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Analysis of North Korea's Test Launch of Missile with 4.5-Ton Super-Large Warhead |
| September 23, 2024
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Jo Jang-WonVisiting Research Fellow, Sejong Institute | jjo@sejong.org
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On September 19, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that "on September 18, the Missile General Bureau conducted a test launch of a ballistic missile equipped with a 4.5-ton super-large conventional warhead to verify its accuracy and explosive power at a range of 320 kilometers." In the report, Kim Jong-un stressed "the need to continue to bolster up the nuclear force and have the strongest military technical capability and overwhelming offensive capability in the field of conventional weapons too."
This was North Korea's second test of the 4.5-ton super-large warhead, following the first test on July 1. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) previously reported on July 1 that "two test launches of the 'Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5,' tipped with a 4.5-ton super-large warhead, were conducted, verifying flight stability and accuracy at a maximum range of 500 km and minimum range of 90 km." Since the July 1 launch was the first test of the 4.5-ton super-large warhead, the focus appeared to be on evaluating its maximum range, which could cover the entire Korean Peninsula, and its performance during a minimum-range launch with the minimum amount of fuel. Based on the results of the first launch, it appears that this second test has confirmed the enhanced flight performance and explosive power of the high-yield warhead and its targeting accuracy with a designated point of impact in the interior of the country.
At the same time, to neutralize South Korea's missile defense system, Kim Jong-un has been advocating for shifting from liquid-fuel missiles, which take longer to prepare and are easily detectable, to solid-fuel missiles that can be launched instantly, while also seeking to “diversify” North Korea's tactical nuclear strike delivery systems and its missile launch platforms. As seen from the recent launch of the super-large warhead, future tests will likely aim to 1) improve warhead yield against specific targets, 2) enhance missile operational capabilities, and 3) develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). As a result, North Korea watchers are paying close attention to future provocations. -
There are several variants of missiles that North Korea's refers to as "Hwasongpho-11." According to North Korean reports, the “Hwasongpho-11-Ga” is a ballistic missile with a maximum range of 800 km referred to by South Korea as KN-23, and also known as the “North Korean version of the Iskander.” The "Hwasongpho-11-Na" is a ballistic missile with a range of 400 to 500 km known as KN-24, or the "North Korean version of ATACMS." The "Hwasongpho-11-Da" is an improved version of the KN-23 (North Korean Iskander) with an increased range and ability to accommodate larger warheads. It appears that North Korea refers to the 2.5-ton warhead variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-2.5," and the 4.5-ton variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5.“
For this test launch of the super-large warhead, North Korea appears to have mounted a 4.5-ton warhead on a missile from the KN-23 series, increasing the warhead's payload but reducing its range to 320 km. Considering that the initial test launch of the Hwasongpho-Ga (KN-23) occurred in 2019, it is likely that improvements in solid-fuel technology over the past five years have contributed to North Korea’s ability to equip the missile with a super-large warhead.
The "Hwasongpho-11-Ra," on the other hand, is a close-range ballistic missile (CRBM), with a range of 110 km and capable of hitting targets between 100 and 300 km. This variant appears to be a cost-effective tactical missile meant for mass production. On August 4, North Korea held a ceremony to mark the transfer to a new tactical ballistic missile system, unveiling 250 missile launchers. It is estimated that each launcher can carry four Hwasongpho-11-Ra missiles.
Additionally, North Korea has been focusing on diversifying its strike delivery systems by developing missiles such as 600 mm super-large multiple rocket launchers (KN-25, range of approximately 400 km), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs, range of approximately 2,000 km), small SLBMs (range of approximately 600 km), and long-range cruise missiles like the "Hwasal-1" (range of over 1,500 km) and the "Hwasal-2" (range of over 2,000 km). -
North Korea has been attempting to develop various missile launch platforms to neutralize South Korea's missile defense system. South Korea's three-axis missile defense system –consisting of Kill Chain, Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD), and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) – aims to detect signs of missile launches using reconnaissance assets and strike before a missile is launched. To counter this, North Korea has been diversifying its launch platforms to avoid detection.
On September 15, 2021, North Korea launched two missiles from Yangdok, a region in the South Pyongan Province. In reference to the launch, KCNA reported that "a firing drill was conducted with the railway-borne missile regiment to confirm the practicality of the rail-based missile system for the first time, and to evaluate the combat readiness and ability of the newly organized regiment to execute firing missions as well as master its operational procedures in the event of war." Trains can be hidden in tunnels across North Korea and suddenly moved out of the tunnels to launch missiles, making this launch system difficult to detect.
Additionally, on September 25, 2022, North Korea announced that "a ballistic missile launch exercise simulating the deployment of a tactical nuclear warhead was conducted at an underwater reservoir launch site in the northwest of the country," further stating that "the ability to launch ballistic missiles from the underwater site was verified, and this exercise confirmed the direction for future construction of underwater launch sites."
There are estimated to be around 1,000 reservoirs across North Korea. Considering factors such as the depth of the reservoirs, potential water depletion during droughts, and proximity to North Korea's missile development and production facilities, it is believed that approximately 50 reservoirs are suitable for the construction of underwater missile launch sites. It is also likely that almost all tactical missiles, including the KN-23, can be launched from these reservoir sites.
