, surprised many Koreans by suddenly reversing his stance following Kim Jong Un’s “Two-State Declaration.” He faced criticism for these remarks from both the ruling party and the opposition. For example, Kim Min-seok, a member of the supreme council of the Democratic Party of Korea, commented that “if it were the late President Kim Dae-jung, he would not have agreed with Kim Jong Un,“ adding that “no one in the South or the North has the right to casually throw out the immature idea of permanently turning the blood relatives and ties scattered across the South and the North into a relationship between foreigners.“ 2)
While the view that the “Two-State Declaration” is something worth supporting or at least discussing has been raised by academics, the media, politicians, 3) and former officials,4) the scope of such discussions has been very limited, and the impact on Korean society remains minimal. On the contrary, the declaration has united the South Korean public’s resolve for unification and provided an opportunity for the government to establish the pursuit of a free and peaceful unification as a core state policy. Although the “Two-State Declaration” failed to garner significant interest within South Korean society, it has presented us with a critical task. This task is to unify the public's thinking regarding the need for unification and foster a national consensus on the process and end-state of unification. Moving forward, we must go beyond partisan lines and put our heads together to formulate a unification policy that can effectively respond to the “Two-State Declaration.” -
Considering that Korea‘s division began with an ideological struggle between communism and liberal democracy and was cemented by the Korean War, the question of which system—–North or South–—would carry on the legitimacy of the nation on the Korean Peninsula is inseparably linked to national identity and historical responsibility, making it an issue on which compromise or concession is impossible. Securing national legitimacy is a serious responsibility of future generations to ensure that the sacrifices of those who died resisting North Korea’s attempts to unify the nation under communism are not in vain.
It is no exaggeration to say that the history of Korea’s division is an ongoing story of competition between political systems and struggle over ideologies. Objectively, the competition between the North and the South over which political system better serves the interests of the Korean people is over, but the division of public opinion and social conflict stemming from the ideological struggle continues to hinder the progress of Korean society.
South Korea should respond to the North’s “Two-State Declaration” with a “One Korea Policy.“ Although the ”One Korea Policy“ has been an ongoing topic in Korean society and most Koreans view it as a given, it has not been developed into a concrete policy. However, since North Korea has declared its two-state policy, South Korea should publicize and formalize the ”One Korea Policy“ both domestically and internationally, to communicate our will and desire for unification. Additionally, Korea should generate a strong drive for unification policies to achieve a unified Korea where freedom, peace, and human rights are guaranteed. Considering the declining public awareness and interest in unification, as shown in recent polls across various sectors, solidifying the ”One Korea Policy“ may provide an opportunity to rekindle the Korean public’s awareness and interest in unification.
The “One Korea Policy” upholds the principle of “one Korea,” which asserts that the government of the Republic of Korea is the sole legitimate government representing the Korean people on the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the policy is in line with Article 3 of the Constitution, which states that “the territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands,” observing this as an inviolable constitutional obligation. From this perspective, North Korean territory is an area to be reclaimed under the Constitution, and North Korean people are our fellow citizens, whom we should help and eventually live together with. Grounded in the “One Korea Policy,” South Korea should promote inter-Korean exchanges, cooperation, and transformation in North Korean society based on the “Unification Formula for the Korean National Community” inherited from former administrations, while taking gradual steps toward peaceful unification. The “One Korea Policy” is modeled on West Germany’s “One Germany Policy,” which the West German government successfully maintained until the end of the Cold War. -
Many have described North Korea’s “Two-State Declaration” as reminiscent of the division of East and West Germany during the Cold War. At that time, one of the biggest challenges for new communist states, including the Soviet Union, was gaining legal recognition in the international community. The reason the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc communist states signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, which included commitments to human rights and freedom of the press, was to gain recognition as normal states in the international community. In the same vein, the East German government argued that East and West Germany were separate countries and opposed unification. However, West Germany did not abandon its stance on unification, grounded in the “One Germany” principle, which held that West Germany was the legitimate political entity representing German citizens on German territory. German Chancellor Willy Brandt discarded former Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s Hallstein Doctrine, which had prohibited engagement with communist countries, and implemented Ostpolitik (German for Eastern Policy) to promote change through rapprochement. Nevertheless, the “One Germany Policy” remained in place.
