Requisite Condition of Successful Negotiation for
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula:
Comprehensive Settlement of the Subject, Method, Timeline,
and Corresponding Measures
No.2019-22 (2019.07.08)
Dr. Cheong Seong-Chang
Vice President of Research and Planning at Sejong Institute
For the ultimate achievement of final goal of “a complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula,” which was declared at the inter-Korean and the U.S.-DPRK summits held in 2018, the three nations need to make a comprehensive agreement about the subject, method, timeline, and corresponding measures for denuclearization process. Denuclearization of North Korea and actual progress in the improvement of the U.S.-DPRK relations will hardly be optimistic if such comprehensive agreement cannot be not reached at working-level meetings between the U.S, and DPRK in the near future.
Subjects of denuclearization can be considered as North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials, facilities, equipment, means to deliver nuclear weapons (missiles), scientists and engineers with nuclear technology, etc. Washington regards all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) of the North as the subject of denuclearization, but it is unclear whether North Korea will accept biochemical weapons as the subject of negotiation. Therefore, agreement about the subject of denuclearization between the U.S. and North Korea needs to be reached as a priority.
Regarding the subject of denuclearization, North Korea stated unilateral opinion that it solely considers the dismantlement of Yongbyon nuclear facility. It is known that Kim Yong-chol, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPKCC), had mentioned just the denuclearization of Yongbyon facility as if it is the only nuclear program that North Korea possesses when he visited Washington D.C. last January. From that point, the U.S. administration began to question North Korea’s willingness to put an effort for denuclearization after dismantling Yongbyon facility. Then during the process of working-level negotiations, Kim Hyok-chol, North Korea’s special representative for the U.S. affairs, also avoided to discuss about the concrete subject, level, and method of denuclearization by saying that only Chairman Kim Jong-un has the authority to mention about the denuclearization. And finally, Chairman Kim at the Hanoi Summit limited the subject of denuclearization to Yongbyon facility, making the U.S. and international community to start doubting the willingness of North Korea to denuclearize.
It is hard for now to anticipate how long it may take to decommission Yongbyon facility as a first step toward denuclearization. Thus, the suggestion of the North towards the U.S. that they would make additional agreements about denuclearization in the long run is not acceptable for the U.S., because it can be regarded as the strategy of North Korea to retain status as a nuclear power.
In addition, the U.S. will trust North Korea's willingness to denuclearization only when they reach a comprehensive agreement, which includes the dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The U.S. sees such weapons as a serious threat to its national security. Therefore, for the smooth progress of the U.S.-DPRK negotiations, all subjects of denuclearization should be laid out and discussed at upcoming working-level meetings.
Secondly, a general agreement for the method of denuclearization is needed in future summits and working-level talks. The problem of disabling nuclear weapons and long- and medium-range missiles and relocating nuclear scientists and technicians may be more complex than discarding Yongbyon nuclear facility. North Korea would favor dismantling weapons inside their territory. On the other hand, the U.S. may prefer its own method within its border. However, it will not be accepted unless the U.S. provides a considerable amount of compensation to the North. Thus, both countries should consider discarding nuclear weapons, materials and mid- and long-range missiles at the third country, such as China or Russia.
If North Korea is willing to “completely denuclearize,” it needs to make a consent with the U.S. on the timeline for the goal. The position of the North to first discuss Yongbyon facility and the others at latter negotiations brings a question to its willingness to denuclearize. If denuclearization process were to start from “dismantlement of Yongbyon nuclear facility + α,” an agreement on the due dates of each action will need to be made. Moreover, a concrete agreement should be reached between the two on how long it should take to complete the rest of the denuclearization steps.
In order to encourage North Korea to actively engage in denuclearization negotiations, the U.S. must also give North Korea assurance that the North will gain more than it will lose by giving up its nuclear weapons. To that end, the U.S. needs to present a list of sanctions that it will ease or lift as North Korea proceeds with denuclearization steps, such as dismantling nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, uranium enrichment facilities in other areas, ICBMs and nuclear warheads. If, however, the U.S. sticks to a hard-line and rigid stance demanding a complete denuclearization before lifting sanctions, it would be hard to expect the success in denuclearization negotiations. The U.S. should give the North expectations that easing or lifting sanctions can be achieved in quick pace if it expeditiously proceeds with several denuclearization steps in parallel. In other words, the U.S. and North Korea will have to share and coordinate their interests regarding denuclearization process.
To dispel concerns of the U.S. that the lifting of sanctions could lead to a situation in which the U.S. subsidizes North Korea's WMD development, North Korea should put all its denuclearization targets on the table, including nuclear weapons and missiles and as well as Yongbyon nuclear facility. North Korea should also present a detailed list of all corresponding measures they desire, including security assurance measures, normalization of relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, it is desirable for the North, the US, the South, and China to reach a comprehensive agreement on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, establishment of a peace regime and the easing of sanctions against the North within this year, and implement the agreements simultaneously in a parallel and phased manner. The U.S. may include a “snapback” clause to the agreement so that North Korea cannot suspend or reverse the denuclearization process. Then the North will not be able to unilaterally violate the agreement.
In order to realize a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it is urgent for the U.S. and South Korea to first reach an agreement on a large scale about the subject, method, timeline, and corresponding measures of denuclearization. The South Korean government making hasty agreement with North Korea on parts in which it failed to negotiate with the U.S., causing Pyongyang's distrust of Seoul for its noncompliance with inter-Korean agreements and the U.S.-ROK conflicts should not be repeated.
With three rounds of the U.S.-DPRK summits held, the South Korean government will have to make the most of the collective intelligence of domestic experts in the future to present creative solutions to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it is desirable for Korea-China, Korea-Japan and Korea-Russia to push for close strategic dialogues on the subject, method, timeline and corresponding measures of denuclearization of the North.
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