Furthermore, on September 6, 2023, North Korea launched the "Hero Kim Kun Ok," a submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, from the Sinpo Shipyard in South Hamgyong Province. The "Hero Kim Kun Ok" is believed to be capable of launching both SLBMs and small SLBMs through its interchangeable launch tubes. -
To date, North Korea has focused on diversifying its nuclear delivery systems, in particular the "diversification of tactical solid-fuel missiles." This has included: 1) developing ballistic missiles tailored for different ranges, 2) developing "super-large multiple rocket launchers," which can be considered cost-effective "mini-ballistic missiles" with extended range capabilities, and 3) developing long-range cruise missiles.
However, the news of South Korea's development of the Hyunmoo-4 missile (range of 500 km and payload of approx. 5 tons) and the development of the so-called "monster missile," the Hyunmoo-5, which is expected to be deployed within a few years, appears to have shocked North Korea. The Hyunmoo-5, which is capable of carrying the “world's heaviest warhead,” is known to have a payload of nearly 9 tons.
The Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5, which North Korea test-fired twice - on July 1 and again on September 18 - is a missile from the KN-23 series and, as with other missiles of this type, is capable of low-altitude gliding flight. Unlike the typical free-fall trajectory of ballistic missiles, it is capable of gliding at low altitudes and performing pull-up maneuvers, making it harder for radar to detect and more difficult to intercept. Additionally, the explosive power of its warhead has been enhanced, improving its ability to penetrate underground. The missile tested on September 18 has a range of 320 km, but if the range was shortened to 150-200 km, which would be far enough to strike the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek from a launch point near the demilitarized zone (DMZ), it is estimated that the missile could carry a warhead of up to 8 tons. An 8-ton warhead can not only penetrate deeply underground, but if a single 8-ton cluster bomb were dropped, it is likely that most of the key facilities at the U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek would be damaged.
Thus, North Korea seems to believe that it has achieved some success in "diversifying" its strike capabilities and is now aiming to further enhance the destructive power of its warheads while improving the operational effectiveness of its missile systems.
Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of Russia's Security Council, visited Pyongyang on September 13. It was reported that during his meeting with Kim Jong-un, the two discussed follow-up measures to the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" signed at the North Korea-Russia summit in June, and exchanged a broad range of views on cooperation measures to safeguard mutual security interests between North Korea and Russia. It is likely that North Korea-Russia military cooperation will continue to strengthen in the future. North Korea, through its weapons support to Russia, has created an opportunity to significantly progress its weapons development systems. North Korea has made presumed advancements in 1) practical testing of the KN-23 missile series, 2) identifying causes of defective products and improving performance, and 3) enhancing quality control at missile production facilities.
While North Korea had previously focused on improving the performance of missiles through prototype production, it now seems to be facing the challenge of improving the "operational effectiveness of the overall missile launch system" through weapons exports for the Russia-Ukraine war. To ensure the continued smooth export of missiles to Russia, North Korea will need to improve 1) the reliability of missile flight and warhead performance, 2) the mobility of missile transporter erector launchers (TELs), and 3) the reliability of missile launch systems. -
With the upcoming U.S. presidential election and the prospect of a new U.S. administration, North Korea could be planning a series of missile provocations aimed at drawing attention to North Korean issues. These provocations may include: 1) the continued development of "super-large warheads" to show off/publicize the mounting of a super-large warhead and 2) MIRV tests aimed at showing the ability to strike multiple U.S. cities simultaneously. It should be noted, however, that even if North Korea conducts a MIRV test in the near future, it will likely be at a rudimentary level. Furthermore, North Korea is expected to conduct "virtual comprehensive tactical training for a nuclear counterattack" in various scenarios focusing on "mastering mission procedures for a tactical nuclear strike" in response to a potential U.S. nuclear attack.
Throughout this process, North Korea is expected to mobilize various propaganda outlets to display and threaten its "advanced nuclear and missile capabilities." In particular, it is expected to publicize that: (1) tactical nuclear weapons with miniaturized, lightweight warheads will be mounted on a variety of short-range missiles; (2) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will be equipped with super-large nuclear warheads; (3) tactical missiles equipped with nuclear warheads will utilize irregular flight patterns, pull-up maneuvers, hypersonic speeds, and submarine launches, making them difficult to intercept with the current air and missile defense systems of South Korea and the United States; and (4) in the event of a conflict, U.S. Navy carrier strike groups approaching the Korean Peninsula would be primary targets for tactical nuclear strikes.
In response, South Korea must strongly assert that North Korea's "threat tactics" will not play out as they intend and intensify efforts to enforce sanctions against North Korea to prevent the import of components and equipment necessary for missile development and expansion of its uranium enrichment facilities. At the same time, Korea should continue to reinforce the extended deterrence capabilities of the South Korea-U.S. alliance to exert pressure on North Korea. Additionally, it is essential to closely monitor the dynamics of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. South Korea must continue to raise the issue of North Korea's potential military support to Russia in international forums to prevent North Korea from potentially exporting tactical missiles armed with super-large warheads to Russia.
| North Korea's Test of Missile Tipped with 4.5-Ton Warhead
| 'Diversification' of Tactical Nuclear Strike Delivery Systems
| ‘Diversification’ of Missile Launch Platforms
| Future Developments: Advancing Warhead Yield and Other Warhead Technologies, Improving Operational Effectiveness
| Future Outlook and Korea's Response Strategy