We should remember that West Germany never retreated from its “One Germany” stance, and the United States, despite normalizing diplomatic relations with East Germany, continued to respect West Germany’s position. During the Cold War, the U.S. affirmed that West Germany was the sole legitimate organized state within former German territory and the only government that could carry forward the legitimacy of a unified German state into the future. West Germany, under the overarching principle of “One Germany,” brought about change in East German society by implementing a flexible and pragmatic Ostpolitik under the banner of “change through rapprochement.” The fact that West Germany’s firm adherence to its core principle actually allowed more space for flexible maneuvering, offers an important lesson for South Korea’s policy toward North Korea.
The “One Germany Policy” was directly reflected in West Germany’s agreements with East Germany and its associated government institutions. East and West Germany signed the Basic Treaty in 1972 and joined the United Nations side by side in 1973. In Article 1 of the Basic Treaty, the two Germanies stated their intention to develop “normal, good neighborly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights.” East Germany interpreted this as establishing relations with a foreign country, including international legal recognition from West Germany. However, West Germany maintained that, up until the time of unification, Article 1 did not imply legal recognition or acceptance under international law.
The Bavarian State Government filed a case with the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that recognizing East Germany as a state in the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany violated the West German Basic Law, which mandated a mission of unification. However, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Basic Treaty did not violate the West German Basic Law. This ruling was based on the logic that although the West German government recognized East Germany as a state in the Basic Treaty, this recognition was a special form of “de facto recognition” rather than legal recognition. While East Germany was recognized as a state under international law, it was not legally acknowledged as a separate state within West Germany. On October 28, 1969, German Chancellor Willy Brandt also stated, “Recognition of the GDR according to international law by the [West German] federal government cannot be considered. Even if two states exist in Germany, they are not foreign countries. Their relations with each other can only be of a special kind.“ This statement implies that the relationship between East and West Germany is a special interim relationship aimed at unification, and the spirit of ”One Germany“ was directly reflected in the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement signed on December 13, 1991. The preamble of the agreement states that North-South relations are recognized as "not being a relationship between states" but rather "a special interim relationship stemming from the process towards unification." Since unification under communism is not an option, this agreement can be seen as the first embodiment of the ”One Korea Policy“ aimed at free unification.
West Germany maintained the “One Germany” principle even in institutions and specific measures related to East Germany. West Germany rejected East Germany’s requests to establish an official embassy, arguing that East Germany was not a foreign country and, therefore, diplomatic relations could not be established. Instead, they opened a Permanent Mission in 1974, and the head of the mission was referred to as a “Permanent Representative” rather than an ambassador. The Federal Ministry of Intra-German Relations (the equivalent of South Korea’s Ministry of Unification), which was responsible for all relations with the East German government, and the Gesamtdeutsche Institut, which researched East-West German relations, continuously promoted and disseminated the necessity of unification both domestically and abroad. -
The “One Korea Policy” has its roots in UN General Assembly Resolution 112 (A/RES/112(II)A), adopted on November 14, 1947. To realize the freedom and independence of the Korean people, the United Nations recommended holding elections no later than March 31, 1948, to choose representatives proportional to the population across the entire Korean Peninsula. These representatives, constituting a National Assembly, would then establish a National Government of Korea. The South established the Syngman Rhee government in line with the UN’s recommendations, but the North refused, establishing the communist Kim Il Sung regime and solidifying the division. The ultimate goal of the “One Korea Policy” is to carry out elections proportionate to the population in North Korea in accordance with UN Resolution 112 so that it can be integrated with South Korea. While there may be some changes to the unification process along the way, the ultimate aim is to create a unified state where ordinary people in the South and the North can enjoy freedom, human rights, peace, and prosperity together.
When the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement was signed in the early 1990s, the “resolution by the concerned parties principle,” which stated that Korean Peninsula issues should be resolved between the two Koreas, was seen as a natural conclusion. However, as Korean Peninsula issues have become global issues due to North Korea's nuclear development, it would now be difficult to achieve peaceful unification without the agreement and cooperation of the international community, particularly Korea’s four major neighboring powers (the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan).
Among these, the United States has shown the most positive attitude toward the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Successive U.S. administrations have expressed support for Korean unification on various occasions, including at summit meetings. The most recent example is the Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea issued during a summit in April 2023. In the statement, the leaders of South Korea and the United States reaffirmed that, “The two Presidents are committed to build a better future for all Korean people and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.” The Chinese government, which opposes Taiwan’s independence and seeks unification with Taiwan, does not appear to oppose Korean unification in principle. That being said, the Chinese Communist Party likely prefers the status quo over a unification led by South Korea. Traditionally, Russia has acted mostly indifferent toward Korean unification, neither explicitly supporting nor opposing it. This is likely a reflection of Russia’s strategic position, which requires prioritizing Europe over the Far East region.
When it comes to Japan, which, despite the longstanding disputes over historical and territorial issues, has deep-rooted historical and cultural ties with South Korea, it is difficult to find cases where Japan has shown a positive stance on unification, even on a theoretical level. In this vein, the Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States from the Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David in August last year garnered significant attention from the Korean media. In the statement, the leaders of the three countries stated, “We express support for the goal of the ROK's Audacious Initiative and support a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace.” With this statement, Japan showed a more developed stance on unification than in the past, and this was praised as a sign of progress in trilateral relations.
However, looking at this from the perspective of the “One Korea Policy,” the U.S. and Japan need to expand on their current position as they failed to mention who the main actor should be or who should lead the unification process. There is no question that the Republic of Korea should be the main actor in the unification process, as unification under a communist dictatorship must be avoided, and the Kim Jong Un regime has no desire to pursue a free and peaceful unification. In line with this, any major statements on unification in the future should include a phrase such as, “We support a unified Korean Peninsula under the leadership of the Republic of Korea that is free and at peace.” This is more than a simple change in wording; it is a matter of whether the international community recognizes the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea as established by Article 3 of the Constitution. In other words, it is a question of whether the international community fully supports the “One Korea Policy.” Considering that the Ministry of Unification was initially founded as the “National Unification Board” in 1967, the Republic of Korea has been upholding the “One Korea Policy” for a long time.
A particular concern regarding South Korea leading the unification process is that Japan is likely to take a more cautious stance compared to the countries. At the Korea-Japan defense ministerial talks in October 2015 in Seoul, Japanese Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani (reappointed as Minister of Defense in the current Ishiba Cabinet) caused controversy by stating that, “South Korea’s sovereignty only applies south of the armistice line.“ This was in opposition to the argument of then-Minister of Defense Han Min-goo that ”since North Korea is considered part of South Korean territory under the Korean Constitution, Japan's Self-Defense Forces would need permission from the Korean government to enter North Korea in case of a contingency.” Japan’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula after the Korean War leans heavily toward “managing the North and South separately,” as shown by both the Mindan and Chongryon organizations being permitted to operate in Japan. The “One Korea Policy” effectively calls on Japan to completely transform its current Korean Peninsula policy approach. This will be diplomatically challenging for Japan, particularly as it seeks to strengthen Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation while also considering improving relations with North Korea. Whether Japan accepts the “One Korea Policy” is expected to be a key determinant of the future of Korea-Japan relations.
The unification of the Korean Peninsula is not a matter of possibility but of timing. Once the Korean Peninsula is unified, the international security order spanning Eurasia and the Pacific will be reshaped, centered on a unified Korea. Accordingly, the foreign relations of a unified Korea will be rebuilt based on which countries most strongly supported the “One Korea Policy” and backed unification throughout the entire process. Korea hopes that the U.S. and Japan, its traditional partners; China, with which it shares deep historical and cultural bonds; and Russia, which expects Korea to play a constructive role in the Far East, can all become true allies of a unified Korea.
| Impact of the “Two-State Declaration”: A Storm in a Teacup
1) Cheon, Seong-Hoon, “North Korea’s Future After Abandoning Unification and Independence (통일과 자주를 포기한 북한의 미래),” Sejong Focus, September 2, 2024.
2) “Kim Min-Seok Criticizes Im Jong-Seok: ‘Kim Dae-Jung Wouldn’t Have Supported Kim Jong Un’ (임종석 저격한 김민석 ‘DJ는 김정은에 동조 안 했을 것’).” Maeil Business Newspaper, September 23, 2024. Former Unification Ministers Chung Dong-young and Lim Dong-won, along with former National Intelligence Service Director Park Jie-won, also expressed critical views. Chosun Ilbo, September 21, 2024.
3) Rep. Lee Yeon-hee, former vice president of the Institute for Democracy, argued at the National Convention preparation committee meeting that, “We need to discuss the concept of one people, two states.” Segye Ilbo, July 12, 2024.
4) Former Minister of Unification Jeong Se-hyun stated, “Im’s remarks may be premature, but ultimately inter-Korean relations will likely move in that direction (two states).” Chosun Ilbo, September 21, 2024; Lee Jong-seok, “Let’s aim for unification while recognizing ‘two states’ and break the cycle of hostile interference.” Hankyoreh, September 27, 2024.
| Korea’s Response: The “One Korea Policy”
| West Germany’s “One Germany Policy”
| Unification Diplomacy Based on the “One Korea Policy”
※ The contents published on 'Sejong Focus' are personal opinions of the author and do not represent the official views of Sejong Institue
